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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the evolution of the law regulating 
African marriages and divorce in Malawi. It offers a re­
view of the principal rules of customary law governing 
marriage and describes the introduction of relevant legis­
lative provisions by the colonial administration, including 
the provisions for the registration of customary marriages 
enacted by African authorities. Special attention is given 
to the position of African Christians and to the policies 
and attitudes of Christian missions as determinants of 
colonial legislative policy.
The analyses focus on the interaction of African custom, 
Christianity and secular statutory regulation of marriage and 
divorce. They highlight the impact on, and implications for, 
African society of the endeavours of the missions to Chris­
tianise African marriage and family life and of the reluctant 
efforts of the colonial administration to extend the applica­
tion of the marriage laws imported from the English legal 
system to the indigenous population. This also involves a 
review of African responses to relevant aspects of the colo­
nial experience.
Largely through the study of case material, the wider 
consequences on African traditional marriage law and prac­
tice of African participation in the social, political and 
economic possibilities of Western European culture are also 
detailed. Much of the effort here is devoted to the exami­
nation of the contribution of the courts to the development 
of customary law and its adaptation to the changing environ­
ment and modern conceptions of social justice.
PREFACE
The advent of European colonial rule in Africa contributed 
to radical changes in the lives of the indigenous people.
What have these changes meant in terms of African marriage 
laws and practices? The material presented in this study 
addresses this question with specific reference to the 
evolution of the laws governing African marriages in Malawi.
The existing laws of marriage in Malawi have not under­
gone any radical changes since the attainment of indepen­
dence in 1964. In the whole field of family law, the only 
major legislative changes have been those affecting the law 
of succession.^ Basically three different types of mar­
riage law operate side by side within one and the same 
legal system. Thus, there are three ways in which marriage
may validly be contracted in Malawi, namely, under custom-
o
ary law, under the Marriage Act, and in accordance with
the provisions of the Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Suc- 
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cession) Act. This last Act applies only to those who are 
described as "non-Christian Asiatics",^ whether domiciled 
in Malawi or not. Although the term "Asiatic" is nowhere 
defined, it is clear that the provisions of the Act do not 
apply to Africans. This study is concerned with the devel­
opment of only those marriage laws which are applicable to 
members of the indigenous African population. The "Asiatics 
Marriage Act" therefore falls outside the ambit of the study. 
Any references to the Act are intended only for purposes of 
completeness.
5There are basically two bodies of law under which Afri­
can marriages may be contracted, namely, customary law and 
the law under the Marriage Act, There are also District 
Council By-Laws^ which provide for the registration of cus­
tomary marriages. Customary marriages may also be regis­
tered in accordance with the provisions of the African 
Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Act.**
The study is divided into four parts. Part I, which 
is preceded by a general introductory survey of Malawi, 
consists of three chapters that offer a review of the prin­
cipal rules of customary law governing marriage. By far, 
the majority of African marriages in Malawi are contracted 
under customary law. The material examined in Part I is 
intended to contribute to a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the development of customary marriage 
law and the impact of European colonialism on African so­
ciety, in particular in terms of the transformation of 
African familial institutions. It is hoped that the rele­
vant analyses will show the significant extent to which 
the development of customary marriage law is rooted in the 
impact of colonial, capitalist economic systems on tradi­
tional African communities and in the intervention of colon­
ial judicial and administrative institutions in African 
family matters.
Unlike the second and third parts of the study, in 
which the basic material used is of a purely historical 
nature, the discussions in Part I rely principally on case 
material. Although the records consulted are mainly those
of the colonial period, post-colonial legal materials, es­
pecially the decisions of the National Traditional Appeal 
Court, have also been utilised extensively. It will be 
seen that generally, it is not essential to draw a very 
rigid distinction between the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. This is so because, firstly, the end of colonial 
rule did not result in the elimination of the institutional 
framework within which the customary law had been evolving 
during the colonial period. Secondly, while the attainment 
of independence ushered in a period of new and different 
political experiences for the African people, generally, it 
has led to the intensification and consolidation, rather 
than to a reversal or diminution, of the forces of social 
change initiated by European penetration. The same proces­
ses of social change continue to impinge upon the develop­
ment of customary law.
Part II contains two chapters which describe the his­
tory of the principal legislation on marriage. This is 
mainly the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and the Native Mar­
riage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923. The 
material presented highlights the issues and problems 
arising from the introduction of the "English system" of 
marriage law in /MalawiJ. The arguments, concerns and dif­
fering points of view of the principal protagonists in the 
history of colonial marriage legislation are surveyed. The 
basic issue in the whole of this history was the question 
regarding the application of the new system of marriage law 
to members of the indigenous African population. It will
be seen, however, that the focus of the controversies which 
ensued was not the whole problem of African marriages, but 
merely the problem of African Christian marriages. This 
underlines the limited scope of colonial legislative activ­
ities, the way in which the legislative agenda tended to be 
influenced merely by the interests of the missions.
At the same time, however, there is an extent to which 
the position of African Christians can be said to have been 
an inherently problematical one. In a society where the 
social division between the so-called "civilised" (mostly 
European) and "uncivilised" (mostly African) people tended 
to be a major element of life, the status of African Chris­
tians was somewhat ambivalent. It will be argued in this 
study that the debates leading to, and resulting from, the 
enactment of the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Regis­
tration Ordinance, 1923 - a unique piece of legislation in 
British colonial Africa - were in effect essentially about 
the social status of African Christians.
However, with the differences in doctrinal approach, 
mainly between the episcopal and the non-episcopal missions; 
with the rise of African nationalism, which manifested it­
self in political as well as religious forms; with the 
advent of "indirect rule", under which there was an apparent 
shift in colonial administrative policy in favour of African 
traditional authority and social institutions - the question 
of African Christian marriage became more tangled. In Part 
III of the study, an attempt is made to decipher the various 
strands of opinion, to delineate a whole range of attitudes
and viewpoints, on the question of the interactions of 
Christianity, African custom and secular statutory regula­
tion of marriage. There are three chapters in Part III.
The first chapter traces the history of Native Authority 
legislation dealing with the registration of customary 
marriages, the second looks at the question of monogamy and 
the third reviews the problem of divorce. It is in rela­
tion to these three subjects that most of the marriage-law 
policy issues are examined in detail.
Part IV concludes the study by identifying the main 
elements and themes in the evolution of African marriage 
law. Current problems of marriage law and the question of 
reform receive consideration at the end of this part of 
the thesis, which consists of one chapter.
The research for this study was conducted between 1982 
and 1983. It mainly involved the examination of archival 
sources at the Public Record Office in London and at the 
National Archives of Malawi in Zomba. Thus, the bulk of 
the material presented in this thesis is derived from the 
primary sources contained in government and missionary 
files. Most of the files consulted date before the end of 
World War II. At the National Archives in Zomba, it was 
also possible to consult more recent files, especially 
those containing court records. (All the relevant archival 
sources are described in full in the Bibliography.) The 
libraries at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, and the Foreign
9and Commonwealth Office, in London, and the library at 
Chancellor College in Zomba, also yielded much useful ma­
terial. Although much of the time of the "field work" in 
Malawi in 1983 was devoted to the research at the National 
Archives, it was also possible to visit a number of insti­
tutions, including courts and government departments, and 
to hold informal "interviews" with judicial, government 
and religious officials.
So far very little has been written on the laws of 
marriage in Malawi. Indeed, the whole legal history of 
Malawi remains largely uncharted. Thus, Dr B.P. Wanda's 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Colonialism, Nationalism and 
Tradition : The Evolution and Development of the Legal Sys­
tem of Malawi (1979)^ may be regarded as a pioneering work 
in the field. Dr Wanda's thesis includes a large section 
(Vol.6) which deals with the evolution of the law of mar­
riage. Needless to say, the work does not address most of 
the central issues involved in the development of the law, 
but is concerned merely with aspects of the broader theme 
of the evolution of the legal system in general. The re­
cently published study by Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and 
Social Order : The Colonial Experience of Malawi and 
Zambia (1985) is really the only known systematic account 
of the development of customary law in Malawi during the 
colonial period. Chanock's work also deals with the law 
of Zambia. It is unfortunate that the book became avail­
able only after much of this thesis had already been writ­
ten. Thus the only substantial reference to some of the
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central themes of Chanock's study appear in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis. Dr H.F. Morris' article, "The 
Development of Statutory Marriage Law in 20th Century Bri-
Q
tish Colonial Africa", (1979), also contains a useful sec­
tion on the development of the statutory marriage law of 
Malawi. Mention should also be made of J.O. Ibik's 
Restatement of African Law (The Law of Marriage and Divorce) 
Vol.3 (1970). Although the Restatement has not had the same 
success as similar Restatements in some of the African 
countries, for example, E. Cotran's Restatement of the cus- 
tomary law of marriage in Kenya, it is still the only work 
in which an attempt has been made to describe all the rules 
of customary marriage law in Malawi. The Restatement pur­
ports to describe the law as it is - it does not make any
attempt to explain the context in which particular rules 
have developed. It is indeed a major weakness of the 
Restatement that it fails to convey the fact that customary
law is a living process. In fact, it is strange that,
throughout his account of customary law, Ibik makes no 
reference to the decisions of the courts. For a law that 
has been developed almost entirely by the courts, this is 
a serious omission.
Most of the secondary sources used in this study are 
either anthropological accounts or studies on the general 
history of Malawi. There are also a number of useful works 
on African law and marriage in general. The Survey of 
African Marriage and Family Life (1953), edited by Arthur 
Phillips, deserves specific mention.
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NOTES
PREFACE
1. See The Wills and Inheritance Act (cap. 10:02), 
enacted in 1967.
2. Cap. 25:1. The Act was first enacted as the British 
Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, no. 3 of 1902. It was re­
named the Marriage Act in 1964. See Chap. 5.
3. Cap. 25:03. The Act was first enacted as the Nyasa- 
land Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Ordinance, 
no. 13 of 1929. It was re-named in 1964.
4. Section 2(1).
5. These were first introduced as Native Authority 
Rules in the 1930's and 1940's.
6. Cap. 25:02. The Act was first enacted as the Nyasa- 
land Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance, no. 7 of 1923. This Ordinance had replaced the Nyasa- 
land Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, no. 15 of 1912 
(repealed by no. 4 of 1923).
7. London : 1979, (see esp. Vol.6).
8. Vol.23 J.A.L.(1979), p. 37. See also Simon Roberts, 
The Growth of an Integrated Legal System in Malawi : A 
Study in Racial Distinctions in the Law, Ph.D. Thesis, Uni­
versity of London, 1967.
9. Restatement of African Law : Kenya I : The Law of 
Marriage and Divorce (London : Sweet and Maxwell, 1968).
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Note on Malawi Cases
The more numerous decisions of the lower courts cannot con­
veniently be included in this Table. In the following 
study, most of these cases are cited by number only.
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CHAPTER ONE 
MALAWI : AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
It is useful to offer a brief historical survey of Malawi, its 
people and institutions in general. The survey is not intend­
ed as a primer of the history of Malawi. It merely presents 
basic background information relevant to the issues raised and 
examined in the study. The general history of the country has 
fortunately been a subject of many published works readily 
available to the interested reader.^
Malawi was formerly a British Protectorate (British Cen­
tral Africa 1891-1907; Nyasaland 1907-1964). Landlocked, 
Malawi is located in southeastern Africa. Its boundaries, 
like those of many other African countries, are a product of 
the "scramble for Africa" conducted by the powers of Europe 
in the last part of the nineteenth century. The country's 
longest border is with Mozambique, once known as Portuguese 
East Africa, on the east and south. On the north, Malawi is 
bounded by mainland Tanzania, formerly known as Tanganyika. 
Tanganyika had been under German colonial rule from 1890 
until the end of World War I when Britain took over the admin­
istration of the country, first under the League of Nations 
Mandate and then under the United Nations Trusteeship. On the 
northwest, Malawi is bounded by Zambia. Northern Rhodesia, as 
Zambia was previously called, fell under British rule as an 
extension of the politico-commercial hegemony of the British 
South Africa Company - a chartered company formed by the 
English statesman, entrepreneur, and colonialist, Cecil John 
Rhodes (1853-1902).
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Between 1953 and 1963, Nyasaland (as Malawi was then 
called) and Northern Rhodesia were two of three partners - 
the other being Southern Rhodesia, now the Republic of Zimbab­
we - in the Central Africa Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa­
land, Nyasaland achieved independence as Malawi in July,
1964. The country became a republic in July, 1966. Malawi 
is currently a member of the Commonwealth, the United Nations, 
the Organisation of African Unity, and the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).
1. The African People of Malawi
Malawi is a densely populated country. With a total area
of only 118,484 square kilometers, a fifth of which is covered
by inland water, its population is well in excess of 6 million
people. The ethnic complexion of Malawi may be drawn from the
census results of 1977 which showed a total population of
5,547,460. Of this figure, 5,532,298 were Africans; 6,377
2
Europeans; 5,682 Asians; and 3,103 other groups. These 
figures underline what has always been true about the ethnic 
composition of the country since the advent of colonial rule, 
namely that non-Africans have formed only a small fraction of 
the population. Europeans and Asians have over the years al­
ternated as the largest minority group.
The earliest inhabitants of the region comprising present 
day Malawi were a negroid, and perhaps even a pygmoid, people 
who lived by hunting and food-gathering. These people were 
either absorbed, displaced or eliminated by the Bantu people 
who have been in occupation of the area since about the
3
twelfth century A.D.
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For the sake of convenience, the Bantu people who now 
live in Malawi may be divided between those who were already 
settled in the country by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and those who moved in later. (Map No. 1 indicates 
the general distribution of the various communities in 
Malawi.)
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the larger 
part of the Malawi region was occupied by groups of people 
who shared a common language, culture and clan organisation. 
These people were agriculturalists and lived in scattered 
village settlements. They followed a matrilineal system of 
social structure and spoke what is now commonly known as 
chiChewa. The term Chewa, however, more specifically de­
scribes only one, albeit numerically superior, group of the 
relevant people. The other groups were known as the Nyanja, 
Mang'anja, Chipeta, Nsenga, Chikunda, Mbo, Ntumba and Zimba. 
Broadly, those people who occupied the central part (Central 
Region) of Malawi came to be identified as the Chewa and 
those in the southern part (Southern Region) as the Nyanja 
and Mang'anja.
All the above groups had started as one body of people 
known as the Maravi or Marave. During the sixteenth century, 
the Maravi people had constituted a centralised, clan-based, 
state or empire under a ruler named Karonga or Kalonga (a 
name retained as the title of his successors). The empire 
extended well beyond the present borders of Malawi and cov­
ered portions of present-day eastern Zambia and western 
Mozambique. By the beginning of the seventeenth century,
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however, the empire had started to disintegrate, creating nu­
merous loosely organised chiefdoms. The present name of the 
country, Malawi, was chosen to commemorate the old Maravi 
empire.
The Tumbuka and Tonga^ were the immediate northern neigh­
bours of the Maravi people on the west side of Lake Malawi.
Each of these two groups was an amalgamation of different smal­
ler groups of peoples with clans which had quite different 
historical origins, traditions and types of organisations.
Both groups included patrilineal peoples with their origins 
somewhere around present western Tanzania and matrilineal 
peoples with Chewa or Maravi origins. However, the people in 
each of these groups developed a strong sense of shared iden­
tity. The Tonga, and even more so the Tumbuka, evolved 
languages which were clearly distinct from chiChewa or chi- 
Nyanja. Like their southern Chewa neighbours, the Tumbuka 
and Tonga people lacked large-scale centralised authorities. 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, a group of Bantu 
traders widely known as Balowoka had entrenched themselves 
among the Tumbuka and, largely through shrewd diplomacy as 
opposed to military conquest, managed to establish a loose 
confederation - the so-called Chikulamayembe dynasty or em­
pire. However, this dynasty had been designed mainly to fa­
cilitate trade in ivory rather than to bring about any far- 
reaching changes in Tumbuka political organisation.^
To the north of the Tumbuka and Tonga were the settle­
ments of the Ngonde-Nyakyusa and Lambya peoples. These groups 
were cattle owners and cultivators. They were clearly
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distinguished from their Tumbuka, Tonga and Maravi southern 
neighbours. They were patrilocal and traced descent through 
the male line. The Ngonde had a highly centralised govern­
ment under the powerful Kyungu dynasty. The Lambya on the 
other hand were organised into small chiefdoms. The Ngonde 
and Lambya groups had originated from the same area around 
western Tanzania. There is doubt whether the Ngonde people 
were ever extensively involved in the ivory trade which had 
absorbed the Chikulamayembe dynasty.^ However, they are re­
puted to have achieved a level of material well-being and 
social development well above that of most groups in this 
part of Africa.^
Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
area of the present Northern Region of Malawi had been set­
tled by the Lambya, Ngonde-Nyakyusa, Tonga and Tumbuka groups; 
the Central Region by the Chewa; and the Southern Region by 
the Nyanja and Mang'anja peoples. According to existing his­
torical accounts, until the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, relative peace and stability had reigned among the 
predominantly agricultural people settled in the region of 
Malawi. However, this state of affairs was shortly followed 
by a period of disruption and much upheaval which resulted 
from the intrusion of new groups of Bantu people and from the
Q
intensification of the trade in slaves.
Mainly, four further groups of Bantu people arrived in 
the Malawi region during the nineteenth century - the Ngoni, 
the Yao, the Lomwe and the Sena. It was the arrival of the 
Ngoni and the Yao that was to spark-off the social and
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political havoc which was to characterise the remainder of 
the nineteenth century and even the start of the twentieth.
The Ngoni people, just preceding the Yao, began to set 
up permanent settlements in Malawi from the mid-nineteenth 
century. The Ngoni of Malawi represent splinter groups of 
one of various groups of Nguni people who fled from the area 
of northern Natal (South Africa) around 1820 in the wake of 
the rising power of the Zulu kingdom of Tchaka. The parti­
cular group of Nguni people who finally settled in Malawi 
were led out of Natal by Zwangendaba Jere. They travelled 
north-eastwards. From the start, their odyssey was charac­
terised by the "continual absorption of conquered people .•. 
counterbalanced by a recurring fractionalization". Even 
before crossing the Zambezi in 1835 and 1836, two groups had 
emerged - the original group led by Zwangendaba and a breaka­
way group led by Ngwane Maseko.
After the death of Zwangendaba around 1845, his group 
split into five factions which scattered in four directions. 
Two of the factions travelled to locations in what are at 
present Tanzania and Mozambique, one entered the Malawi area, 
and the remaining two headed for the Luangwa valley in pre­
sent Zambia.
The faction which had entered the Malawi region was 
further split into two main groups. One group finally set­
tled among the Tumbuka people in what is now Mzimba District 
(the Northern or M'Mbelwa Ngoni); the other, after even fur­
ther fission, settled among the Chewa people in present Dowa
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and Ntchisi Districts (presently known as the Central Ngoni). 
Of the two groups which had gone to the area of Zambia, one 
(led by Mpherembe) later came and joined the M'Mbelwa Ngoni. 
The group that remained in Zambia was led by Mpezeni (the 
Mpezeni Ngoni). Two offshoots of the Mpezeni Ngoni later 
settled among the Chewa of Malawi in present Mchinji District 
(also presently known as the Central Ngoni).
The Ngoni of Maseko (after sojourns in various places 
including locations in present Malawi, Tanzania and Mozam­
bique) finally settled among the Chewa people in present Dedza 
and Ncheu Districts (the Central Ngoni).
The first wave of permanent Ngoni settlers had entered 
the Malawi region about 1857, the last wave entered right at 
the close of the nineteenth century. In the course of the 
long journey from Natal, the Ngoni ranks swelled with peoples 
of different groups and cultures. The original Nguni group 
included people of Ntungwa, Swazi and Sutu clans; by the time 
the Ngoni crossed the Zambezi, Karanga clans had been assimi­
lated as well. By the time they finally settled in Malawi, 
the Tumbuka, the Senga, the Chewa and various other groups had 
been absorbed into Ngoni political structures.
The Ngoni were a pastoral people whose way of life was 
dominated by war. The organisation of Ngoni society and its 
moral code were geared towards martial ends. They had highly 
centralised monarchical governments with a system of age regi­
ments, into which all males of fighting age were incorporated. 
Their livelihood depended on frequent raids on others for
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supplies of grain and cattle. The Ngoni had little notion of 
trade. The maintenance of large armies also depended on these 
raids. Captives were not sold into slavery, but incorporated 
into Ngoni society and military machinery. Many successful 
Ngoni military leaders were of non-Ngoni origin, people who 
had once suffered defeat at the hands of the Ngon i . ^  The 
Ngoni entry heralded havoc in the Malawi region. The Tumbuka 
were subjugated; the Tonga remained under perpetual siege 
until the advent of European colonial rule; so too did many 
of the Chewa groups in Central Malawi. Only the Ngonde and 
Lambya groups further north and some Nyanja and Mang'anja 
groups further south really avoided the devastation of Ngoni 
terrorism.
Wherever the Ngoni settled, their culture did not domi­
nate to the same degree as their political and military pre­
sence. The Ngoni who had come to settle in the Malawi region 
were a patrilineal people and many of their ranks spoke a 
Zulu-related language. Before long, however, local tongues 
replaced Zulu; and in most places, Ngoni social customs were 
overwhelmed by those of the host people. The Northern Ngoni 
were a partial exception; although Tumbuka replaced Zulu as 
the common language, the salient features of Ngoni social 
custom were maintained, and to some extent even adopted by 
the host people.
Groups of Yao people entered the Malawi area for perma­
nent settlement between the sixth and seventh decades of the 
nineteenth century. Previously, the Yao had occupied a large 
area on the southeast of present-day Malawi, in what is today
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Mozambique. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
there were about ten different groups of Yao people in the 
Mozambique area; of these, only four have settled in Malawi. 
Some groups remained in Mozambique while others settled in 
what is today Tanzania. The Yao are a kindred group to the 
Makua and Makonde people. Primarily, the Yao were an agri­
culturalist people. Some of their groups were renowned 
artisans. It was their trading activities, however, which 
earned the Yao fame, fortune, influence and eventually, 
notoriety.
Before they actually settled in the area, the Yao had 
long been trading with the people of the Malawi region. The 
Yao brought into the interior guns, gun-powder, cloth, beads 
and various ornaments which they exchanged for ivory, tobacco, 
copper, iron and even domestic slaves. At the coast, their 
main clients were the Arabs; at times they also traded with 
Indian, French and Portuguese merchants; although with the 
Portuguese, the Yao usually worked in competition.
Yao settlements in Malawi were established in the 1860's 
and 70's mainly in the southern part of the country, with 
concentrations in present Mangoche, Machinga, Zomba and Blan- 
tyre Districts. From their new settlements, the Yao main­
tained their trading activities. By then, tragically, the 
small-scale, and perhaps relatively benign, trade in domestic 
slaves had degenerated into a wicked mass-traffic in human 
lives. The coastal demand for slaves had increased and lead­
ing Yao traders began to concentrate on slave raiding. Peace­
ful trade relations were disrupted and the whole of the
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Southern Region was engulfed in internecine conflict as 
thousands of men, women and children were dragged into slav­
ery or, more usually, ignominious death on their way to the 
coast. The devastation was not confined to the Maravi people; 
weak Yao groups as well fell victim to the greed of their 
fellow Yao. Equipped with firearms, and backed by sophisti­
cated and ruthless clients, principal Yao slavers like Mponda, 
Makanjira, Makandanji, Zarafi and Kawinga became very powerful. 
The old competition with Portuguese traders took on a new and 
sinister aspect in the southern part of the Malawi area.**
Like the Chewa, the Yao were matrilineal and matrilocal. 
Their political organisation was more decentralised than even 
that of the Chewa or Nyanja. They lived in small, loosely 
amalgamated groups of kin. These groups were fissiparous and 
rarely grew into large political units. ChiYao, the language 
of the Yao people, did not suffer the same fate as Ngoni.
Even today, chiYao is widely spoken by Yao people. A further 
important point about the Yao is that many of them adopted 
Islam as their religion. This, however, is not attributed 
simply to the early Yao contacts with the coastal people. 
Large-scale conversions to Islam were a relatively late phen­
omena which was apparently indirectly facilitated by the es-
12tablishment of the colonial order. Prior to the 1890's
neither the Arabs nor the few Yaos converted to Islam would
seem to have had the "time or need to pursue an active Islamic
13conversion programme". Only after the defeat of the slave
traders, when relative peace and freedom of movement had been
established by the British administration, did effective Muslim
14proselytism really begin.
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The Lomwe were the last group of Bantu people to enter 
and settle in the Malawi region. They are the only group 
whose main body settled in the country after the establish­
ment of colonial rule. Small groups of Lomwe people had 
been in the area at an earlier period, but these had tended 
to be mixed with such other groups as the Yao and the Nyanja 
or Mang'anja and had thus never established a distinct pre­
sence. Such absorption must have been all too easy as the 
Lomwe shared the basic cultural patterns of the Yao and 
Nyanja people occupying the area. Indeed, the Lomwe and the 
Yao were kindred groups who had originated from the same 
region in what is today Mozambique. The arrival of the main 
body of Lomwe people for permanent settlement in Malawi is 
put at about 1899.^ Lomwe groups continued coming in for 
the next two decades.
The Lomwe fled their original homeland in Mozambique be­
cause of the atrocities of the Portuguese feudal administra­
tion in the prazos and also because of famine. In British 
Central Africa, they became the chief source of cheap labour 
in the growing European-settler industry. Then commonly and 
misleadingly known as Anguru, the Lomwe became victims of 
much negative stereotyping from their European and African 
hosts. They also bore the brunt of the exploitation of Afri­
can labour on European estates under the infamous Thangata 
system - a thinly-disguised form of forced labour.^ Their 
inner resilience and progressive instincts, however, soon 
earned the Lomwe greater recognition and respect. Their main 
settlements were over what is today Mulanje District, among
the Nyanja and Mang'anja people.
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Little has been written about the Sena people who also 
migrated from Mozambique in the 1880's. They settled over 
the southern tip of the Malawi region, among the Mang'anja 
groups. Sena culture bears close similarities to the cul­
tures of the people of northern Malawi. Unlike other major 
groups of the south, the Sena are a patrilineal people who 
trace descent through the male line. The Sena constitute 
the greater part of the population in present Chikwawa and 
Nsanje Districts.^
2. The Swahili-Arab Penetration
The people living in the Malawi region had been in con­
tact with the outside world long before the arrival of Bri­
tish pioneers. Early British arrivals were not, as they
often assumed, "entering a largely closed society with little
18concept of the outside world". Of the various influences 
already operative in the area, the Swahili-Arab penetration 
calls for specific mention.
Arab and Persian settlements on the east coast of Africa
just north of the Ruvuma river date as far back as around 975
A.D., that is, long before any manifestation of Portuguese
19interest in the area. At first Malindi, then Mombasa, then 
Kilwa-Kisiwani, and finally Zanzibar, successively became 
headquarters of Arab traders. Here, as Pachai put it
...the Persians and Arabs traded and intermingled with 
Africans, marrying African women and influencing 
African culture in the development of a new language, 
kiSwahili, as well as in dress and religion. When the 
Portuguese came to Sena and Tete in 1531, they found 
eastern trading communities and settlements already ex­
isting in these places. A number of kiSwahili words 
were already part of the local African language.20
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The main items of trade sought by the Arabs were ivory and 
slaves. There was also a demand for timber, tortoisesheH, 
leopard skins and gold.
Eventually, splinter groups of "Arabs" - mostly people 
of mixed Arab-African blood and Swahili or Arabised Africans - 
established settlements further in the interior. In the 
Malawi area, there were mainly two such settlements, one at 
Nkhota Kota and another at Karonga, on the western shores of 
Lake Malawi. A party of Zanzibaris led by Jumbe Salim bin 
Abdallah established a permanent settlement at Nkhota Kota 
in 1840. Through diplomatic tact, military alliances with 
local chiefs, trade and slave raiding, a succession of Jumbes 
consolidated their position at Nkhota Kota. They became in­
fluential in local politics. Their wealth - much of it 
reckoned in slaves and ivory^the possession of firearms, and 
the fact that they also acted as representatives (walis) of 
the Sultan of Zanzibar, earned the Jumbes power and prestige. 
They became a major obstacle in the way of the British coloni­
al enterprise in the area. The last (fourth) of the Jumbes 
was charged with murder by the British and deported to Zanzi­
bar in 1894; and in 1895, a British agent took over the gov-
21ernment of Nkhota Kota. Mlozi, the leader of Swahili Arabs 
who had settled among the Ngonde in Karonga, had an even less 
fortunate end. From about 1887, Mlozi and his allies had 
brought the Karonga area into turmoil with their slave raids. 
Mlozi's attempts to consolidate his influence in the area had 
been met with fierce resistance, first by the local Ngonde, 
then the African Lakes Corporation - a British company which
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had established a branch in Karonga in 1884, and eventually
the British administration. In 1895, Sikh and African troops
led by a British captain moved against Mlozi. After his cap-
22ture he was tried by Ngonde chiefs and hanged.
The Arabs who had settled in the Malawi area were not 
missionaries; they had come to trade and not to convert, or 
to establish new values among, the local populations. In 
general, the local people continued to be governed by their 
traditional rulers and to adhere to traditional customs.
The Arabs made no attempt to substitute Islamic law for local 
African laws. The Malawi Islamic tradition is traceable not 
only to the few Arabs who had settled in the country, but to 
the overall Arab presence along the east coast of Africa.
At the same time, the spread of Islam in the area owes less 
to Arab proselytism than to the enthusiasm of a few local 
African teachers. In the words of Robert Greenstein:
The spread of Islam in Nyasaland cannot ... be fully at­
tributed to outsiders from the East African coast. Most 
Muslim communities generally agree that the two men re­
sponsible for the success of Islam were Shaykh Abdalla 
bin Haji Mkwanda of Kachulu (Bibi Kulunda's area) and 
his pupil, Shaykh Sabiti bin Muhammad Ngainje of Mpoche 
village, Mtengula, Portuguese East Africa. Both men 
trained numerous waalimu, and the latter supervised reli 
gious instruction and the erection of mosques in the 
areas of Chowe, Jalasi, Kawinga, Zomba, Chiradzulu, and 
Mlanje. The proselytism focused on the Yao and lake­
side Cewa and was so successful that by 1921 some 73,015 
claimed to be Muslims.23
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the spread of Islam in 
Malawi mainly took place after Christian missions had become 
well established in the country. There might well have been 
a connection between the spread of Islam and African reaction 
to Christian, European, presence.
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Arab activities had no doubt contributed to the opening- 
up of Malawi and surrounding areas to the wider world. The 
coastal culture which the people of the interior had come in 
contact with could be traced further afield to Arabia, Persia, 
and even India. In reality, it was not only the Eastern 
world which had been opened to the peoples of Malawi by con­
tacts with the Arabs. At Zanzibar, there had been extensive 
contacts between the Arabs and the Western world. By mid­
nineteenth century, Zanzibar Could boast American, British 
and French consulates. Through their involvement with the 
Arabs, the inhabitants of the Malawi area were also beginning
to acquire some ideas about people of the Western worl<^ who
24would come to dominate their lives.
3. European Missionary Enterprise
Hardly had such groups of people as the Ngoni, Yao and 
Arabs settled down in Malawi than another force, the mission­
ary enterprise, appeared on the scene. As an instrument of 
change, the arrival of the missions was to exceed any other 
previous event in its impact on the people of Malawi. Whether 
consciously or unconsciously, there can be no doubt that the 
missions paved the way for British colonial rule with all its 
consequences and implications. In short, without the missions 
there could be no Malawi as we know it today.
Christian missionary settlement in the Malawi region was 
inspired by the legendary Scottish explorer, Dr. David Living­
stone (1813-73). Although preceded by the Portuguese, Living­
stone was the first European to visit what is now Malawi with 
the firm intention of bringing the area to the attention of
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the Western powers and who actually succeeded in doing so.
Between 1859 and the time of his death in 1873, he visited
the area twice and pursued a tireless campaign, urging the
people of his country to open up this part of Africa for
25Christianity and lawful commerce.
The first response to Livingstone's plea came within his 
lifetime with the launching of the Universities Mission to 
Central Africa (UMCA), mainly by the Universities of Cambridge 
and Oxford. In 1861, the UMCA set up a station at Magomero, 
between Zomba and Blantyre. This place proved inhospitable 
and the station was moved to Zanzibar. The mission returned 
permanently to the area of present-day Malawi in 1885, when 
it set up a station at the island of Likoma on Lake Nyasa 
(Malawi). From here the mission expanded.
Meanwhile, other missions had arrived in the area. After 
the death of Dr. Livingstone, the Free Church of Scotland and 
the Established Church of Scotland set up missions to honour 
Livingstone's pleas and commemorate his achievements. The 
mission of the Free Church of Scotland was Christened the
Livingstonia Mission, after Livingstone, and began its opera-
26
tions in the country in 1875. The Overtoun Institution, 
which was founded in 1894 at Khondowe, northern Malawi, is 
mainly responsible for the immense fame of the Livingstonia 
Mission. This institution became a nucleus of higher learning 
for Africans in Malawi and neighbouring regions. The Estab­
lished Church of Scotland named its mission in Malawi after 
Livingstone's place of birth in Scotland, Blantyre. The 
Blantyre Mission was opened in 1875 in the present Blantyre
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District. In 1909, the Blantyre Mission established the Henry 
Henderson Institute, the equivalent of the Overtoun Institu­
tion.
Non-Anglican and non-Scottish missions also established 
themselves in the country. The Dutch Reformed Church Mission 
arrived in 1859 and established stations in central Malawi.
The Dutch Reformed Church had an organisational structure 
based on elders, similar to that of the Scottish missions.
In 1924, the Presbyteries of the Livingstonia and Blantyre 
Missions were merged to form the Church of Central Africa, 
Presbyterian (CCAP). Two years later, the Dutch Reformed 
Church (the Nkhoma Presbytery) was also admitted to the CCAP.
The year 1892 saw the arrival of Joseph Booth, the most 
controversial of European missionaries. Booth engineered the 
establishment of the Zambezi Industrial Mission, the Nyasa 
Industrial Mission, and the Seventh Day Adventist Mission.
It was by Joseph Booth that John Chilembwe - the leader of 
a 1915 African uprising against European rule and founder of 
the Provident Industrial Mission - was initially inspired to 
work, and even die, for the advancement of the African people.
The Montfort Marist Fathers and the White Fathers estab­
lished Catholic missions in the country in 1901 and 1902 res­
pectively. Although the Catholics were late in coming, they
soon outstripped the earlier arrivals in the size of member-
27ship, although not in overall influence. The arrival of 
the South African General Mission, whose operations were con­
centrated mainly in Northwestern Rhodesia, completed the
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roster of missionary bodies which had been established in the 
country before World War I.
Spreading the Christian gospel was one of the basic aims 
of the missions. In their churches and tours of African vil­
lages, the missionaries were urging Africans to abandon tradi­
tional religious practices "and to accept the truths of the
28gospel as a complete code of conduct". The missions, of 
course, did not speak with one voice, for each denomination 
strove to stamp its own version of Christianity upon the local 
scene.
The advancement of literacy among Africans was another 
basic aim of the missions. As mission stations and churches 
proliferated, so too did mission schools. The missionary 
contribution to African education during the colonial era can­
not be overestimated. From small open space gatherings to 
such complex institutions as the Overtoun, mission schools 
drew thousands of Africans into the orbit of Western culture.
It may be noted in passing that although the colonial 
administration was an early beneficiary of missionary endea­
vours in the field of education - in the sense that many 
mission-educated Africans were utilised by the administra­
tion (mostly as messengers, clerks, artisans and interpre­
ters)^. the colonial government was slow in assuming an active 
role in the promotion of African education. It was only in 
1926 that a government-organised education system was intro­
duced. Even thereafter, the Government shouldered only about
2910% of the total cost of education.
Mission education programmes varied markedly in content 
and emphasis, reflecting major cleavages in the thinking of 
the missions as to the desired impact of Western influence 
on the African populations. For example, there were some 
missions which advocated the type of education which merely 
made Africans better Christians and better subjects without 
radically altering their social, political and economic en­
vironment. Catholic and Anglican bodies, in particular, were
30closely identified with this type of approach, which earned
the missions much praise from government officials in the
31wake of the Chilembwe rising in 1915. On the other hand, 
there were those, most notably the Scottish, missions whose 
aims were to bring about an economic and social revolution 
among Africans. In the rather apt and paraphrased imagery of 
one of the founding fathers of the Livingstonia Mission, the
desire of the latter missions was "to create a purified
32Chicago in Central Africa". The very composition of the
first party of the Livingstonia Mission testified to the 
"industrial" intent of the mission. Only one member, Dr. 
Robert Laws, was an ordained minister. The rest were five 
artisans : a sailor, an engineer, a gardener, a blacksmith
and a carpenter. The party was initially headed by a warrant
33officer of the Royal Navy. Even Dr. Laws (who soon assumed
the leadership of the mission and who was to stay in the coun­
try for fifty-two years) was not just a clergyman, but was 
also a qualified medical doctor whose other interests included 
meteorology and linguistics.
The ways in which the missions fostered the process of 
Westernisation in the country were by no means confined to
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direct teaching and preaching. As stated by Rotberg:
...the missionary contribution was also evident in in­
numerable other ways. His tours of the villages and 
an entrepreneurial role that has generally been under­
estimated played a large part in opening up the coun­
try to Western influence. The missionary was a trader; 
he stimulated African desires for Western products and 
supplied those wants by a complicated transport, sales, 
and service network. The missionary was compelled to 
protect his trade routes and to preserve order on the 
stations. He therefore became a lawgiver, a policeman, 
a prosecuting attorney, and a judge....The missionary, 
whether trained or untrained, was also called upon to 
heal the sick and comfort the dying. In general, mis­
sionary assistance gradually drew Africans into the 
Western orbit.34
Missionary presence in the Malawi area was a major con­
tributing factor to the eventual introduction of British col­
onial rule in the country. At the time of the arrival of the 
missions, the Malawi area was in a state of constant turmoil. 
The clash of various African groups continued; Arab and Afri­
can slave traders were intensifying their activities; and the 
Portuguese were beginning to exert their influence in the 
area. The missions got involved in local squabbles and were 
under constant threat from slave traders. Their plight, but
also the negative publicity of some of their attempts to ex-
35ercise civil powers within the vicinity of their stations, 
focussed the attention of the British people on the possibili­
ty of establishing a British Protectorate in the area.
4. Outline of Constitutional Developments
A British Protectorate was declared over what was then 
known simply as the Nyasaland Districts in May, 1891. A 
local administration was set up in accordance with the provi­
sions of the African Order-in-Council, 1889. The head of the
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administration was entitled Her Majesty's Commissioner and 
Consul-General and was endowed with powers to introduce 
ordinances, proclamations, rules and regulations subject to 
approval by the Foreign Office. In April, 1904, control 
over the administration of the territory was transferred 
from the Foreign to the Colonial Office. In theory, however, 
the country was never annexed as a colony, but remained a 
Protectorate. In 1902, the British Central Africa Order-in- 
Council introduced the modern constitution of the Protector- 
ate.37
New constitutional provisions were introduced under the
38Nyasaland Order-in-Council in July, 1907. By virtue of 
this Order-in-Council, the designation of the country was 
changed from British Central Africa Protectorate to Nyasa­
land Protectorate; the title of Commissioner and Consul-
39General was replaced by Governor and Commander-in-Chief; 
Executive and Legislative Councils were for the first time 
created. The Legislative Council was made up of the Governor, 
the Government Secretary, the Government Treasurer, the 
Attorney-General and other official and unofficial members 
appointed by the Governor. The Executive Council was composed 
of the Governor and the ex-officio members of the Legislative 
Council, namely the Government Secretary, the Treasurer and 
the Attorney-General. Up to 1949 both the Legislative and 
Executive Councils consisted of Europeans only. African in­
terests were supposed to be represented by a missionary ap­
pointee to the Legislative Council.^ No provision was made 
for the interests of Asians, who were settling in the country,
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mostly as retail traders.^ The Legislative and Executive 
Councils were created to advise the Governor. The creation 
of these bodies did not therefore put any new limits on the 
powers of the Governor. In the words of Pachai: "In effect
what was introduced in 1907 was the principle of consulta­
tion without introducing the elements of constraints on the
/ O
Governor's position".
The introduction of the system of indirect rule in 1933
marked the start of official attempts to involve Africans in
the administrative and policy-making processes. Under the
/ ^
Native Authority Ordinance, 1933, African chiefs and Prin­
cipal Headmen gazetted as Native Authorities were empowered 
to make rules and orders on various matters within their re­
spective areas of jurisdiction.^ In 1944 and 1945, three 
Provincial Councils were established. These were advisory 
and non-statutory bodies consisting of Native Authorities 
selected from District Councils of chiefs or Principal Head­
men plus a minority of some other Africans. From among the 
membership of the Provincial Councils, a Protectorate Council 
was established in 1946.
In 1949 a limited, but important, step was taken when 
the Protectorate Council was invited to submit five names to 
the Governor out of whom the Governor could nominate two mem­
bers to serve on the Legislative Council. Thus, for the 
first time, two Africans became members of the Legislative 
Council^-* (In 1953 the number of African members was in­
creased to three). In the same year, 1949, the Indian Chamber 
of Commerce was also invited to submit up to three names from
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which the Governor nominated a single person to represent 
Asian interests.
The Provincial, Protectorate and Legislative Councils 
constituted official channels through which African views 
could be put forward by the Africans themselves. On important 
matters of policy, however, the African voice still did not 
carry much weight with the colonial administration. It was 
the commercial sector of the European settler community which 
exerted an influence vastly disproportionate to its actual 
numbers. It was the voice of this sector which, at least in 
the short run, carried the day over the issue of Nyasaland 
joining Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia in a Federa­
tion of three countries.
The Federation (Constitution) Order-in-Council was enac-
A C.
ted in August, 1953. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa­
land came about against the will of the majority of Africans 
in Nyasaland. African opposition to the Federation soon 
transformed into opposition to colonial rule in general and 
into calls for a more representative government. It was not 
so much the chiefs or headmen (whom the colonial administra­
tion insisted on treating as the true representatives of 
African people), but voluntary African movements or associa­
tions which became increasingly important in the voicing of 
African protest. "Native Associations", mainly comprising 
members of the indigenous intelligentsia, began to appear in 
Nyasaland as early as 1912 when the North Nyasa Native Associ­
ation was formed by Africans around the Livingstonia Mission.^ 
Several Native Associations had been created by the 1930's.
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In 1944, the various Native Associations joined to form the 
Nyasaland African Congress, the precursor of the present 
ruling party, the Malawi Congress Party.
In 1955, provision was made for elections to be held 
for the non-official representatives on the Legislative 
C o u n c i l . S i x  non-Africans would be elected on one elec­
toral roll and five African representatives would be chosen 
by the Provincial Councils, on a different roll. In the 
first elections, which were held in 1956, each of the five 
African representatives elected to the Legislative Council
49spoke as a representative of the Nyasaland African Congress. 
Thus, perceptibly, the role of leading the African population 
was being shifted from the traditional chiefs to the indige­
nous intelligentsia. In 1959 African representation on the 
Legislative Council was increased to seven members. The re­
sult of the creation of one roll for all non-Africans was, 
ironically, the elimination of Asian representation on the 
Legislative Council.^
Following major political disturbances in 1959, a new 
constitution was agreed upon during the Nyasaland Constitu­
tional Conference which was held at Lancaster House in 
London from July to August, 1960.^ The new Constitution 
provided for a Legislative Council of twenty-eight elected 
members and five officials and an Executive Council of ten 
members, five officials and five non-officials. There were 
two voting rolls for the Legislative Council, the upper 
roll with eight members and the lower roll with twenty. Qual­
ifications based on education, income and property practically
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ensured that the upper roll would be dominated by Europeans, 
Elections under the 1960 Constitution were held in August,
1961.52
After the electoral victory of the present ruling Malawi 
Congress Party in the 1961 elections, the stage was set for
the further constitutional talks that were held at Marlborough
53House, London, in November, 1962. Here a constitution for 
internal self-government was agreed upon. Internal self- 
government was achieved in 1963. The Executive Council was 
replaced by a Cabinet headed by the country's first Prime Minister. 
The Legislative Council was re-named the Legislative Assembly. 
For most purposes, the Cabinet would not be advisory to the 
Governor. In September, 1963, new provision was made for a 
Legislative Assembly of fifty-three members, fifty chosen 
from a general roll and three from a special roll reserved 
for Europeans. European representation was terminated in 
1973; Asian representation had ceased in 1961. In December,
1963, only ten years after its creation, the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved.
Malawi became an independent sovereign state on 6 July,
1964. Exactly two years later, the country achieved its pre­
sent republic status. The Republic of Malawi (Constitution) 
Act, 1966, provides for an elected President as Head of State. 
Executive power is vested in the President. Cabinet Ministers, 
chosen by the President, are responsible to him. Legislative 
power is vested in a unicameral National Assembly of elected 
members. However, the President may appoint an unlimited 
number of nominated members. The Constitution provides for
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the Malawi Congress Party as the only legal national party.
The Party meets annually in a National Convention which can 
deal with a variety of matters of national interest, includ­
ing moral and social issues. Questions relating to family 
law have also been addressed by the Party. Some of the dec­
larations on marriage law and practices are considered in 
the fourth chapter of this study.
3. Some Elements of the Administration
Administering what, in relation to the meagre resources 
available, was a vast territory, with poor communications, 
was a major problem for the British colonial authorities. 
Perhaps it says something about the industry and resourceful­
ness of the people involved that before long the life of al­
most every individual African became affected by the presence 
of the boma.
The district administrator, invariably a British officer, 
was without doubt the hub of the colonial administration. The 
broad policy decisions were, of course, ultimately taken be­
tween the Governor (Commissioner) and the Colonial (Foreign) 
Office. Still, the district was the main unit of administra­
tion, and it was on the shoulders of the district administra­
tors that the many burdens and responsibilities of administra­
tion rested. In the words of one historian:
...these men were required to be resourceful and enter­
prising in dealing with a host of problems ranging from 
bridge building to shooting marauding animals, but 
their primary duty was to represent the government, main­
tain law and order and collect taxes....Although it has 
in recent years become fashionable to denigrate the colon­
ial service official, the individual achievements of these
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men did much to ensure the relatively efficient function­
ing of administration at district level where the main 
contact between government and the people lay.54
The district administrators had been known by various names, 
including "Collectors", "Residents", "District Officers" and 
"District Commissioners".”^  There were also "Assistant Col­
lectors" or "Assistant Residents" etc., who shared the duties 
of district administration. The number of districts in­
creased with each new demarcation. The first Commissioner, 
Johnston, started with four districts in 1892; the number had 
increased to twelve in 1894; and by 1922, there were twenty
districts. There are now twenty-four or more districts (see 
Maps 2 and 4).
When Provincial Commissioners were appointed for the 
first time in 1921, the hierarchical structure from the Gover­
nor through the Provincial Commissioners to the District Com­
missioner took shape. The office of the Chief Secretary 
(Secretary to the Administration) also calls for specific 
mention. The Chief Secretary was the channel of communica­
tion between the Governor on the one hand and the ever- 
increasing number of Heads of Departments, the Provincial 
Commissioners and various other bodies operating in the coun­
try, for example, the missions, on the other. He was Head of 
the Civil Service. Most matters of policy were controlled 
and defined by the Secretariat. For example, the Chief Secre­
tary played a major role in defining policies regarding mar­
riage legislation.
At first, the British authorities had no clear policy as 
to whether or not, or to what extent, African traditional 
rulers should be involved in the administration. There were
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clearly too few European officials to establish effective 
control, especially in the rural areas. There was thus an 
obvious need to utilise the African rulers or leaders in 
the administration. Instead, however, Johnston began his 
administration by a series of military campaigns of "pacifi­
cation" against the more powerful chiefs or leaders. Whether
56
the Commissioner had much choice in the matter is debatable. 
Clearly, the chiefs he had moved against were themselves 
intent upon resisting the British intrusion. With an army 
based on a few hundred soldiers from India, Johnston managed 
to subjugate the African chiefs. In the process, the fabric 
of traditional authority was either undermined or altogether 
shattered. The "pacification" which had been won by military 
might led to the disintegration of traditional government and, 
eventually, to an administrative nightmare.^
Even as early as 1903, the officials had already begun
to address themselves to the possibility of involving the
58Africans in the administration of the country. Of course, 
it is useful to bear in mind that the purely indigenous 
forms of government and dispensation of justice did not al­
together cease with the advent of the British administration. 
These, however, increasingly became weak. Within the frame­
work of the direct administration by the British authorities, 
some use was made of the services of traditional leaders. As 
Pachai notes, however, these services:
...were obtained on an ad hoc basis. Traditional chiefs 
had no place in the statutory provisions of the adminis­
trative s; regarded as inef­
fectual
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This view, that the traditional chiefs or leaders were 
ineffectual, continued to influence the policies of the 
British Government even after significant steps had been 
taken formally to involve African chiefs or leaders in the 
administration of the country. The system of direct British 
administration came to an end in 1933 when the Native Author­
ity Ordinance and the Native Courts Ordinance^ came into 
operation. Under these statutes, the system of "indirect 
rule", based on the Cameronian model of Tanganyika, was in­
augurated. Under this system, African "chiefs"^ as "Native
Authorities" assumed some judicial, executive and legisla-
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tive powers. In these functions, these "Native Authori­
ties" were closely "supervised", "guided" or "controlled" by 
the District Commissioners. The Native Authorities acted 
too much as agents of the British officials to retain any
real capacity to facilitate the evolution of any truly repre-
6 3
sentative local government. It was, indeed, this issue 
that Lord Hailey addressed when he visited Nyasaland in 1935 
and 1947.^^ Following the directions of the Colonial Offi c e ^ 
in 1947, the Nyasaland Government moved steadily towards the 
idea of representative local councils.
Statutory local councils were introduced in 1953 under 
the Nyasaland Local Government (District Councils) Ordinance.^ 
The Ordinance envisaged the creation of multiracial councils 
in all districts. For some time, the Native Authorities had 
been working with non-statutory councils, although they had 
nevertheless remained the main units of local government. 
However, from 1953, although they would remain part of the
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system of local government, their real authority, even if not 
their nominal powers, would be diminished, as they were to be 
required to operate within the larger multiracial councils. 
More importantly, however, the 1953 Ordinance was to be in­
troduced only gradually and not at once throughout the terri­
tory. Thus, by 1960, when the Ordinance underwent radical 
amendments, only a fraction of the Native Authorities had 
been affected.^
The system effected by the 1953 Ordinance had come under 
heavy attacks, particularly from radical African nationalists 
who saw it largely as an attempt to obscure the issues raised 
in connection with the imposition of the Central African 
Federation. Elections to the councils had largely been boy­
cotted. In 1960, the 1953 Ordinance^® and the Native Author­
ity Ordinance (the latter had not been wholly repealed) were 
amended.^ The Native Authorities and the District Councils 
now became separate units, the former remaining largely as 
agents of the central government. By further amendments in 
1 9 6 1 ^  statutory District Councils would be constituted in 
all the rural districts; the majority of the members of the 
councils would be popularly elected; a smaller number of 
chiefs in each district would remain as ex officio members
and the District Commissioners would relinquish their posi-
72tions as Chairmen of the District Councils. Although these 
developments partly reflected the recommendations of the 
Colonial Office of 1947, they really constituted the begin­
ning of the post-colonial, African, administration. In the 
new context, the powers of the chiefs were further attenuated 
and their role became less clearly defined.
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6. The Judiciary
Only a very brief word on the courts is really necessary
73in this Introduction.
The history of the court system in Malawi may be divi­
ded into five phases. The first phase spanned the years be­
tween 1891, when the country was formally declared a British 
Protectorate, and 1902. In accordance with the 1881 Royal 
Instructions, the area was constituted into a local juris­
diction in 1891. The jurisdiction was exercised by the Bri­
tish Consular Court and the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony 
was constituted as the Court of Appeal for British Central 
Africa. Soon afterwards, in 1892, on the recommendation of 
the Commissioner and Consul-General, the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs issued judicial warrants to a number of 
collectors to act as magistrates. Under the Africa Orders- 
in-Council of 1889 and 1893, the collectors could administer 
justice to Europeans and other foreigners. Although the col­
lectors could administer justice even in the case of Africans, 
justice for the latter continued to be dispensed by the indi­
genous authorities, outside the framework of the colonial 
administration.
The second phase began in 1902 and lasted until 1933. 
Under the British Central Africa Order-in-Council, 1902, the 
High Court of the British Central Africa was constituted.
This court had "full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over 
all persons and over all matters in the Protectorate".^
The British Central Africa Order-in-Council, 1902, also laid 
down the constitutional basis of the laws that would be applied
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in the Protectorate. Under Section 15(2) of the Order-in- 
Council, it was provided that in the exercise of its civil 
and criminal jurisdiction, the High Court should:
...so far as circumstances admit, be exercised in con­
formity with the substance of the common law, doctrines 
of equity, and statutes of general application in force 
in England on the Eleventh day of August, 1902, and 
with the powers vested in and according to the proce­
dure and practice observed by and before courts of jus­
tices of the peace in England and according to their 
respective jurisdictions and authorities at that date....
Under Section 20 of the Order-in-Council, it was provided 
that:
In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives 
are parties, every court (a) shall be guided by native 
law so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to 
justice and morality or inconsistent with any Order-in- 
Council or Ordinance, or any Regulation or Rule made 
under any Order-in-Council or Ordinance; and (b) shall 
decide all such cases according to substantial justice 
without undue regard to technicalities of procedure and 
without undue delay.
The Subordinate Courts Ordinance, 1906, established 
courts subordinate to the High Court. These courts were divi­
ded mainly between District Courts, which had jurisdiction 
over non-Africans, and District Native Courts, which had 
jurisdiction over Africans. These courts were manned by ad­
ministrative officers. Appeals from them lay to the High
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Court. In 1929 the District Courts and District Native 
Courts were reconstituted into first-, second-, and third- 
class Subordinate Courts. From 1948, the Government began 
to pursue a policy of relieving administrative officers of 
their judicial duties and entrusting these to profession- 
ally-qualified Resident Magistrates. There are currently 
four types of Subordinate Courts : the courts of the Resident
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Magistrates and the courts of the Magistrates of the first-, 
second-, and third-Grade. Appeals from these courts lie to 
the High Court.
Thus, some features of the second phase in the evolu­
tion of the judiciary can be traced to the present day. How­
ever, the third phase began in 1933 and lasted until 1962. 
This is the phase of indirect rule, during which the Native 
Authorities were empowered to dispense justice among Afri­
cans. Appeals from the Native Authority courts went to the 
District Commissioners and then from there, to the Provin­
cial Commissioners and finally to the High Court. In the 
case of sub-Native Authorities, appeals first went to the 
Native Authorities. The Native Authority courts applied cus­
tomary law, although they also presided over certain minor 
criminal offences created by statute. The Native Authorities 
lost their judicial powers in 1962.
The introduction of Local Courts, under the Local Courts 
Ordinance, 1962,^ ushered in the fourth phase. This Ordi­
nance removed the judicial powers of the Native Authorities. 
The appellate functions of the District and Provincial Com­
missioners were also abrogated. Some of these officials, 
however, became Assistant Local Courts Commissioners who sup­
ervised local court work and trained staff. The former judi­
cial functions of the Native Authority courts were assumed by 
the Local Courts. Thus, the Local Courts essentially applied 
customary law. In each district there was a Local Appeal 
Court to which appeals from the various Local Courts within 
the district lay. Appeals from the Local Appeal Courts lay
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to the High Court. Appeals from the High Court were heard 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The latter was the highest 
court of the land. The Republican Constitution in 1966 abol­
ished the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council.
The Magistrates’ Courts continued as before. Thus, the 
court system in Malawi followed the common pattern in Common­
wealth Africa. The customary-law courts and the English- 
styled courts were not completely separated. Such separation 
existed only at the lower levels. At the higher level, the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal handled appeals 
from both the Magistrates', and the customary-law courts.
The general movement in Commonwealth Africa has been 
towards the integration of the courts. In the fifth and cur­
rent phase in the evolution of the Malawi judicial system, 
which began in 1969, the movement has been towards the oppo­
site direction. Fundamental reforms introduced between 1969 
and 1970 brought about a more complete separation between 
the "customary-law", and the "English-styled" courts. Under 
the Traditional Courts Act (cap. 3:03), the Local Courts 
were renamed Traditional Courts. More importantly, however, 
three Regional Traditional Courts, one in each region, were 
constituted. These courts were empowered to try the most 
important criminal offences (including murder and treason) 
and to order any sentence provided under the Penal Code, in­
cluding capital punishment. The Regional Traditional Courts 
have no civil jurisdiction; neither do they have any appel­
late jurisdiction. They only hear criminal cases on first 
instance. By a further amendment to the Traditional Courts
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Act in 1970, the National Traditional Appeal Court was con­
stituted. This court is empowered to hear civil and crimi­
nal appeals from both the £bistrictj Traditional Appeal 
Courts (formerly Local Appeal Courts) and the Regional Tra­
ditional Courts. Appeals from the Magistrates' Courts con­
tinue to be heard by the High Court and appeals from this 
court lie to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The 1969-70 reforms were not introduced specifically to 
bring about a more complete separation between the "English- 
styled" courts and the "customary-law" courts. The immedi­
ate objective of the reforms was to give greater power to 
the Traditional Courts. At least with respect to criminal 
cases, the thinking was that these courts would be less in- 
cumbered by alien legal technicalities and therefore that 
they would administer justice in a way that was more satis­
factory to the majority of the people. In general, the cre­
ation of these more powerful Traditional Courts was also in­
tended to enhance the traditional character of customary 
law. The abolition of the appellate jurisdiction of the High 
Court in customary-law civil cases underlined the belief that 
an English-styled court, normally manned by British officials, 
was less likely to be sympathetic to traditional African 
values and customs.^
7. Economic Life Under Colonial Rule
Obviously, British colonialism meant the introduction of 
a cash economy and wage labour. At least in the early years, 
however, what Dr. David Livingstone had seen as complementary 
ventures, namely, Christianity and commerce, turned out to be
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tragically contradictory. The ravages of the transactions 
in slaves which had partly led to the British intervention 
would be compounded by new, though comparable, forms of ex­
ploitation.
To this day, Malawi has remained a country of few natur­
al resources. Agriculture, mainly at subsistence level, is 
the main occupation of the people. From the beginning, 
cash-cropping in large plantations was the main economic 
venture of European entrepreneurs. This led to an acute de­
mand for land and human resources. Both of these were se­
cured by means that were far from equitable or, indeed, much 
removed from slavery. The problems of land and labour were 
compounded by Government tax policies.
The Shire Highlands in the Southern Region was the most 
intensively exploited area. Here, many settlers "bought" 
large tracts of fertile land, reducing the Africans previous 
ly occupying these lands into a status of indentured serfs:
By the 1920's, Africans who resided upon white- 
owned plantations in the Highlands had the option of 
either working there, paying a cash rental, or subject­
ing themselves to eviction and the long, rather diffi­
cult process of finding new plots on which to plant 
subsistence crops. If they remained tenants, whites 
told them what and when they should and could culti­
vate and, at arbitrarily contrived prices, purchased 
the resultant crops in lieu of rent. White managers 
refused to allow their tenants to grow maize and other 
foodstuffs for personal profit. They prevented Afri­
cans from cutting down trees in order to build huts in 
the customary manner. In an area where the accepted 
pattern of residence was matrilocal, whites denied 
young men the opportunity to live with their prospec­
tive in-laws. Although whites viewed these and a num­
ber of other constraints as logical and even necessary 
exercises in defense of private property, Africans con­
sidered them harsh and irrational abuses. An African 
who regarded whites and the coming of white rule with
74
suspicion could have his worst fears confirmed by be­
coming a tenant upon a white-owned plantation.78
Africans who resided outside European plantations were 
not exempted from exploitation. They were drawn into Euro­
pean plantations by the need to fulfill their tax obligat­
ions to the Government. The colonial administration had in­
sufficient financial means even for the minimum tasks of 
consolidating European rule and maintaining order. The co­
lonial administration introduced a poll tax as early as
791892. This was payable by every male adult. In many
cases, the poll tax was later converted into a hut tax. Tax
was sometimes deliberately used by the Government in order
to "encourage" Africans to work for the planters. Wages
were generally set at a monthly level corresponding to an
individual's tax obligations. Thus, people worked simply to
pay tax, which kept on increasing as Government commitments
widened. The methods of enforcing tax collection were them-
80selves highly oppressive, often contravening the clear 
instructions of Whitehall.
Thus, within the territory, wage labour meant practi­
cally nothing in terms of the material wellbeing of the 
African people. In most cases, it meant suffering and rank 
exploitation. The result was that many Africans sought to 
better themselves materially by seeking employment in 
foreign lands, especially the countries of southern Africa. 
By 1903, writes Pachai:
...substantial information was already to be had in 
the country about the prospects outside....With the 
growth of the cash economy, more western goods were
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in demand. The practice of Indian shopkeepers of al­
lowing credit facilities increased the volume of pur­
chasers as well as debt into which the unsophistica­
ted purchaser was drifting. A period of work outside 
seemed the best method of liquidating debts, purchas­
ing luxury or status goods, earning cash for the pay­
ment of lobola or bride money and also satisfying 
one's curiosity about the world outside while at the 
same time raising one's standards, a point which mis­
sionary preaching and teaching never ceased to stress.81
From 1903, when about 1000 labourers travelled abroad, ex­
cept for occasional interruptions, each succeeding year saw 
greater numbers of /Malawians7 leaving the country for work 
in other African countries. Again, to quote Pachai:
In 1935 a commission was set up in /llalawij to report 
on migrant labour, on the effect of this on village 
life and on the probable future effects on the Protec­
torate as a whole. The commission found a gloomy pic­
ture : 25-35 per cent never returned home; many mar­
ried foreign wives or entered into irregular unions.
It also found that at one time about 120,000 Africans 
worked outside the country - or one in every four male 
adults.82
Even within the territory, the number of Africans involved 
in wage labour was gradually increasing. Trading and cash- 
cropping by the Africans themselves also increased.
The ascendancy of the money economy also meant the be­
ginning of the process of urbanization. Many people flocked 
to the towns in search of a living. The process of urbani­
zation led to the forced integration of different communi­
ties of people. Marriages across traditional groups became 
common. In the new context, the social concepts and beliefs 
of individual communities became less meaningful. The new 
economic systems also led to the ascendancy of the nuclear 
family, the weakening of traditional authority and the emer­
gence of new patterns in social relationships. Prostitution,
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single-parentage and loose informal unions between men and 
women became more prevalent. Even the rural areas were 
not shielded from these developments. Everywhere, the new 
economic systems put a great strain on traditional social 
structures and mechanisms of social control. Thus, while 
the people remained basically poor, the new economic forces 
brought about fundamental changes in African social life.
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P A R T  I 
CUSTOMARY LAWS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
CHAPTER TWO
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CUSTOMARY LAWS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE - 
A General Introduction and Legal Aspects Relating 
to the Formation of Marriage
1. Introduction
This is one of three chapters which offer a review of the 
principal rules of customary law governing marriage in Malawi.
The study carried out in the three chapters is not intend­
ed to provide detailed descriptions of rules or principles 
governing each and every aspect of marriage in the manner of 
the Restatement of African Law projects.* Only a limited 
number of issues are covered in these chapters.
The matters selected for discussion are those which more 
clearly bring out the distinctive features of customary mar­
riage and, therefore, those which serve to illustrate actual 
or potential conflicts of customary law with both the imported 
Western principles of marriage and the changing social condi­
tions within African society. The main task of the discus­
sions is to highlight legal responses to the process of social 
change and to new patterns of social relationships. In parti­
cular, the discussions describe legal developments in response 
to: the breakdown of the traditional kinship-structure which 
has led to the emergence of the nuclear family; the increased 
emphasis on freedom of the individual as against the tradition­
al authority of the senior members of the family; the increased 
economic independence of individuals; and in general, the adop­
tion or imposition of Western culture and values.
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The material presented in each of the three chapters 
roughly corresponds to a particular aspect of marriage law.
The present chapter examines selected items relating to the 
formation of marriage. These include capacity to contract 
marriage, essential consents, and other items relating to 
marriage preliminaries. The next chapter examines some of the 
consequences of marriage under customary law. The last chap­
ter of the series deals with the dissolution of marriage and 
consequent rights and obligations. Still, there is much over­
lap in the material presented in the three chapters. Indeed, 
the division of these chapters is primarily intended to facil­
itate presentation and not to demarcate any thematic boundaries.
While it is not very difficult to recognise the changes 
which have taken place in African patterns of social and 
familial relationships, the attempt to depict the impact of 
modern influences on the development of particular rules of 
customary law must reckon with a plethora of obstacles. Chief 
among these is the lack of any extensive knowledge of customary 
law and its operation in pre-colonial societies. Anthropologi­
cal writings provide one source of information. However, the 
fact that these were prepared for different purposes, by people 
whose main interest was not to ascertain rules in a legalistic 
sense, is only the lesser of several shortcomings of existing 
anthropological sources. Another shortcoming of these sources 
is that they all date from the twentieth century. They there­
fore mainly describe societies which had already come under 
the new, Western, influences. Where they purport to depict 
customary law in its pristine state, their accounts ought not
to be regarded as amounting to much more than mere
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reconstructions of the past. Furthermore, existing anthropo­
logical writings on Malawi are not comprehensive. Only a 
limited number of traditional societies have been investigated. 
Thus, even in the discussions which follow, most examples of 
specific rules or developments will tend to be drawn only from 
the somewhat limited number of societies on which there is 
ample material.
Even the rules of contemporary customary law are not al­
ways readily ascertainable. The law has remained unwritten. 
Although court records do exist, these are of limited utility. 
Most of the records do not contain much beyond a short narra­
tive of the facts of the case and a simple, sometimes even 
cryptic, order of the court. In fact, there are important 
aspects of customary marriage on which it has not been possible 
to find adequate case material. In some of such instances 
reliance has been placed wholly on the works of anthropologists 
and other non-legal sources. Even where there are court 
records, it is not always possible to ascertain the existence 
of a particular rule of law, particularly if there are contra­
dictions in the relevant decisions. There is no unifying 
principle under customary law by which contradictions in the 
judgements of the courts may be resolved. Decisions of the 
relevant courts do not strictly constitute binding precedents. 
Their value is, so to say, evidential rather than authoritative.
2. Social Grouping
The operation of customary-law rules of marriage cannot 
fully be appreciated without some acquaintance with traditional 
social groupings. These are now briefly surveyed as follows.
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a) The Village
The village is the basic unit of settlement among the 
African communities of Malawi. Even today, with growing 
numbers of people establishing more-or-less permanent resi­
dence in urban centres, practicaly every member of the indi­
genous African population is, at least nominally, attached to 
some village. The village - mudzi (in chiChewa), muzi (in 
chiTumbuka), musi (in chiYao) or akaya (in chiNgonde) are some 
of its African names - is both a territorial and a social en­
tity. Each group of people setting up a village recognises 
one person as the "leader". The leader is commonly referred 
to descriptively as "the owner of the village" (e.g. asyene 
musi in chiYao or mwene muzi in chiTumbuka). The title 
"village headman" introduced by the colonial administration 
has in various corrupted forms (e.g. hedemani in chiTumbuka) 
become part of indigenous vocabularies. Villages are indige­
nous institutions. They constituted basic building blocks of 
chiefdoms. However, the colonial administration recognised 
and reorganised these villages for colonial administrative pur­
poses, especially for the collection of taxes. Administrative 
villages did not always coincide with customary villages. The 
colonial administration insisted on larger villages. Normally 
a village headman could not obtain government recognition un­
less he had at least twenty tax-payers under his charge. Head­
men strove for government recognition because this conferred on 
them greater prestige, greater authority and a financial reward 
based on the amount of tax collected. The terms "village" and 
"village headman" are used in this discussion in their customary, 
rather than administrative, context.
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Villages differ in size and physical appearance. The size
of a village could be anything from one cluster to a dozen or
3
more clusters of dwelling units. Usually, villages are com­
pactly built and easy to discern as discrete units. However, 
some villages do exhibit different characteristics. The Tonga 
villages, for example, as Van Velsen noted:
...do not have the obvious physical apearance of villages, 
viz a collocation of dwellings clearly marked off from 
other similar units of habitation. In fact along parts of 
the lakeshore the population lives in a string of seeming­
ly uncoordinated clusters which are generally within hail­
ing distance of one another. In the hills the situation 
is slightly different. As one gets farther inland, more 
than a mile or so from the lake, the population becomes 
less concentrated and the distance between one group of 
hamlets and another may be greater. But here, too, vil­
lages as political units are not easily discernible for a 
stranger
The unity of the village, however, is manifested not only 
through the physical boundaries, but also through the social 
relationships of the people occupying it. Thus, even where the 
physical boundaries of a village are unclear, its corporate 
identity is. always readily discernible by its members.
b) Social Groups Within the Village
The majority of the people in one village are related to 
each other and to the village headman by blood and/or marriage. 
Complete strangers might settle in a village with the consent 
of the village headman or a higher chief.
Many Malawian terms denoting social groupings lack pre­
cision. Different communities would use the same term to denote 
different types of social units. Even within one community a 
particular term can be used indiscriminately to denote a variety 
of social groupings. The term mbumba is a good example. The
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term may refer to a simple or nuclear family consisting of a 
married man and woman with their children.^ Mbumba may also 
describe the larger group of relatives who trace descent 
through either the male or female line to a common ancestor or 
ancestress. In some matrilineal communities the group con­
sisting of uterine brothers and sisters may constitute a 
mbumba with the eldest brother or maternal uncle as its head.^ 
Mbumba may also refer only to a man's sister or sister's daugh­
ters, that is, to that group of a man's female kin who are
Q
likely to perpetuate the matrilineage which he represents.
The smallest social unit in the village is the nuclear 
family or elementary family consisting of a married man and 
woman with their children, if any. Two very common Malawian 
terms for this unit are nyumba (literally, house) and ban,1a.
A polygynous man, together with each of his wives and their 
respective children, will normally be regarded as constituting 
a separate unit. The husband is invariably regarded as the 
head of the nyumba or banja. Members of each nyumba occupy 
a separate building or set or cluster of buildings, they cul­
tivate separate plots of land and maintain separate food stores. 
Big livestock, such as cattle, are usually kept in a common 
pen. It is rare, however, for African households in the vil­
lages to consist entirely of members of the nuclear family. 
Relatives other than primary kin often form part of the house­
hold.
Within the village, members of the nuclear family form 
part of larger social groups within which relationships are
effectively recognised for a variety of social purposes. The
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composition of these groups vary from community to community. 
Among the matrilineal Yao, for instance, all daughters of a 
single woman constitute a distinct group called the mbumba.
This is the unit which Clyde Mitchell calls "the sorority- 
group". He explains as follows:
Consistent with the Yao idea that men should take care of 
the affairs of the lineage, sisters look to their eldest 
brother when they are in trouble. This group of sisters 
in the care of their brother is called mbumba. In the 
plural acambumba the word refers to women ingeneral, but 
in the singular it refers to a particular group of women 
in the way I have explained. The word is always used in 
the sense of 'so-and-so's mbumba', as mbumba Ja Ce 
Mayele.10 The central concept here is the brother-sister 
link and I have accordingly translated the word mbumba as 
sorority-group.11
The brother in charge of the mbumba is called the asyene mbumba
(the owner of the mbumba). His sisters rely on him on a variety
of matters including marriage arrangements, illness, quarrels
with husbands, and supervision of children. While the eldest
brother is still young the functions of the asyene mbumba are
discharged by the maternal uncle, the mother's asyene mbumba.
The supervisory role of the latter does not entirely cease
with the coming of age of the nephew. The roles of the maternal
uncle and the brother over the latter's mbumba can therefore
constitute a source of conflict between the two. If the elder
brother fails to perform his duties as asyene mbumba the sisters
12may turn to a younger brother or brothers.
The mbumba among the Yao and corresponding social groups
among other matrilineal communities form parts of even larger
groupings, the matrilineages. The matrilineage, which is also
13called mbumba (or big mbumba) by some people - the Yao call it
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mlango - is also found within the village. It consists of all 
the blood relatives who trace their descent through the female 
line to a first or common ancestress. The depth of a matri- 
lineage within a village varies. Mitchell notes that among the 
Yao the depth of a matrilineage within a village is seldom more 
than five or six generations from the founding ancestress to 
the new-born children. He further observes that:
The name of the founding ancestress is remembered and the 
descent of each member of the matrilineage can easily be 
recounted. The ancestress is known as the likolo or 
lipata, words which also refer to the trunk of a tree ... 
the founding ancestress is seen as the stem or root from 
which all members of the lineage have sprung, and the 
various sections of the matrilineage are seen as branches 
(nyambi).14
The senior man by generation and age is the leader of the matri­
lineage. It is from the members of his/her matrilineage that a 
person expects most help and whom he/she, in turn, is expected 
to help. Ideally, members of the matrilineage will act to­
gether to pay fines imposed on one of their member. They will 
support a member in quarrels and disputes. They will collec­
tively seek redress if one of them is injured. An individual 
is in turn expected to share his wealth with members of his 
matrilineage.
In patrilineal communities the largest group within the 
village is the patrilineage, consisting of all blood relatives 
who trace descent through the male line to a first or common 
ancestor. Among the Tumbuka, for example, this group is called 
fuko. The senior man by generation and age leads the fuko.
The leader will normally preside over the settlement of internal
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disputes. The social rights and obligations of the fuko vis- 
a-vis an individual member and vice versa are similar to those 
described above in relation to members of a matrilineage.^ 
Members of one fuko will normally have a common name. A vil­
lage is often known by the common name of the lineage of the 
village headman. The village will normally have been founded 
by the first ancestor of this group. Its members will span 
more generations than other lineages found within the village. 
Members of the village headman's lineage also tend to enjoy a 
special political status. The lineage will normally be linked 
to similar groups within the village through its female mem­
bers. Thus, members of the "smaller" or "younger" lineages are 
often referred to by members of the dominant lineage as baphwa, 
that is, maternal nephews.
c ) The Emphasis on Kinship Ties
Kinship ties among Africans used to be carefully cherished 
and emphasised. One's prestige and material security mainly 
depended on the size of the group of people falling within the 
range of relationships which could be utilised for social and 
economic purposes. Duties founded on consanguinity were exten­
ded to a wider circle of kin. This was partly emphasised by 
the classificatory terminology characteristic of African kin­
ship systems. An officer of the Nyasaland administration once 
observed that:
The commonest cause of difficulty to the European is the 
use by English-speaking Africans of terms, which we are 
accustomed to apply to one individual only, to a large 
number of people whom the African regards as all standing 
in the same relationship to him. If an employee asks
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permission to attend his mother's funeral for the third 
time in a year he is not necessarily a liar, because he 
will call "mother" not only the woman who bore him 
but also everyone whomshe calls "sister" and he will 
speak in the same way of a multiplicity of "fathers" and 
"children". The only way of settling a definite rela­
tionship in European terms is by asking whether a person 
referred to as "father" or "mother" is the actual biolo­
gical parent of the speaker, and likewise when "children" 
have been spoken of.lo
As Radcliffe-Brown pointed out, the significance of such termi­
nology is not only that it brings within one's mental grasp a 
much greater number of kindred than is possible by the use of 
descriptive terminology (e.g. father's brother or mother's 
sister), but it also underlines the method of ordering relation 
ships in the relevant societies. He wrote:
The general rule is that the inclusion of two relatives 
in the same terminological category implies that there is 
some significant similarity in the customary behaviour due 
to both of them, or in the social relation in which one 
stands to each of them, while inversely the placing of two 
relatives in different categories implies some significant 
difference in customary behaviour or social relations.17
Persons addressed as "father", "mother", "sister", "brother", 
"son" or "daughter" could be called upon to serve surrogate or 
interchangeable roles with members of the nuclear family. In­
teractions with these people would normally be characterised 
by the same etiquette as that followed in relation to corre­
sponding members of the nuclear family. Incest taboos, for 
example, would apply between a man and all women who are clas­
sified as his "sister" or "mothers" or "daughters". Indeed, 
this might partly explain the low incidence of pre-marital
sexual intercourse and pregnancies which is said to have existed,
18for example, in the patrilineal Ngoni villages. None or few
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of the unmarried people within the village could indulge in 
sexual flirtation that was not in violation of the incest 
taboo.
d) Marriage, Family and Social Structure
Many of the family-law disputes that have come before the
courts underline the problem of reconciling one basic aspect
of African customary marriage with contemporary social life
and ideas. At least in its traditional context, marriage under
African customary law is to be seen primarily as a pact or an
alliance between two bodies of relatives and only in a secon-
19dary aspect as a union between one man and woman:
In order to understand the African customs relating to 
marriage we have to bear in mind that a marriage is es­
sentially a rearrangement of social structure. What is 
meant by social structure is any arrangement of persons 
in institutionalised relationships. By a marriage certain 
existing relationships, particularly, in most societies, 
those of the bride to her family, are changed. New social 
relations are created, not only between the husband and the 
wife, and between the husband and the wife's relatives on 
the one side and between the wife and the husband's rela­
tives on the other, but also, in a great many societies, 
between the relatives of the husband and those of the wife, 
who, on both sides, are interested in the marriage and, in 
the children that are expected to result from it.20
The interest of the respective kin in the marriage is not only 
social in character as marriage creates rights and obligations 
capable of legal enforcement by or against them. As will be 
shown below, the very legal validity of marriage depends on the 
involvement of the kin.
The problem today is that the social context reflected in 
the collective aspect of customary marriage has changed funda­
mentally, particularly in urban centres, but even in rural
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areas. The relevant aspect of customary marriage reflects the 
character of traditional African society which was one of 
loosely constituted nuclear families within dense networks of 
lineage and kin relationships. The nuclear family in tradi­
tional African society bore some resemblance to the English 
family of the late medieval and early sixteenth-century. The 
most striking characteristic of the latter, Lawrence Stone has 
noted:
...was the degree to which it was open to external influ­
ences, a porosity that is in contrast to the more sealed 
off and private nuclear family type that was to develop 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Not only 
its individual members, but the nuclear family itself was 
strongly other-directed.21
The functional boundaries separating the nuclear family from 
wider kinship networks were weak and blurred. For many social 
purposes, the nuclear family was less autonomous and less iso­
lated. More often individual members looked outside the nu­
clear family for social, material and emotional support. The 
importance of the nuclear family lay almost exclusively in its 
role as a unit of reproduction, hence the obsessive emphasis 
of African marriage systems on procreation. Marriage was first 
and foremost a mechanism for the determination of "ownership" 
of children. It is in relation to children that the concept of 
the customary marriage as a pact between two families finds its 
ultimate expression.
For the individual many aspects of life were experienced 
at a collective level within kinship structures. Individual­
istic tendencies were generally deplored and were readily asso­
ciated with punishable behaviour such as witchcraft. The
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interests and desires of the individual were subordinated to 
those of the extended family. The collective needs of the kin 
received greater emphasis than those of the "immediate" parties 
in the formation and termination of marriage alliances. Formal, 
as opposed to intimate or romantic, relations between husband 
and wife were quite consistent with "happy" or "successful" mar­
riages. The collective will of the kin as expressed through 
the elders was authoritative and at times even authoritarian. 
Many of the "battles" of early missionaries against what they
saw as "forces of heathenism" were in reality struggles with
22kinship ties and authority. Many of the rules or principles 
which are unique to customary law underline this collective
aspect of African customary marriage.
The whole process of colonialism involved the establish­
ment of institutions and the introduction or intensification of 
forces which were to weaken the hold of the kin over the indi­
vidual, reduce the individual's dependence on kinship ties, and 
enhance the character of the nuclear family as a discrete, auto­
nomous, social unit. As the social, political and economic 
environment became more complex, the individual became involved 
in new, and often more rewarding, relationships. The individu­
al's loyalty to the kin was even more decisively undermined by 
the superimposition of the more authoritative state structures 
over the traditional familial structures.
3. Capacity to Contract Customary Marriage
The question as to which people are capable of contracting 
marriage under customary law is an involved one. In the follow­
ing discussion, however, only three topical aspects of the
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subject are examined, namely age, marital status and the pro­
hibited degrees.
a) Age
Of
There is no definite answer to the question as to^what
age persons become legally capable of entering into marriage
under customary law. Ibik has noted in relation to all the
major African groups in Malawi that, under customary law,
there is no fixed age as such for either males or females at
23which they become legally capable of contracting marriage.
Normally, however, a male person will be allowed to marry
any time after puberty, so long as he has shown that he is
24capable of discharging the necessary marital duties. Like­
wise, a female person will be allowed to marry after her first 
menstrual period. In the olden days, boys and girls would nor­
mally acquire the various skills necessary for married life by 
the time they reached puberty.
Pubertal ceremonies, particularly in the case of girls, 
often involved preparation for marriage. In certain special 
cases these ceremonies also constituted part of marriage cere­
monies. Lucy Mair observed, for example, that among the Chewa 
people:
...it was customary in the past for girls to be betrothed 
before puberty. From the time of betrothal limited sex 
relations were permitted between the couple, but the girl 
must not be deflowered until the initiation ceremony 
which was held as soon as possible after her first menstru­
ation. This ceremony was linked so closely with the mar­
riage as to be almost part of it; the husband provided part 
of the cost in the form of presents to the women instruc­
tors, and married life began immediately afterwards.25
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The discouragement of early marriages would seem to have 
been a feature unique to Ngoni society before British conquest. 
The need for martial excellence controlled almost every aspect
of Ngoni culture, including their moral code which sometimes
a.
verged on the ascetic. Margjret Read made the following obser­
vation:
Being a nation under arms the state demanded first of all 
a supply of young men whose outlook was fixed on war, and 
who were relatively independent of family ties. They con­
sidered the years from 20 to 30 as the best years of a 
man's fighting life, and during these years the state de­
sired to claim him to the exclusion of all other claims.26
The Ngoni associated even legitimate sex between a married
couple with misfortune in battle, with weakness before the enemy,
27and even with laziness!
The discouragement of early marriage among the Ngoni was
also extended to women. The ages of 25 to 30 years were consi-
28dered ideal for marriage on the part of women. It was be­
lieved that women came to their "full strength" at these ages. 
Strong children, it was maintained, could be born only of 
mothers who had come to "full strength".
It may be noted as an incidental point that the Ngoni seem
to provide an example of the rather unique situation of a statal 
or political authority directly intervening in matters of mar­
riage arrangements. A characteristic feature of traditional 
African life was that marriage was no concern of the state or 
political organs. Marriage was mainly a matter between the kin 
of the man and the kin of the woman. Ngoni men in contrast had
to obtain permission from the king or chief in order to marry.
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Permission was normally given on a regimental basis and, in 
turn* regiments were organised on the basis of age.
In general, it was up to the parents or guardians to de­
cide whether or not a boy or a girl was old enough for marriage.
There is ample evidence showing that in many traditional
29communities children used to be betrothed even before puberty. 
Girls in particular would be betrothed while still very young 
and often to men who were far much older than themselves. It 
is far from clear whether in all these cases marriage would be 
deferred until the parties reached puberty. The character of 
African marriage formalities is such that it is not always easy 
to tell when a mere betrothal turns into an actual formal mar­
riage. Marriage alliances were often forged in stages rather 
than by a single act or transaction. Thus in the example of the 
Chewa cited above, the relationship between the betrothed couple 
already begins to look like that of husband and wife before and 
during the pubertal ceremonies. Where a child is betrothed to 
a man who is already married, particularly in patrilineal socie­
ties, it was also possible for the man to pay the whole or part 
of the lobola due and take the girl with him. Cohabitation 
would nevertheless be postponed until the girl reached her pu­
berty. It is difficult to say whether, before the girl reaches 
puberty, such an arrangement could be regarded as constituting 
a marriage or a mere betrothal. The Tumbuka term for the prac­
tice, ku.jalira, literally means "to book", as one books a hotel 
room or a seat with an airline. This tends to convey the idea 
that the arrangement is not regarded as a fully constituted 
marriage.
99
There can be little doubt that since the establishment of 
colonial rule, since the courts began to intervene in African 
family disputes, the norm against marriages involving young 
children has gained ascendancy.
The turning point came with the advent of Christian mis­
sions. Mission teaching condemned child-betrothals and child- 
marriages. Guided by the Christian-European concept that mar­
riage was a contract between man and woman, the missionaries 
insisted that the free consent of the parties was essential to 
a ’’valid" marriage. Child-marriages tended to undermine the 
consensual nature of marriage as conceived by the missions.
It is also useful to note that at the time of the arrival of 
the missions, various aspects of African customary law were 
undergoing a process of severe degeneration as a result of the 
intensification of slave trade and raiding. Principles of tra­
ditional law were being corrupted to accommodate the ever- 
increasing demand for slaves. Marriage was widely used to dis­
guise transactions in slaves. Early colonial court records are
30replete with cases of this nature. The condemnation of child 
marriages was in some respects an extension of the campaign 
against slave institutions.
Colonial magistrates played an even more decisive role in 
discouraging child-betrothals or child-marriages. They did so 
mainly by disallowing any claims based on such marriages or be­
trothals. In one case which came before the Blantyre District 
(Native) Court in 1909, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
the return of the latter's daughter aged6 years. According to
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the plaintiff, the girl in question was his wife. There would 
clearly seem to have been some arrangement to that effect be­
tween the defendant and the plaintiff. The presiding, European, 
magistrate was disgusted. He dismissed the claim, observing
that it was "repulsive that any native should marry a child of
31such tender years".
kej>T^
In 1911, the same court . another case in which the 
plaintiff claimed for the return of a wife whom he had married 
two years previous to the presentation of the suit. According 
to the presiding magistrate, the wife in question was only 
about 8 and 9 years old at the time of the hearing. He ob­
served :
Besides conformity with native custom in the matter of 
ankhoswe etc., free consent of both principals is neces­
sary to a valid marriage: in this case the girl is not 
old enough to give such consent as she cannot understand 
the contract.32
The marriage was therefore, in the words of the judgement, 
"annulled". In another similar case the same court declared 
that the marriage was void, although the supposed husband was
awarded 2/6 compensation for the hut he had built in the girl's
33village. In yet another case with similar facts, the court 
declared that there could be no marriage. Yet, confusingly, it
Q  /
went on to record a judgement of "divorce".
One observation which can be made from these judgements is 
how the magistrates so readily incorporated English legal con­
cepts into customary law. Even assuming that pre-colonial cus­
tomary law did not allow marriages involving children of tender
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years to take place, it is altogether unlikely that traditional 
authorities would have applied the concepts of a void or void­
able marriage contract in the manner of the European magistrates. 
There is no evidence indicating that such concepts of legal 
analysis ever formed part of traditional customary law. The 
cases just cited provide just one example of how foreign,
English, legal notions became infused into customary law.
Africans in general, far from asserting their "traditions" 
on this matter, tended to be self-conscious and many informers
would deny the existence of any such customs as allowed the
35betrothal of young children. Indeed, there is no reason to 
suppose that most of the informers would be deliberately lying 
about the relevant customs. With the advent of European rule, 
the relevant practices quickly began to die down and became 
less noticeable to a casual observer. The individuals indulg­
ing in such practices became less assertive, particularly when
36
they lived within the vicinity of a boma.
Thus, in one case which came before the Mzimba District 
(Native) Court in 1911, J sued M for the return of £1 and a 
number of blankets which M had received in consideration for the 
betrothal of his little daughter to J. It transpired that 
neither M nor J had wanted to be seen as the chief instigator 
of the transaction. When J came to M's place to claim his 
"bride", M simply pointed at the girl and told J to take her 
(by force). J refused to do so because, on his own admission, 
he was afraid of the boma. Instead, he asked M to bring the 
girl to his (J's) place for him. A stalemate developed and the
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37whole transaction fell through. The parties in this case 
were clearly well aware that their intended transaction con­
travened European precepts of social justice. Sometimes the 
mere knowledge of what Europeans would disapprove induced 
"self-correcting" processes within African communities.
b ) Marital Status
The question whether the married status of a person consti­
tutes a bar to subsequent marriage under customary law cannot 
fully be answered without taking into account existing marriage 
legislation. In particular, mention must be made of the legal
implications of the provisions of the Marriage Act (cap. 25;
3801). A person married under this Act cannot contract a sub­
sequent marriage under any law during the subsistence of the 
statutory marriage. The relevant statutory provisions, which
represent the imported English law rather than African custom
39are examined at a later stage in this study.
It is still a basic principle of the law of the country 
that a man who is married under customary law may enter any 
number of subsequent marriages under customary law. The mere 
fact that the first marriage is blessed by Christian marriage 
rites does not alter the legal position as regards the man's 
ability to take two or more wives. The whole relationship be­
tween the African institution of polygyny and the teaching and
rules of Christian missions is considered in detail in a later
u  ^ 40chapter.
In those communities which have adopted Islam as their 
religion, there is no evidence that the Quaranic rule which 
restricts the number of wives a man may marry to four only has
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modified African customary law. The Yao constitute the lar­
gest group of Africans who follow the Islamic faith in Malawi.
In many Yao marriages, a mwalimu (local muslim preacher or 
teacher) is called to perform a religious rite. However, in 
basic matters of marriage law traditional African custom pre-
/ O
vails. In 1954, J.D.N. Anderson observed, with respect to 
the Yao of Nyasaland, that there were "occasional complaints 
that a man /had7 ... exceeded the four /wivesj which Islam
y O
allows". Anderson made this observation to stress the ab-
44sence of any strong Islamic influence on Yao marriage customs,
rather than to suggest that the limit to four wives had become
established among Yao muslims. Of course, however, a "com-
45plaint" against a muslim who takes more than four wives can 
still be made on purely religious grounds, in the same manner 
as a "complaint" may be made against a Christian who takes an 
additional wife. However, except in the case of Asians,^ reli­
gious doctrines as such are not legally enforceable. They can 
only be enforced if they become part of local custom. There is 
no evidence that the Islamic rule restricting a man to four 
wives was ever, or is now, part of Yao custom.
As a general rule, a woman cannot enter into a subsequent 
marriage during the continuance of a prior marriage.^ While 
a marriage involving a woman who is already married to another 
man is regarded as irregular, what this means in precise legal 
terms is not an entirely straightforward matter. The follow­
ing examination of actual judicial decisions underlines the un­
certain state of the law.
In patrilineal systems, where marriage involves the payment 
of malobolo (bride price), there is a principle which states
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that noone should be in possession of two or more malobolo 
with respect to one and the same woman. In the case of V.J. 
Chimombo v. J. Silungwe (1979),^ the National Traditional 
Appeal Court explained the principle as follows:
Where two men pay lobola in respect of the same woman, 
the first man to pay is the one legally married and en­
titled to her, and should the second man purport to live 
with the woman, he should be guilty of elopment and the 
legal husband may maintain an action for her return and 
damages.49
The person who receives the malobolo is liable to the second 
man for the malobolo paid by the latter. If sued for damages 
by the legal husband, the second man may also be entitled to 
proceed against the guardian for indemnity.
In Charles Chinula v. Elija Kacheche (1940),^* A. Kacheche 
(son of the respondent) was married to E. Chinula (daughter of 
the appellant). E. Chinula committed adultery with N. Moyo 
when her husband was away; a child was born as a result of the 
adultery. The respondent received two head of cattle from N. 
Moyo as compensation for the adultery. Later, the respondent 
sued the appellant for the return of the malobolo (2 head of 
cattle and 5/-) which had been paid on behalf of A. Kacheche. 
Apparently, it was at E. Chinula's insistence that the respon­
dent had brought the suit for the return of malobolo as she 
wanted to be free to remarry. The suit for the return of 
malobolo was, in essence, a petition for divorce. In fact, E. 
Chinula (the appellant) had meanwhile already received one cow 
from N. Moyo, apparently as malobolo for E. Chinula.
The court of Native Authority M'Mbelwa Jere (Mzimba) re­
fused to grant the return of malobolo. E. Chinula was ordered
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to return to her father-in-law, the respondent. Interesting­
ly, however, the court also ordered the appellant to hand 
over to the respondent the cow which the former had received 
from N. Moyo (in connection with the intended second marriage 
of E. Chinula). The appellant (Charles Chinula) was dissatis­
fied with M'Mbelwa's decision and appealed to the District 
Commissioner. The appeal was upheld and the District Commis­
sioner made the following pertinent observation in relation to 
the cow given by N. Moyo:-
If Chinula received the cow as part of payment for a new 
"dowry" he was wrong as there had been no divorce between 
the parties in any native court. If Chinula received the 
cow as compensation for adultery he had no right to do so 
as according to native custom, such compensation is pay­
able only to the husband or his relatives.52
The District Commissioner then proceeded to dissolve the mar­
riage between A. Kacheche and E. Chinula. He also ordered the 
return of two head of cattle and 5/- originally claimed by the 
respondent. He further ordered that the appellant should re­
turn the cow received from N. Moyo to the latter and not to 
the respondent. He finally observed:
As to whether N. Moyo now marries E. Chinula, that is a 
matter for the parties concerned and not for anyone 
else.53
The decision underlined the principle referred to above, namely 
that noone should be in possession of two malobolo with respect 
to one woman. While the appellant was still in possession of 
the malobolo received on account of his daughter's first mar­
riage, he could not legally receive "new" malobola or adultery 
damages on account of the same daughter. In effect, the case 
underlined the view that under customary law a woman cannot
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contract a valid marriage during the subsistence of another 
marriage to another man.
The original order by NA M'Mbelwa was, in principle, pos­
sibly not very different from that of the District Commissioner. 
Although there is no record of the reasons for the order, it 
seems likely that the Native Authority court had envisaged an 
eventual divorce between A. Kacheche and E. Chinula and a sub­
sequent marriage between the latter and N. Moyo. M'Mbelwa's 
order was apparently an attempt to effect a "gradual divorce", 
whereby E. Chinula would remain with her father-in-law until 
N. Moyo had fully recouped the "father-in-law" for the 
malobolo paid to the appellant. The cow originally paid by N. 
Moyo to the appellant would have been given to the respondent 
in part payment of the malobolo which would have been due from 
the appellant to the respondent upon the anticipated divorce 
between A. Kacheche and E. Chinula. The cow would then have 
been treated as part payment of malobolo due from N. Moyo to 
the appellant.
In David Mfune v. Lyson Baloyi (1981),^ before the Nation­
al Traditional Appeal Court, the husband (D.M.) failed to prove 
that the marriage between his former wife and another man had 
taken place before his own marriage to the woman had been valid­
ly terminated. The husband (the appellant), put forward a 
rather ingenious argument. Soon after his marriage to the 
woman in question, it was discovered that the latter was al­
ready pregnant with another man's child. Upon this discovery, 
the woman's father, the respondent (L.B.), returned the malo­
bolo he had received from the appellant. The respondent's case
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was that the return of malobolo had terminated the marriage.
The appellant, however, argued that according to the relevant 
Ngoni customary law, the fact that a woman is found to be preg­
nant by another man at the time of marriage does not automati­
cally nullify the marriage. The husband, it was argued, could 
still accept the validity of the marriage, except that part of 
malobolo would have to be returned. The appellant maintained 
that this had been his intention when he had sent the wife back 
to her parents and when he had accepted the malobolo proffered. 
Confirming the finding of the lower appeal court, the National 
Traditional Appeal Court found as a fact that the whole, and not 
just part, of the malobolo had been returned to the appellant. 
The court observed, however, that:-
Even if the lobola was paid back, if it was paid after the 
respondent had already allowed his daughter to be married 
to somebody else the respondent would still be liable to 
the appellant ... because unless all the lobola was paid 
back the marriage was still in subsistence and the respon­
dent could [ n ly allow his daughter to be married
It was held, however, that the appellant had failed to show 
that the malobolo had been returned after the respondent had 
already given his daughter to another man.
The cases just cited do indicate that a subsisting marriage 
constitutes a bar on the part of the woman to any marriage with 
a third party. This is not simply to say that polyandry is not 
recognised under customary law. Even if the intention of the 
woman is to abandon her husband, the cases seem to state that 
she cannot contract a valid marriage with another man before 
the first marriage has effectively been terminated. The proper
to somebody
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procedure for a woman who wants to leave her husband and marry 
another man is to wait, or to institute proceedings, for the 
dissolution of the first marriage before contracting a second 
marriage. This also extends to widowed women, since death does 
not ipso facto bring a marriage to an end as is the case under 
English l a w.^
The general rule that a woman cannot enter into a subse­
quent marriage during the continuance of a prior marriage would 
appear to have been applied less strictly to marriages contrac­
ted under matrilineal systems than to lobola marriages. How­
ever, even in relation to the latter marriages, the courts have 
not always been consistent in their approach.^
In one case, brought before the Blantyre District Court, 
a married woman contracted a second marriage with another man. 
After five years, the first husband instituted proceedings, for 
the restitution of conjugal rights. The court held that there 
was no point in forcing the woman to go back to her first hus­
band. Instead, the court ordered the second husband to pay 10/- 
to the first husband as compensation for the latter's "loss of 
a wife".^
In the more recent case of Matimati Nkhwazi v. Dailes
59nyaPhiri (1982), the wife left her husband because the latter 
was inflicted with leprosy. Without formally divorcing the 
husband, she married another man. The first husband instituted 
proceedings, for the return of the wife. The court of first 
instance did not grant the order for the return of the wife. 
Instead, it ordered the dissolution of the first marriage on 
the ground of the husband's leprosy. The respondent, the wife,
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was ordered to pay K16 compensation to the petitioner. The 
husband appealed to the Nkhata-Bay Traditional Court of Appeal, 
where both the divorce and the award of K16 ordered by the 
lower court were upheld. The husband finally appealed to the 
National Traditional Appeal Court.
The National Traditional Court observed that, under the 
relevant Tonga law, the respondent should have asked for a 
divorce or some other arrangement by the respective parents be­
fore marying another man. It was further observed by the court 
that the husband's illness, however serious, did not entitle 
the wife to a divorce. Significantly however, the court 
ordered the dissolution of the first marriage on the ground that 
the subsequent marriage between the respondent and the other man 
had become a fait accompli. The subsequent union was thus 
accepted as constituting a valid marriage.
There is a sense in which even these latter decisions 
underline the idea that a marriage contracted by a woman during 
the subsistence of a prior marriage to another man is irregular. 
The cases do show that the first husband has a right of action 
against either the wife herself or her intended second husband. 
More importantly, the cases do not rule out the possibility that 
the wife can be ordered to return to her first husband. Yet the 
decisions implicitly recognised the legal validity of marriages 
contracted in this way. Analysed in the terms of English law, 
the decisions convey the idea that under customary law, a mar­
ried woman does 'not necessarily lack the legal capacity to con­
tract a new customary marriage. In other words, a marriage 
contracted by a woman during the subsistence of an earlier
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marriage to another man is not void ab initio. Such a marriage 
is merely subject to certain rights which a court may enforce 
against either the woman or her second partner, in favour of 
the first husband.
It does not appear that there are any major differences 
in the substantive principles of the various communities on this 
matter. The lack of uniformity in court decisions seems mainly 
to underline the general phenomena of customary-law courts, 
whereby decisions are guided more by the circumstances of each 
case than by abstract rules or principles. Thus, there are 
cases where it is clear that the woman and her relatives are 
against the first marriage and that it is only the second mar­
riage which has a chance of lasting. In such cases the prin­
ciple that a married woman lacks the legal capacity to contract 
a valid marriage may be played down or altogether ignored in 
order to preserve the subsequent marriage. This approach is 
partly necessitated by the greater extent to which the exis­
tence of a customary marriage depends on the wishes of the 
people involved rather than on any governmental authority.
Still, the distinction between matrilineal and patrilineal 
systems may be a relevant one. It will be shown later that it 
is more important under the patrilineal than under the matri­
lineal systems that a man is validly married to a woman when it 
comes to the determination of the man's rights over the chil­
dren borne by the woman. The question, and principles regard­
ing, whether or not a marriage has been properly constituted 
may thus tend to receive greater emphasis under patrilineal 
than under matrilineal systems.
Ill
c) Prohibited Degrees
In customary law the degrees of relationship within which 
marriage is forbidden are very much wider than those of English 
law.
In the past, even the clan constituted an exogamous unit.
A clan is the largest familial group, with somewhat vague boun­
daries. It contains all the people who are supposed to be de­
scended from a common ancestress (in matrilineal systems) or 
ancestor (in patrilineal systems). Clans were very important 
in the past, particularly among the Chewa and related groups. 
For important social purposes, the lineage constituted the 
highest level of social grouping. The clan, which would com­
prise a number of villages and an even greater number of lin­
eages, was mostly important as a unit of political action. 
Still, marriage between members of the same clan was forbidden. 
People of the same clan were known by a common family name, 
which was also the name of the clan, like Banda, Phiri or 
Mwale. Thus, one general rule was that people with an identi­
cal family name could not marry each other.^ Nowadays, clans 
have lost their former importance. People with the same clan 
name may marry each other, so long as they are not descendants 
of a known common ancestor or ancestress. People are usually 
able to trace their ancestry up to the fifth or sixth genera­
tion. It ought to be pointed out, however, that even today, 
marriages betwen people who have the same family name are 
rather rare.
As a general rule, blood relatives are not allowed to 
marry each other under customary law.^
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In many communities, however, cross-cousin marriages are
allowed. Among such matrilineal people as the Chewa, such
marriages were even preferred, for, as Lucy Mair observed,
"the youth £could7 follow the rule that he must live at his
62wife's home without leaving his own village". In her study
of one area comprising four villages in Dedza District, Mair 
noted that of the 73 marriages contracted in the area, 22 
(about 30%) were between cross-cousins. In the same villages,
an even higher proportion of the marriages were intra-village
63ones.
The familiarity already existing among all the parties 
concerned in cases of cross-cousin marriages may contribute to 
happier relations between husband and wife. Some of the tens­
ions inherent in the relationships between the respective kin 
of the husband and the wife are eliminated. On the other hand, 
it was predominantly in relation to cross-cousin marriages 
that the practice of child-betrothal and forced marriages used 
to flourish. Such marriages often underlined a social ideolo­
gy under which the interests and happiness of the individual
spouses were subordinated to the wishes of the elders and the
64interests of larger social groups.
Furthermore, the parties to a cross-cousin marriage are 
people who have interacted with each other in other roles, 
namely those of blood relatives. It is thus possible that such 
parties may have difficulties in adjusting to the roles of 
husband and wife. There may even be a tendency to view their 
new roles and relationship less seriously than would be the 
case between complete strangers. Thus, in the case of
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Namfuko v. Awali and Akunjawa (1935),^“* which came before the 
Chiradzulu District Commissioner, Namfuko and Akunjawa were 
cross-cousins who had been married for several years. Later 
Akunjawa, the wife, ran away with Awali with the intention of 
marrying him. In a suit for divorce and compensation by 
Namfuko, the wife contended that her marriage to the petition­
er was not a "real one", but merely a "cousin marriage". As 
such, the wife contended that the marriage was not a legally 
binding one. The attitude of the respondent in this case 
shows how some people may tend to view marriage between cross­
cousins as a species of social arrangement distinct from, and 
less solemn than, marriages involving people who are not rela­
ted to each other. In the relevant case, however, the court 
correctly rejected this view and emphasised that even the so- 
called "cousin marriage" was a legally binding marriage.
Marriages between cross-cousins have tended to decline 
with the decline in arranged marriages. Indeed, such marriages 
do not seem ever to have been popular among people following 
the patrilineal system.
Marriage between close affines is also forbidden. In 
general, however, the range of affines a person may not marry 
seems to be much more limited than that of blood relatives.
Each community has its own rules and within one community prac­
tices change from time to time.
Marriage between father-in-law and daughter-in-law or 
mother-in-law and son-in-law is universally forbidden. In some 
communities people within these relationships may not even eat
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food in the presence of each other. Marriage between any 
parent of a husband and any parent of a wife is equally for­
bidden. On the other hand, in many systems of customary law, 
a man is allowed to marry the uterine sisters of his wife ir­
respective of whether or not the latter is deceased. Indeed, 
in some societies in the olden days, the husband of an elder 
sister had a prior right to marry the younger sisters of his 
wife. Other suitors had to pay a token gift to him before 
they could marry the younger sisters.^ However, although a 
husband may marry the sister of his w i f e , ^  marriage between 
the brother of a husband and the sister of a wife may not be 
permitted. Again, however, in many societies, a widow may 
marry her deceased husband's brother. Normally, however, the
brother of a deceased husband does not marry but "inherits"
6 8the widow.
It is useful to bear in mind that ultimately, it is the 
opinion or view of the parents of the parties rather than an 
abstract code of prohibited degrees which matters most. With­
in certain limits, if the parents on both sides have no objec­
tion to a proposed marriage, the marriage is likely to take 
place. The general guiding principle has been described by 
Radcliffe-Brown in the following words:-
...the rules or customs relating to prohibited or pre­
ferred marriages have for their social function to pre­
serve, maintain, or continue an existing kinship struc­
ture as a system of institutional relations. Where a 
marriage between relatives would threaten to disrupt or 
throw into -disorder the established system it tends to 
be disapproved or forbidden, and the greater and more 
widespread the disturbance that would be caused by a mar­
riage, the stronger tends to be the disapproval which it 
meets with.69
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The customary-law bars to marriage on the basis of affinity 
and consanguinity do not appear to have been much of a topical 
issue with the missionaries. This is perhaps to be expected.
The extended nature of African kinship ties, emphasised by the 
classificatory terminology employed in establishing relation­
ships,^ meant that exogamous groupings within African communi­
ties were much larger than was the case under church law. Thus, 
many prohibitions based on church law were also to be found 
under African customary law.^ Of the few exceptions were is­
sues about the marriage of a widow to the brother of her de­
ceased husband and the marriage of a man to the sister of his
wife. But then, these same marriages have been a subject of
72controversy even in relation to English law. The marriage of 
widows to their deceased husbands' brothers, for example, was 
a major issue in the Livingstonia Mission Presbytery early in 
this century. Donald Fraser, a missionary of comparatively 
liberal views, made several attempts to have the practice legal­
ised by the church. In October, 1911, he successfully pushed
through Presbytery a motion to this effect. A year later,
73however, the motion was annulled.
4. Essential Consents
It is socially desirable for all key members of the fami-
74lies of both parties to approve a proposed marriage. For 
legal purposes, however, only the consent of the following 
categories of people may be absolutely necessary.
a) The Parties
At least in theory, as already noted, marriage under cus­
tomary law is to be regarded as a pact between two familial
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groups rather than just as an agreement between the prospective 
husband and wife. Normally, it is the agreement between the 
parties’ "marriage guardians"^ and not any agreement between 
the parties themselves, that is said to constitute the contract 
of marriage.^ Hence, the question arises whether the consent 
of the parties themselves is really essential to the validity 
of the marriage contract.
Even within purely indigenous systems of law, it was 
standard procedure to obtain the consent of both parties before 
the conclusion of formal marriage negotiations. Although the 
consent of the boy (or man) would seem to have been regarded as 
more essential,^ it was normally the consent of the girl (or 
woman) that required formal expression.
Normally, marriage negotiations commenced with courtship 
and an agreement between a boy and a girl to become husband and 
wife. Once the two had agreed upon a marriage, they would ex­
change information indicating which of their respective rela­
tives would be responsible for formal negotiations. Formal ne­
gotiations were invariably initiated by the boy's side, and it 
was therefore the boy who first apprised his elders of a pro­
posed marriage. Apart from a gift (chikole) which was given 
by the boy to the girl, it was in fact this exchange of informa­
tion - as to the identity of those responsible for the negotia­
tions - that distinguished a relationship which was intended to 
develop into a marriage from one that was intended to remain a 
mere casual affair. The boy's relatives would not open formal 
negotiations until they had been formally requested to do so by 
the boy. The consent of the latter to the eventual marriage was
117
normally inferred from his request to his relatives to open 
negotiations. On their part, the girl's relatives would nor­
mally not proceed with any negotiations before they had formal­
ly obtained the girl's consent. In general, it was not neces­
sary for the boy and the girl publicly to declare in the pre­
sence of each other their intentions to become husband and wife.
Even in cases where parents selected spouses for their 
78children, and where formal marriage negotiations were not 
preceded by any courtship or agreement between the intended 
spouses, the consent of the latter would normally be obtained 
at least before they could be called upon to commence cohabita­
tion.
On the other hand, it is important to remember that the 
freedom to accept or reject a marriage on the part of the par­
ties was often exercised within a multiplicity of accepted con­
straints. A couple would, for example, accept a proposed mar­
riage because, as cross-cousins, they felt obliged to marry 
each other according to the wishes of their parents. A member 
of the Ngoni aristocracy, to take another example, would feel 
bound to go through with a marriage that had been arranged to
cement vital political alliances even though he or she had a
79different personal preference. Such constraints, however, 
were not necessarily inconsistent with the presence of consent 
on the part of the parties.
Whether, on the other hand, the 'consent of the parties was 
regarded as an essential condition for legal validity is not 
conclusively established by the available evidence. Even were
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it not legally essential, the consent of the parties could have 
been insisted upon for the purely practical purpose of enhanc­
ing the chances of happy marriages. Although it was by no means 
an outstanding feature of traditional African family life, com­
panionship in marriage could not have been completely ignored as 
a factor to successful relationships. There is the possibility 
that the consent of the parties was designed to have a secondary 
or supportive role, as opposed to a constitutive one, in the 
formation of marriage. A party who had consented to a marriage 
could more readily be expected to honour his or her marital ob­
ligations than one who had entered into a marriage grudgingly 
or through compulsion. The fact that in some cases marriage 
could be arranged for very young children without any real con­
sensual capacity is indeed indicative of the possibility that 
the consent of the parties was not essential to the legal vali­
dity of a marriage.
At the present day, it is a well-established principle of 
customary law that the consent of both parties is essential to 
the validity of marriage. In the Restatement, Ibik notes - 
with reference to all princip^L^ African groups in Malawi - that
the consent of both spouses to marry each other is essential to
80the validity of marriage. It has not been possible to identi­
fy a recent or entirely authoritative judicial decision on the
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point. In Kamcaca v. Nkhota (1968), the High Court of Malawi 
listed the consent of parties among the essentials of a valid 
customary marriage. In the relevant instance, however, the 
court was concerned more with Southern Rhodesian, than with 
Malawian, customary law.
It is mainly in the decisions of the early District Courts 
and in certain official communications of colonial administra­
tors that one may find pronouncements of the principle under 
consideration. Petitions for "divorce" on the ground that a 
marriage had been contracted without the consent of a petition­
er were quite common during the early years of the colonial ad­
ministration. (The petitions were almost invariably brought 
by women or girls. This tends to suggest that marriages ar­
ranged against the wishes of boys were less frequent. For it 
is unlikely that men would have been any less inclined to use
the courts to free themselves from unwanted marriages than 
82women.) Some of the petitions do not provide typical exam­
ples of the traditional power of parents over their children in 
matters of marriage; they simply indicate that even in the 
period immediately preceding the establishment of colonial rule 
and for some years afterwards, there had been many dealings in
women slaves. Some of the women had simply been captured by
8 3their alleged husbands. Others had been given away by their 
own relatives, initially not by way of marriage, but in settle­
ment of some debt or as compensation for h o m i c i d e s . M a n y  of 
the typical examples of marriage arrangements made without the 
consent of the wives involved children of tender years. Cases 
where adult girls or women were concerned tended to involve 
other complications besides the mere absence of consent. In 
one suit, for example, it transpired that the person who had 
forcibly given the woman in marriage was not the latter's im­
mediate relation, but someone the woman chose to describe 
merely as "this man". Thus, in challenging the validity of the 
marriage, the petitioner relied not only on the absence of her
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consent, but also on the fact that the person who had given
85her away was not competent to do so or to act as her nkhoswe.
There is no doubt as to the broad legal principle followed 
by the courts in the relevant cases. Reference has already 
been made to a judgement of the Blantyre District Court in 1911 
in which it was stated that:
Besides conformity with native custom in the matter of 
ankhoswe etc., free consent of both principals is neces­
sary to a valid marriage.86
It may be recalled that in the relevant case, a girl who had 
been given in marriage while still of tender years and without 
her consent was entitled to leave the alleged husband (respon­
dent), and the marriage in question was "annulled". Although
not stated in the same concise manner, this principle was under-
87lined by decisions in many other cases.
Some of the judgements, however, would seem to have put a
gloss on the principle. Thus, in one case which was decided
88by the same Blantyre District Court, a woman petitioned for 
"divorce" on the ground that she had not been consulted in the 
arrangement of her marriage to the respondent. Since the in­
ception of the marriage, however, she had lived with the respon­
dent for several years and three children had been born. The 
fact that the petitioner had not been consulted in the arrange­
ment of the marriage would clearly seem to have been accepted 
by the court. Yet, the petitioner was still ordered to return 
to her husband and was warned that orders regarding compensation
and custody of children would be made against her if she did not
89do so. Notably, it was observed that the petitioner had lived
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with the respondent for a very long time within British rule 
without making any objection to the marriage. As such, it was 
held, she could not be allowed to deny the validity of the mar­
riage .
The relevant decisions seem to imply that a marriage that 
was invalid at its inception for want of consent on the part of 
one party could retrospectively be validated, either by subse-
jaL.) l a r f
quent consent, or by mere inatjri4ity on the part of the relevant 
party to challenge the validity of the marriage at the earliest 
possible opportunity.
The colonial administration never expressly legislated 
against "forced marriages". In the 1930s, pressure had been 
put on the Colonial Office to look into the question of the 
freedom of women in British dependencies regarding marriage ar­
rangements. Allegations had been made, particularly with refer­
ence to East Africa, that African girls were being forcibly 
dragged into marriages against their wishes, and that colonial
administrations in the dependencies were doing nothing at all
90to alleviate the plight of such girls. The relevant adminis­
trations, including the administration in Nyasaland, were re­
quested by the Colonial Office to consider the possibility of
91introducing legislation on the matter. The administration 
in Nyasaland argued against the proposal for legislation. One 
of the arguments advanced by the administration was that the 
alleged cases of coercion had generally ceased to occur. The 
other argument was that sufficient safeguards existed through 
the combination of customary law itself and colonial adminis­
trative institutions. The relevant passage of the Governor's 
reply to the Colonial Office read:
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(b) In the extremely remote case of attempted coercion, 
a girl would not hesitate to complain to the village 
headman, or to the /’Native Authorityj or /District 
CommissionerJ if necessary.
(c) If a complaint of this nature were brought before a 
Native Court and attempted coercion proved, the parent 
responsible would be publicly reprimanded, ordered to 
pay costs and probably fined for breach of native law 
and custom.92
This clearly underlined the readiness of colonial officials to 
intervene on behalf of the individual against the authority of 
the kin.
Indeed, the intervention of colonial officials in African 
family matters constituted a major factor in the establishment 
of the principle that the free consent of the parties was es­
sential to the legal validity of marriages under customary law. 
Of course, this was not the only factor. The teaching of 
Christian missions and the availability of economic opportuni­
ties outside traditional kinship structures, greatly undermined 
the prestige and authority carried by age, and, helped to foster 
the notion of individual liberty as a fundamental principle of 
social life. Still, any proposition that the consent of indi­
vidual spouses was essential to the validity of marriages would 
largely be futile in the absence of the superior authority of 
colonial courts to reverse the decisions of senior family mem­
bers .
It must be emphasised that since the early times of coloni­
al rule, the tendency even among African traditionalists was to 
emphasise the importance of consent, as opposed to asserting 
that parents had any legal power to impose arranged marriages 
on their children. The importance of obtaining the consent of
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the parties in marriage arrangements was already widely recog­
nised even before European intervention. It is not very like­
ly, however, that a chief or some other outside authority with­
in purely traditional African society could intervene in a mar­
riage arrangement in order to uphold the wishes of an unwilling 
party. The character of traditional African society was such 
that the preservation of the authority of the old over the 
young, and the subordination of the wishes of individuals to 
the interests of whole kin groups, received greater emphasis 
than the promotion of individual freedom. Perhaps only where 
a proposed marriage was palpably inappropriate - for example, 
if it was clearly incestuous - could an outside authority 
intervene.
b ) The Bride's Guardian
Strictly, the principal parties to a marriage contract 
under customary law are not the spouses themselves, but certain 
of their senior relatives, commonly known in English as "mar­
riage guardians". The question as to which of the spouses' 
relatives may act as marriage guardians is briefly considered 
at the end of this discussion.
Without exception, the consent of the bride's guardian is 
absolutely essential to the validity of marriage under customa­
ry law. Without the guardian's consent or approval, a relation­
ship entered into by a woman is regarded as mere friendship
(chibwenzi in chiChewa or chibwezi in chiTumbuka), whatever the
93views or intentions of the parties themselves. In some cases, 
the man may even be held liable in damages to the guardian for 
"illicit intercourse" or - should the relationship involve the
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^  94removal of the woman from her guardian - for elopment.
h
There should not be much confusion in practice whether or 
not a guardian has rendered his consent or approval to a mar­
riage. Although there are generally no prescribed methods or 
formalities whereby guardians may express their consent, such 
consent is normally expressed with sufficient publicity and 
formality as to leave no doubt as to its existence. Further­
more, the existence of consent is made obvious through the 
guardian's participation in certain key formalities. In patri­
lineal systems where the payment of malobolo by the groom's 
side to the bride's side constitutes a vital ingredient of mar­
riage, it is the bride's guardian who is the principal recipi­
ent of malobolo. The receipt of malobolo or participation in 
some agreement regarding the same on the part of the guardian 
will be evidence of his consent to the marriage. In matrilin- 
eal systems, a marriage is not legal unless the girl's guardian
and the boy's guardian meet or otherwise come to stand surety
95(chinkhoswe) for the marriage. In general, any normally con­
stituted marriage involves, at the end of the formalities, the
handing over of the girl by her guardian to cohabit with the 
96boy. The guardian would not hand over the girl to the boy 
unless he (the guardian) consents to the marriage.
However, matters may not always be so straightforward. 
Difficulties do, for example, arise when an unmarried girl is 
made pregnant or simply runs away and begins to cohabit with a 
man. The guardian of the girl can bring an action against the 
man (or the man's legal guardian) as noted above. If, after 
receiving the compensation, the guardian does not take the girl
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away, but leaves her to continue cohabiting with the offending 
man, doubts may arise as to the nature of the resulting rela­
tionship between the parties.
97
In Gerald Phiri v. John Kumwenda (1938), the Atonga 
Tribal Council Native Authority court had ordered the appell­
ant to pay £2 5/- to the respondent as compensation for the 
appellant's adultery with the respondent's wife. On appeal 
to the District Commissioner, the appellant contended that the 
respondent and his alleged wife were not validly married and 
therefore that he could not be liable for adultery to the re­
spondent. To substantiate this claim, he referred to a previ­
ous case in which the respondent had been ordered to pay £1 10/— 
for an illicit union with the woman in question. In the same 
previous case, however, the respondent had also been ordered to 
"regularise" his union by paying "dowry". The appeal was dis­
missed and it was held:
There is no doubt that the fact that John, respondent, was 
ordered to pay dowry proves that his marriage with the 
woman was binding.98
The dowry ordered had not in fact been paid. Still, the exis­
tence of a binding marriage was inferred from the fact that no- 
one had appealed against the order as to dowry. All the parties 
were said to have been in agreement with the order. This was 
taken to represent consent to the marriage on the part of all 
the people involved, which included the woman's guardian.
99In Tadeyu Nkhata v. Daina nyaKaunda (1938), also an ap­
peal from the Native Authority court of the Atonga Tribal Coun­
cil, the same appeal court reached a different conclusion. The
126
appellant had asked for the respondent's hand in marriage. The 
latter agreed but refused to permit the appellant to contact 
her parents. The two eloped. In fact, the respondent was al­
ready married to another man who had paid £5 in malobolo. The 
respondent's mother took the appellant to court where the lat­
ter was ordered to pay £4. This amount was described as 
"dowry". The mother, however, refused to accept this amount
lant, whereupon the latter sued to recover the £2. His claim 
was dismissed by the A.T.C. The appellant appealed to the 
District Appeal Court, contending that the £2 had been paid as 
dowry which should be recoverable upon desertion by the respon­
dent. On the respondent's part, it was contended by her mother 
that the £2 had not been received as malobolo, but as compensa­
tion for the adultery/elopment. The mother pointed out that 
her side had refused to accept the £4 ordered because they knew 
that their daughter was already married. They could not take 
their daughter back from the appellant, she contended, because 
the daughter had "proved adamant". The appeal was dismissed 
in the following words:
In my opinion this (£2) could not have been dowry. Her 
previous husband paid £5 and parents would not accept 
£2 from another man. They would undoubtedly have claimed 
compensation for adultery. If £2 was dowry, where was 
the compensation for adultery?100
In other words, it was found as a fact that there had been no 
intention on the part of the respondent's guardian to consent 
to a marriage between the latter and the appellant. Yet, 
the decision may be questioned in its endorsement of the entit­
lement of the respondent's mother to compensation for her own
and could only accept £2. Later,
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daughter’s adultery. One would have thought that the people
entitled to the compensation were the relatives of the legal
husband (if the latter was away as seems to have been the case)
102rather than the respondent's relatives.
Instances of confusion as to whether or not a woman's re­
latives have consented to a marriage are not confined to
103lobola-paying systems. In David v. Kunyalaka (1934), David 
wanted to marry Kunyalaka. He approached Kunyalaka's relatives 
with a formal proposal of marriage. David was told that the 
woman, Kunyalaka was already married to a man who was then in 
Southern Rhodesia. David insisted, however, undertaking to 
meet all the legal liabilities should the husband institute 
any proceedings against Kunyalaka or her relatives. The rela­
tives accepted this offer and David and Kunyalaka commenced 
cohabitation. Apparently, no formal chinkhoswe was instituted. 
No formal proceedings by the previous husband or his relatives 
were brought against the arrangement. No formal divorce had 
taken place between Kunyalaka and her absentee husband. The 
union between David and Kunyalaka had lasted for eleven years 
and four children had been born when David discovered that the 
hut tax he had been paying for Kunyalaka (through Kunyalaka's 
guardian) was not being registered in his (David's) name but 
that of Kunyalaka's previous husband. David took Kunyalaka to 
the court of Native Authority Mpama.
The suit hinged on whether or not there was a valid mar­
riage between David and Kunyalaka. In the course of the hear­
ing before the Native Authority, Kunyalaka's relatives denied 
that David was Kunyalaka's husband and contended that the
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relationship in question had been mere "chibwenzi". The Native 
Authority agreed with this contention. It "dissolved" the 
union and ordered the respondent to pay 10/- compensation. 
(After finding that there was no marriage it is not clear why 
the award of compensation was made.) The appellant appealed 
to the District Commissioner, contending that his marriage to 
the respondent had been properly constituted and that he still 
wanted his wife for whom he had paid hut tax for eleven years. 
The District Appeal Court held that David could not claim that 
his union had been properly constituted simply because of long 
cohabitation and the fact that his relationship with the respon 
dent had not been actively opposed by the latter's relatives:
The union was merely "chibwenzi", an "illicit" union and 
therefore respondent is free to end it whenever she de­
sires . 104-
Having thus decided, however, the court went on to observe that 
the conduct of the respondent and her relatives was not alto­
gether justifiable:
The same facts make it clear that she /respondent^ undoubt­
edly expected David to become her husband and that her re­
latives acknowledged David, if not as her proper husband in 
the absence of a divorce from Saulos /"the previous husband7 * 
then as her lover. The fact that Elepere /“the official 
guardian of the responent^ never took action to prevent the 
union continuing or even starting, coupled with his failure 
to have David's name entered in the census has convinced me 
that although he accepted the union he was not prepared to 
lay himself open to a case for compensation and that the 
paying of all the taxes in Saulos' name by him was to manu­
facture evidence of his own integrity in the matter. He 
has attempted to run with the hare and hunt with the 
hounds without doubt.105
The respondent was ordered to pay back all the taxes paid for 
her by the appellant.
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c ) The Groom's Guardian
The cases just recounted demonstrate the pitfalls of nego­
tiating one's own marriage without the help of one's relatives 
or guardian.
Under strict traditional law, the consent or approval of 
the groom's guardian is also essential to the validity of mar­
riage. Strictly, it is in the name of the groom's guardian
that the proposal of marriage to the bride's people is made.
It is also to the guardian that the reply is addressed. In 
patrilineal systems, the significance of the guardian's consent 
was further enhanced by the fact that the guardian constituted 
the principal donor of the malobolo. With the introduction 
of wage labour, many young people can pay their own malobolo 
without depending on their parents or relatives. This has 
tended to reduce the practical necessity for the guardian's 
consent. In practice, however, even those people who can fur­
nish their own malobolo act through their guardians or rela­
tives. In a rural setting, it is highly improbable that a 
young man would negotiate his own marriage without enlisting 
the help of his elders. On the other hand, married men who 
simply seek additional wives do often conduct their own negoti­
ations. At the present day, however, a marriage where the boy 
has duly paid his malobolo and obtained the consent of the 
girl's people may not be considered invalid simply because the 
boy's guardian has not given his consent or approval. Indeed, 
this fact seems 'to be taken for granted by the courts - so much 
so that there is hardly any decision specifically covering the 
point, although cases in which it is potentially relevant arise
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108from time to time. Although the traditional insistence on
the consent of the parties' guardians is as strong as ever as 
far as female parties are concerned, it has tended to be re­
laxed in the case of male parties.
However, a man who negotiates his own marriage without the 
involvement of his kin may have difficulties in enforcing his 
marital rights. It is to the kin, particularly the guardian, 
that a man turns when confronted with a hostile wife and 
hostile in-laws. The support of the kin cannot be relied on if 
the latter had not been consulted in the marriage arrangements. 
It is their involvement which constitutes the best evidence of 
the existence of a marriage. Without such involvement, the wife 
and her relatives may, however unjustifiably, altogether deny 
the existence of a marriage with impunity. From the viewpoint 
of the man's own kin, his relationship with the woman is as 
good as a mere chibwezi. Upon his death, there may be noone to 
look after his interests in the marriage.
In matrilineal systems, it is less certain that a man 
could contract a valid marriage without the consent of his 
guardian. Where malobolo have been paid, the courts will nor­
mally infer the existence of a valid marriage from the payment 
and receipt of the malobolo. They do not normally ask whether 
or not the man's guardian consented to the marriage. In matri­
lineal systems, on the other hand, the first question the 
courts will ask, if there is any dispute as to the existence of 
a marriage, is whether there are guardians from both sides who 
stand surety for the marriage. In David v. Kunyalaka (above), 
for example, the evidence of the respondent and her relatives
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denying the existence of the marriage was very suspect, as the 
District Commissioner pointed out. Yet they succeeded in their 
defence, at least on the question of whether or not there had 
been a valid marriage. Matters would very likely have been 
different had the appellant produced his own guardian as a wit­
ness to the alleged marriage.
A Note on Guardians
In general, it is the senior brother of one's mother who
acts as one's guardian in matrilineal systems. In some cases,
a woman's senior uterine brother may also act as her guardian.
Indeed, a relationship of conflict may sometimes emerge between
a mother's brother and a senior uterine brother over the guard-
109ianship of a group of sisters. In the absence of either of
these people, any other senior member of the matrilineage may 
act as a marriage guardian.
In theory, and this was also true of actual practice in 
the olden days, the consent of the parents of the parties was 
not legally required. The father in particular was regarded as 
a stranger and his consent was sought purely out of courtesy. 
Over the years, however, the role of the father in this respect 
has grown in importance. In a study of the matrilineal people 
of Dedza District, Lucy Mair stresses, for example, that:
Whatever may have been the case in the past, or elsewhere 
today, in Kaphuka village /"in DedzaJ, it is regarded as 
normal for children to be brought up by their own parents, 
and unnatural for them to go to the mother's brother while 
the parents' marriage is in being. The matrilineal prin­
ciple is not carried to the point of denying the father all 
authority over his children. It is definitely he, and not 
the mother's brother, whose consent is required for their 
marriage, and for the removal of a daughter by her husband. 
It is clear that the modern tendency is for the father's
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authority and responsibility to increase relatively to
that of the mother's brother.110
Speaking of the matrilineal systems in general, cases in which 
the father and not the maternal uncle has acted as the marriage 
guardian of a party have come up with much regularity. The 
tendency for the father's authority to increase is indeed one
of the most visible transformations in the social life of matri­
lineal people. Particularly in urban areas, among the working 
classes, the position of the father as the legal guardian of his
children is almost taken for granted. This development without
doubt underscores the enhanced character of the nuclear family 
as a discrete autonomous social unit and the diminishing influ­
ence and authority of the wider kin groups.
In patrilineal systems, a father, a father's brother, a 
paternal grandfather and even a brother can act as a guardian.
In rare circumstances, one's aunt - father's sister - may also 
assume the role of a g u a r d i a n . I n  some cases, most notably 
among the Tonga of Nkhata-Bay District, either the patrilineal 
or matrilineal principle may operate to determine a person's 
marriage guardian. In theory, the matter should be resolved 
by reference to the legal nature of the marriage between a 
party's father and mother. If malobolo had been paid, then 
the patrilineal principle should operate. If not, then the 
matrilineal system may operate. In practice, the determination 
of one's guardian is often the outcome of intricate social man­
oeuvres by members of the family of a party's father (bakuchi-
rumi,lit. on the man's side) and members of the family of a
112party's mother (bakuchikazi, lit, on the woman's side).
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In some special circumstances, a complete stranger may act 
as a marriage guardian. A person who has settled among complete 
strangers may rely on a substitute or surrogate guardian. Nor­
mally, even a stranger in a village assumes a particular posi­
tion within the maze of relationships of consanguinity and af­
finity which hold the village together. There will thus be 
people within the village whonhe or she regards as father, 
brother etc., and any one of these people can act as a marriage 
guardian. Even European administrators and missionaries occas­
ionally stood surety for marriages of freed slaves or people
113who had otherwise lost contact with their relatives. Cases
of this nature may be said to show the flexibility of customary 
law and its adaptability to different conditions. On the other 
hand, as will be argued later, they may also be indicative of 
the strain involved in the application of traditional customary 
law to modern conditions.
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CHAPTER THREE
CUSTOMARY LAWS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE - 
The Rights, Obligations and Implications of Marriage
Marriage creates new legal relationships and entails certain 
rights and obligations, on the part of the parties themselves 
and, on the part of third parties. Naturally, the diversity 
of traditional social systems implies a diversity in the cus­
tomary laws governing matrimonial rights and duties. The main 
division is between matrilineal and patrilineal societies, al­
though variations may be found within each of these systems.
In many important respects, the relevant principles of tradi­
tional customary law are not only inconsistent with European 
conceptions of social justice, but are also ill-suited to 
modern conditions of African life - a fact clearly brought out 
by some of the court cases considered below.
It will be recognised, especially from the discussions in 
the next chapter, that questions regarding matrimonial rights 
and obligations tend to arise mostly at the time of the break­
down of marriage. Thus, many of the legal rights and liabili­
ties which accrue on marriage are not covered in the present 
chapter, but are discussed in the next chapter, which deals 
with the dissolution of marriage and related matters. In the 
following discussions, the only issues examined are those which 
tend to arise during the subsistence of a marriage.
1. Choosing the Matrimonial Home
One of the main distinctions between the matrilineal and 
patrilineal systems of marriage practices is manifested in the
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principles governing the choice of the matrimonial home. This 
is one area of customary marriage law about which there have 
been some public expressions of dissatisfaction, especially 
with reference to the position under the matrilineal systems.*
a) The Law Under Matrilineal Systems
Strictly speaking, neither spouse has the right to dictate 
to the other as to where the matrimonial home should be set up. 
In matrilineal societies the husband is by law required to 
reside at his wife's village. In practice, however, it is the 
hope and intention of most men eventually to obtain permission 
to take their wives to their own villages. Such consent, by 
the wife's guardian, may be given as a matter of course after 
a period of observation during which the man's behaviour and 
ability to take good care of the woman are assessed. It is 
also possible, with the consent of the wife's guardian, for the 
man to take the wife to his village immediately after the mar­
riage. This usually happens where the man has a hereditary
position of authority in his village, for example, if he is a
o
village headman or a chief. A man who because of his work 
has to reside elsewhere may also be allowed to take his wife 
away immediately after the marriage. A token gift may be 
given to the guardian upon the removal of the wife from her 
village. Such a gift is not malobolo and does not change the 
rights of the parties, for example, as regards the affiliation 
of children. It may be noted in parenthesis that there is an 
obligation on the part of the man to "build a house for his 
wife in the latter's village. This obligation may be waived
where it has been agreed that the husband should take the wife
3
away immediately after the marriage.
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In principle, when the husband takes the wife away from 
her home, he does not do so as of right, but by virtue of the 
consent of the wife's guardian or, sometimes, the consent of 
the wife herself. Where the wife and her people refuse to let 
the husband take her away, the husband must cohabit with her 
in her village. If he refuses to do so but insists that the 
wife should follow him, he may be found guilty of desertion 
and the wife can divorce him. Thus in N v. K (1909),^ N sued 
K claiming the return of K's daughter, who had been given to 
N in marriage. K stated that he had not taken his daughter 
away from N, that he had only insisted that N should build a 
house in the village and not take the daughter away. The 
daughter - N's wife - corroborated her father's evidence and 
further stated that she did not want to go to N's village but 
wished to remain in her father's village. The Blantyre Dis­
trict Court held in favour of the defendant and ordered N to 
build a house within six weeks or else an order of "separation" 
(divorce) would be granted.
The power of the woman's family to determine the location 
of the matrimonial home has not, however, always been upheld 
by the courts. A husband may not, for example, be required to 
follow the wife and build a house each time the latter's guar­
dian shifts to a new site. In U v. A (1911) U petitioned 
the Blantyre District Court for the return of his wife who had 
followed her mother to a new site. U had already built a home 
for A at the site where they had been living before the shift.
U refused to follow A and her mother to the new site. The 
court decided in favour of the petitioner. The wife was or­
dered to return to her husband at the old site. The presiding
144
magistrate observed:
A man cannot be expected to be constantly moving to
suit his mother-in-law's whims.7
Q
Again, in K v. K (1910), the husband had been living with 
his wife at the wife's mother's home. On the death of her 
mother, the wife decided to leave the old site and sought to go 
and live with her uncle at a place far more inconvenient for 
the husband, who had a job with a company. The husband had 
also secured accommodation on the company's land. The wife was 
ordered by the court to go and stay with the husband at the 
accommodation secured by the latter.
Chimbamba v. Alise (1938)^ was an appeal from Native 
Authority Nkulo to the District Commissioner, Chiradzulu. The 
Native Authority court had ordered the appellant to leave his 
village and build a house at his wife's village. The appellant 
contended that the order was against an express agreement be­
tween the appellant, on the one hand, and the wife and her 
relatives on the other, to reside at the appellant's village, 
where the latter had a business and a permanent house. In pur­
suance of this agreement, the parties had lived at the appel­
lant's village for about three years. Then one day the wife
left for her village, ostensibly to attend a funeral. When 
she failed to return, the appellant petitioned the Native Auth­
ority court for her return. The Native Authority court or­
dered the wife to return on the condition that the appellant
should build a house in her village. On appeal to the District
Commissioner, it was found that the respondent and her rela­
tives were not keen on the marriage and were merely using the
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appellant for material gain. The District Commissioner ordered 
the wife to return to the appellant within one month, without 
the condition that the appellant should build a house in her 
village. When she failed to return, the marriage was dis­
solved on the ground of her desertion.
The order of the lower court was rather surprising, though 
not entirely unusual. Even the District Commissioner, however, 
noted that the order had been strictly in accordance with cus­
tomary law, although he did not follow the alleged law. 
Strictly, the house which a husband builds in the wife's vil­
lage is supposed to constitute a matrimonial home for both the 
husband and the wife, not just for the wife. The house is not 
some kind of payment or gift by the husband to her people.
Yet the order of the lower court would clearly seem to imply 
that the house was some sort of payment by the husband.
True, in principle, an agreement allowing the wife to re­
side at the husband's village or place of work does not alto­
gether revoke the husband's obligation to build a matrimonial 
house in the wife's village. Such an agreement simply sus­
pends the obligation. It does not alter the basic legal na­
ture of the marriage as an uxorilocal one. The order of the 
lower court in the above case would only have been in strict 
accordance with customary law if the court had not also or­
dered the respondent to return to her husband's village.
Thus, in matrilineal societies, marriages are as a rule 
uxorilocal. The husband is supposed to build a house in his 
wife's village and to live there for the duration of the mar­
riage. The tendency among the European magistrates was to
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interpret the matrilocal principle rather narrowly. The prin­
ciple was rarely allowed to operate outside itS narrow tra­
ditional context. A variety of pretexts were readily used as 
bases for avoiding the full implications of the principle. It 
is useful to note that the matrilocal principle was consistent 
with the high degree to which the conjugal unit of husband and 
wife was open to the external influences of the senior kin.
In other words, the principle was inherently inconsistent with 
the European conception of marriage as basically a matter be­
tween husband and wife.
b) The Law Under Patrilineal Systems
In patrilineal, lobola-paying systems, marriages are, 
generally•speaking, virilocal, that is, the wife is supposed 
to follow the husband to his village and reside there during 
the duration of the marriage.
Even here, however, a man is under an obligation to pro­
vide a house for the wife. If he has more than one wife, he 
should build a house for each of them.
Among the Ngoni of olden days, the very arrangement of
the huts of polygynous wives was governed by some intricate 
r u l e s . F r o m  the position of each hut, people could tell the 
status of each wife and consequently the legal status of the 
children born of each wife in relation to succession. Thus,
in the case of a Ngoni chief, his wives were assigned to dif­
ferent huts either to the right (lusungulu) or to the left 
(kwa gogo) of the hut of the mother of the chief. The succes­
sor to a vacant chieftainship always came from the lusungulu
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and never from the kwa gogo. The issue of the arrangement of 
huts was, for example, at the core of the bitter succession 
dispute which followed the death of Zwangendaba Jere.^*
Even in patrilineal systems, the location of the matri­
monial home is a matter which is not always free from diffi­
culties .
In some cases, the malobolo may not have been paid by the 
husband to the wife’s relatives. As a matter of principle, it 
is the payment of malobolo that justifies the removal of a 
woman from among her people to the husband's home. In S v. K 
(1913),^ K married S's brother's widow. S had not asked for 
malobolo because K resided in S's village. Later, K decided 
to move, but S refused to let his sister-in-law leave with K.
It was held that K could only remove S's sister-in-law after 
the payment of malobolo.
No authority has been found in relation to cases where 
the woman's relatives do not want to receive malobolo for their 
daughter even though the husband is able and willing to lobola.
Modern conditions, particularly the introduction of the 
cash economy are usually blamed for the high malobolo and the 
whole commercialisation of the system. In fact, there is 
sometimes a reverse tendency, whereby parents look askance at 
the receiving of "payments" for the marriages of their daugh­
ters. The reasons for this attitude are many. Some of these 
reasons have something to do with the view that the charging 
of malobolo amounts to a sale of the bride. This, of course, 
is a gross misunderstanding of the whole system of lobola
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13marriages. It is useful to mention that parents who are per­
fectly aware that a lobola marriage is not a sale, may never­
theless refuse to accept malobolo as a safeguard against, in 
the words of the National Traditional Appeal Court in Nicholas 
Msukwa v. Ellen Msowoya (1979):
...the sort of people who, after paying dowry, regarded a 
wife as an item of property, and not as a lifetime 
partner, and that they would treat a wife in any manner 
they wanted.14
In other words, a parent may refuse to accept malobolo in order 
to ensure that his daughter will not be mistreated on the basis 
of the misguided idea that the payment of malobolo gives a 
husband the right to do whatever he wants with his wife.
Another reason for a refusal to accept malobolo may be the 
desire on the part of the woman's parents to follow the matri­
lineal system of law as regards residence and children. This 
is likely to happen among patrilineal people who live in close 
proximity to matrilineal communities or among those groups, 
like the Tonga of Nkhata Bay,*"* who previously used to follow 
matrilineal practices. Among such people, whether or not a 
man is asked to pay malobolo, and whether or not he is allowed 
to take the wife to his village, is not always a simple matter 
of following an established principle, but the outcome of in­
volved manoeuvres between the two families concerned.
In predominantly and exclusively patrilineal communities, 
parents who refuse to receive malobolo for their daughters nor­
mally allow the husbands to take the wives away. However, 
there do not appear to be any specific rules on the matter.
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A parent who refuses to accept malobolo may not command much 
sympathy from the courts. The inclination of the courts may 
be to hold against a person who has deliberately refused to 
follow the established practice. The law may thus be interpre­
ted in favour of a husband who is willing to honour tradition­
al practice, but who has been prevented from doing so by the 
wife's guardian. Nevertheless, a court could have difficul­
ties resolving the issue. Strictly, the refusal of the guardi­
an to accept malobolo could be interpreted as a refusal to 
sanction the marriage. Thus, the husband could not be held to 
have any right to remove the woman from her village. This 
would clearly seem to be one of those issues of customary law 
in relation to which some deliberate reform may not be out of 
place. One possible change would be to allow the spouses 
themselves to decide, without giving either of them an automa­
tic veto. Should they fail to agree, a court's decision should 
not depend on any rigid rule, but on the relative merits of the 
case of either party. In other words, a principle analogous to 
the one obtaining in English common law*^ could be applied.
Another kind of difficulty is presented by cases where 
malobolo have been paid, but where the husband seeks to leave 
his original village for some other place. Is the wife obliged 
to follow the husband?
This question arose in the Mzimba case of Zebron Tembo v . 
Margret and Ellen Jere.*^ The case is an important one because 
it also deals with the law as regards matrimonial property. 
Margret and Ellen Jere, the defendants, were sisters and were 
also members of the Jere aristocracy. Margret was the elder
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sister and the first (and senior) wife of Zebron Tembo, the
plaintiff. Ellen was Zebron's second wife (mbiligha). Zebron
had also a third wife, Roda Ziba. Zebron was the son of a
rather prominent and historical figure within the Livingstonia
18Mission, Mawelero Tembo. For a long time, all the parties 
had been living at Njuyu with the father and father-in-law, 
Mawelero. This was the original home of Zebron. What seems 
to have sparked off the whole dispute were the constant quar­
rels between the two sisters on the one hand and Zebron's 
third wife, Roda on the other. Jealousy between the wives was 
the root cause of the dispute. Soon, these quarrels embittered 
the relationship between Margret, the first wife and her hus­
band, Zebron. When Zebron threatened to "dismiss" Margret, 
Zebron's father intervened in favour of the daughter-in-law, 
and another quarrel ensued between Zebron and his father. This 
was the final straw. Zebron applied for a government permit 
to emigrate to the neighbouring, Northern-Rhodesian district of 
Lundazi.
Accompanied by his third wife, nyaZiba, Zebron collected 
some of the cattle he had received on the marriages of Margret 
and Ellen's daughters and left for Lundazi in September, 1936. 
The defendants were left behind at Njuyu with their father-in- 
law, Mawelero. While in Lundazi, however, Zebron paid the 1937 
hut tax for his first two wives. Upon the death of his father 
in the same year, 1937, Zebron went back to Njuyu with a view 
to fetch his two wives, sons and cattle and bring them to 
Lundazi. Margret and Ellen not only refused to follow Zebron 
to Lundazi, but when Zebron attempted to collect the family
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cattle, Margret blocked the cattle kraal. Zebron, in his own 
words, did not "wish to cause problems"; he left without the 
cattle. He immediately wrote a letter to the District Commis­
sioner of Mzimba District, seeking the latter*s assistance in
his quest to bring his two wives and property to Lundazi. The
matter was referred to the court of Native Authority M'Mbelwa
19Jere, where Zebron instituted formal legal proceedings. He 
demanded that his two wives should be ordered, together with 
the sons and cattle, to follow him to his new home in Lundazi. 
Speaking for herself and her sister, Margret refused to go to 
Lundazi.
I don't want to live elsewhere but here where my father 
had married me on the village where my father-in-law
died and my husband's own village.20
She also made it clear that she had no intention of divorcing 
her husband. Zebron's sons too refused to join their father. 
The latter expressed the view that what their father really 
wanted was not the children or the wives, but the cattle.
It was held by M'Mbelwa's court that there was no ground 
for ordering a divorce, that the defendants had sound reasons 
for refusing to follow their husband and that the court could 
not force them to do so. It was ordered that the Jeres should 
remain at their husband's original home, that if Zebron wished 
to move to Northern Rhodesia, he should shuttle between his 
new and old homes to visit his wives. It was further ordered 
that Zebron should return the cattle he had so far removed 
from Njuyu. The court declared that the wives, children and 
property at Njuyu were all Zebron's. Nevertheless:
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The cattle, which were paid as dowries from Nyajeres' 
daughters must be used at Nyajeres' own houses; and if 
he TZebron/ wishes to do something with these cattle, 
he must consult with them /“JeresJ and agree together.
Should there be any difficulty that may happen while 
Zebron is in Rhodesia, the sons must consult their 
father or report to him. Zebron should not take cattle 
without /they knowledge of his wives, but he must ask or 
consult with them.
If Zebron tries to take cattle secretly or by force,
the court will order that all property go to Nyajere -
inferring that he dislikes them.2l
The impression left after the proceedings was that all the 
parties were satisfied with M'Mbelwa's judgement. Yet, sever­
al months later, Zebron wrote to the District Commissioner, 
Mzimba, complaining against M'Mbelwa's judgement. In the 
letter, Zebron stated his position by asking a series of rhet­
orical questions as follows: He had paid everything (malobolo)
for his wives who together with the children and the property 
were his. Why were they still at Njuyu? NyaJere was "claim­
ing" all property. Why? She had not brought any cattle with
her when she married him. Where did she get the powers to 
snatch children and cattle from him? Why should he return the 
cattle (he had so far removed) to Njuyu? Who would look after 
the women and who would pay tax for them? He had the permission 
of the Boma to go to Northern Rhodesia. Why was he being or­
dered to go to (visit) Njuyu? He ended by declaring that if 
his wives and the cattle followed him to Northern Rhodesia,
the matter would rest; but if they refused, then he was appeal-
22ing against M'Mbelwa's decision.
Native Authority M'Mbelwa had forwarded the record of his 
judgement on the case to the District Commissioner, together 
with a lengthy explanatory note in which it was stated, inter 
alia, that:
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The object of the claim of cattle by Margret Jere is based 
upon custom of the Angoni, that the property of one house 
cannot be removed and put into another house although the 
houses belong to one husband. That is to say, Zebron 
Tembo wished and still wish/es7 to take the cattle (dowry) 
paid for their daughters to Rhodesia and use them there 
with his third wife Roda Ziba, which is truly contrary to 
the native custom. Her claim for cattle in the second 
place is to try to make her husband return to Njuyu, or 
leave the cattle there in care of his sons and his wives, 
so /thatj whenever he wishes to do anything with them, he 
can do so after the arrangements and agreements have been 
made by them all together.... The court ordered him to 
return cattle for fear that he could use them without 
proper consultation with two wives, to prevent use of 
cattle against customary law.... He is not forced to re­
turn, the court only advised him to go and exercise his 
right of inheritance to property etc. of his late father 
/Vlawelero7 Tembo. The court was satisfied with his pro­
mise that he would shuttle.23
The Commissioner was in complete agreement with M'Mbelwa and 
was also of the view that neither M'Mbelwa nor himself had 
power to order anyone to go to a foreign country. Meanwhile, 
Zebron had lodged a formal appeal which he soon withdrew and 
then finally asked for a retrial, stating - with some justi­
fication - that M'Mbelwa and all the sub-chiefs in the area 
were related to the defendants and therefore unfit to try the 
case. The Commissioner suggested that a special panel of 
people unconnected with the parties should try the case.
Zebron agreed, but the Provincial Commissioner was against the 
idea. It was finally agreed that the case should be retried 
by the neighbouring Native Authority Chikulamaembe. Chikula- 
maembe's decision was that he could not force the defendants 
to follow Zebron. It was also observed that Zebron had initi­
ally left for Lundazi without consultation with his senior 
wives and this was wrong. After further negotiations and per­
suading, however, it was agreed that the parties should re­
settle in a neutral place. The area of sub-chief Chindi Jere 
was agreed u p o n . 24
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The foregoing case may be regarded as somewhat weak on 
the relevant principle which will be stated presently. First­
ly, the defendants were not "ordinary" wives, but members of 
an aristrocracy. Thus, an otherwise male-orientated justice 
might have been bent a little to suit this particular case. 
Secondly, the husband in this case was not proposing a simple 
shift in the location of the matrimonial home, but a move to 
a foreign country. This might have weighed against him. Yet, 
it is useful to note, respectively, that even those least 
likely to be impressed by the defendants' family background - 
the District Commissioner and Native Authority Chikulamaembe - 
reached the same conclusions as M'Mbelwa's. The fact that the 
new site was in Northern Rhodesia should also be put into per­
spective. Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were under the 
same British colonial power. Thus, even in a strictly legal 
sense, Northern Rhodesia was not truly "foreign" territory.
More importantly, whatever was the view of the European admin­
istrators, to the Africans in South and Central Mzimba,
Lundazi was hardly regarded as foreign territory, particularly 
during the relevant period. It was mainly the legal principles 
involved, rather than other considerations, which had influ­
enced the decisions in the case.
It would seem that even where the husband has paid 
malobolo for his wife, it is not so much a case of the husband 
having the right to decide where the parties shall live as a 
matter of the law pre-determining that the village of the hus­
band shall be the matrimonial home. Thus, particularly when 
the husband's move to a new place is motivated by no good
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reason, the wife may be justified in remaining at the original 
home. Customary law may even operate to prevent the husband 
from depriving the wife of the matrimonial property. By remain 
ing at the village of the husband, the wife cannot be guilty of 
desertion. Whether or not the husband is to be regarded as 
having deserted the wife may depend on whether or not the lat­
ter has been left with any option to join the husband. Of 
course, the location of the matrimonial home can always be 
changed by agreement between the parties.
Thirdly, there are cases of inherited widows who refuse to 
abandon the homes of their deceased husbands for the homes of 
their new husbands. It may be noted that such cases are rare 
because in most cases the person who inherits a widow belongs 
to the same village as the widow's deceased husband.
25
In the case of Timoti Sakala v. George Sakala (1982), 
the National Traditional Appeal Court rejected a claim that it
was the custom in Mzimba District that a man who inherits a 
widow could not move her from the place where her husband had 
died and had been buried. It is likely that claims of the ex­
istence of such a custom are based on the existence of some 
religious rituals in the olden days which might have been nec­
essary before a widow could be removed from her deceased hus­
band's place of burial. In practical terms, it can be incon­
venient, uneconomical and utterly disruptive to remove someone 
from a place where she might have spent many years and formed 
many valuable attachments. Otherwise* it would indeed appear 
to have been the custom in Mzimba to allow the new husband to
remove the widow or widows.
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The custom was in 1940 severely criticised by a District 
Commissioner in Mzimba in connection with Native Authority
M'Mbelwa's judgements in the case of Simon Gondwe v. John
26
Gondwe (1939). The plaintiff, Simon Gondwe, was the undis­
puted heir to his deceased brother's three widows, children 
and property. However, Simon Gondwe had not been living in 
the same village or, indeed, in the same area as his deceased 
brother. The children and the widows did not want to leave 
their village and join the plaintiff. The latter's attempts 
to "collect his inheritance" were obstructed by the defendant, 
who was one of the sons of the deceased and, on his own admis­
sion, part of the "inheritance" due to the plaintiff. When 
the case was brought before M'Mbelwa, the defendant made it 
clear that he did not dispute his "father's" (the plaintiff's) 
right to the "inheritance"; but stated that he and others did 
not want to leave their place, that if the plaintiff wanted to 
inherit them he should come and join them at their place.
After failing to reconcile the parties, M'Mbelwa delivered a 
judgement authorising the plaintiff to go and fetch the widows, 
children and property. A letter from M'Mbelwa to that effect 
was delivered to the local chief (NA Mtwalo), but the latter 
refused to help. The plaintiff attempted to effect M'Mbelwa's 
order by self-help, but was repulsed with threats of violence 
by the defendant.
The matter was brought back to M'Mbelwa. Meanwhile the 
first widow had relented and joined the plaintiff. The chil­
dren - including the defendant - and the other two widows held 
to their earlier position. The third widow, for example, stated
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that she liked the plaintiff and would be very glad to be with
him, but only on the condition that he moved to the home of
27
her late husband. The plaintiff retorted that he did not 
mind whether or not the widows liked him; all he wanted was 
for them to join him and help him in his work.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, M'Mbelwa's court went 
back on its earlier judgement. This time the court held that 
the defendant and the widows were not to blame. It was de­
cided that it was the plaintiff who was to blame for having 
left his original home (the deceased brother's village) and 
built elsewhere. The court held that the defendant could not 
be compelled to move where the plaintiff had settled. It was 
up to the plaintiff to follow them. The plaintiff appealed 
to the District Commissioner. After reading both the first 
and second judgements of M'Mbelwa's court, the District Com­
missioner, W. Thatcher, made the following observations:
I have cross-examined /the7 appellant who can advance no 
other reason for demanding his family to join him than 
that it is according to custom and that his sons should 
be near him to help him and work for him: Neither of
the respondents28 had had any connection with /"the7 ap­
pellant's new village - they have lived either at their 
present site or abroad. Appellant lived at respondent's 
present site from 1908 to 1935 when he moved to his pre­
sent abode .... He had left in anger after a quarrel with 
his deceased brother.29
The District Commissioner went on to state that his inquiries 
had disclosed that M'Mbelwa's first judgement had been in ac­
cordance with native law. He was not sure about M'Mbelwa's 
reasons for the second decision, but observed:
It seems that there must have been good and sufficient 
reasons for a complete reversal of their previous
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judgement, and it appears to me that ZtheJ preservation 
of personal liberty and choice of action must provide a 
good and sufficient reason for refusing to compel a 
number of reasonable and responsible individuals to-up­
root themselves and their belongings and follow the wan­
derings of one, possibly not so reasonable individual. 
Native law and custom must be respected and preserved 
in so far as it does not conflict with natural justice 
and the changing and in this case more reasonable, ideas 
of modern times.30
Here is one example of a rule of customary law being expressly 
rejected on the basis of its inconsistence with Western Euro­
pean conceptions of social justice. Thus, although a man who 
inherits a widow may under traditional law be entitled to re­
move her from her deceased husband’s village, the power to re­
move her may be subject to her consent or acquiescence. The 
courts have clearly tended to emphasise personal liberty in­
stead of traditional rights on this aspect of the law.
2. Domestic Rights and Duties
The domestic rights and duties of the husband and wife 
are generally the same in all African communities. Under mod­
ern influences, certain basic differences between matrilineal 
and patrilineal societies have become less pronounced.
To provide accommodation, food and clothing for the wife 
and children, and sexual companionship for the wife, are re­
garded as some of the basic duties of a husband. It is also 
the duty of the husband to protect his wife and children. Dis 
charging this duty may also involve taking legal action on be­
half of the wife for torts committed against her. In a deci­
sion of a Traditional Court in Rumphi District, confirmed by 
the National Traditional Appeal Court in 1979, a husband who 
failed to consult a herbalist to protect his wife against
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sorcery was held to have committed a matrimonial offence of
31sufficient gravity to warrant the wife's petition for divorce.
There is some doubt whether a husband to a marriage con­
tracted under the matrilineal system has a legal duty to main­
tain his children. Such children are regarded as belonging to 
the wife and her people, and the primary responsibility for
their maintenance is said to fall on their maternal uncle or
32other member of the wife's mbumba. In one case decided in 
1935, the Native Authority Machinjili ordered a husband who 
had divorced his wife to pay £1 10/- as compensation. The wife 
claimed that this was not enough as there were children to be 
cared for. She appealed to the District Commissioner. Dismis­
sing the appeal, the District Commissioner observed;
This court sees no reason why it should upset or alter in 
any respect the decision of the native court. This court 
is not aware that the appellant has any claim under Yao 
custom to a larger sum of compensation than that awarded 
by the native court .... Such compensation is granted as 
a temporary assistance for a divorced woman, suddenly de­
prived of the support of her husband.33 it is not regarded 
as a sum payable in respect of the maintenance of the 
children of the marriage until they grow up. The custody 
of the children in local native custom remains with the 
mother and similarly the responsibility for their mainte­
nance rests with her and her family.34
More recently, the National Traditional Appeal Court has stated 
in a number of cases that under the chikamwini (matrilineal)
system, the husband has a moral, but not a legal, duty to main-
3 5tain his children. This view of the law is also underlined
3 6
by Ibik in the Restatement.
It is worth noting, on the other hand, that all the rele­
vant panels involved in the Restatement recommended a change 
in the law so that the father should be under a legal duty to
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maintain, clothe, feed and educate the children of the marriage.
The recommendation was an aspect of a broader recommendation to
the effect that the father should assume and be allowed to ex-
37ercise full parental rights over the children. In the olden 
days, when children were more of an economic asset than a lia­
bility, there was perhaps less objection to placing the duty to 
maintain the children of the marriage on a third party. At the 
present day, even in rural areas, bringing up children can be 
a costly task. Even in matrilineal communities, it is the 
father and the mother who decide on the number of children they 
want to have. The children's maternal uncle or other relative 
of the wife has little say in this matter. Yet, under the tra­
ditional system he may be legally bound to maintain any number 
of children the other man decides to have. The system can eas­
ily be abused by unscrupulous men who, while maintaining that 
the responsibility for the maintenance of their children falls 
on the wives' relatives, do not themselves assume corresponding 
responsibilities with regard to their sisters' or nieces' chil­
dren.
The most important objection to the traditional system is 
that, today, it is rarely followed in practice. There is hard­
ly any noticeable difference in the way fathers care for their 
children between patrilineal and matrilineal communities. 
Fathers under the latter system generally assume the same re­
sponsibilities towards their children as those assumed by
38fathers under the patrilineal system. It is useful to note 
in this regard the apparent absence of any cases where husbands 
married under the matrilineal system sue either their wives or
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their wives' guardians for the maintenance of children. Cases 
of this nature would be flooding the courts were it the case 
that fathers did not regard themselves as responsible for the 
maintenance of their children.
In upholding the duty of a husband to maintain the chil-
/T
dren of the marriage the law would be doing little more than 
confirming a generally accepted practice. This development 
constitutes the most important aspect of the ascendency of the 
nuclear family as a social and economic unit and the diminish­
ing influence, authority and responsibilities of wider kinship 
groups.
Indeed, the enhancement of the nuclear family at the ex­
pense of wider kinship ties constitutes one of the central fea­
tures of the legislative reform accomplished under the Wills
39and Inheritance Act, enacted in 1967. If a man married under
customary law dies intestate, the Act basically operates to
ensure that the larger fraction of the intestacy will devolve
upon his wife or wives, children and the deceased's actual 
40dependants. Under traditional customary law, relations out­
side the nuclear family would have an equal or greater claim.
The claim of such outside relatives was, generally speaking, 
greater under matrilineal than patrilineal systems. This was 
mainly because, under matrilineal systems, a man's responsibi­
lities were owed principally to the children of his sisters 
and not to his own children. A man's own children were prin­
cipally the responsibility of his brother-in-law (the children's 
maternal uncle).^ The other fraction of an intestacy will 
still devolve in accordance with customary law. The Act purports
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to maintain the difference between patrilineal and matrilineal
systems by differentiating the sizes of the portions of the
intestacy which will devolve in accordance to customary law.
The fraction subject to customary law is smaller (1/2) under
the patrilineal systems than (the 3/5) under the matrilineal 
42systems.
In practice, many women contribute as much or sometimes 
even more than their husbands to the acquisition of food, 
clothing and even accommodation for the family. In rural, in­
digenous economies, food is acquired by both husbands and
A ^
wives, mainly through cultivation. Between husbands and
wives there tends to be a more or less balanced share of tasks -
from the clearing of freshly occupied pieces of land, through
planting and weeding, to the harvesting of crops. Although
there is no demographic information on the subject, it seems
clear that an increasing number of wives in urban, Westernised
communities work for wages or salaries to supplement those of 
44their husbands.
Nonetheless, there are certain duties which may be said 
to represent the minimum required of every wife. These in­
clude: exclusive sexual relationship with the husband, the pre­
paration of food, the day-to-day maintenance of the matrimonial
45home and the feeding and cleaning of children.
An important feature of customary-law marriages is that 
some of the matrimonial rights and obligations may be enforced 
by or against people other than the spouses themselves. A wife 
whose husband is away may proceed against the latter's rela­
tives for maintenance or divorce. In matrilineal systems, a
163
husband's right that he should be given a plot of land for cul­
tivation creates a correlative duty not so much on the part of 
the wife as on the part of the wife's guardian to provide the 
piece of land. At least during the initial years of marriage, 
in matrilineal societies, the husband may be under an obliga­
tion to hoe for his in-laws, as well as for his wife.
3. Rights Over Children
In many matrimonial disputes children have provided the 
main bone of contention. Disputes about children are far more 
common, for example, than disputes about the division of family 
property. This is to be expected for, as already mentioned, 
the essence of marriage in traditional African communities has 
been its function as a mechanism for the determination of "own­
ership" of children. In theory at least, the issue of children 
provides a further example of important differences between 
people following the matrilineal and those following the patri­
lineal systems of family life. Yet, especially at present, the 
relevant customary-law principles are by no means always defi­
nite or certain. The following discussion is confined to the 
examination of the law relating to the affiliation of children. 
The rules governing the rights of the parties on divorce are 
examined in the next chapter.
A child born out of wedlock is affiliated to the matrili-
46neage or patrilineage of which the mother is a member. Where 
the matrilineal system is followed, the mother's brother is the 
person who acts as the principal legal guardian of the child. 
Where the patrilineal system is followed, either the maternal 
grandfather or the maternal uncle will be the principal legal
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guardian. However, there is no rule under customary law which 
would prevent a child born outside wedlock being affiliated to 
the genitor's family, either by a court order or by an arrange­
ment between the parties concerned. Where the natural father 
is asked to maintain and educate the child, for example, it may 
be assumed that the intention is to affiliate such child to the 
father.^ So too where the father is allowed to take the child 
upon payment of expenses incurred for the latter's upbringing, 
the assumption will be that the father is thereby invested with 
the rights of a legal guardian.
Subsequent lobola marriage between the natural parents of 
a child born outside wedlock normally has the effect of affili­
ating the child to the father and the father's patrilineage. 
However, it is always prudent in such a case for the question 
of the child to be specifically included in the marriage negot­
iations. Mere payment of damages for illicit sexual inter­
course does not give the genitor any rights over the child. 
Subsequent marriage by the mother to a person other than the 
natural father of a child born outside wedlock does not invest 
the husband with any rights over the child. The fact that the 
husband may be caring for the child does not make any differ­
ence as far as the former's legal rights are concerned.
As a result of the enactment of the Wills and Inheritance 
Act, 1967, on the other hand, the child itself may acquire 
some rights as a dependant.^ Conversely, in matrilineal sys­
tems, should the husband have acquired any children from his 
previous associations with other women, his subsequent marriage 
does not invest his wife's people with any rights over such
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children. It is not clear whether under the Wills and Inheri­
tance Act such children would inherit upon the wife's intes- 
49tacy. In either case, however, it is useful to remember 
that in the broad social sense, the relationship between one 
spouse and the children acquired by the other spouse will be 
that of father-and-child or mother-and-child respectively. Mar­
riage between the relevant people would undoubtedly be regarded 
as incestuous.
As far as the question of affiliation is concerned, obvi­
ously it does not make any difference in matrilineal systems 
whether or not a child is born within wedlock. In either case 
the child is affiliated to the mother's mbumba. Applying the 
matrilineal principle in its pristine vigour, the relationship 
between a man and his children may be regarded as being purely 
biological. Even to his own children the father/husband is a 
"stranger". According to Lucy Mair's informants, the husband 
under the matrilineal Chewa:
...is described as "borrowed" (ngongole) or as tonde 
obwereka, a stud animal (literally.borrowed male).
''He begets children and goes home".50
The maternal uncle and not the father is the one who is the 
legal guardian. The maternal uncle would be the one responsi­
ble for the marriage arrangements of the children, for payments 
of fines or damages incurred by them, and for the general sup­
ervision of their upbringing. The father may nevertheless be 
responsible for the maintenance of his children. This respon­
sibility would, however, fall on him only indirectly through 
his broad obligation to render assistance to his w i f e . ^  It is
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the maternal uncle who would recover damages for injuries 
caused to the children; who would have the power to call upon 
the services of the children, and the authority to chastise 
them. In the context of modern life, the maternal uncle would 
be the principal recipient of gifts or remittances from work­
ing children. Corresponding to his indirect responsibility to 
maintain his (or more correctly, his wife's) children may be 
the husband's indirect claim to the services of the children 
through the mother.
There can be little doubt, however, that the importance 
of the father has greatly increased. With many of the matri­
lineal people of today, the father can hardly be described as 
a mere "borrowed bull". His social and economic importance 
to the children is scarcely less than that of his counterpart 
in patrilineal systems. Although maternal relatives continue 
to press for their traditional interests in children, the ten­
dency has been to leave the responsibilities on the shoulders 
of the fathers. This is particularly true where responsibili­
ties of a modern nature, such as the payment of school fees, 
are involved. While contact with patrilineal peoples and the 
teachings of Christian missionaries have clearly played their 
part, the increased importance of the father among the matrili­
neal people of Malawi must largely be seen as an aspect of the
impact of modern social and economic forces on African family
52life in general.
It must be emphasised that the increased importance of the 
father does not constitute evidence that matrilineal people are 
becoming patrilineal. Lineages among matrilineal people almost
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universally continue to be traced through their mothers as op­
posed to their fathers. The strengthening of the social bond 
between fathers and their children reflects the enhanced posi­
tion of the nuclear family in society, it is not an indica­
tion of any switch of attachment on the part of children from 
their mothers' families to the families of their fathers. A 
child these days would be inclined to view himself or herself 
as belonging first and foremost to his father and mother as 
opposed to belonging to his maternal uncle. However, when it 
comes to extending the network of relationships beyond the 
nuclear family, it will still be the relatives of the mother 
rather than those of the father who take precedence.
The general principle among the patrilineal people is
clear. The payment of malobolo establishes the affiliation
of children to the people who pay the malobolo. Indeed, it
is as though the malobolo constitute a payment for the repro-
53ductive capacities of the wives. Thus, normally, children 
are affiliated to their father's patrilineage. The principal 
legal guardian of the children is their father. In his ab­
sence, a paternal uncle (he is also called father) or a pater­
nal grandfather will normally fill the position of principal 
legal guardian. In the absence of any of these an aunt can 
also act as a legal guardian.
From some of the old cases decided in Native Authority 
M'Mbelwa Jere's area (Mzimba District), it would clearly seem 
that among the Ngoni people the patrilineal principle was in 
the olden days very rigidly adhered to. The Ngoni authorities 
would go to great lengths to avoid as much as a hint of anything
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that would seem to compromise this principle.
Thus in George Shaba v. Filimon Ngulube (1937),^ X,- a 
cousin (even in the African sense) of George Shaba had married 
Filimon Ngulube's daughter. Malobolo had been duly paid.
After a while, X's wife ran away to her village whereupon X 
followed her and stayed there as well. Later, X went abroad 
for work and died there. His wife, four sons and three daugh­
ters continued to live in the wife's village. One of the 
daughters got married and the malobolo received for her re­
mained in the village of X's wife. X's eldest son was the 
person alleged to have given his sister away. The malobolo 
was presumably also in his hands. No immediate relatives, 
apart from his own children, had survived X. The closest re­
lative was apparently a certain lady who had since migrated 
to Northern Rhodesia.
The plaintiff, George Shaba, was a son of X's deceased 
sister. Much younger than even X's eldest son, Shaba was ap­
parently the closest relation on X's side. He sued X's father- 
in-law for the return of X's widow, children, and the property 
received in respect of X's married daughter. Both the defen­
dant (and M'Mbelwa's court) readily admitted the plaintiff's 
power to collect what was demanded. At the same time however, 
it was also implicitly admitted that X's sons were his right­
ful heirs. The plaintiff vouched that the property to be col­
lected would be used solely for the benefit of X's sons and 
not for the plaintiff himself. The court of Native Authority 
M'Mbelwa tried to persuade the widow and the children to go 
with the plaintiff. Both the widow and the children refused
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to leave. According to the widow, she would have gone back 
to her husband's village had the person recalling them been 
the lady in Northern Rhodesia, but not the present plaintiff 
whom she said she did not know. The court thought that the 
defendant was responsible for this resistance. It was held, 
however, that the widow and her children could not be com­
pelled to go with the plaintiff,^ in which case the defendant 
would have to return the malobolo paid for X's widow as well 
as that received in respect of X's daughter.
Clearly, had X's sons been living in their father's orig­
inal home, it is highly unlikely that the plaintiff would even 
have attempted to assume any form of control over them. On X's 
death, X's eldest son and not the plaintiff would have taken 
charge over his deceased father's affairs. The underlying 
principle of the plaintiff's claim, and the courts' endorsement 
of it, would clearly seem to have been that X's eldest son was 
not entitled to assume control over his father's family so long 
as he was staying with his mother's father (the defendant), as 
this would only serve as a backdoor for the defendant to assume 
control over X's children. The martial concerns of Ngoni l a w ^  
and the fact that the majority of the wives would be members of 
rival if subjugated tribes may well account for such rigid ad­
herence to the patrilineal principle. The District Commission­
er to whom the defendant in the above case had appealed was 
astounded by M'Mbelwa's decision. He observed:
There is little doubt that the foundation of the original 
Angoni law was based, perhaps on slavery , but in any 
event it is based upon the father's duty to his chief and 
headman in time of war, where the tribe could only suc­
ceed if all the men, or prospective men were available to
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the chief. This is now changed and [the] Government has 
affirmed the right of any man to move away from his 
tribal area and live where he wishes without hindrance.57
With reference to M'Mbelwa's specific order, the Commissioner, 
observed:
It means Shaba (plaintiff) will make a monetary gain on 
people in whom he himself admits has no right whatsoever 
.... But I fail to see why a distant relative or in fact 
anyone should benefit by a payment to himself in exchange 
of a right which has ceased to have any effect and exists 
only in the strict letter of Angoni law....58
The Commissioner, nevertheless, let the order as to the return
of malobolo paid for X's widow stand. As to malobolo for the
daughter, and the whole principle upon which M'Mbelwa's court
had attempted to persuade the widow and the children to join
the plaintiff, it was recommended that M'Mbelwa's council
59should consider changing the relevant Ngoni law.
It would also clearly seem, in strictly patrilineal areas, 
that the mere fact that a husband has not paid malobolo due to 
his wife's people does not automatically affiliate children of 
a marriage to the mother's kin group. Of course, in order to 
secure payment, the wife's people can hold on to the children 
until malobolo have been paid. On the marriage of the first 
daughter, the wife's people may retain the malobolo paid for 
her, or if it is received by the husband’s people, the latter 
may be obligated to hand it over to the wife's people. Receipt 
of the daughter's malobolo by the wife's people discharges the 
husband from any further obligation to pay and vests in him 
the full rights over children.^
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Where the parties divorce or one dies before any malobolo 
are paid, the husband may still be entitled to the children on 
the condition that he pays the malobolo. Thus, in Leah Chipeta 
v. Yakobe Jere (1939)^ the husband had not paid malobolo up to 
the time of divorce. The court of Native Authority M'Mbelwa 
ordered that the husband should pay malobolo and claim his 
children.^
Where there are no good reasons for late payment, this 
may be taken as evidence of an unwillingness to legalise the 
marriage and the husband may lose the children. Thus in Elias 
Khunga v. Richard Chawinga (1945) the husband did not profer 
any malobolo for fifteen years after being ordered to. There 
was no reason for the delay and the court could only view his 
subsequent willingness to pay as having been prompted by the 
impending marriages of the daughters of the marriage. The 
parties had divorced in court fifteen years before and the 
court had ordered that the husband could take the children if 
he paid malobolo. After fifteen years delay, his attempt to 
pay malobolo and get the children was rejected.
However, there are certain areas where patrilineal and 
matrilineal systems operate side by side and cases where the 
parties are from different marriage systems. In such cases, 
the non-payment of malobolo tends to be taken almost for grant­
ed as evidence of the parties' intention to contract their mar­
riage in accordance with the principles of matrilineal customa­
ry l a w . ^  There are also some parents who, for one reason or 
another, do not want to demand malobolo for their daughters.
In purely patrilineal communities such as those in Mzimba or
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Karonga, a decision by the wife's parents not to claim malo­
bolo should not automatically entitle them to the children.
There does not appear to be any express rule of customary law 
providing for such cases. It is very likely, however, and 
this would be in accordance with the spirit of the patrilineal 
principle, that a court would give the husband or his relatives 
the option to pay malobolo and claim the children should any 
need arise for such a claim. In other words, customary law is 
unlikely to be interpreted in such a way as to give the wife's 
people the option to trade malobolo with children.
A man who has paid malobolo for his wife will also be en­
titled to any child born of an adulterous act between his wife 
and another man. This is an ancient principle, but was con­
firmed by the National Traditional Appeal Court as recently as 
1979 in John Nyirenda v. Durton Mapunda. ^  This was a case 
where the natural father attempted to gain possession of a 
daughter born of a married woman. The messenger sent to col­
lect the daughter was severely beaten by the legal husband of 
the daughter's mother. In a court case which ensued, the 
legal husband demanded payment for the cost of bringing up the 
child as a condition for the release of the girl to the natur­
al father. The court of first instance ordered the natural 
father to pay four cows and K20 for the daughter. This award 
was eventually upheld by the National Traditional Appeal Court. 
The court expressed its agreement with the husband's argument 
that since the child had been born when the mother was still 
his wife, the child legally belonged to him and not the genitor. 
It must be emphasised that the issue here is not one of evidence
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namely, that a child born during wedlock is presumed to be the 
natural issue of the husband - but one of law. Proof that the 
issue is the natural child of another man is irrelevant.
4. Liability for Illicit Sexual Relations
Actions arising from illicit sexual relations account for
66a large portion of family-law litigation under customary law. 
With the exception of certain ritualistic sexual arrangements 
practised in some communities,^ it is perhaps true to say that 
under customary law, any sexual relation between man and woman 
outside marriage is actionable against either the male or both 
the male and female partners. The English term, "adultery" is 
widely used indiscriminately to describe a variety of illicit 
sexual relations. This is a reflection of indigenous vocabula­
ries in which one and the same term may be used to describe, 
for example, intercourse in violation of the marital bed as 
well as intercourse betwen unmarried partners. This, however, 
does not signify any absence of conceptual distinctions amongst 
various forms of sexual misconduct. Important distinctions are 
drawn between various forms of illicit sexual relations.
The seriousness attributed to each particular offence de­
pends, very broadly, upon either of the following considera­
tions, namely, the marital status of the female partner and 
whether or not any pregnancy results from a particular sexual 
encounter. Within these two broad bases, there are other 
factors upon which further distinctions can be drawn. In gen­
eral, there can be little doubt that the principles upon which 
liability for illicit sexual relations is based reflect
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traditional African social conceptions by which men tended to 
be regarded as having some form of proprietary interests or 
rights in women. This will hopefully become apparent in the 
course of the following discussion, which examines the law re­
garding the most common forms of illicit sexual relations. In 
an ascending order of seriousness, these are as follows.
a ) Intercourse With an Unmarried Woman Without Pregnancy
Even a mere act of sexual intercourse with an unmarried 
woman, which does not result in pregnancy, constitutes a civil 
offence under customary law on the part of the male partner 
against the legal or physical guardian of the woman. The age 
and the consent of the woman to the intercourse are, strictly
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speaking, irrelevant insofar as civil liability is concerned. 
The injured party is not the woman herself, but her guardian 
and her family as a whole.
Different views may be entertained as to the exact nature 
of the injury for which more-or-less standardised damages tend 
to be awarded.^ In W. Zgambo v. W.S. Luhana (1978),^ the 
National Traditional Appeal Court described the damages award­
ed in such cases as being compensation for the "deflowering" of
the girl. This would indeed seem to have been true among the
a_
patrilineal Ngoni of olden days. As Margjret Read pointed out, 
a form of partial love-making, ukuhlobonga, was allowed among 
unmarried Ngoni girls. However, if intercourse led to the 
rupture of the hymen, the man responsible would pay heavily to 
the parents of the girl "to compensate for lost lobola".^
Parents of a bride who had not preserved her virginity before 
marriage would expect to receive reduced malobolo. The girl
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herself would be disgraced. Among the well-to-do, a vital pre­
stigious ceremony preliminary to marriage - the umsindo -
72would be denied to a girl who had been deflowered. Cram, J., 
perhaps had this practice in mind when, in Chitema v. Lupanda 
(1961), he referred to:
...the well-recognised principle of African customary law 
that the girl was in the nature of her father's chattel... 
and that /through her intercourse with a man7 he suffered 
damage to his property. He suffered family disgrace and 
dishonour, and, as the girl lost some of her value in the 
marriage market, he could suffer pecuniary loss, which 
would amount to damage.73
The material aspect to the basis of liability should not 
be exaggerated. Indeed, with respect, the above observation 
by Cram, J., is misleading to the extent that it tends to em­
body the false notion that marriage involving the payment of 
malobolo amounted to a sale of the woman. It is useful to 
note that, although it is among the patrilineal people that 
actions of this nature are frequent, even under the matrilineal 
systems, the guardian of a woman has the power to take action 
against the offending m a n . ^  Yet among the matrilineal people 
the question of loss of malobolo does not arise. Moreover, it 
was not among all patrilineal people that virginity was regard­
ed as a sine qua non to a respectable marriage. Even among the 
Ngoni of today, the question of a bride's virginity is hardly 
raised in marriage negotiations. More importantly, while it 
may avail the defendant to allege that the woman in question 
has been leading a promiscuous life, such a defence does not 
arise simply because of proof that the woman is not a virgin.
It would really seem to be the intangible injury to family 
pride and honour that provides the general basis for liability 
in these cases.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, some European magistrates were 
hesitant to award damages on the mere basis that a man had had 
sexual intercourse with a woman. In Chinyama Banda v. Esinat 
nyaBanda (1938),^ the Atonga Tribal Council (Chintheche/ 
Nkhata-Bay District) had ordered a man (appellant) to pay £2 
10/- to the relatives of a woman (respondent)^  as damages for 
sexual intercourse with her. The man appealed to the District 
Commissioner, claiming that the respondent had invited him to 
her house and therefore that his conduct was not contrary to 
customary law or alternatively that the £2 10/- was excessive.
It was also alleged that a marriage had been contemplated be­
tween the parties. There was also some suspicion that the 
sexual intercourse had taken place upon a promise of payment 
by the man. More awkwardly, the action had been brought by 
the woman herself, who incidentally had also been responsible 
for revealing the indiscretion to her parents. Whatever the 
circumstances of the alleged offence, the African assessors 
sitting with the District Commissioner were of the view that 
the parents of the woman were entitled to the damages ordered 
by the Native Authority court. The District Commissioner fol­
lowed this advice and upheld the award of the lower court. He 
nevertheless made the following comment:
...I consider that the respondent in allowing the appel­
lant to step in her house with her, has done wrong and is 
severely reprimanded.
I cannot understand why a woman such as this is not, 
according to native law and custom, considered to hold 
any responsibility for the adultery for it seems to me 
that a bad woman would readily entice a man to commit adul­
tery with her knowing that the native court will order the 
man to pay compensation to her family.77
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78In Site Manda v. Andreya Mhoni (1939) the same District 
Commissioner went further and actually reversed a decision of 
a Native Authority awarding damages to the respondent (Mhoni) 
on account of his daughter’s sexual intercourse with the appel­
lant (Manda). The Commissioner's decision was based on the 
considerations that the daughter in question was unmarried, was 
old enough to assume responsibility for her actions, and that 
she had not been made pregnant. The majority of the magistrates, 
however, fully adhered to the traditional rule. As must be 
clear from Chitema v. Lupanda^  and Zgambo v. Luhana, ^  both 
the High Court of Malawi and the National Traditional Appeal 
Court have recognised and applied the traditional rule.
b) Impregnating an Unmarried Woman
Impregnating an unmarried woman is treated as a more seri­
ous offence than merely having sexual intercourse with her.
The differences in the seriousness of the two offences can be
seen, for example, in the case of K.G. Chiphwafu v. J .
81Mkwapatila (1966). The case came before the Ntchisi Dis­
trict Local Appeal Court by way of appeal from a Local Court 
of first instance. The latter had ordered the appellant to 
pay £40 damages for impregnating the respondent’s daughter.
On appeal, it was found that the appellant had not made the 
daughter pregnant, but had merely had sexual intercourse with 
her. The award of £ damages was accordingly reduced to £20.
The distinction between the two offences was also the basis of 
the decision of-the High Court in Chitema v. Lupanda, which 
will be considered below.
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In practice, the prospective defendant is first given the 
option to marry the pregnant woman before legal action is 
brought against him. It is usually only when the offender has 
refused to marry the girl that action is brought against him. 
It does not follow, however, that an offer of marriage by the 
offender automatically absolves him from legal liability. The 
parent of the girl can choose to recover damages first before 
entertaining any proposal of marriage. It is also possible 
that the parent of the woman may not be in favour of any mar­
riage .
In principle, sexual intercourse with a married woman is
regarded as a more serious offence than making an unmarried
woman pregnant. In terms of the damages awarded, however, the
82two offences do not seem to be treated very differently.
This is particularly true where a school girl is involved.
The courts, especially the National Traditional Appeal Court,
take a very serious view of pregnancies involving school chil-
83dren. Thus in Francis Chakwawa v. Florence Pingani (1981), 
Chakwawa had been ordered by the Blantyre Traditional Court to 
pay K150 to the parents of a school girl whom he had made preg 
nant. Chikwawa appealed to the National Traditional Appeal 
Court against the decision. In dismissing the appeal, it was 
stated:
...Their Lordships /"the judges of the Traditional CourtJ 
wish to endorse in this court that when such things are 
done to girls who are about to go to school or wish to 
continue with schooling they take a very serious view of 
such incidents.84
The appeal was not only dismissed, but the award of K150 was 
enhanced by K50 to K 2 0 0 . ^
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The difference between impregnating a school girl and
impregnating an ordinary girl or woman is highlighted, for ex-
86ample, by the case of James Banda v. Esther Mphande (1980). 
Banda had been ordered by a lower Traditonal Court to pay K140 
compensation for making Mphande's daughter pregnant. The 
lower court had proceeded on the assumption that the girl in 
question was at school. The girl had been attending a typing 
school - not part of the structure of formal education. On 
appeal to the National Traditional Appeal Court, it was held 
that a girl in a typing school was not a "school girl". The 
appeal was therefore allowed and the award of K140 was reduced 
to K50. In another identical case, an award of K201 was re­
duced to K60.*^
According to a 1976 judgement of the National Traditional
Appeal Court, the higher damages awarded in respect of school
girls are intended to reflect the frustrated expectations of
the parents and relatives of the girl and the expenses in-
88curred on the education already covered by her. A pregnant 
girl will almost invariably be expelled from school. Her 
chances of a career are thereby greatly diminished. A girl 
whose education has been disrupted will also tend to have a 
limited range of suitors many of whom may be regarded as un­
suitable by ambitious parents. Apart from the purely person­
al loss on the part of the parents, the higher damages awarded 
with respect to school girls would clearly also seem to under­
line a punitive element. The courts "seem to be concerned as
a matter of national policy about the advancement of women in
89the field of education. The higher damages are partly
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intended to express societal disapproval of the relevant be­
haviour and to serve as a warning to prospective offenders.
The damages awarded are not for any supposed injury to 
the girl herself, but to compensate her parents and relatives.
Indeed, the law governing liability for illicit sexual 
relations underlines another general principle of traditional 
customary law. Under strict traditional law, a woman was not 
accorded the status of an independent legal person. She was 
treated not merely as a perpetual minor but also merely as an 
object of rights and liabilities. Thus, the woman's consent 
to an act of illicit intercourse was not, as already stated, 
relevant to the determination of liability. Her character 
may constitute a relevant issue. Evidence, for example, could 
be adduced that the woman had been leading a life of promiscu­
ity. This does not, however, constitute a complete defence.
At the court's discretion, it may be taken into account in the
90assessment of damages.
Where the woman's character appears to serve as a complete 
defence, the question of evidence may really be what is at 
issue. If the man denies paternity, the woman's loose charac­
ter may persuade the court to accept such a denial. More cru­
cial in the whole qu&Stion of the woman's legal position is the
fact that, strictly, she has no locus standi to proceed against
91the man responsible for her pregnancy. Thus, even if the
woman does not want to proceed against the man, this cannot pre 
vent her parents from doing so. By corollary, if the parents 
of the woman do not wish to bring any action against the man, 
the woman has no remedy under traditional customary law.
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In practice, however, the traditional principle is not 
always strictly adhered to. A court may not necessarily re­
fuse to entertain an action merely because it has been brought 
by the woman herself instead of her parents. This is not mere­
ly an example of the flexibility of customary-law procedures, 
but also an indication of the gradual recognition of the status 
of women as independent legal persons under customary law. In 
theory, an action brought by the woman herself is regarded as 
being prosecuted on behalf of the parents. The award itself 
may be granted in the name of the parents rather than the 
woman herself. In some cases, however, the courts have aban­
doned even such merely formal adherence to the traditional 
principle.
92In Charles Nkhoma v. Dorothy Thokozani (1981), the Na­
tional Traditional Appeal Court dismissed an appeal against 
the decision of the Blantyre Traditional Court which had or­
dered the appellant to pay K151 "for giving the respondent a 
child". The woman's claim would seem to have been for the 
maintenance of the child. The lower court had nevertheless 
awarded damages for the illicit sexual intercourse rather than 
for the maintenance of the child. In the course of its judge­
ment, the National Traditional Appeal Court observed that under 
customary law, an illegitimate child belonged to the mother and 
the biological father was not duty bound to maintain the child. 
The court could not therefore order any specific amount to be 
paid for the child. With respect to the award for damages, the 
court addressed itself to the question whether the respondent 
was entitled to sue under customary law. It was observed that,
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in normal circumstances, the suit should be brought by the par­
ents or guardian of the woman. The court noted, however, that:
...in certain circumstances this is not possible. An 
urban setting is the case in point. The girl might leave 
Mzimba to seek employment in Blantyre. She finds a man 
who pretends that he will marry her and the girl becomes 
pregnant. In this circumstance it would really be diffi­
cult for the girl to cause her parents or guardian to 
come all the way from Mzimba to Blantyre to summon the 
man. The situation is very complicated when the girl 
comes from outside the country, may be from South Africa. 
It would be very difficult for her to summon her parents 
or guardians. In this situation therefore the girl has 
got a locus standi in that case.93
The award of K151 was held to stand.
It is worth mentioning that under the general law of 
Malawi, the Affiliation Act (cap. 26:02), an unmarried woman 
with a child can initiate affiliation proceedings against the 
putative father. An order against the putative father for the 
maintenance of the child may be obtained in a Magistrate’s 
Court. It is not possible to say how often women actually 
make use of this remedy.
More relevant to the present discussion, however, is the
question whether any analogous remedy exists under customary
law. As already noted, the National Traditional Appeal Court
94in Nkhoma v. Thokozani, for example, affirmed the tradition­
al principle that a putative father of a child born outside 
wedlock cannot be compelled to pay for the maintenance of the 
child.
Yet, the National Traditional Appeal Court has not been
consistent on this matter. In Steeve Augusto Kalombe v. Anne
95Michongwe (1980), for example, an order was made against the
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putative father to deposit K100 in a Post Office Savings Ac­
count for the maintenance of a child born outside wedlock.
The court further ordered that withdrawals from the account 
should be made by both the father and the mother. This was 
to ensure that the money should be used specifically for the 
child. More interestingly, the court also seemed to lay down 
as a general rule that "each time a court makes an order for 
maintenance [i.\J should also order the free movement of the 
child" - between the father and the mother. This was clearly 
an innovation, patterned on affiliation orders of Magistrate's 
Courts and without any antecedent principle under traditional 
custom.
96In the High Court case of Chitema v. Lupanda, Cram, J., 
would seem to have been of the view that an order for the main­
tenance of the child born out of wedlock could be made under 
customary law. The case had originated from the Zomba African 
Urban Court where the appellant had been ordered to pay compen­
sation to the parents of the respondent in respect of sexual 
intercourse between appellant and respondent and the subsequent 
birth of a child. The appellant had also been ordered to put 
another sum of money on trust for the maintenance of the child. 
The appellant appealed against both orders - the first one on 
the ground that only the respondent's parents and not the re­
spondent hereself could sue for damages, and the second order 
on the ground that paternity had not been proved. With regard 
to the appeal against the first order, the High Court held that 
the point raised by appellant was merely procedural and that an 
award of damages in favour of the responent's parents could
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properly be made although the action had wrongly been brought 
by the respondent herself.
The appeal against the second order relating to mainten­
ance was allowed. It was found that sexual intercourse had 
indeed taken place between the appellant and the respondent.
It was on the basis of this finding alone that not only was the 
lower court's award of damages to the respondent's parents up­
held, but the damages were also enhanced, to take into account 
the fact that the appellant was a teacher of the respondent.
The High Court agreed with the appellant that paternity had not 
been proved. The court drew a distinction between questions
of evidence and questions of procedure and indicated that the
97former had to be decided in accordance with the general law.
It was therefore stated that in an affiliation application, 
the evidence of the mother required corroboration. In the in­
stant case, it was held that there had hardly been any corro­
boration. Furthermore, the girl had not named the appellant 
until after the birth of the child and after she had been 
beaten by her parents. The date of the alleged sexual inter­
course suggested either that the baby had been born prematurely 
or that the appellant was hot the father of the child. No evi­
dence of a premature birth was produced. Cram, J., observed:
It is a cardinal principle of justice that a man is not 
responsible to maintain an illegitimate child unless he 
is proved to be the father. Once it was decided that the 
standard of proof in a civil court had not been attained 
so as to fix paternity on the appellant in my respectful 
view no order could be made against him in respect of the 
child. I do not consider any customary law would make a 
man responsible for maintenance of a child that was not 
his own and any such law would be declared repugnant to 
justice in terms of the /NyasalandJ Order in Council.98
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The clear implication here was that an affiliation order could 
have been issued had the appellant been proved to be the father 
of the child. Still, there is no guarantee that an order for 
maintenance can be obtained as of right under customary law. 
Whether such an order can be obtained in any particular case 
would still seem to depend largely on the whim of a particular 
judge or judges rather than on any established legal principle.
c ) Marital Infidelity
Sexual intercourse between a married man or woman and some­
one other than the lawful spouse - adultery in the proper sense 
of the term - is a complex and involved subject. Only the main 
points of law involved are considered in this discussion.
Firstly, it is useful to consider the question whether or 
not under customary law adultery constituted a criminal offence, 
as well as being a civil wrong.
According to one widely held view, death was in the olden
99days a common punishment for adultery. In other words, adul­
tery was treated as a criminal, rather than as a civil, of­
fence. George Simeon Mwase made the following observation,
which was part of his general criticism of European justice in 
Nyasaland:
Adultery is one /"law7 which gives a lot of doubts in the 
way the whiteman decide it. The whiteman's law asks this 
as a civil case which has no much importance. /VByJJlOl 
The country's /African traditionalj law, this is one of 
the capital charge or the capital crime which /Ywas77 
followed with death sentence by consuming the both cul­
prits with fire, or a nobkery uknobkerrie.7) [ [o rJ J even a 
spear would play his flesh or her flesh until they were 
both perished. Their dead organs were not to be cared 
for. And sometimes both the culprits were to be driven
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away by cutting parts of their bodies such as ears, arms,
nose or something else in the way of emasculation.102
There is hardly any evidence upon which the existence of such 
a practice as described above may be confirmed or denied.
The possibility that at some period adultery was punished
103by death cannot, of course, be ruled out altogether. It is
worth remembering that in traditional African societies, adul­
tery was a wrong not only in the legal sense, nor was it re­
garded merely as antisocial behaviour, but it was also seen to 
lead to supernatural consequences. Events such as epidemics
or misfortunes in battle were sometimes attributed to indi-
104screet conduct among members of relevant communities. Fur­
thermore, in ancient societies in general, death tended to be 
applied to a wide range of offences, as it was one of a very 
limited range of available punishments. Theft and murder, for 
example, would carry the same penalty of death - the difference 
in seriousness between the offences being reflected only in 
the manner of execution.
Another more likely possibility is that in traditional 
African communities, parties to an illicit sexual association, 
particularly if found flagrante delicto, were not protected by 
the law against violent acts of self-help by, or on behalf of, 
the injured party. The offending man, in particular, could 
have been regarded as a "wild pig" which could be killed with 
impunity. Thus, even without being a capital offence, adultery 
would have carried with it the risk of death at the hands of 
the offended person. Of course, this is true even today. Under 
the imported English criminal law, however, an offended spouse
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would not be acting within the law if he or she carries out 
violent acts of self-help against the offenders. Extremely 
violent acts of retaliation could lead to criminal prosecu- 
tion.105
Whatever the position was in the remote past, it seems 
clear that the treatment of adultery as a capital offence was 
not part of customary laws in the period immediately preceding 
the introduction of European rule. At least, the apparent 
disappearance of such practices as described by Mwase had noth­
ing to do with the advent of European rule.
It was mainly from the early 1930s that the courts began
to treat adultery as both a criminal (although not a capital)
and a civil offence. In addition to compensation orders, fines
and, occasionally, terms of imprisonment, began to be imposed
on account of a d u l t e r y . T h e  Native Authorities were mainly
responsible for this development. Clearly, the practice of
imposing fines for adultery (in addition to compensation orders)
had no immediate precedent in traditional African practice.
The fines imposed used to be significantly lower than the dama-
108ges awarded to the offended parties. This in itself perhaps
is an indication that adultery was seen primarily as a civil 
offence and only secondarily as a crime. The African authori­
ties probably believed that a decline in moral standards could 
be checked through the instrument of law. As Martin Chanock 
observes, the authorities:
...viewed the rate of adultery as a sort of index of moral 
decline and they were concerned to use the law and courts 
as weapons to punish and control it.109
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Criminal sanctions for adultery, and not mere civil compensa­
tion, were probably seen as a more adequate way to underscore 
the law's concern for moral values.
European magistrates in their appellate role were not al­
together consistent in their decisions concerning cases of 
adultery. In some cases, the fines imposed by Native Authori­
ties were upheld; in other cases, the fines were disallowed on 
the very ground that adultery was only a civil offence.
In 1946, a circular from the Chief Justice, E.E. Jenkins, 
to all District Commissioners (magistrates) expressed doubts 
as to the advisability and legality of imposing fines or terms 
of imprisonment for a d u l t e r y . T h e  Chief Justice also re­
fused to treat adultery as a criminal offence in Joseph Supedi
112Limbani v. Rex (1946). It was held in this case that the
principle upon which adultery was being treated as a criminal 
offence had not been satisfactorily established under customa­
ry law.
At present, the question whether adultery is a criminal 
(as well as a civil) offence is of mere academic or historical
interest. As was pointed out by Cram, J., in Isaya Mpozera v .
113Victor Mwachuma (1965), no person ought to be convicted of 
a criminal offence unless the offence is prescribed in a writ­
ten law.^^ There is at present no written law under which 
adultery is made an offence. Equally important is the fact 
that at present, the courts at all levels invariably treat 
adultery solely as a civil offence.
It is a straightforward principle of customary law that 
a husband is entitled to recover damages on account of adultery
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committed by his wife. Intercourse with a married woman is
regarded as an injury to the husband and not to the parents
of the w o m a n . I n  fact, in places like Mzimba, the woman
herself, but more usually her parents, are also liable to corn-
116
pensate the husband. As well as recovering damages from
the man who commits adultery with the wife, the husband may
also recover damages from the woman herself or her guardian.
In some cases, the action for damages against the other man
has been brought by the wife herself or her parents. In
Vailess Mulweni v. Alexander Chirwa (1935),^^ for example,
the wife to an adulterous association brought an action for
damages against her male partner. The damages were awarded in
the name of the husband. The woman herself was also ordered
to pay damages to her husband for the adultery. In cases of
this nature, the lawful husband may not subsequently proceed
against the other man for further damages. The proper course
for the husband would be to proceed against his wife or her
118parents for the damages. Normally, the latter would hand
over to the husband the damages they recover from the offend­
ing man. Actions of this type normally involve wives with 
absentee husbands. The wife or her guardian would bring the 
action as an act of expiation and in the hope of minimising her 
own liability to the husband.
A question often raised in relation to African customary 
laws in general is whether the definition of adultery extends 
to any unseemly conduct short of actual sexual intercourse.
From most of the decided cases in Malawi, it would clearly seem 
that a distinction exists between "adultery” and unseemly con­
duct short of actual sexual intercourse.
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Unseemly conduct between a married woman and another man
119is also actionable under customary law. That this offence
is distinguished from actual adultery is underlined by the
fact that it is treated less severely than adultery. Thus, in
120one appeal case before the Mzimba District Commissioner, 
the appellant admitted to having invited the respondent's wife 
to a bush at night. It was found that no adultery had taken 
place. The lower, Native Authority, court had nevertheless 
ordered him to pay £2 10/- compensation and a fine of 12/6.
The appellant successfully appealed against the amount of da­
mages awarded, contending that it equalled the amounts usua­
lly payable in cases of actual adultery. The District Commis­
sioner agreed and the damages were reduced to £1. In James
121Abner Mwale v. Hawtrey Jailos Kali^ (1959), the lower court 
had ordered the appellant to pay £6 as compensation for his 
alleged adultery with the respondent's wife. On appeal to the 
High Court, it was held that adultery had not been proved, but 
only the lesser offence of kunyengana. The award of £6 was 
reduced to £3.
On the other hand, it is useful to bear in mind that in 
the courts administering customary law, adultery need not be 
proved by direct or particularly strong evidence. Conduct 
showing undue familiarity easily leads to the inference of 
actual adultery. Thus, in practice, it can be a delicate ex­
ercise to distinguish between cases of actual adultery and 
cases of mere indiscretion short of adultery. Thus, in Levi
TOO
Gelesomo v. Alex Mzoza (1976), the appellant sought to deny 
liability for adultery by claiming that he had only been guilty 
of the lesser offence "of escorting the respondent's wife". It 
was held that adultery could be inferred from the facts admitted.
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Apart from the fact that the wife's adultery may give rise
to an action for damages, such adultery also constitutes a ma-
123trimonial offence upon which the husband may seek divorce.
Any remedy against the offending third party is not regarded as
a substitute for possible divorce proceedings. Rather the two
10/
are regarded as complementary. However, a husband may not
be allowed to recover damages against the wife (or her parents)
on the basis of the same act of adultery upon which an order
125of divorce has been obtained. Furthermore, if it is shown
that gross misconduct on the part of the husband (for example 
neglect) has contributed to the wife's adultery, this may af­
fect the husband's entitlement to whatever remedies are avail- 
able.126
The customary law governing liability for illicit sexual 
relations is almost exclusively geared towards the social con­
trol over access to women. It can be seen that the relevant 
principles focus almost entirely on the protection of men's 
rights in women. Thus, whereas a husband may sue a third 
party who commits adultery with his wife, the wife has no cor­
responding right to proceed against a woman who commits adul-
127tery with the husband. Such obvious double standards in
the law have attracted much attention in some parts of Africa. 
In Kenya, for example, the Commission on the Law of Marriage 
and Divorce recommended that a wife should have a right of
action for damages against a woman with whom her husband has
128committed adultery. This is now part of the statutory mar-
129riage law of Tanzania. In Malawi, Ibik's panels were unan­
imous in recommending that the wife should be entitled to the
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130same right of action as the husband. So far, there has
been no indication of any change in the law.
Traditionally, the wife had no claim to any exclusive sex­
ual relationship with her husband. The husband's adultery was 
an offence only in relation to the legal guardian of the co­
adulterer and not in relation to the wife. The common view was 
that the wife lost nothing by the husband's adultery. In any 
case, the husband could legally contract further marriages with 
other women. Thus, unless the husband's adultery was persis­
tent and was accompanied by neglect or other matrimonial mis­
conduct, it did not constitute a ground upon which the wife 
could seek divorce.
The modern tendency has been towards legal equality be­
tween men and women. Thus, although women may still be expec­
ted to ignore sporadic acts of adultery by their husbands,
legally, even a single act of adultery by the husband would
131justify the wife to seek divorce. As the following discus­
sion will show, at present, the wife may even be legally en­
titled to divorce her husband if the latter contracts another 
marriage with another woman.
d) Polygyny
As already indicated,the question of polygyny is consi-
132dered elsewhere in this study. However, there is one point
which calls for immediate attention.
It is of course one of the main features of marriage under 
customary law that it is potentially polygynous. In theory, 
there is no limit on the number of wives a man may take. As
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already observed, even those Africans who have adopted Islam
133are not legally limited to any number of wives.
The point which calls for immediate attention here re­
lates to the fact that under traditional customary law, a man's 
subsequent marriage to another woman did not entitle the first 
wife to a divorce. It must be noted that under customary law 
the court will normally dissolve a marriage once it is clear
1 *5/
that there is no prospect for the marriage to continue.
The court will dissolve a marriage even where the party seeking 
the divorce has no valid grounds. Thus, even under strict tra­
ditional customary law, a woman would be granted divorce if she 
did not want to form part of a polygynous relationship. How­
ever, apart from the fact that (and perhaps because) such a 
wish would be regarded as anti-social, the woman would be held 
to be responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Thus, 
where applicable, she could be ordered to return part or all 
the malobolo paid by her husband. In other cases, she could 
be ordered to pay compensation for wrongfully divorcing her
husband. She could also forfeit other important claims, for
135example, as regards family property or even children.
Under the law as just described, the wife of a husband 
who intends to take another woman has no real alternative to 
submitting to a polygynous relationship. The law would penal­
ise her if she opts for a divorce. However, the courts have - 
been interpreting the law rather differently. From a number 
of actual court decisions, it would appear that under custom­
ary law today the wife is entitled to opt out of a customary 
marriage if such a marriage has become polygynous in fact rather 
than merely in potential.
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The tendency to depart from the strictly traditional ap­
proach can be traced to the older decisions of European magis­
trates involving people who professed to be Christians. The 
magistrates were normally reluctant to make orders which would 
adversely affect women who had chosen to opt out of polygyny 
on account of their religious beliefs.
1 36Thus, in Atuleje v. Machaka (1938), a woman married 
under customary law petitioned the court of Native Authority 
Nchema for divorce on the grounds of desertion and neglect on 
the part of the husband. Actually, the real problem was that 
the petitioner could not bear children. Being a Christian, 
however, she objected to her husband taking a second wife.
The husband, nevertheless, took another wife. It can be noted 
in parenthesis that in a typical African traditional setting 
the wife's objection to the husband's wish to take another wife 
would have been viewed with unreserved reprobation. The hus­
band's conduct would not only have been in accord with tradi­
tional practice, but would have been the only recommended 
course of action. The Native Authority in this case granted 
the divorce and, in accordance with tradition, ordered the 
petitioner to pay £1 10/- compensation for wrongful divorce.
The petitioner appealed to the Chiradzulu District Commission­
er against the order for compensation. The District Commiss­
ioner found that there had been neither desertion nor neglect 
on the part of the respondent, but that the parties had be­
come incompatible because of the woman's Christianity and the 
man's polygyny. He quashed the order for compensation, ob­
serving that:
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This is one of those cases where mutual separation with­
out any further liability on either side is most desir­
able. 137
The High Court of Malawi was to develop this principle even 
further.138
In contrast, the courts would seem to have been less pre­
pared to accept conversion to Christianity as a good excuse on 
the part of a man to put away his extra wife or wives. Thus, 
in an old case, where a man wanted to put away his second wife 
because he had become a Christian, the District magistrate in 
Ncheu had the following to say:
Listen /’the man/ has acted very /"inconsiderately./ in 
this matter, he was a baptized Christian in 1913 and 
married his second wife in 1914. He now turns the woman 
and her children away because he is a Christian and may 
not have two wives - The court can not prevent him from 
turning the woman away under such circumstances but is 
of the opinion that he should make liberal provision for 
the woman and child.139
The man was ordered to pay compensation amounting to £3, a 
very substantial sum in 1916. Recently the National Tradition­
al Appeal Court adopted an almost similar view on the question. 
In Chiwaya v. Chiwaya (1977),^^ the court stated that a hus­
band could divorce a wife on the ground that he had been con­
verted to a religion which required only one wife. He would, 
however, be liable to compensate the divorced wife. Thus, it 
would appear that the traditional principle has been extended 
only in favour of women. The concern of the courts in the 
relevant cases is not the morality of polygyny as such, but 
its implications on the social status of women.
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The courts continue to uphold the principle that a mar­
riage contracted under customary law (even if such marriage 
is also blessed by a Christian ceremony) is potentially poly­
gynous. An existing customary marriage with one woman will 
under no circumstance invalidate a subsequent customary mar­
riage with another w o m a n . E v e n  in the olden days, however, 
consultation with the first wife was demanded by social eti­
quette. Failure to do so, however, did not invalidate the 
subsequent marriage. It did not change anything in the legal 
positions of the parties. There are indications in judicial 
dicta that the social requirement, that a man who intends to 
take a second wife should do so only after consultation with 
his existing wife, is acquiring a legal character.
In Poya v. Poya (1979),^^ the National Traditional Ap­
peal Court expressed the view that: "under tradition, it is 
cruelty for a husband to marry another wife without the con­
sent of the first wife". The term "cruelty" was clearly used 
in the legal sense to mean a matrimonial offence rather than 
in the mere social sense. In Mphaweni Wasili v. Mary Wasili
-I/ O
(1979), the National Traditional Appeal Court advanced the 
even more far-reaching proposition that: "a man who marries 
a second wife against the wishes of the first wife, that was 
cruelty". Of course, the implication of this proposition was 
not that the absence of consent on the part of the first wife 
would vitiate the subsequent marriage. Still, the proposition 
that a man is committing a matrimonial offence if he takes a 
second wife against the wishes of the first wife has important 
implications.
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Particularly in modern times, there can be very few women 
who would not protest against their husband's intentions to 
take subsequent wives. Christianity, together with the impact 
of secular education, wage-labour and the money economy have 
altered people's attitudes towards polygyny. Although the in­
digenous communities may still be described as "polygynous", 
this must probably be taken to mean merely that polygynous 
marriages are legally recognised and socially tolerated rather 
than that such marriages are regarded as ideal.
Increasingly, the notion of monogamy as the ideal form of 
marriage is gaining ascendancy. No longer does the possession 
of many wives confer the same, if any, measure of prestige as 
it used to in the olden days. In the first place, the number 
of wives and children (which used to be a measure of wealth 
and success) does not often reflect a man's real wealth or 
worth in modern times. In many cases, such possession of many 
wives merely reflects the degree of willingness on the part of 
the man to accept a lower standard of living. Even the rural 
areas (where subsistence farming constitutes practically the 
sole basis of sustenance) are affected by the strains and stres­
ses of a cash economy. Few men can support more than one wife 
without straining their (usually-already meagre) resources.
In urban and semi-urban areas, polygyny simply tends to lead to 
the transfer of the man's resources from the existing wife to 
the new one. In many cases, the tie with the first wife merely 
tends to degenerate. The state of polygyny has in some cases 
come to represent a mere transitory stage between marriage with 
one woman to marriage with another. Educated women or women
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with independent means - ideal for a polygynous man - are un­
likely to tolerate a polygynous state of marriage. Many have 
come to loathe and regard it as degrading and as a mark of 
their inferior status under traditional law.^^ Even women 
with very litle formal Western type of education tend to view 
polygyny as an affront to their dignity and self-respect.
Women who agree to marry married men sometimes do so only in 
the hope, usually well-founded, that they would eventual­
ly displace previous wives.
Even in the old traditional societies, it is unlikely 
that polygynous households did not present special difficul­
ties. The all-tranquil polygynous households depicted by such 
enthusiastic Africanists as the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya 
must surely be seen more as ideal-types to which people as­
pired than as everyday phenomena. Societies where women 
cheerfully encouraged their husbands to take additional wives, 
where co-wives and their children received equal treatment and 
equal love, where there was no jealousy or possessiveness, but 
only the unstinting co-operation of the wives^^^ rather belong 
to the realm of utopia. Partiality in the treatment of wives, 
jealousy, discord, the resort to (and accusations of) witch­
craft and the use of love potions, and many other problems 
were traditionally acknowledged as inherent in polygynous fa- 
milies.^^ The highly supportive nature of closely-knit 
social groups, together with the fact that the economic and 
social welfare of individuals depended less on the activities 
of the nuclear family than on the wider family, tended to 
ameliorate the harsher aspects of polygyny. In conditions
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where the nuclear family is becoming more important, and where 
the supportive role of the wider kin-group is diminishing, the 
difficulties attaching to polygyny become more intolerable.
Even in the olden days, such women as Kenyatta described 
in Facing Mount Kenya, who urged their husbands to contract 
further marriages, must have been few. The only usual cases 
when women would want their husbands to take subsequent wives 
were those which involved the latter's own sisters or close 
relatives. In particular, if a woman was unable to bear chil­
dren, she would normally want her sister or other female rela­
tion to bear children for her. Even today, the desire for 
children remains the most, and possibly the only, widely and 
readily-acknowledged rationale for polygyny. It is worth re­
membering that even in olden times, only a fraction of the men 
in a given community actually took more than one wife.
Even nowadays, contracting marriage under customary law 
is not a commitment to polygyny. Many people who contract 
marriage under customary law do so simply because this is to 
them the only normal and familiar way of getting married, and 
not because they seek to follow each and every practice assoc­
iated with customary marriage. The above proposition by the 
National Traditional Appeal Court would seem to underline this 
very fact. Its implication is that even if a woman is married 
under customary law, she has a right that her husband should 
not impose on her a polygynous way of life which may well be 
revolting to her. The correlative duty implied by this right, 
however, is not that the man cannot take a second wife. All 
that is implied by this right is that, if the husband does take
a second wife, he will be held responsible for the break of the
marriage if the wife decides to opt out of the resulting poly-
gynous relationship. It is submitted that in modern conditions,
this is a sound principle and one can only hope that it will be
148strengthened by subsequent court practice or even legislation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CUSTOMARY LAWS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE - 
Dissolution of Marriage and Consequent Rights and Obligations
This is the last of the three chapters dealing exclusively 
with the rules governing marriage and divorce under customary 
law. The chapter offers a review of the rules governing di­
vorce, custody of children, matrimonial property, and the 
rights and liabilities which accrue on the death of a spouse.
1. Divorce
Divorce is one of the areas of customary family law 
which most clearly displays the impact of modern influences 
on traditional African social practices. The following dis­
cussion delineates the main features of customary divorce 
law and highlights the main changes taking place.
a) The Right to Seek Divorce
Either spouse may seek divorce from the other. There is 
no legal discrimination on the basis of sex as to who is enti­
tled to divorce; although it is possible that social pressures 
against seeking divorce weigh more heavily on women than men.
As already noted, marriage under customary law is not 
simply a matter between a man and a woman, but a social pact 
between two familial groups. This raises the question whether 
apart from, or even instead of, the spouses themselves, any 
outside person - notably a marriage guardian or a parent - has 
the power to seek the termination of marriage.
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It is perfectly in order for a marriage guardian or any 
senior member of a family to initiate divorce proceedings on 
behalf of a spouse, with the permission or approval of the 
spouse. In fact, particularly where a woman is concerned, it 
is traditionally more appropriate that the proceedings should 
be initiated and conducted by the guardian rather than the 
spouse. The same holds in a case where a husband seeks to di­
vorce his wife. It is traditionally more appropriate to bring 
divorce proceedings against the wife's guardian and not the 
wife herself. This would be particularly prudent if the hus­
band intends to claim compensation or the return of malobolo. 
The ever-growing tendency for wives to institute and conduct 
divorce proceedings on their own behalf, and for husbands to 
bring matrimonial proceedings against wives directly and not 
through the latter's guardians, must be noted as an example of 
modern influences.
The pertinent question, however, is whether a guardian 
could institute divorce proceedings without the prior consent 
or approval of the spouse concerned. According to Ibik's 
Restatement,^ - divorce proceedings instituted in this way would 
seqm to be impermissible throughout Malawi. Indeed, as a mat­
ter of general social policy, the courts perhaps ought not to 
countenance any dissolution of marriage at the bidding of an 
outside person against the wishes of both spouses. The need 
for individual freedom is here compounded by the social desir­
ability of lasting marital unions and should thus easily out­
weigh any consideration for the traditional authority of guar­
dians or elders. The role of guardians or parents in a
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marriage should be sanctioned only to the extent that it is
2
constructive and not destructive.
From the decided cases - which are not many or exten­
sive - it would indeed seem that, as long as the spouses them­
selves want a marriage to continue, an attempt by a third 
party to initiate a divorce will be doomed to failure. It 
should be easy enough for a court to reach a decision where
the attempt to secure a divorce has been motivated by sheer
3
spite or purely selfish considerations. Even where valid 
reasons are adduced, the approach has been to warn the erring 
party, rather than to actually order a divorce. The tendency 
has been to address the problem constituting the basis for 
the intended dissolution of marriage. For example, where a 
wife still wanted to remain with her husband although the lat­
ter had ill-treated and neglected her, the court merely or­
dered the husband to mend his ways and refrained from dissolv­
ing the marriage as requested by the wife's guardian.^ In an­
other case decided in 1912, a husband had not paid the malobolo 
due to the wife's people. The wife's guardian wanted the mar­
riage dissolved, but the wife still wished to remain with her 
husband. The Mzimba District Court refused to dissolve the 
marriage but ordered the man to pay malobolo for the wife."*
It must be noted in relation to the above cases that with­
in a purely traditional setting, the wishes of the parents 
would have easily prevailed. In the development of the law 
towards greater individual freedom, the presence or availabil­
ity of new judicial structures, which were superimposed over 
traditional familial authority, was a sine qua non.
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b) Procedure for Divorce
This is a rather involved subject and the law is by no 
means certain.
The most basic question today is whether a customary mar­
riage may only be dissolved by a decree of a court or whether 
extra-judicial divorce is still legally possible. Firstly, 
however, it is necessary to deal with the basically tradition­
al aspects of the law.
In traditional African communities, divorce was normally 
effected by an arrangement between the two families of the 
spouses. In other words, divorce normally occurred outside 
state or political structures. This was consistent with the 
fact that marriage was essentially a social pact between two 
social groups. It is far from clear whether divorce was mere­
ly the recognition of a breakdown of marriage or whether it 
consisted in the fulfillment of prescribed procedures.
It is perhaps even inaccurate to refer to traditional pro 
cesses by which marriages were dissolved as "procedures for 
divorce". In general, the processes of terminating marriages 
were first and foremost processes of reconciliation. Only 
when reconciliation had failed did the matter become one of 
divorce. Which of the relatives of the spouses would take 
part in a given marital dispute largely depended on the seri­
ousness of the dispute and its possible consequences on the 
marriage. Seemingly minor disagreements were expected to be 
resolved between the spouses themselves, without the involve­
ment of any third party. Relatively more serious quarrels
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would be settled by the wife's or husband's senior relatives, 
depending on where the spouses resided. Only when the matter 
could not be resolved by the resident relatives was there 
need to invite the guardian or parents of the other spouse. 
Where a dispute threatened to break the marriage, it was es­
sential that the families of both spouses should be represen­
ted. Should the two families fail to reconcile the parties, 
a divorce settlement would be reached and the marriage would 
accordingly be brought to an end.
There could be serious disagreements between the two fa­
milies, for example, as to the return of malobolo or the dis­
tribution of matrimonial property, or the control over the 
children of the marriage. Generally, it was only in such 
cases that a forum outside the two families, (for example a 
chief or a chief's council) would be involved. Then, the mat­
ter would strictly no longer be one of divorce, but one about 
the specific issue of disagreement, for example, the return of 
malobolo.
As a general rule, the consent and cooperation of the 
wife's and husband's guardians(or family representatives) were 
essential to the dissolution of marriage. It is not clear 
whether and to what extent divorce by unilateral repudiation 
on the part of one spouse was ever allowed under customary 
law. At present, assuming that extra-judicial divorce is 
still possible, it is unlikely that the courts would approve 
of a divorce by unilateral repudiation. In Isaya Mpozera v . 
Victor Mwachuma (1965),^ the High Court expressed the view 
that, if such type of divorce had ever existed under customary
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law, the court would be "obliged to declare it repugnant to 
justice and morality...."^ It must be noted, however, that 
once a spouse accepts the unilateral repudiation of the 
other as constituting divorce, a court may not have any real 
alternative to accepting the dissolution of the marriage. In 
such a case, perhaps, the divorce could be regarded as having 
been effected by mutual consent or repudiation, rather than 
by unilateral repudiation. Indeed, in the few cases where 
divorce seems to have been effected by a unilateral act of 
one party, it has invariably been the other party, who has con-
Q
tended that the unilateral act amounted to a divorce.
In patrilineal systems, a divorce did not normally be­
come effective until malobolo had been returned by the wife’s 
people to the husband, or unless some other settlement regard­
ing malobolo had been reached. Questions of malobolo, parti­
cularly where there were children, were usually complex, so 
that there was rarely much room for informality. Whether or 
not malobolo had been returned (and therefore whether or not 
a divorce had been effected) was an even more critical matter 
if the wife intended to remarry. Where the malobolo had not 
been returned, the second "husband" could be sued for adul- 
tery or for enticing somebody's wife. Furthermore, the chil­
dren born of the second marriage could be regarded as belong­
ing to the first husband.^ In matrilineal systems, in con­
trast, there was a greater tendency to informality in the dis­
solution of marriages. It was sometimes possible for a woman 
and her people to dissolve a marriage simply by dismissing and 
sending away an unwanted husband.^
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Since the beginning of the colonial rule, the tendency has 
been to take divorce suits to the courts. Formal court proceed­
ings have nowadays replaced informal arbitral proceedings as 
the common or normal way of effecting customary-law divorces.
In some cases judicial divorce is inevitable. Divorce is al­
most invariably accompanied by ill-feeling between the parties 
and such ill-feeling sometimes spreads to other members of the 
respective families of the parties, thereby rendering informal 
divorce arrangements impossible. Irreconcilable claims regard­
ing the refund of malobolo, the distribution of matrimonial 
property, or the custody of children must no doubt constitute 
the main reason for taking divorce suits to the courts. How­
ever, people have been taking divorce suits to the courts even 
where there are no such claims to be settled and even where 
both parties want to divorce. The possible legal and social 
implications of this call for attention.
Practically throughout the colonial period, there was 
clear legal recognition of extra-judicial divorce in the case 
of customary-law marriages. There was implicit recognition 
of such divorces, for example, under Native Authority rules 
or District Council by-laws which provided for the registra­
tion of customary-law marriages and divorces. Even as they 
stand today, a typical clause (providing for the registration 
of divorces) in the relevant instruments commences as follows:
Whenever a non-Christian marriage registered under these 
by-laws or under any Native Authority Rules previously 
in force in the District is dissolved by a court or 
according to Moslem law or according to native law and 
custom, the party ... etc.12
219
This shows a clear recognition that marriage could be dissolved
13in accordance with customary law otherwise than by a court.
The courts also used to readily accept extra-judicial divorce.
At present, it is not at all clear whether extra-judicial 
divorce is still legally possible or whether the courts have 
exclusive power to dissolve customary-law marriages. The ques­
tion was left open in Khondiwa v . Mtamba1ika (1965),*^ in which 
Cram, J., did express doubts as to the continued admissibility 
of extra-judicial divorces after the passing of the Local 
Courts Ordinance in 1962. In Maggie Chitekwe v. Navicha 
(1965),*^ the High Court actually held that customary-law mar­
riages could only be dissolved in a Local Court and that extra­
judicial divorces were no longer legal. The relevant section 
of the Local Courts Ordinance*^ (and now of the Traditional 
Courts Act) did not expressly prohibit extra-judicial divorces, 
nor was it specifically concerned with the question of divorce. 
The specific object of the section was to delimit the respective 
jurisdictions in matrimonial causes of the High Court, on the 
one hand, and the Local Courts, on the other hand. The section, 
firstly, prohibited the Local Courts from entertaining causes 
arising from the Marriage Ordinance, 1902. This was clearly 
done ex abundanti cautela as jurisdiction over relevant mar­
riages was already reserved to the High Court by the 1902 Or­
dinance itself. Secondly, it prohibited the High Court from 
entertaining on the first instance causes relating to custom­
ary-law marriages. It was from the latter that the High Court 
seemed to draw the conclusion that extra-judicial divorce was 
no longer legal. It is submitted, with respect, that this
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conclusion was a non sequitur. The reservation of first- 
instance jurisdiction to the Local Courts amounted only to a 
restriction on the judicial powers of other courts. It is hard 
to see in what way it could be interpreted as indicating that 
extra-judicial divorce was no longer legally permissible.
The view that extra-judicial divorce is not permissible 
must have its basis in other considerations and not in the ex­
isting enactments delimiting the jurisdiction of African courts. 
General considerations of public policy seem to provide the main 
basis. This tends to be underlined in the more recent deci­
sions of the National Traditional Appeal Court. This court has
not been very consistent on the relevant issue. In some cases,
18it has implicitly recognised extra-judicial divorces. How­
ever, in more direct references to the issue, the court has ex­
pressed the view that customary marriages could be dissolved 
only by the courts. Significantly, this view has been expressed
without any reference to any statutory provision, like the Tra-
19
ditional Courts Act. In E. Nthenda v. E. Mabvira (1981), the 
court simply observed to the effect that marriage under custom­
ary law created a status of such importance as should be ter­
minated only by a court order. The rationale for this rule, 
according to the court, was the need to "ensure that all for­
malities as to dissolution are complied with and that all that 
was acquired during the matrimony is distributed smoothly and 
fairly".^ This must be seen as an example of judicial efforts 
both to modernise customary marriage law and to enhance the 
status of customary marriage. Extra-judicial divorce tends 
to be associated with the idea that customary marriages consti­
tute loose ties which are less solemn than statutory marriages.
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The evolution of judicial divorce also characterises the 
ascendancy of individualism and the decline of kinship author­
ity and influence. In order to obtain divorce or other matri­
monial remedies, there is a tendency for individual spouses to 
dispense with the authority or cooperation of the kin. Strict­
ly, or ideally, it should not be possible for a marriage to be
dissolved unless the marriage guardians or family representa-
21tives have been consulted. In practice, the courts have not 
always insisted on this requirement. Thus, a divorce may now 
be obtained by a spouse without any involvement on the part of 
his or her senior relatives. The rights, obligations, and 
decision-making powers pertaining to marriage have tended to 
be concentrated on the spouses themselves. As will become more 
clear in the course of this chapter, increasingly, divorce and 
accompanying remedies have come to depend on the interests, 
wishes and conduct of the spouses themselves. In other words, 
customary marriages have come to be treated more as contracts 
between the individual spouses than as social pacts between 
families.
The preference for judicial divorce is an aspect of the 
more general tendency, whereby kinship authority or control is 
giving way to formal legal regulation. Customary marriages 
can no longer realistically be conceived purely as social pacts 
between families. Within the complexity of modern society, 
customary marriages are acquiring a new dimension as aspects 
of public life and concern. The courts, rather than tradition­
al familial structures, are proving to be the more effective 
machinery for social control.
c) Grounds for Divorce
In describing the principles governing divorce under cus­
tomary law, the following remarks of Rubin and Cotran provide 
a useful starting points
It is not clear whether there are grounds for divorce in 
customary law. Many writers have inclined to this view, 
but there is good reason for doubting its validity - par­
ticularly if any analogy with the recognised grounds of 
divorce in English law is suggested. It is true that di­
vorce may be refused because inadequate reasons are ad­
vanced by the parties, but there is no limitation on the 
number of reasons which are allowed; nor are they forma­
lised into a set of watertight rules. Above all, the ab­
sence of specific grounds or reasons for divorce is not 
fatal to an attempt to end a marriage....22
Under customary law there are certainly no exclusive grounds
23upon which divorce may be granted. It is perhaps correct to 
state that the ultimate power in the determination of whether 
or not there should be a divorce lies with the parties them­
selves and not the courts. To use the language of current 
English divorce law, a divorce will ultimately be granted if 
it appears that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
Unlike the position under English law, however, the deter 
mination of whether a marriage has broken down irretrievably 
does not depend upon the fulfillment of certain prescribed con 
ditions, but on whether the parties can be persuaded to con­
tinue to live together as husband and wife. Strictly speaking 
customary law does not confer any power on the courts to deny 
divorce where at least one of the parties no longer wants to 
continue with the marriage. In E.P. Joshua v. E.B. Joshua 
(1981),^ the National Traditional Appeal Court underlined 
this idea by stating that:
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At customary law a court cannot force a marriage between 
spouses. Before it dissolves a marriage, however, a 
traditional court is not astute /eager?7 to bring the 
matrimony to an end. It does so only when there is no 
hope of reconciliation between the spouses and where the 
marriage has completely deteriorated (sic) the court will 
grant divorce to ease the tension between the spouses....25
The phrasing may betray some acquaintance with the law in 
Western common-law jurisdictions, but there can be little doubt 
that the principle is basically a customary-law one. In the 
instant case, both the trial court and the National Tradition­
al Appeal Court itself had tried without success to dissuade 
the respondent "from his course of action". As the respondent
no longer wanted his wife the courts had no choice but to dis-
26
solve the marriage. So too in Kakhobwe v . Kakhobwe (1981), 
the National Traditional Appeal Court referred to how the pre­
siding members of the court:
...had done all in their power to reconcile the spouses 
but respondent strongly objected to reuniting with his 
wife even as a second wife. The court need /can?7 not 
force a marriage between two unwilling spouses.27
Court records are replete with examples of marriages which 
have been dissolved simply because one party no longer wants 
the other or because he or she wants to marry another person.
The principle just described is not necessarily contra­
dicted by the not-so-infrequent instances when a court has re­
fused to order a divorce and asked the parties to remain mar-
28ried. Almost invariably, the cases where divorce is refused 
will be those where it appears to the court that there is an 
opportunity for reconciliation, or where it is very clear that 
the parties have not utilised the available processes of recon-
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ciliation. Should it subsequently transpire that the parties can-
29not be reconciled, divorce will be granted. In other words, 
a court's refusal to grant divorce is not absolute, but condi­
tional upon a possible change of heart on the part of the party 
seeking the divorce.
In practice, however, people who seek divorce will usually 
endeavour to show that their actions are based on serious 
grounds. Divorce without good reasons is not favourably coun­
tenanced. Even under customary law, marriages are intended to 
be permanent. The absence of exclusive grounds of divorce is 
by no means a reflection of any liberal attitude towards di­
vorce in traditional society. Marriage created strong and 
much-cherished social bonds, not only between the husband and 
the wife's relatives on the one hand and between the wife and 
the husband's relatives on the other, but also between the re­
latives of the husband and those of the wife. Divorce, which 
constituted a threat to these relationships, was frowned upon 
and tended to be allowed only where the continuation of a mar­
riage constituted a greater threat to harmonious relationships.
Even the death of one spouse was generally not regarded as suf-
30ficient reason for dissolving a marriage.
Traditionally divorce is said to have been rare in most
31communities. Nowadays, divorce is very common, especially in 
urban and semi-urban areas. The most frequent allegations in 
divorce suits include adultery, desertion, childlessness, ne­
glect to maintain wife, and neglect to perform certain marital 
duties. During the colonial period, the failure of a husband 
to pay hut tax became a common complaint. Refusal to assist
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members of a spouse's family, infection with veneral disease, 
quarrels with co-wives, the taking of another wife by the hus­
band, failure to observe certain taboos, incurable or recur­
rent illness, dissipation of matrimonial property, frequent 
visits or frequent requests for support by relatives of the 
other spouse, false accusations of adultery, recurrent ab­
sence from the matrimonial home, imprisonment for serious 
crime - all these and many other allegations have served as 
grounds or reasons for divorce.
The definition of legal conditions or grounds upon which 
marriage could be dissolved, as the case is, for example, in 
the English legal system, is characteristic of societies which 
rely on bureaucratic machinery for the regulation of social 
relationships. The absence of exclusive definitions of grounds 
upon which marriage could be dissolved under customary law must 
be seen as a reflection of the lesser extent to which tradition­
al African society relied on formal legal regulation. The sta­
bility of marriage and social relationships depended largely on 
the influence and authority of the kin. The absence of exclu­
sive grounds for divorce was not a reflection of any laxed mor­
ality; it merely underlined the fact that less emphasis was 
placed on formal legal regulation.
At present, it may be argued that, in the final analysis, 
the role of the courts in divorce suits is merely one of rub­
ber-stamping the expressed wishes of the parties. There is no 
true legal regulation of divorce. Of course, a party whose 
conduct is adjudged to have led to the breakdown of a marriage 
may suffer certain legal consequences. The party may be ordered
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to pay compensation to the other party. Such orders are more
common in matrilineal systems. The awards are usually smaller
32than any other type of award in matrimonial proceedings. In 
some recent cases, "guilty" husbands have been ordered, in ad­
dition to compensation, to build houses for their divorced 
33wives or to pay maintenance. It must be pointed out, however, 
that the practice of awarding maintenance - another example of 
the influence of English law - is not a completely established 
one and is clearly less evident in rural areas. In patrilineal 
systems, the general rule is that the guilty party loses the
Q  /
malobolo. Thus, where the wife is the guilty party, her guar­
dian will be required to return the malobolo which the husband 
had paid for her. If the husband is the guilty party, the 
wife's people will be allowed to keep the malobolo. In some 
cases the malobolo may be apportioned between the parties.
This will be the case, for example, if the court finds both 
parties equally to blame for the breakdown of the marriage.
Which party is to blame for the breakdown of the marriage may 
also be a relevant factor in deciding the question of custody 
of children, which will be discussed presently.
Orders of this nature are basically of modern origin.
Even the rules regarding the return of malobolo represent a re-
35interpretation of traditional principles. The present prac­
tice of the courts would seem to be an attempt to impose some 
form of legal constraints on divorce. The absence of such 
legal constraints in traditional African societies was perhaps 
more than compensated for by the effectual operation of other 
mechanisms of social control. To the extent that traditional
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systems of social control are no longer effective, it may in­
deed be socially desirable that there should be some legal 
constraints on divorce. Particularly in modern, urban areas, 
the practice whereby a court would grant divorce whenever it 
cannot persuade the spouses to live together has grave social 
implications, especially with regard to the status and dignity 
of women. The institution of marriage ought to be something 
more than a form of purely private contract. Marriage creates 
a status that is uniquely basic to the stability of society in 
general. The dissolution of marriage is not a matter which 
should be decided entirely on the basis of the private calcula­
tions of the parties. Of course there is a point beyond which 
it would be socially unjust and undesirable that a marriage 
should continue against the wishes of a spouse or both spouses. 
Whether or not such a point has been reached, however, should, 
in any given case, partly be determined as a matter of law and 
general social policy, rather than as a simple matter of imple­
menting the expressed wishes of the parties. Especially if 
children are involved, there ought to be some minimum legal 
requirements which must be fulfilled before divorce could be 
granted.
To cite the conclusions of the Law Commission in England,
the objectives of a good divorce law should include the support
37of marriages which have a chance of survival. The orders 
made by the courts against "guilty" parties in customary di­
vorce cases hardly constitute an effective safeguard against un 
necessary divorces. As long as the party who seeks divorce is 
willing to pay compensation or to forfeit malobolo or custody
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of children (in other words, as long as a party is willing to 
pay the "price"), divorce will be granted, however trivial or 
unjustified his or her reasons are for seeking to break a mar­
riage. Furthermore, the relevant orders are a rather inappro­
priate mechanism for regulating such a delicate matter as di­
vorce. They are largely punitive or vindictive in character 
and pay scant attention to the future needs which the parties 
and their children are likely to face. The result is that 
marriages, again to paraphrase the conclusions of the Law Com­
mission, tend to end with the minimum fairness and the maximum
38bitterness, distress and humiliation.
Recrimination rather than reconciliation is the more com­
mon feature of divorce proceedings in the courts. In the early 
District Courts manned by European magistrates, reconciliation 
generally ceased to be a feature of divorce proceedings. In 
African courts, some attempts would be made to reconcile the 
parties before a pronouncement of divorce. Sometimes, however, 
these attempts are no more than incidental and perfunctory. 
Sometimes, it is even possible that the attempt to reconcile 
the parties is being used merely as a device to determine which 
party should be held responsible for the breakdown of marriage. 
Generally, the courts do not seem to feel bound to attempt a 
reconciliation before pronouncing divorce. Of course one ex­
planation for this may be that when the parties resort to court 
proceedings, they are assumed to have exhausted all attempts at 
reconciliation. This may be the case in some, but unfortunate­
ly not in all, instances. More unfortunately, the principle of 
reconciliation has not always been followed; many marriages
have been dissolved without any or much evidence of attempted 
reconciliation.
Even African courts are tied down by inherent bureaucra­
tic constraints in their conduct of divorce actions. There is 
none of the leisurely, all-encompassing exploration of issues 
characteristic of traditional African procedures. The courts 
have little time for prolonged and extensive inquests into 
foundering marriages. They tend only to focus on the immedi­
ate issues of the dispute. A lack of acquaintance with the 
parties and their surroundings necessarily introduces an ele­
ment of detachment with the result that divorce may more read­
ily be contemplated as a solution to a marital dispute than 
would be the case were the dispute to be handled only by people 
intimately connected with the parties. The parties themselves 
may not feel that the court is the proper place to voice their 
innermost concerns.
2. Custody of Children on Divorce
The principles of affiliation described in the preceding 
chapter have tended to be watered down by certain principles 
which the courts have sometimes applied to disputes about cus­
tody of children on divorce.
Firstly, it must be stated that the term "custody" in 
customary-law disputes is commonly used in the broad sense to 
connote the whole range of parental rights, powers and obliga­
tions. A party who has been awarded custody of children, as­
sumes thereby the rights, powers and obligations of "guardian­
ship" as well. Custody implies something close to absolute
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"ownership" of children. Thus, the age of the children is of 
only limited relevance. For example, if there are grown-up, 
but unmarried, daughters, an order of "custody" is still neces­
sary because it must be determined who would act as their "mar­
riage guardian" or who would be entitled to malobolo paid in 
respect of their marriages. The awarding of custody to one 
spouse usually has the implication of excluding the other 
spouse and his or her kin from all legal rights, powers and ob­
ligations. The death of a spouse who has been awarded custody 
does not revive the rights or obligations of the other spouse.^9 
Secondly, however, the whole practice of courts awarding cus­
tody is of recent origin and the rules applied by the courts 
are still very vague. There are as yet no elaborate principles 
regarding the legal implications of awarding custody to one 
spouse or the other. With the steady disintegration of the ex­
tended family system, the question regarding the rights, but 
especially the obligations, of divorced parents over children 
is certainly the most urgent and one which should receive pri­
ority in any future attempt at reform.
a) The Law in Patrilineal Systems
It would clearly seem that under traditional customary law 
in patrilineal systems, the only basis upon which children of 
a marriage could be taken from a husband and given to the wife 
was the husband's failure or refusal to pay malobolo. Other­
wise, upon divorce, children would be left with, or at any rate 
would continue to be regarded as legally belonging to, the 
husband.^ It does not appear to have mattered whether the 
husband was responsible for the breakup of the marriage. The
I
i
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only exception was in relation to children of tender years. 
These were always allowed to go in with the mother. They 
would be returned to the father when old enough. When taking 
the children back, the father was obliged to bring a cow or 
other form of payment to cover for the wife's trouble in car­
ing for the children.^
The courts, on the other hand, have introduced another 
principle in the law. A party whose conduct is adjudged to 
have led to the breakup of the marriage will normally be de­
prived of both malobolo and custody of children.^ Thus, where 
the wife is responsible for the breakup of the marriage - for 
example if she commits adultery or deserts her husband - her 
guardian will be ordered to return malobolo and custody of 
children will be awarded to the husband. If on the other hand, 
it is the husband who is to blame, the wife will be awarded 
custody of children and no order against the wife for the re­
turn of malobolo will be made. The application of this prin-
/ 1
ciple is evident even in the older court records.
However, if one compares old decisions of African courts 
and those of modern Traditional Courts, it will be found that 
this principle is applied more readily and more completely to­
day than was previously the case. During colonial days, Euro­
pean magistrates were more willing to apply the principle than 
African courts. Thus, in Chipeta v. Jere (1939)^:
The wife stated: "I want my husband to tell me why he has
neglected me for a long time. I want him 
to divorce me now. I like him but he has 
neglected me for a long time."
The husband replied: "The reason I have neglected her is
that the child on her back is not mine."
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Divorce was granted by the Native Authority court on the ground 
that the husband had neglected the wife. As already stated, 
however, the husband was still given the option to pay malobolo 
which he had not already paid in order to get the children of 
the marriage. The wife appealed to the District Commissioner, 
contending that because the husband had abandoned her, he 
should be adjudged to have abandoned the children as well. The 
wife did not deny that she had a child by another man. However, 
her adultery was attributed to the husband's long absence from 
Nyasaland and neglect. On these facts, the District Commission­
er held that the respondent was entirely to blame. The wife 
was awarded custody of the children and the malobolo, which had 
apparently been paid by the time of the appeal.
The establishment of the principle that the guilty party 
should lose both children and malobolo received its initial im­
petus from European administrators when the latter began to 
preside over customary-law marriage disputes. The principle 
reflects a view of marriage that is at variance with the under­
lying implications of the traditional African concept of mar­
riage as being primarily a pact between two social groups rather 
than between two individuals. One implication of the tradition­
al way of looking at the marriage pact was that children were 
regarded as belonging primarily to the whole of either the man's 
or woman's family and only secondarily as belonging to an in­
dividual husband or wife. It becomes conceivable for the con­
duct of an individual husband or wife to drastically affect 
the rights of a whole kin group over such a fundamental matter 
as children only when marriage begins to be seen as being
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primarily a contract between two people, and children to be 
regarded as primarily belonging either to the husband and wife. 
It is also possible, however, that the "guilty-party" principle 
appealed to African authorities independently of any influence 
of European administrators. Certainly, the principle has some 
inherent social advantages. The fear to loj^se children as well 
as malobolo can indeed act as a deterrent against ill-conceived 
divorces. It restores the balance of advantage between husband 
and wife. Without it, a wife may be compelled to endure mis­
treatment by the husband simply because she knows that divorce 
would also mean separation from her children. A callous hus­
band, on the other hand, will have no incentive to desist from 
misconduct towards his wife if he knows that his only loss may 
be the malobolo paid for her. Loss of malobolo is in fact no 
loss at all if the husband is able to retain his children.
Apart from the advantages described above, the principle 
has little else to commend it. In fact, its very advantages 
may also be its disadvantages. Its obviously punitive under­
tones are objectionable. The object of reconciliation in any 
divorce case should not merely be to prevent a marriage from 
breaking up. Even where a divorce order has been made, the 
need remains to avoid further recrimination between the parties. 
The need is the greater where there are children to be consi­
dered. Rewarding one party and punishing another is clearly 
the wrong way to go about reducing the tension between divorced
lAft-'
spouses. Even were some punitive measures necessary (which is
h
unlikely), children can hardly be the best weapon to effect 
such measures. Even worse, no clearly developed principles
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regarding maintenance of children after divorce exist under 
customary law. For support from a parent against whom an 
order of custody has been made, children depend mainly on the 
parent's sense of moral duty and not on any legal obligation. 
Such sense of moral duty is hardly boosted by the application 
of the "guilty-party" principle. Moreover, the guilty parent 
may very well be the person better equipped to care for the 
children.
b) The Law in Matrilineal Systems
The "guilty-party" principle has sometimes also been used
with respect to marriages under the matrilineal system. In
45Kamozi v. Kalauza (1917), the plaintiff and his wife had been 
staying in the wife's village in accordance with the uxorilocal 
marriage system. After the death of the wife, the plaintiff 
sought to leave the village, and to take the children of the 
marriage with him. The Blantyre District Court stated that the 
following principle would apply:-
If a man is turned out of a village through no fault of 
his own he may take his children. If he leaves of his 
own accord, owing to his wife's death or for any other 
reason the children remain with the mother or her rela­
tives .46
In many of the cases, however, this principle has not been
followed and the courts have adhered to the strict law of the
matrilineal systems that children belong to the mother's side.^
Whether or not the wife is at fault has been regarded as irrel-
48evant as far as the question of custody is concerned.
It is in the decisions of the National Traditional Appeal 
Court that the strict matrilineal principle has received most
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emphasis, against what would seem to be obvious indications of
49the need for change. The firm manner in which the court has 
tended to endorse the "guilty-party" principle in relation to 
lobola marriages contrasts rather sharply with the court's re­
jection of the principle in relation to chikamwini marriages.
In Jeladi Kalonda v. Effe Masauko (1979),^ for example, the u 
court stated that irrespective of fault, children under the 
chikamwini system belong to the w i f e . ^  The difference in the 
approach of the National Traditional Appeal Court between 
chikamwini and lobola marriages has no obvious explanation.
One possible explanation is that the neutralisation of the 
traditional patrilineal principle is being seen by the court 
as an aspect of the improvement of the legal position of 
women. Since, with respect to children, the legal position of 
the wife under the matrilineal system is already an advanta­
geous one, the court may not have seen any need to alter the 
law. It must be noted, however, that the question of custody 
in modern times is not a simple one of rights or powers over 
children, but also one of obligations. With the decline in 
the extended family system, asserting that, on divorce, chil­
dren belong to the wife's side is sometimes simply putting the 
wife in a position where she has to shoulder the burden of 
bringing up the children on her own. The constant reminder by
the National Traditional Appeal Court that the father has a
52"moral duty" to help in bringing up the children does not 
provide any guarantee that the husband's help will be forth­
coming. In fact, such reminders serve to underline the argu­
ment against the very strict application of the matrilineal 
principle.
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The "guilty-party" principle is even less defensible.
Apart from the fact that it does not represent strict tradi­
tional law, the principle, as already argued, is of little so­
cial utility, particularly as regards the welfare of the chil­
dren themselves. The principle may also lead to unjust or in­
equitable results. It is not always easy to apportion guilt. 
Complaints which the parties are able to articulate in divorce 
proceedings are usually mere symptoms of deep-rooted causes.
It is rarely the case that a marriage breaks down because of
53the fault of one party alone. A party adjudged to be guilty 
may happen only to be the one who had placed the last straw.
It is perhaps on the basis of some of these considera­
tions that, occasionally, the courts have refrained from award­
ing custody to one parent alone. Instead, either joint custody 
has been ordered or the children have been left free to choose 
between either parent.^ A possible ingredient of orders of 
this type could be a principle which the High Court used to 
apply very regularly in custody disputes under customary law. 
When considering questions of custody, according to the High 
Court, the most important consideration was the moral and ma­
terial welfare of the children. The welfare of children was
paramount, irrespective of the customary-law rights of either
55spouse. In the more recent decisions of the National Tradi­
tional Appeal Court, this principle has tended to be ignored. 
Thus, it is uncertain whether, and to what extent, the princi­
ple could be said to be part of modern customary law. Ibik's 
panels in the Restatement unanimously recommended that custom­
ary law should be altered so as to enable the court to pay due
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regard to the best interests of children of the marriage. The 
implication of this, of course, is that the panels did not 
regard the principle as having been established under customary 
law. On the other hand, the recommendation is an indication 
that the principle is a somewhat familiar one in African com­
munities. It is submitted that the further development of the 
principle would be a great improvement in customary law.
3. Matrimonial Property Rights
It is not possible here to do more than make a few brief 
and rather generalised remarks on the subject of matrimonial 
property rights. The discussion deals almost exclusively with 
the law relating to the division of property on divorce. Pro­
perty claims of one spouse upon the death of another - largely 
the subject-matter of the Wills and Inheritance Act, 1967 - 
are altogether excluded from the present discussion, which is 
essentially about claims between husband and wife as opposed to 
claims between a spouse and third parties.
a) Personal Belongings
Items acquired by either spouse for purely personal use 
are not usually considered to constitute matrimonial property. 
Such items as clothing and ornaments are a clear example. Cer­
tain implements used by either spouse in pursuit of a special 
trade or hobby - weaving, carving, pot-making, hunting, trap­
ping etc. - also tend to be treated as personal belongings.
All such personal items are regarded as belonging to the indi­
vidual spouse, who can dispose of them as he or she wishes.
On divorce, each spouse is entitled to retain his or her per­
sonal belongings, which are not subject to any division.
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Still, disputes do arise especially in relation to person­
al items which a husband may acquire for his wife in fulfill­
ment of his marital duties, for example, the duty to provide 
clothing for the wife. A husband may retain some measure of 
control over such items even though they have already been 
transferred to the wife. A wife may not dispose of these 
things without the husband's authorisation. On divorce, parti­
cularly where the wife is the cause of it, attempts have been 
made by husbands to repossess the relevant items. Attempts 
have also been made to claim back other gifts given to the wife 
and her relatives. At least today, the law seems to be that 
such things cannot be taken away from the wife even if the di­
vorce arises from her misconduct.^  In Noel Gondwe v. Fran- 
cisca naNyungwe (1980),^ the National Traditional Appeal 
Court expressed the view that on divorce, a husband is not 
entitled to claim whatever he has spent on his wife. Any such 
claim, the court stated, would not only be against customary 
law, but would also be contrary to good conscience. The clear
implication of this is that the wife would be entitled to re-
58tain personal belongings bought for her by the husband.
b) Traditional Household Property
This will include such things as cooking utensils, tools 
for cultivating, chairs or stools, beds or mats, water vessels, 
baskets, mortars - in short, various normal household items 
employed for the common good of husband, wife and children. 
"Traditional household property" must be understood also to in­
clude industrially*' manufactured items which many normal house­
holds use in place of traditional equivalents. Paraffin lamps, 
metal pots and other utensils, blankets, mirrors, flour-sieves,
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charcoal-irons and other such items of relatively small value 
must be included in this category. Expensive modern items 
such as cars, electric refrigerators and cookers constitute a 
different category of matrimonial property.
The general rule appears to be that "all traditional mov­
able property, which a spouse acquires and brings to the matri­
monial home constitutes matrimonial property (katundu wanyum
59ba.)". Such property is subject to the joint control of hus­
band and wife, and may not be disposed of by either spouse 
without the consent of the other.^ It is doubtful, however, 
if a unilateral disposal of such property by one spouse is 
legally actionable. If persistent, of course, such conduct may 
amount to dissipation of matrimonial property which constitutes 
a good ground for divorce.^
Traditionally different principles would appear to have 
been followed in the distribution of traditional household pro­
perty upon divorce. One way was to divide the property between 
the spouses, with the spouse adjudged to have caused the di- 
vorce getting the smaller share. In some places, apparently,
if the wife was at fault, she would get nothing at all. If the
husband was the one at fault, then the property would be divi-
6 3
ded equally between the spouses. In some cases the spouses
had equal shares of the property irrespective of where the 
guilt l a y . ^  Under another rule the husband was entitled to 
everything irrespective of who was at fault.^ In other places, 
each spouse would be entitled to take what he or she had brought 
or bought, with the wife getting a larger share of the property 
acquired jointly by the parties.^ Yet another way of distri­
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buting the property was to give to the wife those things asso­
ciated with her domestic duties, for example, cooking utensils 
and to leave things like furniture with the husband.^
There are not many decided cases on the relevant matter.
From the few cases decided by the High Court (before 1969) and
the National Traditional Appeal Court, judicial opinion would
clearly seem to lean in favour of the principle of equal dis- 
68
tribution. The details as to the application of this prin­
ciple have never really been worked out. By equal division, 
the courts do not seem to imply that a monetary value should be 
be placed on each and every item and then divided accordingly. 
What equal division might imply with reference to property in 
a given household will be illustrated below when dealing with 
the distribution of modern household property.
c ) Livestock
Traditionally, only such animals as foufls and pigeons 
would be owned on a strictly individual basis. Such animals 
would normally be placed in the joint care of the spouses and 
be regarded as matrimonial property. On divorce, they would 
be distributed in the same way as any traditional household 
property. However, if a spouse kept such items of livestock 
separately, for example, if they were entrusted to a third 
party, they may be regarded as belonging solely to that spouse 
and on divorce the spouse may be entitled to them as though 
they were his or her personal possessions.
Bigger livestock like goats, but especially cattle, tend­
ed to be subject to more complex patterns of ownership. Al­
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though cattle could be owned as individual property, they were 
normally kept under the care of a broader social group. Thus, 
Coissoro notes with reference to the matrilineal Chewa that:
All members of a mbumba put their individually owned 
beasts in the possession of the senior member....The 
senior member although technically£*has no ownership 
over the beasts entrusted to him, enjoys the privilege 
of using them for his own personal needs and for custo­
mary purposes, without having to ask for the authoriza­
tion of their owners.69
He then goes on to explain that the true owners of such cattle 
may not dispose of them without giving notice to the senior 
member, but observes:
This limitation on the disposal of cattle by their owner 
does not mean, however, that the cattle are ultimately 
the property of the mbumba even as a corporate entity 
with its own rights.... 70
Similarly, with reference to the patrilineal Ngoni, 
Coissoro notes:
The rules regarding the disposal of cattle were based 
on the principle that no individual member of a house 
had any separate or separable interest in the house- 
herd, so that only with the consent of senior members 
of the house could any beast be disposed of by a member 
of the house.71
There was no distinction between inherited cattle and self 
acquired cattle:
...so that, a beast purchased or received as a gift by 
a house-member could never become the individual pro­
perty of the purchaser or the donee.72
Within such patterns of ownership, cattle could not strictly 
become matrimonial property and therefore subject to division 
between husband and wife upon divorce. Any cattle a spouse
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could call his or her own would, at least nominally, be at­
tached to a wider family group, and the family groups of hus­
band and wife were mutually exclusive.
Cattle received as malobolo for married daughters was 
regarded as belonging to the father's side of the family and 
not the mother's. Among some people, like the Ngoni and the 
Lambya, each wife of a polygynous man, with her children, con­
stituted a discrete unit in relation to the management of malo­
bolo cattle. Cattle received for daughters' of one unit 
would normally only be used to pay malobolo for the sons of 
that unit. Cattle would readily be transferred across units 
if need arose, for example, if one wife had only male children. 
Such a transfer would create either a debt relationship between 
the two units or a special bond whereby children of the units
involved would begin to relate as though they belonged to one
73 74woman. As already noted in Z. Tembo v. M. and E . Jere, if
cattle from one unit w«^- required for some purpose the husband 
was required to consult with the wife of that unit before act­
ing. Still, the husband was the overall owner of all the cat­
tle received for the daughters. The attachment of cattle to 
each unit and the need to consult with the wives did not mean 
that the latter were co-owners. The interest of the wife was, 
as it were, a v/carious one. Her right to protest against im­
proper use would be exercised only to protect the interests of 
her children and not her own. Upon divorce, the wife could 
not claim any part of the cattle received on account of her 
daughters.
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Traditional ideas of ownership are rapidly changing.
There is a clear movement from collective to individual owner­
ship of cattle. Thus, cattle may readily be viewed as consti­
tuting matrimonial property. Where such cattle h a ^ b e e n  ac- 
quired by the joint efforts of both spouses may be shared 
by the spouses on the same principles as those governing tra­
ditional matrimonial property.^ It is still doubtful, on the 
other hand, whether a court would at present readily order the 
division of cattle received as malobolo between husband and 
wife. Where the spouses have separately acquired cattle as in 
dividual property, each is likely to be allowed to retain them 
as such.^
d ) Farming Land and the Matrimonial Home
Any land allocated to a person for use with his or her 
spouse constitutes matrimonial property. Generally, however, 
the powers of disposal and the claim to continued occupation 
or use after divorce may vest in one spouse alone.^ In the 
case of spouses living virilocally, land will be allocated 
to the husband. During the continuance of the marriage
such land will be subject to the beneficial enjoyment of both 
spouses. A wife may even enjoy exclusive beneficial use of 
certain pieces of land expressly re-allocated to her by the 
husband. Still, it is the husband who will have the overall 
control over the land and power of disposal. Upon divorce, 
the wife will have no claim to the land. In the case of spou­
ses living uxorilocally, the wife’s people will normally pro­
vide the husband with a piece of land where he could grow 
crops for his household. Such land constitutes matrimonial
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property, but the husband cannot dispose of it without the 
consent of the wife's people who remain the rightful owners. 
The wife herself may not have the same power as that enjoyed 
by a husband in a lobola marriage. That power will normally 
vest in her legal guardian. The beneficial enjoyment on the 
part of the husband is dependent on the marriage. Upon di­
vorce, the husband's right that his wife's people allow him 
to use the land lapses. It is possible on the other hand 
that a husband may acquire a piece of land independently of 
his marriage. This is usually the case with dimba-gardens 
(stream-side gardens). A husband would enjoy full rights to
such land even though he resides uxorilocally. He will con-
78tinue to have a claim even after divorce.
The position regarding farming land also holds true in 
relation to the matrimonial house. During a marriage, the 
house constitutes matrimonial property and is subject to the 
joint control of both spouses. Where the parties reside viri- 
locally, the house becomes the sole property of the husband 
upon divorce. Where they reside uxorilocally, the house is 
kept by the wife.
Where the parties reside uxorilocally, even upon divorce, 
the matrimonial home may not be regarded as belonging entirely 
to the wife. It has been a rule of most matrilineal communi­
ties that, on divorce, the husband is entitled to take away 
with him doors, windows, iron roof and other fittings of the 
matrimonial house. According to Ibik, this right to remove 
the fittings is only implicit where the husband had provided
79them. The wife is always entitled to retain the main struc­
ture of the house and any fixtures which cannot be removed
80without destroying the main structure. In Dora Legison v .
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Lester Somera (1980), the Chiradzulu District Appeal Tradi­
tional Court had ordered that the respondent, a divorced hus­
band, could go and fetch the iron-roof sheets from the house 
he had built for his wife. On appeal to the National Tradi­
tional Appeal Court, however, it was held that the husband 
could not remove the iron sheets or any fittings from the 
house built for the wife. The National Traditional Appeal 
Court has also indicated that this will be the case even if 
the wife is responsible for the divorce. The court has ex­
plained its decisions simply by observing that the husband 
under matrilineal systems has an obligation to build a house 
for the wife in her village.
Indeed, where a house has not been built and the wife is not 
adjudged to be the wrong party, the court's view has been that
the husband's obligation to build a house should not lapse with
82divorce. On this point, the National Traditional Appeal 
Court is clearly stretching the traditional obligation of the 
husband under the matrilineal system. The court would appear 
to be using this obligation as a basis for a form of mainte­
nance orders in favour of the wives. Whereas the High Court 
would order husbands to pay a sum of money in direct mainten­
ance, the National Traditional Appeal Court would seem to pre­
fer to achieve the same objective indirectly, by modifying a 
principle of traditional custom. It is interesting to note in 
this connection that the court has held that irrespective of
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fault, the husband should not be allowed to remove fittings 
from the matrimonial house built in the wife's village. On 
the other hand, the question of fault is regarded as a rele­
vant one in deciding whether or not to order the husband to 
build a house for the wife on divorce. There is a clear par­
allel here to the High Court's approach to the question of 
maintenance.
The rule that, on divorce, a husband could remove fit­
tings from the matrimonial home perhaps represents one of the 
attempts to adapt the chikamwini residential principle to 
changing life-styles in African communities. Obviously, the 
original chikamwini principle had not contemplated the gradu­
al change in African architecture, whereby houses with com­
paratively expensive fittings would be built. Traditional 
huts had few fittings and these were of negligible economic 
value. The huts were rarely built with windows; doors were 
normally fashioned from grass or reeds; and the same kind of 
material was used to make roofs. Thus, the rule regarding 
fittings could have had no economic rationale in purely tradi­
tional communities. The rule must have been invented to deal 
with a new situation in which houses began to acquire some 
economic value. The rule, however, underlines a point which 
has already been made, namely, that the house built by the hus­
band in the wife's village was basically intended as a matri­
monial home and not as an economic contribution to the wife's 
family. The rulings of the National Traditional Appeal Court 
against the husband taking away the fittings from the matrimon­
ial house do not themselves represent any return to the basics 
of the chikamwini principle.
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The compatibility of the chikamwini principle with modern 
economic life has been a subject of much controversy. On vari­
ous occasions, there have been calls for the abolition or modi­
fication of the system. The main argument is that, under the 
chikamwini system, there is no incentive for the husband to 
improve the farmland allotted to him, or to build a decent 
homestead, in the wife's village, as these are things which he 
would be forced to leave behind him either on divorce or on 
the death of the wife.
The question of modifying the system was considered, for
example, by the Ncheu District Council in the 1950's. The
Council put forward the interesting proposal that the courts
should be empowered to enforce a nuptial contract, which would
be printed at the back of a marriage certificate, and which
83would be signed by the parties and their witnesses. The 
contract would contain, inter alia, the following:
(a) On the death of the wife or dissolution of marriage 
(the husband being the innocent party) the wife and her 
witnesses agree that the husband shall be allowed to re­
main at the village and to continue to cultivate the land 
allotted to him, despite the fact that no bride-price has 
been paid. 84
(b) The husband agrees to make improvements to the land 
and to build a well-constructed home for his wife.85
(c) The husband has the power to bequest (sic) his pro­
perty, including the building constructed by him and trees 
planted by him to one of his children.86
There is no evidence that the proposals were ever implemented. 
The view of the Chief Secretary was that the proposed law would 
be difficult to apply, although, at the same time, he welcomed 
what he described as:
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...this indication of the Ncheu District Council's desire 
to get away from the stultifying effect of the uxorilocal 
custom and matrilineal descent.87
In its 1971 Annual Convention, the Malawi Congress Party 
included among its declarations the following:
Having discussed fully marriage customs prevalent in 
Malawi in relation to the development of the country, 
delegates agreed that steps should be taken to change 
ects of our marriage customs which retard pro
A more direct reference to the chikamwini system had been made 
by the Party during the 1969 Annual Convention held in Blan- 
tyre, as follows:
The Conference, having discussed fully aspects of Malawi 
marriage customs and their implications in the development 
of this country, recommended that:
(i) The system of chikamwini should be discouraged.
(ii) The people should be encouraged to allow husbands 
to take their wives to their (husbands') homes.89
Since the 1971 Convention, however, less attention has 
been paid to the specific question of marriage laws. The above 
declarations of dissatisfaction with the chikamwini system have 
not been followed by any concrete measures.
It must be noted that, from the viewpoint of the wife, the 
lobola system may present the same problems as the chikamwini 
system. The view implicit in the criticism against the latter 
system is that the virilocal residential system is more condu­
cive to development than the uxorilocal system. It is submit­
ted that this view may be correct largely only because of a 
major weakness in social attitudes. Both systems, to the ex­
tent that they inhibit individual initiative, are inherently
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ill-suited to the modern capitalist economic environment. The 
real advantage of the virilocal system derives from the fact 
that society is currently still dominated by men. Men domin­
ate the decision-making processes in the social and economic 
spheres. It is the man who is the head of the nuclear family. 
Economic development in modern society is, for good or for ill, 
closely linked to the strengthening of the nuclear family as an 
economic unit. In the chikamwini system, the nuclear family 
is more vulnerable to external influences because of the weaker 
position of its head, being a stranger in the wife's village.
The stronger position of the husband in his own village under 
the virilocal system makes for a more independent nuclear fa­
mily. Were the decision-making powers and the economic privi­
leges to be equally distributed between men and women, husbands 
and wives, the difference between the lobola and chikamwini 
systems would have been minimal.
In modern days, the matrimonial home may be built in a 
place other than the village of either husband or wife. The 
law with respect to such cases is uncertain, if not non­
existent. The same is true with farming land acquired commer­
cially by either husband or wife or both. Fuller comments on 
the law with respect to such cases will be made below as part 
of the discussion on the law regarding the division of modern 
forms of property.
e ) Foodstuffs
The rule that upon divorce foodstuffs should be divided
equally between the spouses would seem to be universally recog-
90nised. There is no rule, however, which would prevent a court
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from ordering that a larger share of foodstuffs should go to 
the party who has been awarded custody of the children. Un­
harvested crops do not attach to the land; they are also sub­
ject to equal or equitable division between the spouses.
f ) Modern Forms of Property
Traditional forms of property have generally never been a 
subject of much litigation between spouses. This is possibly 
partly due to the fact that the rules regarding the division 
of such property are sufficiently established to obviate seri­
ous differences between the parties. It may also be due to 
the fact that many traditional households possess very little. 
On divorce, there is usually very little to quarrel about. 
Litigation about the division of matrimonial property in gener 
al is also relatively infrequent compared, for example, to li­
tigation about children. Yet this is bound to change as more 
people begin to acquire expensive household items and other 
forms of property. Already, customary-law courts are dealing 
with such things as maize mills, canteens, brick houses built 
in urban areas, sewing machines, stereo sets etc. In all like
lihood, they will soon be, or already are, dealing with bank
91and other complex investment accounts, property encumbered 
by mortgages, insurance policies etc. Whether, or to what ex­
tent, existing customary-law courts can be said to be equal to 
the task of dealing with such issues is a matter into which 
the present discussion is not intended to delve. What must be
stressed here is that there are no clear customary-law prin-
92ciples dealing with such type of property.
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More specifically, there is no clear indication that the 
courts are prepared to stretch the rules governing the divi­
sion of traditional matrimonial property and apply them to 
modern forms of property. With regard to purely household
items, the courts have more often than not ordered that the
93property be divided equally between the spouses. By "equal 
division" the courts tend to mean any or a combination of the 
following things: Equality may mean numerical equality, where
this is possible. Thus, where there are two radios, each 
spouse may be allowed to take one without taking into consi­
deration any disparity in their value. Equal division may 
simply mean matching one item with another. The wife may take 
the refrigerator for which the husband is allowed to retain 
the family stereo set. The third meaning is a refinement of 
the second one. Items of matrimonial property tend to be di­
vided between those pertaining to the wife (womanly) and those 
pertaining to the husband (manly). Thus, property may be 
shared in such a way^- that the wife tends to take such things 
as a sewing machine or food mixer against, for example, living- 
room furniture awarded to the husband. On the whole, just 
"sharing" rather than "equal division" would seem to be the 
correct term.
94The case of Zibia Kuluwani v. Michael Kuluwani (1981) 
which went to the National Traditional Appeal Court provides 
a glimpse into the likely contents of a modern, affluent house­
hold, and into the way a court may order the division of modern 
matrimonial property. The court ordered that the property 
should be divided as follows:
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The wife was to get - two single beds, one chest of draw­
ers, one radio, three blankets, one sleeping bag, a sewing 
machine, two coffee tables, four stools, six pots, one set of 
plates, six tumblers, twelve spoons and forks, a food-mixer, 
a food-cutter, a dining set and one bed spread. The husband 
was to keep - a double bed, one chest of drawers, one mirror, 
three blankets, one sleeping bag, one bed spread, the sofa set, 
four stools, the stereo set, chair covers, cooler box, the re­
mainder of the plates and tumblers, the baskets and the press­
ing iron.
Household goods as the ones listed above are treated as 
constituting matrimonial property. It does not seem to matter 
whether or not the wife has directly contributed to their ac­
quisition. Anything expressly acquired for the personal use 
of a spouse remains his or her property. From one case at 
least, it would seem that anything that requires some form of 
registration may be regarded as belonging to the person in
whose name the property is registered. Thus in Nsabwe Liundi
95v. Naliyeni Bandawe (1964) the respondent had divorced the 
appellant because the latter had taken a second wife and chased 
the respondent from the matrimonial home. The appellant was a 
successful business man. The respondent had given him material 
assistance in the business which at first had consisted mainly 
of one maize mill. Later, a second maize mill was bought and 
this was licensed in the wife's name. The court of first in­
stance in Kasupe (Machinga) awarded the maize mill to the wife. 
The award was upheld in subsequent appeals to the Kasupe Local 
Appeal Court and ultimately the High Court.
253
Very expensive property which a husband may acquire other­
wise than in fulfillment of recognised marital duties, if not 
registered in the wife's name and if the wife has not directly
contributed to the purchase money, seems to be treated as the
96sole property of the husband.
In matrilineal systems, the fact that the husband has not
fulfilled his obligation to build a house at the wife's home
does not mean that any house bought or built elsewhere belongs
to the wife. This point was stressed by the National Tradition-
97
al Appeal Court in E.W.F. Nthenda v. Elefa Mabvira (1981).
Indeed the decision in this case would seem to put the husband
in a particularly strong position because the house in question
had been acquired jointly by the husband and wife. The husband
was ordered to pay K200 for the wife to build another house at
her home. He, however, retained the matrimonial home. On the
98other hand, in the High Court case of Liundi v. Bandawe the 
court of first instance had ordered that the matrimonial home 
go to the wife. The order was, however, set aside by the Local 
Appeal Court. On (the husband's) appeal to the High Court, the 
three African assessors sitting with the Chief Justice recommen­
ded that the house should be returned to the wife. The Chief 
Justice was inclined to agree with this; unfortunately, the mat­
ter regarding the house had not been specifically raised by the 
wife during the High Court proceedings. Still, the judgement of 
the court of first instance and the views of the assessors in 
the High Court a-re important in that they point to the possibil­
ity of a matrimonial home of the type under discussion going to 
the wife rather than the husband.
254
4. The Legal Status of Widows and Widowers
A customary marriage is not automatically or immediately 
dissolved by death. A formal act of divorce is normally re­
quired if the surviving spouse wishes to bring the marital re­
lationship to an end. In most cases, the severance of the mar­
ital bond occurs as part of purification rites which tend to
99come at the end of usually-long mourning periods. Thus, 
among many people, the necessity for a formal act of divorce 
is magical or religious rather than legal in character. In 
some systems, however, the principle that marriage is not auto­
matically dissolved by death has serious legal implications. 
Should the surviving spouse and the relatives of the deceased 
desire to continue with the relationship, there are ways of 
doing so provided for under customary law.
Among matrilineal people, it would seem that arrangements 
whereby a widow or widower may marry a relative of the deceased 
spouse are purely optional. Such arrangements will normally be 
made as a mark of esteem or an act of kindness on the part of 
the relatives of the deceased for the surviving s p o u s e . T h e y  
are not made in pursuance of any legal obligation. In lobola 
systems, on the other hand, levirate and sororate arrangements 
may not only meet some social need, but will also serve to ful­
fill legally enforceable claims. The contrast between matri­
lineal and patrilineal systems is well underlined in court re­
cords relating to the respective systems. Whereas in patrili­
neal systems it is possible to find court decisions on the levi­
rate and sororate institutions, there would seem to be hardly 
any such decisions in the other system. Naturally, therefore,
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the following discussion is solely concerned with patrilineal 
systems. It concentrates on the law regarding the claims of 
widowers against relatives of deceased wives and the law re­
lating to the legal status of widows.
a) Widower's Claims on his Deceased Wife's Relatives
The death of a wife used to entail liability on the part 
of her relatives to supply the husband with another wife. The 
choice of the "substitute wife" was usually restricted to sis­
ters of the deceased or close paternal cousins or nieces. If 
the relatives of the deceased wife were unable or unwilling to 
supply another wife, they were required to return part or the 
whole of malobolo paid for the d e c e a s e d . A p a r t  from demon­
strating this principle, the case of Alifeyo Mhango v. Simeon
102Chisambi (1934) is even more interesting because it involved
a marriage that had been solemnised under the Native Marriage
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(Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923. When the 
wife died, a shaving ceremony took place and at this ceremony 
the relatives of the deceased wife signalled their undertaking 
to supply another w i f e . ^ ^  The defendant in this case was the 
brother of the deceased wife. After the shaving ceremony, the 
defendant was informed by a friend that in a church marriage 
the husband of a deceased wife could not claim another wife.
The defendant followed this advice and refused to deliver an­
other wife to his brother-in-law, the plaintiff. The latter 
sued for the return of malobolo. The defendant's plea that this 
was a Christian marriage and therefore excluded the application 
of the relevant practice of customary law was rejected both by 
the Native Authority and, on appeal, by the Mzimba District
256
Commissioner. The defendant was ordered to return malobolo.
The widower's claim for a substitute wife must be disting­
uished from another aspect of the sororate institution whereby 
a husband was given a sister of his wife during the latter's 
lifetime (nthengwa yambiligha as it is called in Tumbuka). In 
the mbiligha case, there would in effect be two marriages.
Some malobolo would usually be paid for the sister. Although 
this tended to be far less than the usual amount, the woman's 
parents could, if they were so inclined, claim the full malo­
bolo. Divorce with one wife did not automatically mean di­
vorce with her sister; although if it was the elder sister who 
had been divorced, the younger one might follow, out of loyalty. 
On the other hand, when a sister was given on the death of the 
first wife, no new marriage was created and the husband was not 
obliged to pay further malobolo.
The case of a sororate marriage arising from the failure 
of the first wife to bear children was somewhat ambivalent.
The position of the husband in such a case tended to be closer 
to that of a widower. He would normally not be asked to pay 
further malobolo. The children born of the second sister would 
normally be considered to belong to the childless wife. Thus, 
for example, among the Ngoni, if the first sister was also the 
senior wife, the children of the second sister would rank first 
on succession even though between the marriage of the first 
sister and that of the second there were other wives with chil­
dren. More importantly, when the prior wife could not bear 
children, as when she had died, the husband could ask for another 
wife as of right.
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Of course it was not in every case that a widower would 
be allowed to claim for a second wife or the return of malobolo* 
If on her death, the wife was already old, or past childbearing, 
or had left a sufficient number of children who no longer re­
quired close maternal care, there was usually no liability on
the part of her relatives to supply a new wife or return malo- 
107bolo. In effect, much depended on how long the marriage had
lasted before the death of the wife. With the diminishing popu-
108larity of the custom, even among the Native Authorities, it
soon became accepted that if a marriage had lasted for more
than one year no claim by the widower against the relatives of
109his deceased wife should lie. According to a District Com­
missioner in Karonga, the ancient custom had, under modern con­
ditions, "proved a heavy burden on the old p e o p l e " . F u r ­
thermore, the widower would forfeit any claim if he had ill- 
treated the deceased during her lifetime; so too if her untime­
ly death could in some way be attributed to his negligence or 
misconduct. In one case held in Mzimba in 1913, the wife had 
been devoured by a lion. The accident was somehow attributed 
to the husband's failure to provide effective protection for 
his wife. Although the wife had borne only one child (who had 
eventually died) the return of malobolo was r e j e c t e d . T h e  
widower would be even less likely to succeed if he had neglec­
ted to pay malobolo for his deceased wife.
b ) The Legal Status of Widows
The general principle is clear enough. Where malobolo 
have been paid, the death of the husband does not free the wife 
from the marriage. She is not free to marry any person outside
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the circle of her late husband's relatives. If she does so,
her action and that of her intended partner would constitute,
to use the words of the National Traditional Appeal Court in
Mtambalika Moyo v. Hilda Chipeta (1974), "a breach of an old
112and respectable custom". Mere sexual intercourse with an
"unreleased" widow also constitutes adultery and the man re­
sponsible may be liable to pay compensation to the relatives
113of the deceased. A widow may not leave her late husband's
village to live with her own parents. If she does so, even
if she does not marry again, her parents will be called upon
114to return the malobolo paid for her.
Under strict traditional custom, the primary obligation 
of a woman whose husband has died is to go through the proce­
dure of "widow inheritance", ukungenisa or ukungena in chiNgoni, 
or nthengwa yauchokolo, in chiTumbuka. She must continue with 
her marriage obligations, including bearing children, with a 
relative - preferably a uterine brother - of the deceased. No 
further malobolo are demanded and the children born with the 
new man tend generally to be regarded as the lawful issue of 
the deceased. It is as though, with the death of the husband, 
nothing has changed. Sometimes, particularly when the widow 
is past childbearing, the "inheritance" is merely nominal and 
the widow does not actually cohabit with the new husband.
A widow could remain in her deceased husband's village 
without being "inherited" by any of his relatives. This is 
normally the case where she has grown-up sons who could take 
care of her. In such a case, as the saying goes, her own 
children inherit her. Even if there is someone who wants to
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inherit her, a widow may elect to remain "single". As long as 
she remains in the village of her late husband, her in-laws 
may not have the power to compel her to be inherited. Thus, 
in one case, a widow who did not want to be inherited success­
fully applied for a court order warning a persistent brother- 
in-law against m o l e s t a t i o n . A  problem may arise today in 
relation to a widow who resides neither in her late husband's 
village nor in her parents' village, but in a neutral place of 
work. For obvious reasons customary law is silent on the mat­
ter. It seems likely, however, that she may not necessarily 
be held to have deserted her husband's people as long as she 
still visits them and still uses the husband's village as the 
primary place of abode during holidays.
A widow who wants to be released from her marriage must 
seek a formal divorce. Her parents will be required to return 
malobolo, or where a prospective husband has already been iden­
tified, the latter may be ordered to pay malobolo directly to 
the widow's relatives-in-law.^^ With the introduction of 
colonial rule, women started to resort to the courts in order 
to obtain freedom. Such "applications for freedom" were very 
common in the early District Courts where European magistrates 
presided. This is understandable. A widow who sought her 
freedom would normally be operating not only against the wishes 
of her in-laws, but also against the interests of her parents. 
She would therefore require the independent authority of the 
courts to put pressure on her parents to return malobolo, and 
on her in-laws to release her.
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European magistrates, perhaps naturally, tended to be 
sympathetic to the needs of widows. Thus, although they did 
not ignore customary law, they would usually do their best to 
alleviate any hardship entailed by the application of custom­
ary law. For example, on granting freedom to a widow, they 
would order only a small portion of malobolo to be paid.^*^
In many cases, however, the obligation to return malobolo
118would be suspended until the widow actually re-marries.
This way, she would be able to go and live with her parents 
without the latter immediately being called upon to return 
malobolo. In one case, a widow ran away with a very poor man. 
The man was sued by relatives of the widow's late husband. In 
desperation, he offered to work for the plaintiffs. The court 
adjourned the case until the relatives of the widow were called. 
A compromise was reached whereby the widow's parents would pay 
half the amount due to the plaintiffs. The latter agreed not 
to ask for the other half until the defendant could pay. Ac­
cording to the court, the defendant's offer to work for the
plaintiff's would have been "too much like slavery" and would
119have put the widow herself in a rather humiliating position.
The institution of "widow inheritance", especially in 
modern times, is a double-edged sword. The widow has a right 
too that a relative of her deceased husband should inherit her. 
She has a claim on her husband's relatives for support and pro­
tection. Should the relatives fail to find someone who could 
inherit her, this would be construed as an intention to divorce 
the widow. She may thus be allowed to leave without the obli­
gation to return malobolo and in some cases, she may even be
allowed to take the children. This may also apply to a case 
where the widow is not allowed to "marry" a relative of her 
own choice. This may be a greater problem today than in the 
olden days because there may not be many men who would be will­
ing to inherit widows. Financial burdens may be one obstacle.
A person who inherits a widow must in most cases also be pre­
pared to become a polygynist. This may present special prob­
lems in Christian communities. It is not only failure to pro­
vide a man that will excuse a widow from the obligation to re­
main with her husband's relatives. Any other conduct which may 
constitute a ground for divorce will do. Even quarrels between 
brothers over one woman may be construed as a ground for di-
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE APPLICATION OF MARRIAGE LEGISLATION TO AFRICANS - 
The Marriage Ordinance, 1902
1. Introduction
The marriage legislation applicable to Africans in Malawi was 
introduced between 1902 and 1923, by the colonial administra­
tion. Mainly, it comprises the Marriage Act which was enacted 
in 1902 as the British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance,* and 
the African Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Act which
was enacted as the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registra-
2tion Ordinance in 1923 - replacing the Christian Native Mar-
riage Ordinance of 1912. The two chapters in this part of 
the study examine the tangled history of the enactment of the 
above statutes. The issues relating to the history of the Mar­
riage Ordinance, 1902, are discussed in this chapter. The his­
tory of the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Or­
dinance, 1923, is detailed in the next chapter. The latter 
also includes an account of the Christian Native Marriage Ordi­
nance, 1912.
The body of law inaugurated by the enactment of the Mar­
riage Ordinance, 1902, derived ultimately from the English law 
of marriage. This was a law which had its roots in English, 
Western-European, cultural and religious traditions. The rele­
vant principles were, in many respects, radically different 
from those governing marriage under African customary law. Di­
vorce, in the cases of marriages contracted under the Ordinance, 
was also to be governed by similar principles, and these were
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embodied in the Divorce Ordinance which was enacted in 1905.^
In addition, the English law governing the distribution of per­
sonal estates on intestacy was to govern succession to the pro­
perty of Africans married under the Ordinance and to the proper 
ty of their children (irrespective of the marriage law applica­
ble to the latter).
In the present discussion of the history of marriage legis 
lation, the main task will be to highlight the issues of policy 
regarding the availability of the provisions of the Marriage 
Ordinance to members of the African population and the implica­
tions on the status of the indigenous marriage laws within the 
colonial legal system. The ultimate questions addressed are 
whether, in what way, and to what extent, the enactment of the 
Marriage Ordinance could be interpreted as constituting a mea­
sure towards the replacement of indigenous marriage systems. 
This essentially involves an attempt to identify the policy 
considerations which had necessitated the evolution of the pre­
sent dual system of marriage law for Africans. The relevant 
questions are examined from the standpoint of the officials 
actually involved in the transactions relating to the introduc­
tion of the relevant legislation. This chapter also lays down 
the foundation for the discussions in the following chapters 
which consist of a close examination of the interaction of co­
lonial legislation, indigenous African custom and Christian 
missionary ideologies in the development of marriage law. The 
main question in this chapter on this* particular theme relates 
to colonial official attitudes towards the continued availabi­
lity of customary marriage law to those Africans who had adop­
ted Christianity as their religion.
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2. The Origin and Provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902 
The initial impetus for the introduction of European types 
of marriage legislation in British African territories has 
often been attributed to the wishes:
...of the missionary bodies who felt that they were un­
able to keep their converts true to their voluntary pro­
fessed religion without the aid of legal sanction and 
penalties.5
This view, as some of the more recent studies have shown,
6 7
is not quite accurate. Indeed, as Morris has noted, some
missionaries were even hostile to the introduction of the Or­
dinances as they constituted state interference with the reli­
gious sacrament of marriage. With some missions, as will be­
come apparent in the next chapter, the struggle between church 
and state for control over the regulation of marriage which had 
taken place in England was being repeated in the African pro­
tectorates.
The immediate problem leading to the introduction of mar­
riage legislation had little to do with marriages of Africans, 
Christian or otherwise. The enactment of the relevant statutes 
had been prompted by the problems of non-African immigrants who 
wished to contract marriage locally.
Prior to the introduction of local marriage legislation 
in many parts of British colonial Africa, marriages of non- 
African immigrants had been governed by the Foreign Marriage
o
Act, 1892. This Act empowered consular officers to solemnise
marriages at their official residences between parties one or
9
both of whom were British subjects. The restriction to
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marriages to which at least one of the parties was a British 
subject, and the fact that the parties to an intended marriage 
had to travel a long distance to one of the few locations of 
consular residences, had been sources of much hardship. In 
October, 1902, for example, with the intention of obviating 
some of the defects of the Foreign Marriage Act, the adminis­
tration in British Central Africa Protectorate presented a 
draft marriage ordinance to the Foreign Office for approval.
The main object of the draft was to "simplify the procedure" 
for contracting marriage and to give power to the Commissioner 
to appoint ordinary (that is, non-consular) magistrates as 
Marriage O f f i c e r s . U n d e r  the Foreign Marriage Act, in this 
territory, marriage could be solemnised only at two places: 
Zomba and Blantyre. These two places had catered not only for 
British Central Africa, but for the entire British sphere north 
of the Z a m b e z i . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  similar to those made by the
British Central Africa administration had been made by the ad-
12ministration in the East Africa Protectorate.
In response, the Foreign Office sent draft marriage Ordi­
nances to several African territories, including British Cen­
tral Africa, with instructions that the drafts be enacted as
13Marriage Ordinances. It would seem that the overriding con­
sideration at the Foreign Office was the introduction of uni­
form marriage ordinances in the protectorates. The relevant 
draft ordinances had been closely patterned on the Southern 
Nigeria Marriage Proclamation of 190CT,^ following a recommen­
dation by the Colonial Office:
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...that the Southern Nigeria Proclamations are the latest 
precedent ... and the most suitable for use in a British 
Protectorate.15
In turn, the Nigerian Proclamation had been modelled on the 
Gold Coast Marriage Ordinance, 1884.*^
It was clear from the provisions of the draft Marriage 
Ordinance sent by the Foreign Office to the Commissioner, 
British Central Africa, that considerations other than the mere 
need to alleviate the difficulties of a minority immigrant pop­
ulation had been taken into account.^ The proposed law would 
be available not only to expatriates, but also to members of 
the indigenous population. The draft Ordinance provided for 
the demarcation of the territory into marriage districts, the 
appointment of Registrars of Marriages and the licensing of 
places of public worship as places for the celebration of mono­
gamous marriages. Marriage could be celebrated either before 
a civil Registrar of Marriages or before an authorised Minister 
of religion in a licensed place of public worship. In either 
case, certain preliminaries at the office of the Registrar of 
Marriages would have to be completed by the parties, unless 
the marriage was under a special licence issued by the Commis­
sioner .
The fact that even Africans could avail themselves of the 
provisions of the Ordinance was implicit in many of the clauses 
which had been framed specifically with reference to Africans. 
For example: Section 35 of the Ordinance provided that:
...any person who is married under this Ordinance... shall 
be incapable, during the continuance of such marriage, of 
contracting a valid marriage under any native law or custom.
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Section 39 (later Section 40):
Where any person who is subject to native law or custom 
contracts a marriage in accordance with the provisions 
of this or any other law relating to marriage ... and such 
person dies intestate....
And any person who is the issue of any such marriage as 
aforesaid dies intestate....
The personal property of such intestate and also any real 
property of which the said intestate might have disposed 
by Will, shall be distributed in accordance with the pro­
visions of the law of England relating to the distribu­
tion of the personal estate of intestates, any native law 
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 51 made it an offence, carrying a maximum penalty of 
five years, for any person to contract marriage under the Mar­
riage Ordinance being at the material time married in accor­
dance with the native law or custom to any person other than
18the person with whom such marriage is contracted. All these 
provisions envisaged the possible application of the Ordinance 
to Africans.
Besides the references to customary law, there was another, 
less obvious, indication that the Ordinance was of general ap­
plication. The opening words of Section 7:
Whenever after the commencement of this Ordinance, any 
persons desire to marry....
were sufficiently indicative of, not only the generality, but 
arguably also the inherently exclusive character of the Mar­
riage Ordinance. But for Section 35, under which the continued 
validity of customary marriages was expressly excepted, Section 
7 of the Ordinance would clearly have’ thrown some doubt on the
continued validity of customary marriages contracted after the
19commencement of the Marriage Ordinance.
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It is very doubtful, however, whether the Foreign Office 
had any clearly-formulated policy with regard to the applica­
tion of the Marriage Ordinance to marriages of Africans. In 
the preparation of the original drafts, neither the local ad­
ministrations nor the missionary establishments had been con­
sulted. As Morris has observed, little thought was given, for 
example, to the question of:
Whether an enactment which might be suitable for the 
coastal areas of West Africa, with a considerable 
westernised population, would also be suitable for the 
rest of Africa where conditions were very different.20
There is no intention here to follow the developments in all 
the territories affected by the standard draft Marriage Ordi­
nance sent by the Foreign Office. Subsequent developments in 
British Central Africa were, however, closely linked, at 
least for a while, with developments in Uganda. A brief ac­
count of the reaction in Uganda to the Foreign Office draft is 
therefore in order.
3. The Reaction in Uganda
In British Central Africa, the draft Marriage Ordinance 
prepared by the Foreign Office was enacted immediately after 
it had been received. However, soon afterwards, the Commission­
er, Alfred Sharpe, received information from the Foreign Office 
to the effect that in Uganda, the equivalent Marriage Ordinance 
had been objected to as "unworkable” . The Commissioner was in­
structed not to bring the British Central Africa Marriage Ordi­
nance into force until it had been determined whether any objec­
tions would be raised in British Central Africa to the Ordinance.
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If so, the Commissioner was instructed to forward details of
such objections, together with any proposed remedies, to the
21Foreign Office for further consideration.
In Uganda, the missionaries were displeased with several 
aspects of the draft Ordinance. The Anglican Bishop, Alfred 
Tucker, in particular was highly critical of the draft Ordi­
nance. The requirements that certain preliminaries should 
first be completed at the office of the Registrar of Marriages 
before marriage could be solemnised was one of the aspects cri­
ticised. Bishop Tucker contended that the long journeys in­
volved in travelling to offices of the Registrars of Marriages 
would prove ’’irksome" and "unworkable" for Africans:
...men will be required to travel hundreds of miles to 
face hunger and weariness and it may be sickness and 
death before they can get married.22
The fee charged under the Ordinance was also criticised 
by Bishop Tucker as being too high. The Bishop warned that 
the fee could be interpreted by Africans as an additional form 
of interior taxation (which had been prohibited by the terms 
of the Baganda Agreement, 1900). There was also opposition to 
a clause applying the English law of succession to Africans 
married under the Ordinance.
Bishop Tucker also sternly disapproved of the clause in
the Ordinance which authorised the marriage of a man to the
23sister or niece of his deceased wife.. The marriage of a man 
to a sister or niece of his wife (not necessarily deceased) had 
been a familiar feature of many systems of African customary law.
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However, the inclusion of this clause in the Marriage Ordinance 
had not, as might be assumed, been intended as a recognition of 
this feature of customary law. The inclusion of the clause had 
come as a result of developments in England which led to the 
enactment of the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907. 
Morris explains as follows:
In 1902 when the Secretary of State sent his draft Mar­
riage Ordinance, marriage with a deceased wife's sister 
was still unlawful in England, but since a change in 
this respect was then contemplated, the draft Ordinance 
anticipated the change and stated specifically that the 
rules regarding kindred and affinity were to be those 
under English law except that a man could marry his de­
ceased wife's sister or niece.24
Bishop Tucker claimed that among the Baganda, the practice le­
galised by the Ordinance had completely disappeared as a re­
sult of Christian teaching and therefore that the clause legal­
ising such practice constituted a step backwards. Other mis­
sionaries also expressed opposition to the provisions of the 
25Ordinance.
The objections raised by the missions in Uganda were di­
rected both at the bureaucractic incumbrances which the Ordi­
nance imposed and at the whole idea of applying English legal 
principles of marriage law to Africans. In the final analysis, 
the argument of the missions in Uganda was that the application 
of the Ordinance would constitute an obstacle to the promotion 
of the Christian ideals of marriage among Africans. This is 
indeed how the Commissioner of Uganda summed up the matter in 
a despatch to the Foreign Office. He noted that the effect of 
the Marriage Ordinance would be:
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...to discourage Christian marriage, and to produce di­
sastrous results to the work the missionaries have so 
far successfully taken up in elevating the moral tone of 
the people.26
It was the desire of the missions that Christian marriage 
should be free from complicated procedures and expense. In 
the words of the Commissioner:
They /"the missionaries7 fear, and I think with some 
reason, that if the Baganda find it otherwise, and that 
Christian marriage entails on them trouble and expense 
for which they do not bargain they are very likely to 
think that the game is not worth the candle and to pre­
fer to continue in their old social and conjugal customs.27
In Bishop Tucker's words:
Every hindrance placed in the way of /"Christian/ marriage 
is an incentive to immorality.28
It is useful to emphasise that these arguments were not
essentially to the effect that indigenous customary marriage 
practices were preferable, in the context of the social condi­
tions of Africa, to the alien form of marriage introduced 
through the Ordinance. On the contrary, it was implicit in 
the arguments that the disappearance of indigenous practices 
would be a desirable thing. While the Ordinance was seen only 
as an obstacle to Christianity, customary marriage practices 
were viewed as the very negation of Christianity.
As a result of the reaction in Uganda, a feeling of regret
for having introduced the Marriage Ordinances without consulta­
tion with relevant officials in the protectorates pervaded the 
Foreign Office. One of the officials observed how unwise it 
was:
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...to prepare these elaborate legislative measures - so 
excellent on paper - without reference to the local cir­
cumstances .. . and needs.29
He added:
It is the more regrettable because if it is a failure in 
Uganda it probably will be in the other protectorates.30
Soon afterwards, the Foreign Office approved a supplemen­
tary Ordinance, the Native Marriage Ordinance, 1903. By virtue 
of this Ordinance, African Christians would be able to contract 
statutory marriage in church without going through the compli­
cated procedure at the office of the civil Registrar of Mar- 
31riages. The fee for registration of marriage was fixed at 
one Rupee. The clause substituting the English law of succes­
sion was repealed. The reference to the marriage of a man to 
a sister or niece of his deceased wife was omitted.
In contrast, the initial reaction in British Central
Africa was that there were no objections to the Ordinance, that
32the Ordinance was suited to the requirements of the territory. 
Thus, on 1st February, 1903, the British Central Africa Mar­
riage Ordinance was duly brought into force. This was not, how­
ever, the end of the matter. From this time until 1948, the 
legislative problems initiated by the enactment of the Marriage 
Ordinance were to become a perpetual item on the agenda of the 
colonial administration.
Despite the assurances from British Central Africa that 
the Marriage Ordinance constituted a satisfactory measure, dis­
satisfaction with the Ordinance mounted at the Foreign Office.
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Details of the Uganda objections and a copy of the Uganda
Native Marriage Ordinance were transmitted to the Commissioner
of British Central Africa. Once again the Commissioner was
asked to ascertain the opinions of the missions, "especially
the Scottish Established Church, the Free Church of Scotland
33and the Universities Mission to Central Africa". Further 
instructions from the Foreign Office enjoined the Commissioner 
to:
...furnish report at earliest convenience and telegraph 
whether any objections have been raised especially as to 
the deceased wife's sister clause.34
By the beginning of 1904, the Foreign Office was contemplating 
a review "of the entire development of marriage law in the ter­
ritories" . ^
The official view in British Central Africa did not 
change. Advising the Acting Commissioner on the Uganda Native 
Marriage Ordinance, Joseph Nunan, the Chief Legal Officer, ex­
pressed himself as being "strongly adverse" to it; stating that
it contained "nothing of utility which is not already conveyed"
36
by the 1902 Ordinance. Nunan even did not see any need to 
consult the missions as requested by the Foreign Office. Never 
theless, at least the heads of the three missions specifically 
referred to by the Foreign Office were consulted. An account 
of their views will be given later in the chapter. Firstly, it 
is essential to examine the official view in British Central 
Africa with regard to the application of the Marriage Ordinance 
to members of the African population.
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4. The Marriage Ordinance and African Marriages : Storey v .
The Registrar of Marriages of the Shire District
37Storey v. The Registrar of Marriages (1903), was the
38first decision of the High Court of the British Central Africa 
Protectorate relating to the provisions of the Marriage Ordin­
ance. In the course of the judgement, Joseph Nunan, the presi­
ding judge, dealt with certain issues which were to predominate 
in the official exchanges on questions relating to the applica­
tion of the Marriage Ordinance to Africans.
The petitioner in the case was Albert James Storey, an 
English man who had come to British Central Africa in 1898 as
a missionary in the employment of the Zambezi Industrial Mis-
39sion. He later left the Mission, and at the time of the pe­
tition, he was working as a clerk in Blantyre. While still at 
the Mission, he had made acquaintance with an Ngoni woman,
Alice Ndumei. The woman had also been in the employment of the 
Mission. She had also been attending classes as a catechumen, 
awaiting baptism. After leaving the Mission, Storey made three 
attempts to persuade Alice Ndumei to join him as a concubine.
On the advice of another European, the man in charge of the 
Mission, Ndumei turned down the first and second invitations.
On the third attempt she consented and joined Storey. This was 
with the express approval of her father, although no kind of 
marriage ceremony took place. After a year (during which a 
child was born, of the union) Storey decided to formalise his 
relationship with Ndumei under the provisions of the newly en­
acted Marriage Ordinance, 1902.
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Lewis Traherne Moggridge, the Registrar of Marriages of 
the Shire Marriage District, refused to perform the marriage 
or to issue a certificate in the Form C under Section 11 of 
the Ordinance. The reason given for the refusal was, in the 
words of the judgement:
...that the woman /was7 not capable of fully understanding 
the nature of the contract, and that she should not be ex­
posed to the legal penalties which she may incur by taking 
a native husband under the simple system of native custom 
at any time hereafter during the life of the European 
husband.40
Storey commenced proceeding before the High Court against the 
Registrar of Marriages. The summons called upon the Registrar 
to:
...show cause why a certificate in Form C should not be 
duly issued by him to the petitioner and marriage duly 
celebrated between the petitioner and Alice Ndumei by 
him as Registrar of Marriages or by some other proper 
authority on the fulfillment of the conditions prescribed 
by the British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, 1902.41
In default of such cause being shown, Storey petitioned the 
High Court for a mandamus, commanding the Registrar of Mar­
riages to issue the said certificate in the Form "C" of the
42First Schedule to the Marriage Ordinance.
Nunan dismissed Storey's petition, stating that he was not 
sufficiently convinced by any evidence which had been brought 
before the court or by the demeanor or words of the woman her­
self that the discretion of the Marriage Registrar should be 
overridden.
In the proceedings, Nunan had the assistance of four asses­
sors - Dr H. Hetherwick, Mr W.W. Miller, Mr R.S. Hynde and
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W.R. Martin - to whom he put a series of questions as to the 
capacity of the parties to the proposed marriage, including 
the following:
Question 5 : Does the woman appear to understand the 
nature of the marriage contract as the 
voluntary union of one man to one woman 
for life to the exclusion of all others?
Question 6 : Does the woman appear to understand the
penalties to which both parties are liable 
for breach of the Ordinance?
Question 7 : Is there a reasonable prospect that the
woman will, if married, be able to remain 
faithful to her marriage vow so far as to 
avoid incurring the said penalties?
Question 8 : Is there any reason of public policy or 
otherwise known to you why such marriage 
should not be celebrated?
One can sympathise with Nunan insofar as he might have 
been using the case at hand as a basis for a fresh definition 
of policy with regard to the application of the Marriage Ordi­
nance to Africans. In his preliminary remarks, Nunan expressed 
the view that apart from Europeans for whom the Ordinance had 
primarily been intended, the Ordinance had further been inten­
ded
...to provide intelligent and educated natives of the 
Protectorate with facilities for entering into a con­
tract of marriage in the English sense....43
Soon after the Storey judgement, Nunan wrote to the Acting 
Commissioner that:
...owing to the primitive character of the native popula­
tion I think that the celebration of marriage under the 
Ordinance should be conducted cautiously and treated as 
an experiment.44
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Nunan and other officials in British Central Africa, in­
cluding the Commissioner, maintained as a matter, not only of 
interpretation but also, of policy that the extension of the 
application of the Marriage Ordinance to Africans should be 
restricted; that only "intelligent or educated" Africans 
should be capable of contracting statutory marriage.
It had clearly been one of the main considerations in 
framing the law contained in the Marriage Ordinance that, ow­
ing to the supposedly primitive social conditions of the major­
ity of Africans, it would be impractical to impose a wholesale 
substitution of English marriage for customary marriage.^
Yet, there does not appear to have been any intention on the 
part of the architects^ of the Marriage Ordinance to bar any 
category of Africans from contracting marriage under the Ordi­
nance. Indeed, the whole tenor of the Ordinance was not re­
strictive. On the contrary, it was obvious from some of its 
provisions that its architects had intended the Ordinance to 
be applied as extensively as possible. Thus, even marriages 
of the very class of Africans whom Nunan purported to exclude 
from the application of the Ordinance were specifically antici­
pated under its provisions. The clauses of the Ordinance under 
which one of the parties to an intended marriage was required 
to sign the notice of marriage in the presence of the Registrar 
of Marriages,^ significantly, made special provision for per­
sons who were "unable to write" or were "insufficiently acquain­
ted with the English language or both".^® Instead of "signing", 
such persons were allowed to use "a mark or a cross in the pre­
sence of some literate persons". Clearly, there was no class of
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people to whom this proviso was more relevant than the "unedu­
cated" Africans.
It is submitted that in pLacing the questions listed above 
before the assessors, Nunan was sidetracking the key issue.
The question most pertinent to the decision must have been 
whether a Registrar of Marriages could (under the provisions of 
the Ordinance as it stood) legally refuse to issue a certifi­
cate in the prescribed form where the parties had fulfilled all
49the necessary conditions laid down by the Ordinance. By dis­
missing Storey's petition, Nunan of course assumed that a Regis­
trar had discretion in such matters. Yet, the relevant Section 
11 of the Ordinance peremptorily stated that:
The Registrar, at any time after the expiration of twenty- 
one days and before the expiration of three months from 
the date of the notice, upon payment of the prescribed fee, 
shall thereupon issue his certificate in the Form (C) in 
the first schedule hereto.
The Section did not seem to leave any room for discretion on 
the part of the Registrar of Marriages to withhold the certifi­
cate for reasons other than those which were specifically stated 
in the Ordinance or which would render a proposed marriage void 
or illegal.
Indeed, despite Nunan1s decision in the Storey case, a mea­
sure of disagreement arose among the officials concerned with 
the application of the Marriage Ordinance over the question 
whether a Registrar had any discretion on the relevant matter. 
For example, in 1917 a Catholic Father at Nguludi Mission, Fr.
M. Cadoret, raised the issue of whether he could celebrate mar­
riage under the 1902 Ordinance between a Christian and a non-
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Christian African.^ The Registrar of Marriages for the dis­
trict expressed doubts about the admissibility of the proposed 
marriage. Incidentally, the Registrar in question was again 
L.T. Moggridge, who advised Fr. Cadoret in terms reminiscent of 
the decision in the Storey case:
In the meanwhile I am myself exceedingly unwilling in such 
cases to bind a heathen native by a contract, involving a 
penalty of five years imprisonment for its breach, which 
contract is quite foreign to native custom and modes of 
thought. I think that there are very few cases in which 
a heathen native could readily grasp the meaning and lia­
bilities of a Christian marriage; the natural inconstancy 
of the native ... is what I want to guard against ... I 
refuse to agree on his or her behalf to agree to an act 
imposing disproportionate penalties on such inconstancy.51
Earlier, however, Fr. Cadoret had been advised by the 
Registrar-General, W.H. McCullough, that such a marriage (in­
volving a non-Christian African) was possible and even desir­
able. In a letter to Moggridge, the Registrar-General disagreed 
with the former's advice to Fr. Cadoret. The Registrar-General 
had no doubt that "heathens" could marry under the Marriage 
Ordinance:
...which in fact would appear to actually contemplate and 
provide for the cases of natives contracting marriage.52
He went on to state that:
If two non-Christian natives contracting marriage comply 
with the provisions of the Ordinance, then I am unable 
to see any valid reason why they should be refused. In 
a case where the parties are unusually ignorant you might 
perhaps decline although I am unable to say exactly on 
what grounds. You might of course always urge heathens 
to eschew the Ordinance and all its ways. You can warn 
them impressively of the dreadful consequences of contra­
vention, but if non-Christians notwithstanding insist on 
the marriage and comply with the law then I don't think 
they can be denied.53
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McCullough's words were echoed in 1929 by the Acting 
Attorney-General of Nyasaland in his advice to the Registrar of 
Marriages for Karonga District. In a letter dated 29th October, 
1929, the Registrar for Karonga inquired of the Registrar- 
General whether he could legally refuse to commence the prelim­
inaries demanded by the 1902 Marriage Ordinance and instruct 
the African applicant to celebrate his marriage under the 
Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923. 
His reason for refusing:
I feel that the native concerned is simply actuated by a 
desire to mock European methods and I feel that if it is 
decided that native Christian marriage can be celebrated 
under the 1902 Ordinance, the Registrar of this District 
will find himself inundated with applications causing a 
considerable waste of time which could be put to better 
advantage.54
The Registrar-General referred the matter to the Acting Attor­
ney-General. The advice of the latter was that provided the 
African in question was prepared to swear the affidavit under 
Section 11 of the Ordinance, there was no rule of law preclud­
ing him from the provisions of the Ordinance. The Registrar 
at Karonga was told that he could advise, discourage and warn 
the African as to the consequences, for example, with regard 
to succession and bigamy, but he could not refuse to celebrate 
a marriage.^
In the Storey case, the ground for refusing to issue the 
certificate was not even proved in fact. There was nothing to 
support the finding that the woman was incapable of understand­
ing the nature of marriage under the Ordinance. The woman could 
not, obviously, have been expected to understand the detailed
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legal implications of marriage under English law. Even in 
England that could not have been a practical requirement. It 
should be enough if the parties had a general idea of the moral 
and social obligations of marriage. It was the duty of the 
Registrar of Marriages to explain to the parties the legal con­
ditions and consequences of marriage under the Ordinance.^ As 
far as the question of monogamy was concerned, even among 
Africans, a woman was allowed only one husband, so that the 
proposed monogamous marriage would not have placed the woman in 
any position of real conflict. The evidence clearly pointed to 
the fact that Ndumei was not a woman of easy virtue.
The four assessors had unanimously answered questions 5 
and 6 above in the affirmative, thereby virtually contradicting 
Moggridge's assessment. It was also Nunan's finding that the 
woman had answered all the questions as to her intention satis­
factorily. A former mission teacher of Ndumei had also deposed 
in her favour and in favour of the intended marriage. The as­
sessors had generally answered question 7 above in the affirma- 
tive.57
The burden of proof in this case should have been on the 
Registrar to show the existence of circumstances justifying his 
refusal to discharge a statutory duty. The Marriage Ordinance 
had placed a duty on him to issue a certificate and he had re­
fused to discharge that duty. Yet, Nunan seemed to hold that 
the burden of proof was on the petitioner and his intended wife.
Apart from constituting evidence of official unwillingness 
to apply the Marriage Ordinance to Africans, the Storey case
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also serves to capture the atmosphere of racial prejudice and 
social bigotry which characterised some of the marriage-law 
policy decisions. In the judgement, Nunan all but ignored the 
legal issue raised by the petition and concentrated instead on 
what he described as the "special circumstances" of the case. 
These included the consideration that:
The woman appears to be a native of very ordinary type. 
That type is very inferior indeed. It is known to be 
exceedingly stupid and its moral tone is what one may 
expect from the notorious sequence of the unyago cere­
mony of puberty; from the polygamous institutions since 
the days of Canaan and from the statistics of adultery 
and divorce cases tried daily at every boma and before 
every headman of any importance in the country.58
Clearly, question 8 above had been intended to draw the 
views of the assessors on the inter-racial character of the 
marriage. While deprecating marriage between "white and 
black", the view of three of the assessors was that a forma­
lised relationship was preferable to an illicit one. It was 
noted that there were many white men in the territory who were 
cohabiting with black women and this was more deplorable than 
a formalised inter-racial marriage. One assessor observed:
I think it would be a pity to compel Mr Storey to live in 
a state of concubinage when he is prepared to incur a 
lawful marriage.59
Nunan, however, agreed with the fourth assessor, Mr Martin, 
who condemned the proposed marriage in the strongest terms. 
Martin declared:
Whatever the black of this country may be a hundred years 
hence, he is not at present fit to associate with the 
white man. His level is that of the beast, or very little 
above it. The time is not ripe for such marriages. Till
292
it becomes ripe, all such marriages should be strictly 
prohibited.60
He further noted that if the proposed marriage were to take 
place, there would be no law to prevent a white woman marrying 
a black man. This, he warned, would threaten the safety of 
European women in the territory.
Nunan himself added that such a marriage as the one pro
...prestige of the whiteman in a territory where he is 
outnumbered by four thousand to one by an exceedingly 
primitive, if docile and industrious race.62
The striking thing in these remarks is not really the attitude 
towards mixed marriages, but the explanations offered. Rather 
candidly, the relevant officials did not refer to any higher 
social ideals which could be threatened by such marriages than 
the fear, in effect, that the European settler community would 
be stripped of the shroud of racial superiority. Although the 
evidence to this effect is not very strong, it is not an alto­
gether far-fetched point that among some of the officials in 
British Central Africa, the extension of the application of 
the Marriage Ordinance to Africans might have been seen as an 
unwarranted recognition of social parity between the European 
and indigenous races. Basically, however, it was the idea that 
Africans were deficient in their moral and social life that 
constituted the basis of some of the thinking on the question 
of marriage legislation.
posed by Storey would
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5. The Marriages of African Christians and the Marriage
Ordinance
a) The Interpretation of the Ordinance
Nunan's statement in Storey1s case, that the Marriage Ordi­
nance had, apart from Europeans, been intended for "intelligent 
and educated" Africans seems to have been deliberately intended 
to discount any notion that conversion to Christianity on the 
part of Africans automatically necessitated or justified the 
celebration of marriage under the Ordinance. The Ordinance it­
self did not expressly make it compulsory for African Christians
63
to contract marriage under its provisions. Theoretically, 
Christians were still free to contract marriage under their re­
spective personal customary laws.
Before the introduction of local marriage legislation in 
1902, it had become an established practice of Christian chur­
ches to solemnise marriages of their African converts in accor­
dance with Christian rites. All Christian churches saw it as 
a duty of their members to receive a church blessing on their 
marriage. For some, the episcopal churches, marriage was in 
fact conceived primarily as a religious sacrament and only 
secondarily, if at all, as a civil contract. The Marriage Ordi­
nance allowed those wishing to contract marriage under its pro­
visions the choice between a civil marriage ceremony and a 
Christian religious ceremony. In this respect, the enactment 
of the Marriage Ordinance did not create much of a problem. 
However, the Ordinance also appeared "to throw some doubt on the 
legality of the unofficial Christian marriages.
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Section 22 of the Ordinance, in particular, stated that:
A Minister shall not celebrate any marriage if he knows 
of any just impediment to such marriage, nor until the 
parties deliver to him the Registrar's certificate or 
the Commissioner's licence.
The implication of this seemed to be that Ministers of religion 
could no longer bless marriages outside the provisions of the 
Marriage Ordinance. In other words, any Christian marriage had 
to be a marriage under the imported English law. African 
Christians who did not want to bind themselves by a contract of 
marriage under the Ordinance, according to this reading of Sec­
tion 22, also could not have their marriages blessed by a reli­
gious ceremony. To the extent that it was essential for Afri­
can Christians to have their marriages so blessed, the ultimate 
implication of Section 22 was that many Africans would be bound 
to contract marriage under the Marriage Ordinance.
The foregoing interpretation of the Ordinance conflicted 
with Nunan's idea that the application of the Ordinance to Afri­
cans had to be embarked on cautiously and as an experiment. Not 
surprisingly, Nunan dismissed the idea that the intention of the 
Marriage Ordinance had been:
...to prohibit the practice which has gone for many years 
amongst Christian missionaries of celebrating a purely 
religious form of marriage in the case of native converts.64
Indeed, Section 22 of the Ordinance could be interpreted differ­
ently. The Section could have been read as referring only to 
cases where there was in fact an intention on the part of the 
officiating Minister and the parties to solemnise a marriage
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which was binding under the provisions of the Ordinance. Where 
there was no such intention then no law would be broken. This 
was the view held by Nunan. He argued that the clause in ques­
tion only referred to Ministers performing marriages under the 
Marriage Ordinance in a licensed place of worship. He explained:
A Christian or purely religious ceremony of marriage of 
natives in this country is still possible without the 
sanction of five years imprisonment in the case of a 
lapse into polygamy and without any interference with 
native law and custom as to the distribution of proper­
ty.65
According to Nunan, such purely religious ceremonies had 
been expressly exempted from the operation of the Ordinance in 
Section 35 which preserved customary-law marriages. The impli­
cation was that purely Christian marriage ceremonies constitu­
ted customary-law marriages. Normally, marriages celebrated 
in accordance with Christian ceremonies were accompanied by 
valid customary-law marriage contracts. Thus, it was possible 
to argue, in support of Nunan1s view, that the mere fact that 
Africans had gone through a Christian marriage ceremony did not 
invalidate the customary-law marriage, which had an entirely 
independent existence. Nunan's interpretation of Section 22 
must be seen as an aspect of his doubts about the advisability 
of any haste in introducing the English system of marriage law 
to Africans.
Both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, which 
latter office took over the administration of the Protectorate 
in 1904, rejected Nunan's interpretation of Section 22 of the 
Ordinance. They rejected the view that the missionaries were
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still free to celebrate Christian marriages between Africans 
outside the framework of the Marriage Ordinance. A Foreign 
Office despatch to the Acting Commissioner, Major F.B. Pearce, 
described Nunan1s reading of the Ordinance as wrongs
It will be remembered that when the Ordinance was first 
enacted in Uganda there was a great outcry ... that it 
would render marriage of native Christians impossible 
because they could not spend three weeks or a month tra­
velling from remote parts to a registrar to make the ne­
cessary declarations.... The suggested remedy was short­
ly to make every clergyman a registrar under the Ordi­
nance. It certainly never occurred, so far as I know, 
to the Commissioner or any of his advisers that the dif­
ficulty was non-existent because the Native Christian 
marriages were not within the purview of the Ordinance 
at all.66
At the Colonial Office the view of the Foreign Office was 
confirmed. A Colonial Office despatch to the Commissioner, 
Alfred Sharpe, emphasised that:
There is in fact no class of marriage to which it is more 
natural to apply the law of 1902 than the marriages of 
Christian natives by Ministers of religion.
Particularly as regards the effect of such marriages 
on the devolution of property. I am advised that it is 
desirable that where natives are married with civilized 
ceremonies whether religious or purely civil, any pro­
perty to which the parties to the marriage may be legally 
entitled should devolve after death according to English 
law as provided by Section 39 of the Ordinance.67
In rejecting Nunan's interpretation, the Colonial Office (and 
Foreign Office) did not draw any distinction between purely 
Christian marriage ceremonies and ceremonies which would be 
preceded by valid customary-law contracts. Either way, the 
Colonial Office rejected the view that marriages between Afri­
cans were excepted from the penal provisions of the Marriage
68
Ordinance by virtue of Section 35.
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It might seem absurd that, while not abolishing customary 
marriages altogether, the architects of the Marriage Ordinance 
could have intended to prevent the missionaries from simply ap­
pending a Christian blessing to an existing customary marriage. 
Yet, it is likely that this had been the actual intention of 
the architects of the Ordinance. The whole scheme of the Mar­
riage Ordinance was based on the assumption that the European 
ideals of social relations would eventually displace the indi­
genous social institutions. The provisions of the Ordinance
reflected the view that was underlined by the well-known
69Nigerian case of Cole v. Cole (1898). In this case, it was 
held that English law was to apply in the distribution of the 
estate of a man who had married in accordance with Christian 
marriage rites, although not under statutory marriage law.
The principle of the case was that a Christian marriage clothed 
the parties and their offspring with a status unknown to African 
customary law, and that it would be against justice to apply 
such customary law to the parties or their offspring. It was 
stated that in such cases, a court was not bound to observe cus­
tomary law.
In an illuminating examination of the history of the parent 
Gold Coast Marriage Ordinance of 1884, Professor Zabel stresses 
the point that most of the officials involved in the making of 
that Ordinance
...were permeated by the facile assumption that English 
law and western ways were superior and could only improve 
the lot of those who adopted them, whatever their indige­
nous traditions might be.70
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The pervasive ethnocentricism of the time led to the belief 
that, since the traditional African institution of marriage 
did not conform to the European conception of marriage,^ cus­
tomary marriages were a reflection of an inferior and barbaric 
culture. Consequently, it tended to be assumed that "civilised" 
Africans - in particular those who had embraced the Christian 
religion and solemnised their marriages in accordance with 
Christian rites - would necessarily require a "true" or more 
satisfactory system of marriage, namely that of English law.
This was an aspect of the tendency to view "civilisation" or 
"progress" among Africans exclusively in terms of the adoption 
of Western European habits and norms. The adoption of Christi­
anity was construed as a manifestation of civilisation and, 
consequently, as a renouncement of traditional African prac­
tices on the part of the individual concerned. Thus, indeed, 
the extension of the application of the Marriage Ordinance to
the African population was primarily targeted at the "educated"
72or "Christian" Africans - the so-called civilised Africans.
That the architects of the Marriage Ordinance had assumed 
that marriages between African Christians would inevitably fall 
under the regime of English law is further suggested by Sections
36 and 37 of the Ordinance. Section 36 provided for the "vali­
dation" of marriages celebrated by Christian churches prior to 
the enactment of the Marriage Ordinance. Marriages so celebra­
ted would take effect as though they had been celebrated in ac­
cordance with the procedure laid down in the Ordinance. Section
37 contained instructions to religious bodies in possession of 
records of marriages celebrated by them, to forward details of
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such records to the Registrar-General. These provisions were 
not, as one might expect, confined to marriages where the ne­
cessary formalities for a valid customary marriage had been 
neglected. A number of exceptions to the operation of these 
clauses were provided for, but significantly, these did not 
include cases where the Christian marriage ceremony had been 
accompanied by a customary-law marriage contract. The effect 
of these clauses was not merely the validation of otherwise 
legally non-existent unions, but also the transformation of 
what were essentially customary-law marriages into monogamous 
statutory marriages.
African Christians who had solemnised their marriages in 
accordance with Christian rites were given no opportunity to 
opt out of the imported English law. The language of Section 
37 relating to the transmission of records to the Registrar- 
General was not permissive but peremptory. Consistent with the 
view that the extension of the application of the Ordinance to 
Africans should not be hurried, Alfred Sharpe attempted to 
foster the view that the clauses under consideration had been
intended for, and should be confined to, marriages of Euro-
73 74peans. The Foreign office rejected this view.
Even where a Minister of religion had not transmitted the 
relevant documents to the Registrar-General, it would appear 
that a pre-1902 Christian marriage would still be regarded as 
though it had been celebrated in accordance with the provisions 
of the Marriage Ordinance. In other words, the operation of 
Section 36 was not conditional upon the fulfillment of the obli­
gation of the Minister of religion to transmit documents to the
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Registrar-General. This was, at least, the implication of the 
High Court decision in Machinjili and others v. Kapusa and 
others (1945).^ The case had originated from the court of 
Native Authority Machinjili, which had ordered in effect that 
the estate of the late Andrew Machinjili should be divided ac­
cording to Yao custom. Yao was the personal law of the de­
ceased. The appellants were the deceased's sons. Under the 
matrilineal Yao system, they did not have any strong claim to 
the estate of their father. Nevertheless, they contended that 
the property of their late father should be divided amongst 
themselves. The case, it may be noted in passing, is an exam­
ple of the kind of problems which prompted the enactment of 
the Wills and Inheritance Act, 1967.^
The judgement of Native Authority Machinjili was confirmed 
on appeal by the District Commissioner, Blantyre, and the Pro­
vincial Commissioner, Southern Province. The sons successfully 
appealed to the High Court. It was contended on the part of 
the appellants that in 1895, the late Andrew Machinjili had 
gone through a ceremony of marriage with the appellants' mother 
in accordance with the rites of the Church of Scotland at 
Blantyre. There was no evidence that the officiating Minister 
had forwarded any documents relating to the marriage to the 
Registrar-General. However, oral evidence was received which 
showed that a Christian marriage ceremony had indeed taken 
place. It was argued that the marriage between the deceased 
and the mother of the appellants had “been brought under the 
provisions of the Marriage Ordinance (by virtue of Section 
3 6 ) . ^  It was contended therefore that the English law of
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succession was the law applicable to Machinjili’s estate, by 
virtue of Section 40 (originally Section 39) of the Marriage 
Ordinance. Mathew, Agt. C.J. agreed. He observed:
It is not for me to comment on the wisdom of these pro­
visions but merely to apply the law. The personal pro­
perty of the late Andrew Machinjili must be distributed 
in accordance with the provisions of the law of England 
relating to the distribution of the personal estate of 
intestates. The appeal is allowed.78
It may be observed by way of comment that the above deci­
sion of Mathew, Agt. C.J., though technically correct, was some­
what anachronistic in the context of the developments since 
1923, when the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration 
Ordinance, 1923, was enacted. By virtue of this Ordinance, it 
had become legally possible to celebrate marriage by Christian 
rites outside the framework of the 1902 Marriage Ordinance. 
Strictly, however, the enactment of the 1923 Ordinance did not 
have the effect of altering the legal character of marriages 
which had already been validated under the 1902 Ordinance.
b ) The Attempts to Amend the Marriage Ordinance 
Perhaps realising that his views on the question of African 
marriages did not accord with the general tenor of the provi­
sions of the Marriage Ordinance, after the Storey case, Nunan 
submitted a draft Marriage Ordinance, the declared purpose of 
which was to "remove doubts" about relevant aspects of the 
Ordinance. Nunan's draft British Central Africa Marriage Ordi­
nance, 1903, provided, inter alia, the following:
Nothing in this Ordinance contained and nothing in the 
British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, 1902, con­
tained shall prevent any Minister of religion from
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contracting in such form and in such place as he shall 
deem fit a religious ceremony of marriage in the case of 
any native.79
The purpose of this clause was to confirm Nunan's dictum in 
the Storey case, that the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, had not 
prohibited the practice of Christian missions of celebrating 
"unofficial" religious marriages between Africans. Nunan did 
not envisage the application of the provisions of the Marriage 
Ordinance to these marriages. In law the relevant marriages 
would be regarded as customary ones.
At the Foreign Office, the import of Nunan1s draft was 
not fully grasped. The reasons for Nunan's draft were confused 
with the views of Bishop Tucker in Uganda. In apparent sympa­
thy with the draft prepared by Nunan, but in words reminiscent 
of Tucker's objections, the relevant despatch from the Foreign 
Office stated that it was a little difficult:
...to see why marriage in the protectorates should be made 
so much more difficult than it is in England, and in the 
case of the natives the very accurate registration ... pro­
vided for does not seem very necessary. On the other 
hand, I think there ought to be some registration of such 
marriages ... and if the principle of Nunan1s proposal is 
approved, I think some clauses ought to be added providing 
for registration in a prescribed form by the officiating 
Minister and the forwarding of particulars to the Registrar- 
General . 80
Further, in the same despatch, it was stated that the Uganda
remedy was "perhaps a better method of meeting the difficulty
about Native Christian Marriage; viz: multiplying the regist-
81rars by appointing Ministers of religion". Nunan1s draft was 
not concerned with the procedure for registration under the Mar­
riage Ordinance, but with the more serious question of whether
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Christian marriage ceremonies should always necessarily expose 
the Africans involved to the legal consequences of the impor­
ted English law.
However, whether or not the Foreign Office had properly 
construed Nunan's proposal became immaterial as the whole mat­
ter of marriage legislation for the Protectorate was soon 
transferred to the Colonial Office. In its communications with 
the Colonial Office on the matter, the Foreign Office presented
Nunan's draft and the Uganda Native Marriage Ordinance, 1903,
82as alternative remedies for British Central Africa.
The transfer from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office 
was to prove a significant development. The text of the stan­
dard Marriage Ordinance was largely a creation of Colonial Office 
officials. Perhaps because of this, the Colonial Office, in 
contrast to the Foreign Office, tended to be less sympathetic
to proposals to depart from the standard text. Legal advisers
8 3like Hugh Betram Cox viewed the standard Marriage Ordinance 
as constituting a delicately balanced, even all-ideal, formula 
which was not lightly to be t€tmpered with. Thus, the suggest­
ion of the Foreign Office that the Uganda law might be enacted
84in British Central Africa was not acted upon. In any case, 
officials in British Central Africa had not asked for the kind 
of law enacted in Uganda.
As to Nunan's proposed amendment, the Colonial Office held 
as a matter of policy that marriages “celebrated in accordance 
with Christian rites should be governed by English law. It was 
stressed that it should be one of the chief aims of the Marriage
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Ordinance, 1902, to cater for that class of Africans whom the
missionaries had "drawn ... out of their native habits and
85customs and married them according to a new regime". The 
proposed draft from British Central Africa clearly went against 
this policy.
On 19th October, 1904, Nunan submitted a second draft which 
merely reiterated Section 3 of the first draft. When this draft 
was also rejected, the Commissioner, Alfred Sharpe, wrote to the 
Colonial Office, explaining Nunan's proposals in detail. He 
stated that apart from marriage under the 1902 Ordinance, which 
was available to both Europeans and Africans, there was only 
one other type of marriage available to Africans. This was
...marriage in accordance with native law and custom.
This marriage the missionaries like to amplify or adorn 
(where they can obtain the consent of the natives) by 
some form of Christian religious ceremony. They have no 
wish to induce natives (except under very unusual circum­
stances) to marry in accordance with the 1902 Ordinance 
as they scarcely think they are fit for this.
Mr Nunan was of the opinion that in view of Section 
22 of the Marriage Ordinance, missionaries might hesitate 
to perform a religious ceremony in the case of natives 
being joined according to native law and custom; lest they 
themselves should incur the pains and penalties laid down 
in that Section; and Mr Nunan's draft was drawn with the 
object of making clear that a missionary or other clergy­
man might if he liked, carry out [a] form of religious 
ceremony... without requiring to see that the provisions 
of the Ordinance were carried out. Such marriage would 
not be marriage under the Ordinance of course; the perform­
ing of a religious ceremony being merely an amplification 
of the native law and custom.86
At the Colonial Office, some officials began to sympathise
with the proposal from British Central Africa. For example, it
8 7was suggested by Gilbert Grindle, either that Nunan's draft 
should be enacted or, that the missionaries should tacitly be 
allowed to continue with their pre-1902 practice without inter-
88ference. This view did not prevail.
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Alfred Sharpe made yet another attempt to persuade the
Colonial Office to accept Nunan1s proposal. In a letter dated
8921st April, 1905, he cited at length a statement made by Dr 
Alexander Hetherwick, Head of the Church of Scotland Mission. 
Confusingly, the views expressed by Hetherwick did not seem to 
support Nunan's proposal. According to Hetherwick's statement, 
it was very necessary to apply the law of 1902 to marriages be­
tween two African Christians. In his view, the application of 
the Ordinance in such circumstances would strengthen the mar­
riage bond in the African mind:
The obligations of the Ordinance are not more than those 
that every Christian marriage imposes. With increased 
facilities for the operation of the Ordinance, I can 
see no difficulty in the adoption of the Ordinance in 
such cases as those I have mentioned.90
Hetherwick's apparent agreement with Nunan would seem to have 
been confined to marriage between a "heathen" and a "Christian" 
or between two "heathens". With reference to such marriages, 
the view of Hetherwick was that it would be "manifestly unjust" 
to bind Africans (to such marriages):
...by a bond which he or she cannot understand. For this 
class ... all the missionaries consider some form of modi­
fied religious rite essential, but simply as an adjunct 
to what is really a native marriage. The pains and penal 
ties of the Marriage Ordinance could not be applied.91
Significantly, Hetherwick expressed the hope that:
In time, with the advance of religion and education this 
class /wouldj disappear entirely - an end greatly to be 
desired.92
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The response of the Colonial Office was the same. Cox, 
especially, was flabbergasted by the proposals from British 
Central Africa, in particular by the alleged attitude of the 
Christian missionaries. He observed:
It seems that the missionaries have been accustomed to 
marry with Christian forms of service half-backed con­
verts or even heathens well-knowing that they don't 
understand the ceremony. They superadd a religious rite 
to native custom. Such a marriage cannot be marriage by 
native custom and I gather from A. Sharpe that if adul­
tery is subsequently committed the missionaries would re­
gard the marriage as annulled.... How any Christian can 
countenance such a prostitution of one of the most solemn 
rites of his church I cannot conceive, but so far has 
modern Christianity departed from St Peter and St Paul 
[that] zealous men it seems countenance it.93
Cox added a typical invective of his:
These unions are to me detestable and it should be the 
duty of any Christian to educate the convert to the 
higher views of marriage and not descend to the level of 
the native.94
In a sense, Cox was advocating the use of secular law as a means
of educating Africans to the supposedly higher views of marriage.
Later, it will be interesting to compare Cox's view with the
equally forceful views of Martin Parr, a fierce critic of the
95Marriage Ordinances.
The advice of Cox was that the proposals from British 
Central Africa should be rejected. The Assistant Colonial 
Secretary, Lyttleton, concurred. Sharpe was told that:
...the Marriage Ordinance contemplates only two forms of 
legal marriages, namely, that complying strictly with the 
provisions of the Ordinance and that celebrated in accor­
dance with native law and custom. Therefore if natives 
go through a religious marriage ceremony, but intentional­
ly neglect to carry out the provisions of the Marriage
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Ordinance, such marriages are liable to the penalty pre­
scribed under Section 4796 of the Ordinance.97
In November, 1905, Nunan prepared yet another draft enti-
Q O
tied "The Native Marriage Ordinance, 1905". The draft 
marked a half-hearted change of mind by Nunan. It was patterned 
on the Uganda Native Marriage Ordinance, 1903, the same Ordi­
nance which had earlier been rejected by both the officials in 
British Central Africa and by the Colonial Office. The proposed 
Ordinance would apply only to marriage between Africans both of 
whom were Christians. The provisions of the 1902 Ordinance 
would still apply, except that the simple church ceremony would 
suffice and the formalities preliminary to marriage prescribed 
under the 1902 Ordinance could be dispensed with; the marriages 
would be celebrated in licensed places and by licensed Ministers 
of religion; the Commissioner would, however, have power to 
license a Minister of religion to celebrate marriage in any 
place, licensed or not; the fee for registration would be re­
duced from three shillings (under the 1902 Ordinance) to one 
shilling. Unlike the Uganda Ordinance, however, Nunan's new 
draft did not exclude the application of the English law of suc­
cession. Nunan simply stated that it had been considered "high­
ly desirable" that the section applying the English law should 
be retained.
In a covering letter to the Acting Commissioner, Nunan ex­
plained that, personally, he was unwilling to re-open the issue, 
but that he had been forced by "earnest representations by the 
Bishop of Likoma /UMCAj and Dr Hetherwick to approach the Colon­
ial Office as to the enactment of the Uganda law in British
99Central Africa". In fact, Dr Hetherwick himself had written 
to the Acting Commissioner on 31st October, 1905.^^ Once 
again, the Colonial Office rejected the proposal to introduce 
the Uganda law in British Central Africa. The main argument 
against the draft was that it was "highly indefinite": it dis­
pensed with the notice of marriage to the Registrar of Marriages 
it did not provide for the publication of notice of an intended 
marriage; there were thus (according to the CO) no adequate 
means of ensuring that the necessary consents had been obtained 
or that there were no legal impediments to an intended mar­
riage - for example, that neither party was already married to 
a third person under native law and custom. It was observed 
that:
...the civil law of marriage should insist on certainty 
with regard to the preliminaries and fact of marriage in 
as much as on this law depends civil status, legitimacy, 
and devolution of property.101
The draft Native Marriage Ordinance was also seen as en­
trusting to the missionaries too much of the powers which pro­
perly belonged to the civil authorities. The proposal to give 
clergymen powers to give consent in civil marriages involving 
minors, to be Registrars of Marriages, and to decide the proce­
dure for marriage, was described as "highly dangerous". The 
Colonial Office would be willing to consider any draft designed 
to alleviate the problem of high fees and long distances. It 
was emphasised, however, that any such draft should not affect 
the legal position as regards intestate succession, penalties 
for bigamy and related offences, and other aspects of the 1902 
Marriage Ordinance.
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Perhaps in an attempt to meet some of the objections 
raised by the Colonial Office, the Attorney-General of British
Central Africa, A.K. Young, prepared another draft "Native
102Marriage Ordinance". This draft retained the preliminaries
prescribed under the 1902 Ordinance. Although the aim of thfe 
draft was to simplify the procedure for contracting marriage, 
if enacted, the proposed law would have had the effect of com­
plicating matters even further. The preliminaries to marriage 
would be split into two. Those preliminaries relating to the 
notice of marriage under Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 would be per­
formed at the office of the Civil Registrar of Marriages. For 
this purpose, the draft provided that all District Residents 
(or officers) and Assistant District Residents would be Regis­
trars of Marriages in their respective administrative districts 
and sub-districts. On the other hand, the preliminaries relat­
ing to affidavits as to capacity and explanations as to the
legal consequences of the contract of marriage would be handled
103by Ministers of religion. For this purpose, another draft
entitled "The Marriage Ministers Registration Ordinance, 1906", 
was p r e p a r e d . T h i s  provided for the registration of Minis­
ters of religion as Ministers who could solemnise marriage under 
the proposed Native Marriage Ordinance. The Ordinance would re­
quire heads of missions to apply to the Registrar-General for 
the registration of their respective Ministers. Unregistered 
Ministers would be incapable of performing marriage. Marriage 
Ministers would keep marriage registers. Particulars would be 
transmitted to the Registrar-General on a quarterly basis.
The Native Marriage Ordinance would impose a fee of one shilling 
for registration.
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Even Young himself was not enthusiastic about the drafts.
He was of the same opinion as Nunan, namely, that the problems 
of distances and fees with which the drafts were mainly con­
cerned were sufficiently provided for under the 1902 Ordinance. 
This view was supported at the Colonial Office. In rejecting 
Young's drafts, the Colonial Office stated that it was:
...averse to further legislation at present on the subject 
of marriage in the British Central Africa Protectorate, if 
it can be avoided.106
Alfred Sharpe was informed that he could utilise the powers 
under the 1902 Marriage Ordinance to issue standing instructions 
for the remission of fees in special cases and appointment of 
additional Registrars of Marriage to lessen the problems of fees 
and distances respectively. Otherwise, it was observed at the 
Colonial Office that, for British Central Africa, there was 
"nothing practically left now to legislate for".^^ Sharpe fol­
lowed the advice given by the Colonial Office. On June 28th, 
1907, standing instructions were issued to the effect that mar­
riage districts would henceforth correspond to the administra­
tive districts and sub-districts in the territory. Every Dis­
trict Resident and Assistant District Resident would be a Regis­
trar of Marriages under the Marriage Ordinance. Marriage Regis­
ters- from this period up to at least 1912, show that in the
majority of marriages involving Africans, the fee was not being 
108charged; although no standing order to that effect seems to 
have been made. The provisions of the British Central Africa 
Marriage Ordinance were left intact. This state of affairs was 
to last until 1912.
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6. Missionary Response to the Enactment of The British
Central Africa Marriage Ordinance
During the period between the enactment of the Marriage 
Ordinance and the time of Young's draft in 1906/1907, mission­
ary participation in the transactions relating to marriage leg­
islation had been minimal. In British Central Africa, there 
had been nothing of the spontaneous and purposeful response as 
had been demonstrated by Bishop Tucker in Uganda. It was only 
after about a year of the enactment of the Marriage Ordinance 
that three heads of missions officially submitted some views 
on the Ordinance. This came as a result of the insistence by 
the Foreign Office, which had been doubtful about the apparent 
official satisfaction with the Marriage Ordinance in British 
Central Africa, in view of the strong criticism against a simi­
lar Ordinance in Uganda. The three heads of missions in ques­
tion were: Dr Alexander Hetherwick of the Established Church of 
109Scotland; Bishop Gerald Trower of the Universities Mission 
to Central A f r i c a a n d  Dr Robert Laws of the Free Church of 
S c o t l a n d . I n  addition to the Marriage Ordinance, the three 
heads had also been called upon to comment on Tucker's objec­
tions and the Uganda Native Marriage Ordinance, 1903. The 
three men expressed themselves as being in favour of the Mar­
riage Ordinance.
Dr Laws told the Commissioner that the Marriage Ordinance 
would serve to "emphasise the obligation of the marriage bond". 
Dr Hetherwick stated that the Ordinance would be "a strong aid 
to the advancement of the marriage state". Bishop Trower ex­
pressed similar sentiments. At the same time, however, it was
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clear that the three missionaries wanted some of the elements 
of the Uganda Native Marriage Ordinance to be implemented in 
British Central Africa. All the three agreed with Bishop 
Tucker that the fees prescribed under the Marriage Ordinance, 
1902, were too high and that the distances to Registrars' of­
fices would be too onerous for Africans. With regard to these 
matters, missionaries who had been in contact with Nunan had 
been assured that the Commissioner had power under the Marriage 
Ordinance to reduce or altogether remit the fees; and that the 
problem of distances could be overcome by the establishment of 
more marriage districts. That the Ordinance provided for such 
powers was all true. Yet, Nunan was not entirely candid with 
the missionaries with regard to the actual intentions of the 
government; because at that time it was being recommended 
by Nunan that marriage districts should not be unduly multi­
plied as only few Africans would need to use the provisions of
112the Marriage Ordinance. By the same token, Nunan was of the
view that there was no need to reduce the fees. Following this 
advice, Alfred Sharpe informed the Colonial Office that:
The fees provided are not really high and any civilized 
Christian natives who desire to take advantage of the 
Ordinance are well able to do so without amendment of 
its clauses regarding fees.113
For the missionaries, the issue could hardly have been 
merely whether or not African Christians could afford the fees 
charged. Even more important must have been the question of 
whether or not the Marriage Ordinance entailed additional mater­
ial burdens on the parties to Christian marriage. If it did, it 
was likely to contribute to the discouragement of Christian
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marriage among Africans. It is clearly in this way that mis­
sionaries like Bishop Tucker in Uganda had viewed the matter.
The attitude of the civil officials in British Central Africa 
on the subject must undoubtedly have been influenced by the 
view that the Marriage Ordinance did not prohibit "unofficial" 
celebration of Christian marriages by the missionaries.
Thus, where it was thought that the burdens of the Marriage 
Ordinance would be too onerous for Africans, the provisions of 
the Ordinance would be ignored and a simple Christian marriage 
ceremony would be performed. Indeed, in practice, many mission­
aries continued to celebrate Christian marriages outside the 
provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, despite the emphatic view 
of the Colonial Office that the practice was illegal.
With varying emphasis, all the three heads of missions
advised against the retention of the clause permitting the mar­
riage of a man to the niece or sister of his deceased wife. 
However, Alfred Sharpe refused to recommend any amendment. He 
stated that he could not see any "genuine desire or depth of 
feeling" among the missions for the repeal of the relevant 
section of the Ordinance. None of the three missionaries made 
any reference to the clause dealing with intestate succession.
The missionaries would seem to have been under the impres­
sion that changes similar to the Uganda law would be introduced 
as a matter of course. This perhaps explains the lack of feel­
ing in their representations noted by the Commissioner in rela­
tion to the deceased sister clause. Unfortunately, as already 
noted, the officials in British Central Africa were not enthusi­
astic about the Ugandan amendment. The Colonial Office was also
314
against it. In his subsequent communications to the Govern­
ment, Dr Hetherwick became more specific in his demands for 
the introduction of the Uganda formula. * Dr Hetherwick
was not really in favour of Nunan's formula of a simple reli­
gious marriage ceremony which did not entail the obligations of 
English law. In a letter to the Acting Commissioner he reiter­
ated that the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, was "suited to the case 
of Native Christian Marriages in this country", and went on 
to explain as follows:
My objection to the Ordinance as it stands was not... due 
to the failure of the native Christian to understand the 
nature of the lifelong bond, but to the distance of many 
districts in the Protectorate from the Registrars' of­
fices, and the amount of fees which I have been told by 
some of the missionaries to the remoter districts would 
press heavily on the contracting parties. The modified 
Uganda Ordinance of 1903 appoints the officiating Minister 
as Registrar and fixed the fee at the rate of a Rupee. 
Corresponding change in the Ordinance here would remove 
the difficulties I have mentioned and make the Ordinance 
a measure of great value to the work of the missions in the 
Protectorate. What has been done for Uganda should be pos­
sible for B.C.A.116
Despite the measures taken by the Commissioner in 1907 to reduce 
the difficulties of distances and fees, Hetherwick was to con­
tinue to press for the introduction of an ordinance on the lines 
of the Uganda Native Marriage Ordinance. Later, in 1912, 
Hetherwick was instrumental to the passing of the Nyasaland 
Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, which had the same object 
as that of the Uganda Ordinance.
7. Summary of Basic Policy-Issues
In the foregoing pages, the history of the enactment of the 
Marriage Ordinance, 1902, has been reviewed. The exercise does
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not constitute any attempt to examine the detailed provisions 
of the Ordinance. The main purpose of the discussions has been 
to highlight the policy-issues raised in relation to the enact­
ment of the Ordinance, especially as regards the application of 
the Ordinance to Africans and with respect to the continued 
availability of customary marriage to African Christians.
Summing up the official arguments for and against the in­
clusion of certain key provisions in the parent Gold Coast and 
Lagos Ordinance, Zabel notes how:
Two streams of thought emerge; one the desire to uplift 
the native to the unquestioned superiority of Christian 
ways, and the other, the fear of tampering with^quite 
incomprehensible existing social structure. One witnesses 
in these documents noblesse oblige, the mood of colonialism, 
being tampered by the harsh lessons of experience in 
Africa.118
The Eritish Central Africa Marriage Ordinance bore the contours 
of these streams of thought. On its face, the Ordinance seemed 
to be strikingly self-contradictory as to its basic object.
On the one hand, in expressly recognising the continued 
validity of marriages contracted under customary law, the Ordi­
nance seemed to underline a desire to avoid tampering with indi­
genous marriage systems. On the other hand, Africans married 
under the Ordinance would virtually be cut-off from the realm 
of customary law as regards marriage obligations, divorce and 
even succession. Severe penalties were prescribed, not only 
against the reversion to polygyny, but also against any attempt 
to go through a customary marriage, even with the existing 
spouse. Thus, whereas a customary marriage could be converted
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into a statutory one, the reverse was made a criminal offence 
punishable by imprisonment for a maximum period of five years. 
These latter aspects of the Ordinance tended to suggest an in­
tention to suppress customary law.
Like similar statutes in other parts of British colonial 
119Africa, the British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance was 
not, however, imposed upon the territory as part of any formu­
lated policy to replace indigenous systems of marriage law.
The Ordinance was also not enacted in response to any request 
by Christian missions who might have sought the aid of secular 
sanction in their endeavours to suppress polygyny. Yet, the 
actual provisions of the Ordinance tended to suggest that these 
had been its objectives.
Implicit in the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, and 
in the related official exchanges, was the assumption that, 
eventually, customary marriage would disappear under the weight 
of European influences. At least during the early period of 
colonial rule, there was seldom any dispute among European of­
ficials that traditional African institutions of marriage were 
inherently inferior and incompatible with civilised social rela­
tions. Not only the recognition of customary marriage in the 
Marriage Ordinance, but even less so, the reluctance of British 
Central African colonial officials to expose their African sub­
jects to the demands of Western-European social and moral stan­
dards did not result from any desire to promote indigenous 
African social institutions or from any notion that customary 
marriage was preferable to the alien form of marriage. The
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differences of opinion between Whitehall officials and the of­
ficials in British Central Africa was not about whether or not 
the Western ideals of marriage would be good for Africans. It 
was a common assumption that the Ordinance marriage was intrin­
sically superior and that its adoption by Africans would only 
be to the latter's good. The point of difference was whether 
Africans could be expected to understand and conform to the 
ideals embodied in the Ordinance.
The main justification for the continued availability of 
customary marriage was rooted in the supposed backwardness of 
the indigenous African population and not in some recognition 
of any intrinsic merit of customary systems. At least initial­
ly, there had been no conscious policy to develop African mar­
riage law from the existing African social institutions. The 
long-term development of African marriage law, it was assumed, 
would be a matter not of reforming the indigenous institutions 
but of Africaris adopting the European system. The preservation 
of customary marriage systems was necessitated mainly by practi­
cal, as opposed to any ideological, considerations. As a corol­
lary, the dualistic system of African marriage law could not 
have been intended as a permanent feature of the law of the Pro­
tectorate, but as a stop-gap measure, necessitated by the recog­
nition of the fact that the immediate replacement of indigenous
120systems was not likely to have satisfactory results.
The European policy-makers assumed that a "civilised" 
African population would reject customary law and aspire to the 
Western moral standards. It was mainly because of this that
the British Government decided to extend the application of 
European systems of marriage law to Africans. As the adoption 
of Christianity on the part of Africans tended to be seen as 
the quintessence of the transformation from the supposedly ori­
ginal savagery of Africans to civilisation, African Christians
provided the most urgent reason for extending the European
121forms of marriage law to Africans. It was also for this
reason that the question arose whether African Christians could 
be allowed to contract marriage under customary law.
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CHAPTER SIX 
AFRICAN CHRISTIANS AND THE MARRIAGE LAWS
Following further representations from certain missionaries, 
especially Dr Hetherwick of the Blantyre Mission, the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance was enacted in 1912. This Ordinance 
was patterned on the once-rejected model of the Uganda Native 
Marriage Ordinance of 1903. Its key feature was the introduc­
tion of an alternative and supposedly simpler mechanism for 
contracting monogamous statutory marriage. However, by 1923, 
the 1912 law had become very unpopular among practically all 
the missions, including those who had been involved in its en­
actment. The Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration 
Ordinance, 1923, was enacted to meet missionary objections to 
this law. This chapter reviews the issues leading to, and 
arising from, the enactment of the 1923 Ordinance. The exer­
cise will involve, firstly, a discussion of the difficulties 
encountered by the missions as a result of the enactment of 
the 1912 Ordinance. This will be followed by an examination 
of proposals made at a conference held in Blantyre in 1920 and 
the eventual enactment of the 1923 Ordinance. While removing 
some of the problems arising from the combined operation of 
the 1902 and 1912 Ordinances, the 1923 Ordinance posed fresh 
problems for the missions. It is also the task of this chapter 
to introduce certain proposals made by the missions to have the 
1923 Ordinance repealed. Some of the. key issues raised in the 
relevant proposals are discussed more fully in two of the remain 
ing chapters.
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1. The Missionaries and the Enactment of the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912
The missions played a somewhat ambiguous role in the en­
actment of the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912. The 
Ordinance was meant to facilitate missionary compliance with 
the requirements of statutory law in celebrating marriages in­
volving African parties.* The practice of the missions between 
1902 and 1912 had been characterised by widespread disregard 
for the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902. Three 
factors had contributed to this state of affairs.
Firstly, the majority of the missionaries had not been 
aware of the official view that all Christian religious marriage 
ceremonies were unlawful unless the same had been conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance,
o
1902. The head of the Universities Mission, Bishop Cathrew 
Fisher, pointed out in 1913 that members of his mission had:
...been accustomed for many years to "marry” our native 
communicants with the usual church service, and sometimes 
our catechumens with a modified form of it. We had no 
idea that we were legal registrars (as all clergy are in 
England ex-officio), or that the law took any cognisance 
of our marriage services. Natives, whether Christian or 
heathen, as we thought, were equal before the law and 
their marriages stood or fell according to the evidence 
that the native customs of marriage had been satisfied.3
Secondly, in many cases, the missionaries had not been pre­
pared to burden their African converts with the legal consequen­
ces of marriage under the Marriage Ordinance. Indeed, this at­
titude on the part of most missionaries was also a main factor 
contributing to the failure of the Christian Native Marriage Or­
dinance, 1912. The relevant arguments are discussed in detail 
below.
il
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Thirdly, the preliminaries to marriage under the 1902 Or­
dinance had proved to be too complicated for Africans. The 
Government on its part attributed the widespread missionary 
disregard for the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, 
almost exclusively to this third factor. Hence, it would seem 
to have been assumed that by enacting the Christian Native 
Marriage Ordinance, 1912 - with its supposedly simplified pre­
liminaries - there would no longer be any reason for the mis­
sionaries to ignore the requirements of statutory law.^ Writ­
ing in 1913, one official of the administration adequately sum­
marised the official thinking behind the enactment of the 1912 
Ordinance. After citing the pre-1912 irregularities in mission­
ary practice, he observed:
....But this Government recognising the absence of any il­
legal purpose on the part of the missionary societies - 
and being anxious to afford better facilities for the mar­
riage of Christian natives - preferred to overlook the 
technical contraventions in question and passed the Ordi­
nance of 1912 with the sole view of removing as far as lay 
in its power, the difficulties attaching to the lawful 
celebration of such marriages under the Ordinance of 1902.5
It is also clear, however, that the 1912 Ordinance was en­
acted as a response to the demands of certain missionaries, who, 
since the rejection of Young’s draft in 1907,^ had continued to 
press the Government for a specialised ordinance to deal with 
marriages of African Christians.^ In 1910, for instance, the 
Nyasaland General Missionary Conference had passed a resolution 
which, inter alia, expressed the Conference's:
...dissatisfaction with the present condition of the law
in the Protectorate as regards native marriages, insofar 
as no provision is made for native marriages by Christian
rites and in accordance with Christian law.8
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The resolution went on:
•...The rapid growth of the native Christian community, 
and of the position which they are assuming in the social 
life of the native population, make it essential that the 
law as regards the status of such marriage should be 
clearly defined.9
By this resolution, Dr Hetherwick was to explain later, the mis­
sionaries had intended to ask for relief from the penalties 
under the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, so that they could celebrate 
marriage between Africans according to the rites of their re­
spective c h u r c h e s . I t  was never expressly stated by the mis­
sionaries concerned whether marriages celebrated in accordance 
with the method proposed would be governed by the principles 
of the 1902 Ordinance, or by customary law, or indeed exclusive­
ly by the religious laws of the respective missions. Whatever 
the exact view of the missions on this point, it was in apparent 
response to their representations that the Colonial Office final­
ly relented and recommended the model of the Uganda Native Mar­
riage Ordinance, 1903, as a solution to the problems in Nyasa- 
land.
The Colonial Office stood firm to its earlier position, 
that marriages solemnised in accordance with Christian rites 
should be governed by the principles of the 1902 Marriage Ordi­
nance and not by any other law. In fact, the Colonial Office 
was not even enthusiastic about the Uganda model, which it rec­
ommended merely as the better of two evils; the other alterna­
tive being to allow the missionaries to conduct informal Chris­
tian marriage ceremonies.^  The recommendation of the Colonial 
Office was followed; a bill entitled the Christian Native
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Marriage Bill was prepared by the Acting Attorney-General,
Joseph Sheridan. In October, 1912, a meeting to which the var­
ious missionary bodies were invited, and which was chaired by 
Sheridan, was arranged in Blantyre.
The aim of the meeting was to allow the Government to ex­
plain more clearly to the missionaries the legal implications 
of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and the purpose and nature of 
the proposed Christian Native Marriage Bill. The meeting also 
provided the missions with an opportunity to comment on the 
proposed Bill before its formal enactment. Unfortunately, only 
a few missionaries attended the meeting. These included Dr 
Hetherwick of the Church of Scotland Mission, Dr Laws of the 
Free Church of Scotland Mission and Mr Hofmeyer of the Dutch 
Reformed Church. Representatives of the Zambezi Industrial 
Mission and the South Africa General Mission also managed to 
meet the Acting Attorney-General at a later date. None of these 
missionaries registered any objection to the new Bill. On the 
contrary, they welcomed the new measure, allegedly under the 
impression that it represented:
...a recognition by the Government of the work done by the 
missions and as a forward step in the ^legislation^ of the 
Protectorate securing the position of natives married ac­
cording to the Christian rites. For the first time in the 
history of the Protectorate Native Christianity found a 
place in the statute book.12
This view, espoused by the non-episcopal missions, contras­
ted with the reaction of the Anglican Universities Mission to 
Central Africa. It was indeed unfortunate that the Anglicans 
had not sent any representative to the Blantyre meeting of 1912,
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as their views were later to form the core of the argument for 
the repeal of the 1912 Ordinance. Dr Hetherwick of the Blan­
tyre Mission had been entrusted by the Governor with the task 
of inviting his fellow missionaries to the meeting. The Bishop 
of the UMCA was somewhat irritated by the fact that he had to 
learn from Hetherwick and not directly from the Governor about 
the meeting. After citing delays in communication between the 
island of Likoma, his headquarters, and the mainland, as one 
reason for his failure to attend the meeting, he also stated
that he did not view the information from Hetherwick as a formal
13invitation to the meeting.
A copy of the proposed Bill had, however, been sent to 
the Bishop by the Acting Governor on September 13, 1912.*^ In 
a reply of 7th October, 1912, and for reasons which were to 
become apparent in his later communications to the Government, 
the Bishop strongly objected to the enactment of the proposed 
Bill. He urged the Government at least to postpone the intro­
duction of the new law and to introduce it only;
...after a far fuller discussion of it has been possible 
among those it chiefly concerned.15
The Bishop became the chief critic of the Christian Native Mar­
riage Ordinance throughout its controversial tenure.^ Ulti­
mately, it was the Bishop's view which would prevail. In 1912, 
however, his protests were strangely ignored, and the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance was duly enacted and brought into 
operation in November of that year.
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2. The Provisions of the Christian Native Marriage
Ordinance, 1912
The Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, was a com­
paratively short instrument, comprising a dozen clauses and a 
brief Schedule. Its provisions can be conveniently summarised.
Section 1 merely furnished the short title.
Section 2 defined the term "Minister" used in the Ordi­
nance. The definition had been inserted on the request made by 
Dr Hetherwick during the October meeting with the Acting Attor­
ney-General. The Section defined "Minister" as any person li­
censed by the Governor for celebrating marriages under the 
A 9 1 2 7  Ordinance. This was designed to enable the Governor to 
appoint "any person" as a marriage Minister. This was unlike 
the case under the 1902 Ordinance where only a "recognised 
Minister of religion" could be appointed.^
Section 3 was the operative clause. It stated:
Notwithstanding anything contained in "The British 
Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, 1902", marriages 
may be celebrated under this Ordinance between 
natives both of whom profess the Christian religion.
This clause is considered fully below.
Section 4 was also a key clause. It provided that:
Except as otherwise provided in this Ordinance the 
provisions of "The British Central Africa Marriage 
Ordinance, 1902", shall apply to marriages celebra­
ted under this Ordinance.
Thus, the principle of monogamy, the rules governing intestate 
succession and prohibited degrees of affinity and consanguinity^®- 
to mention the significant examples - consequent upon marriage
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under the 1902 Ordinance, applied equally to marriages contrac­
ted under the 1912 Ordinance.
Section 5 prohibited the celebration of marriage (under 
the 1912 Ordinance) by any person other than a Minister as de­
fined in Section 2 above or in any building except those li­
censed by the Governor for the purpose.
Section 6 provided that, for the purpose of the registra­
tion of marriage under the /"19127 Ordinance, every Minister as 
defined above should be deemed to be a Registrar of marriages 
under the 1902 Ordinance. The significance of this was that 
a notice of marriage under the 1912 Ordinance could be given 
to a Minister, instead of a civil Registrar of Marriage. In 
other words, the parties to an intended marriage under the 
1912 Ordinance would not be required at any stage to go to a 
civil Registrar.
Sections 7 to 12 provided the essence of the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance. Together with the accompanying 
Schedule, these clauses defined the alternative procedures for 
transacting the preliminaries to marriage. The relevant provi­
sions, which cannot conveniently be summarised here, are dis­
cussed below.
In May, 1913, two amendments were made, one to the Chris­
tian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, the other to the Divorce 
Ordinance, 1905. The object of these amendments was to extend 
jurisdiction over marriages contracted under the 1912 Ordinance 
to certain subordinate courts. Jurisdiction over marriages con 
tracted under the provisions of the 1902 Ordinance was reserved 
to the High Court. The relevant amendments are also considered 
fully below.
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a) The Application of the Christian Native Marriage 
Ordinance, 1912
It is clear from Section 3 above that the Christian Native
Marriage Ordinance, 1912, was not available to everyone, but
was restricted to "marriages .,. between natives both of whom
profess the Christian religion". At the time of the enactment
of this Ordinance, there was no statutory definition of the
term "native". Under the Interpretation and General Clauses
19Ordinance, first enacted in 1929, the term "native" was de­
fined as:
...any native of Africa not of European or Asiatic ex­
traction, but includes an Arab and a Somali and also 
any Baluchi born in Africa.20
According to this definition, people of purely European or 
Asiatic extraction would clearly be excluded from the applica­
tion of the Ordinance.
The most likely difficulty would be the involvement of 
people born of mixed (African and European or African and 
Asian) parents. The tendency was to regard such people as 
being non-natives. This was the case, for example, under the 
Northern Rhodesia Marriage Ordinance, 1918, which, until 1963, 
was not available to "natives". The term "native" was defined 
as:
...a person being a member of an aboriginal race or tribe 
of Africa but shall not include a person partly of Euro­
pean descent.21
In 1940, the Attorney-General of Nyasaland advised against the 
celebration of a marriage between people of mixed parents under
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the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance,
1923, which replaced the 1912 Ordinance. The view of the
Attorney-General was that such people did not qualify as 
22natives. On the other hand, it did not seem that one had 
to be an indigene of Nyasaland to qualify as a native. During 
the short history of the 1912 Ordinance, the restriction of 
the application of the Ordinance to "natives" does not appear 
to have given rise to any practical problems.
The phrase "profess the Christian religion" posed a more 
urgent practical problem for the missions. The phrase was li­
able to, and did on different occasions receive, different in­
terpretations . Officials of the Universities Mission, already 
unhappy with the entire Ordinance, did not hesitate to capital­
ise on the difficulties created by the phrase. They saw these 
difficulties as additional proof of the need to repeal the 1912 
law.
In general, the missionaries tended to restrict the use of 
the word "Christian" to describing a member of a Christian 
church who had actually gone through the ceremony of baptism. 
Members under instruction with a view to baptism, for example,
23catechumens, were not technically considered to be Christians.
In their marriage practices, however, the missionaries did not 
always insist on someone being a Christian in this narrow sense 
in order to be eligible for a Christian marriage ceremony. Spe­
cial provision was often made for marriage between a baptised 
member and unbaptised one, or even between two unbaptised mem­
bers. The critical question was whether such unbaptised members 
could still be married under the provisions of the 1912 Ordinance.
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The question was brought to the fore in 1914 when the
office of the Registrar-General issued a document entitled,
"Instructions to Licensed Ministers", intended as a guide to
the working of the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912.^
The "Instructions" enjoined the officiating Minister to certify
that both parties to an intended marriage were "Christians".
Before these "Instructions", the missionaries - at any rate
those of the UMCA - had assumed that the phrase "profess the
Christian religion" had been deliberately used in the Ordinance
in order to accommodate non-baptised members of a church. The
wording of the "Instructions" therefore presented the question
of whether the missionary assumption about nbn-baptised members
had been correct or whether the "Instructions" represented a
25reversal of policy on the part of the Government. Opinions 
of Government officials did not prove very helpful on the mat­
ter. At one point the missionaries were advised that:
If ... in answer to the question, "Do you profess the 
Christian religion?'1 both parties reply in the affirma­
tive, the marriage may take place.26
This view was highly unsatisfactory. It seemed to throw the 
whole responsibility of determining eligibility for marriage 
under the Ordinance on the contracting parties themselves. In­
deed, could any African who had had no contact with a Christian 
church before qualify for marriage under the Ordinance by mere­
ly uttering a verbal profession of the Christian religion?
Equally unsatisfactory was another somewhat cryptic state­
ment relayed to the UMCA Bishop by A.D. Turnbull, Acting Chief 
Secretary, in 1915. In reply to the Bishop's requests for
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clarification on the apparent conflict between the wording of
Section 3 of the Ordinance and the "Instructions" issued by
27the Registrar-General1s Office, the Acting Chief Secretary 
wrote:
I am directed to state that the certifying Minister will 
be quite in order if he certifies that the parties pro­
fess the Christian religion.28
This offered no clue as to what the officiating Minister should 
look for in order to certify that the parties professed the 
Christian religion. Thus, for quite some time, the position of 
the Government on the matter remained vague. On their part, 
the missionaries still felt that they could solemnise marriages 
of unbaptised converts under the 1912 Ordinance. Such marriages 
continued to be celebrated until 1919.
Between 1917 and 1919, the High Court of Nyasaland deli­
vered two judgements touching on the meaning of Section 3 of
the 1912 Ordinance. In the cases of Peter Amisi v. Zingaremba
29 * 30(1917) and Harrison Mchenga v. Manesi (1919) marriages
celebrated under the 1912 Ordinance were declared null and void 
by the High Court on the ground that the parties thereto did 
not meet the conditions of Section 3. In the first of the 
above cases, neither of the parties had been baptised. On this 
basis alone, the court was prepared to declare the marriage 
void. The view of the court was that noone other than a bap­
tised Christian could legally be married under the 1912 Ordi­
nance. In fact, however, the woman stated in evidence, accep­
ted by the court, that she had never ever subscribed to the 
Christian faith. During the proceedings, she even refused to
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be sworn by the Bible. Thus the court's view that none other 
than a baptised member of a Christian church could contract 
marriage under the 1912 Ordinance may strictly be viewed as a 
mere obiter dictum, rather than an authoritative ratio deci­
dendi.
In the second case, the man was a baptised Christian, but 
the woman had only been under instruction at a mission for a 
few weeks prior to the marriage. In the court's view this was 
not enough to satisfy the requirements of Section 3. Again, 
the authority of this decision on the point under consideration 
seems to be weakened by the fact that the woman was someone who 
could not really be characterised as an established member of a 
Christian church. Nevertheless, the court's view that only a 
baptised member of a Christian church could marry under the 
1912 Ordinance was endorsed by both the Attorney-General and 
the Registrar-General of Marriages, and became the official 
policy in 1919. The Registrar-General enthusiastically noted 
as follows:
The 1912 Ordinance is not a general Native Marriage Ordi­
nance but a Christian Native Marriage Ordinance. It seems 
impossible that any person should be considered a Chris­
tian until he or she has been baptized.31
In general, the missionaries of course shared the view that 
only a baptised member of a church could be considered a "Chris 
tian" in the strict sense of the word. It was, however, an en­
tirely different matter to argue that to "profess the Christian 
religion" in the words of Section 3 meant that one had to be 
actually baptised.
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From 1919, the missionaries could not marry their catechu-
32mens or other unbaptised converts under the 1912 Ordinance. 
Where the missionaries wished to solemnise marriage involving 
unbaptised members of their churches, they were instructed to 
do so in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Ordi­
nance, 1902, which was still open to anyone irrespective of 
race or religion.
The Government policy to restrict marriage under the 1912 
Ordinance to baptised Africans had the advantage of introducing 
an objective criterion for determining eligibility for marriage 
under the Ordinance. Yet, it also introduced a rigidity or in­
flexibility that was unsuited to the requirements of the mis­
sionaries. To the extent that the 1912 Ordinance really pro­
vided for a simplified procedure for contracting monogamous sta 
tutory marriage, and to the extent that there was a need on the 
part of the missions to solemnise marriages of non-baptised con 
verts, the restriction on the application of the 1912 Ordinance 
would in effect revive the pre-1912 situation. In order to 
contract Christian marriages, non-baptised converts had to make
the necessary journeys to civil Registrars of Marriages to com-
33plete the preliminaries under the 1902 Ordinance. The irony 
of this was that, whereas the more seasoned, baptised, convert 
could take advantage of the simpler procedure under the 1912 
Ordinance, the novice, unbaptised convert, had to marry the 
harder way. Furthermore, although the missions normally mar­
ried their non-baptised converts with a somewhat modified reli­
gious ceremony, it was plainly absurd to subject members of one 
and the same church to so radically different procedures as 
existed under the 1902 and the 1912 Ordinances.
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By 1919, many missionaries, as well as government offi­
cials, had become convinced that the 1912 Ordinance had to be 
repealed. As long as it remained on the statute books, how­
ever, the missions sought changes in government policy so that 
they could marry some of their unbaptised converts under the 
Ordinance. An amendment to this effect was proposed by the 
Bishop of the Universities Mission in March 1919. No action 
was taken on the proposal. While clearly willing to consider 
the amendment, the Government preferred to defer the matter 
and deal with it as part and parcel of a more comprehensive
examination of the question of marriage legislation in 
35Nyasaland.
b) The Preliminaries to Marriage Under the 1912 Ordinance
As already noted, the primary objective of the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, was to simplify the procedure 
for contracting monogamous statutory marriage in the case of 
African Christian converts. In this regard the Ordinance was 
only partially successful. Whereas the task of the contracting 
parties was indeed rendered less onerous, the procedure under 
the 1912 Ordinance introduced new complications for the offici­
ating Ministers. The source of the problems partly lay in the 
unwillingness on the part of the civil administration to en­
trust the entire process of marriage formalities to the mission­
aries. The provision which was inserted in the Ordinance in 
order to ensure the participation of the civil authorities in 
the preliminaries to marriage was the main source of problems.36
Like marriage under the principal, 1902, Ordinance, preli­
minaries under the 1912 Ordinance commenced with the Notice of
37marriage by one of the parties to a Registrar of Marriages.
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For the purposes of the 1912 Ordinance, however, "Registrar of
Marriages" meant a licensed church official and not a civil
Registrar. Upon receipt of the Notice, the officiating Minister
had to make the necessary entries and cause the Notice of the
marriage to be affixed on the outer door of a licensed building
38where the marriage was to take place. Marriage could be cele­
brated after 21 days and before the expiry of 3 months from the
39date of the Notice. However, where one of the parties to the 
marriage was "ordinarily resident in a place other than the 
place in which the marriage is intended to be celebrated", the 
Minister had to cause a copy of the Notice to be exposed in a 
conspicuous place in the village of such party where it had to 
remain for a period of 21 days before marriage could be cele­
brated. The officiating Minister could, where necessary, dele­
gate the task of fixing the Notice in the village to another 
" R e g i s t r a r " i n  which case, marriage could not be celebrated 
until the officiating Minister had received a certificate under 
the hand of the other Registrar that no caveat had been entered 
against the issue of a certificate of marriage.
Even where both parties to marriage were ordinarily resi­
dent in the area where the marriage was to take place a further 
requirement was imposed by Section 8 of the Ordinance:
8. (1) Whenever any persons desiring to marry under this 
Ordinance shall have given notice of such intention to a 
Minister ... the said Minister before issuing his certifi­
cate shall forward to the District Resident of the District 
in which the marriage is intended to take place the docu­
ments referred to in the Schedule to this Ordinance.
(2) Upon receipt of such documents the District Resi­
dent may make such inquiries as he shall deem necessary and 
shall before the expiry of 21 days ... inform the Minister
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who forwarded the said documents whether or not a caveat 
has been entered against the issue of the certificate.
(3) Thereafter the District Resident shall file the 
documents as aforesaid in the archives of his office for 
purposes of record.41
The purpose of this provision was to provide for an independent 
investigation by a civil official into the circumstances of a 
marriage contracted under the Ordinance. It must be pointed 
out that the duties of the District Resident under this Section 
would be carried out in the Resident's capacity as an adminis­
trative officer rather than as a Registrar of Marriages (by 
virtue of the Order issued in 1907).^ Further, whereas Assis­
tant District Residents were Registrars of Marriages within
/ o
their Sub-Districts, they were not similarly empowered to dis 
charge the functions of a District Resident under Section 8.^^
For the many missionary posts located in remote areas, far 
from the bomas, the requirements of Section 8 of the 1912 Ordi­
nance were wellnigh impossible to execute, because of poor com­
munication facilities. Correspondence relating to the working 
of the 1912 Ordinance is replete with complaints from mission­
aries as well as civil administrators about the intolerable de­
lays created by this clause. One District Resident, citing in­
stances of marriage documents from officiating Ministers which
never reached him "within several months", aptly described the
45whole of the procedure as "a ridiculous farce". His point
was endorsed by W.H. McCullough, Registrar-General in 1917, who
46also characterised the procedure as ,labsurd". Perhaps no 
mission was more inconvenienced by this clause than the Univer­
sities Mission at the lake islands of Likoma and Chisumulo.
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Documents from this station had to be sent all the way to the 
mainland boma of Nkhota-Kota. It was clear from Section 8 
that even after the expiry of 21 days from the day of the 
Notice of marriage, and even if no caveat against the marriage 
had been entered within those 21 days, a Minister could not 
celebrate a marriage under the Ordinance until he had further 
heard from the District Resident that no caveat had been en­
tered. Communication between the islands and Nkhota-Kota was 
by means of a boat, the visits of which were as infrequent as 
they were unpredictable. The resulting delays became unaccept­
able. The Bishop of the mission concluded as follows:
It is clear therefore that under present conditions it is 
impossible to conform exactly with the directions of the 
Ordinance and a real hardship is placed upon natives of 
Likoma who cannot the least tell when their marriage can 
take place. The social arrangements in connection with 
native weddings (trivial as they may seem) are really 
valued and much preparation is customary. Further, a very 
strong temptation is placed upon such natives to begin to 
live together before marriage when indefinite delays of 
this kind take place and no date can be given even approx­
imately .47
The foregoing quotation is from the Bishop's letter ad­
dressed to the Chief Secretary, dated 14th February, 1917. In 
the same letter, the Bishop enquired of the Chief Secretary 
whether a solution to the problem could be found. The Govern­
ment's answer was to constitute Likoma and Chisumulo islands 
into a separate Marriage District (under the Marriage Ordinance,
1902) with the missionary in charge as the Registrar of Mar- 
48riages. This was done under the mistaken belief that, as a 
Registrar of Marriage (under the 1902 Ordinance), the missionary 
in charge would not be required to forward marriage documents to 
a District Resident when celebrating marriage under the 1912
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Ordinance. As already noted, the functions of the District 
Resident under Section 8 of the 1912 Ordinance were associated 
with his general duties as an administrative officer, and not 
as Registrar of Marriages under the 1902 Ordinance. Constitut­
ing the Priest-in-Charge at Likoma into a Registrar of Marriages 
did not, therefore, obviate the need to forward documents to the
Resident at Nkhota-Kota when conducting marriage preliminaries
49under the 1912 Ordinance.
Nevertheless, the arrangement offered the missionaries away 
out of their troubles under the 1912 Ordinance, albeit in an en­
tirely unexpected way. What in fact had been achieved was that 
the missionaries there could solemnise marriage under the prin­
cipal 1902 Marriage Ordinance without the parties to such mar­
riage being required to travel farther than their own mission 
station to effect the necessary preliminaries. The arrangement 
had a further advantage: it did away with the tormenting dis­
tinction between professors and non-professors of the Christian 
religion; for under the 1902 Ordinance, it did not matter wheth­
er or not one was a Christian. For Likoma and Chisumulo, of 
course, this meant the end of the road for the Christian Native 
Marriage Ordinance, 1 912.^ Not that it mattered as far as the 
missionaries were concerned; presumably, they even welcomed it. 
It can be noted that Christians elsewhere in the territory 
could, if they so wished, still contract marriage under the 
1902 Ordinance. It was, however, only at Likoma and Chisumulo 
that the parties could do so exclusively with their own Minister 
of religion. Other Christians, including those of the Universi­
ties Mission located on the mainland, had to deal with civil 
Registrars of Marriages at the bomas - with all the attendant
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problems which had in the first place led to the introduction 
of the 1912 law. It might also be necessary to point out that 
the arrangement just discussed did not end the Bishop's cam­
paign against the 1912 Ordinance.
As far as issuing a caveat against the issue of a certifi­
cate was concerned, there was less formality under the 1912 
Ordinance than under the 1902 law. Section 9 of the 1912 Ordi­
nance replaced Section 14 of the 1902 Ordinance. Under the 
latter, a person entering a caveat did so by writing the word 
"Forbidden" opposite the entry of the Notice in the Marriage 
Notice Book, and appending thereto his name and place of abode, 
and the grounds upon or by reason of which he claimed to forbid 
the issue of the certificate. Under Section 9 of the 1912 Ordi­
nance, all that was required on the part of the person objecting 
was a verbal communication to the Registrar. By virtue of Sec­
tion 10 of the 1912 Ordinance, a caveat entered against the
issue of a certificate could be removed by the High Court with-
52out much formality. This Section was amended in 1913, and the
power to remove a caveat (under the 1912 Ordinance) was exten-
53ded to a magistrate holding a District Native Court. Under 
Section 15 of the 1902 Ordinance, on the other hand, a caveat 
could only be removed by the High Court after a summary hearing.
Where parental consent was required (that is, in cases of 
marriage involving parties who were under the age of 21 years), 
and there was no parent or guardian available, Section 11 of 
the 1912 Ordinance allowed the Governor, the Judge of the High 
Court, A District Resident or a "Minister" to give such consent 
without any formality.
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The fees on registration and for a certified copy of entry 
was fixed at one Shilling, respectively. This rate applied to 
all marriages to which both parties were "natives" whether con­
tracted under the 1912 or the 1902 Ordinance.^
c) Declarations as to Divorce and Penalties for Violation 
of the Principle of Monogamy
In the course of celebrating marriage under the Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, the officiating Minister was 
required to sign a declaration to the effect, inter alia, that 
he had satisfied himself that the parties to the intended mar­
riage:
...realise and understand the penalties to which they are 
liable for any breach of the provisions of /The British 
Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, 19027, and further that 
they realise the nature and duration of the bond of matri­
mony, and the grounds upon which they will be able to ob­
tain divorce.55
The Minister was under a duty to explain to the parties the 
above penalties and obligations. The parties themselves were 
also required to sign declarations to the effect that they 
understood these penalties and obligations.
It was for good reason that the legislators had been anx­
ious that those who contracted marriage under the Ordinances 
did so with open eyes as to the consequent obligations. Not 
only were the penalties for violating these obligations severe, 
but, even more importantly, conduct amounting to violation of 
the law under the Ordinances was perfectly legal under indige­
nous customary law. The chances of some Africans contracting 
statutory marriage under some misapprehension as to their rights
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and duties were therefore ever present. However, the mission­
aries saw the matter differently. Missionaries of the episco­
pal churches, in particular, were greatly disconcerted by the 
references to grounds upon which divorce could be obtained in 
the declarations. As divorce was absolutely repugnant to their 
doctrine,^ these missionaries found the declarations highly
offensive. Many Catholic missions refused to apply for licen-
57ces under the 1912 Ordinance. They preferred sending their 
converts to civil Registrars under the 1902 Ordinance to having
CO
anything to do with the 1912 law. The Bishop of the Universi­
ties Mission summed up his feelings on the matter in the follow­
ing words:
So far as main questions of principle are concerned it is,
I think, clear that the state has a right and a duty to 
deal with questions of marriage and to insist on whatever 
forms of registration seem best. We are only entitled 
(and then it is not a case of being entitled but of being 
bound) to refuse to comply with such regulations if such 
compliance involves a disobedience either by omission or 
commission to the law of God.59
Later, in a letter to the Chief Secretary, the Bishop wondered 
why one should:
...choose the moment when a man and a woman are about to 
be married to suggest to them how they may at some further 
time get divorce£60
Declarations with regard to penalties for violating the prin­
ciple of monogamy were no less objectionable to many missionar­
ies. The bases of missionary objections to these declarations 
tended to be contradictory, often reflecting the differences in 
perspective between the episcopal and non-episcopal missionar­
ies. The former did not want to have anything to do with the
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threatened penalties. Much as they were committed to the prin­
ciple of monogamy, it was not in their interest that threats of 
harsh penalties should be utilised to promote this principle.
The Anglicans, in particular, felt that these penalties were 
entirely the business of the Government and that they would 
themselves be content to enforce the principle of monogamy eccle 
siastically through suspensions and excommunications.^
On the other hand, the line taken by some non-episcopal 
missionaries was somewhat different. For example, it was ar­
gued by Donald Fraser of the Free Church of Scotland that, while 
the missionaries were being compelled to declare the penalties 
to Africans, Government officers took a cavalier attitude 
towards their enforcement. He observed:
As marriage-officers we are compelled to read the penal­
ties to which any one breaching the law is liable. Yet 
there are a number of cases of open defiance of this law 
and /there is7 no case of prosecution in this place. Se­
veral capitaos62 are notoriously defiant, and are not pros 
ecuted, nor removed from positions of trust. Thus the mar 
riage law is brought into contempt.63
He went on:
Our feeling is that if one or two successful prosecutions 
took place, and thus the earnestness of the law were made 
evident, the whole people would come to recognize the ne- 
nessity of obeying the law. In this tribe (Mombera's 
Ngoni) a public declaration by the Magistrate^ that 
ukulobola cannot be received, and must be returned in the 
case of an invalid /"bigamous7 marriage, and that children 
of the invalid marriage have no right of succession, should 
be quite enough to restrain parents from allowing their 
children to be given in marriage in an illegal way.65
Fraser, however, noted that actual punishment should not be ne­
cessary. Indeed, no missionary ever expressed any enthusiasm
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for severe penalties against those Africans who violated the 
principle of monogamy. In his "Notes", written at a later 
date, Fraser was in fact to observe how strange it was:
...that penalties so severe may be threatened to natives 
who breach the marriage contract especially when we bear 
in mind the present state of native civilization.66
The dilemma for the missionaries could clearly be seen in 
Fraser's views. The lack of positive action to restrain viola­
tions of the Ordinances could only bring the law into contempt. 
Harsh penalties, on the other hand, were seen as unjust in view 
of what they saw as a lower level of civilisation among Africans. 
Moreover, the missionaries feared that such penalties might even 
have the adverse effect of encouraging concubinage among Chris­
tian Africans.^ The issues about divorce and monogamy are dis-
68cussed more fully in later chapters,
d ) The Problem of Jurisdiction
Apart from the power to remove caveats, which was extended 
to magistrates holding District Native Courts, jurisdiction 
over matters arising from marriage contracted under the Chris­
tian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, was reserved to the High
Court. Thus, marriages contracted under this Ordinance could 
be dissolved only by a decree of the High Court. This presen­
ted the obvious problem of access in terms of distances for 
many people. The complexity and high costs of the forms and 
procedures of the High Court would constitute a further obsta­
cle to divorce for many of the Africans.
The problem of distances was highlighted by Fraser, who, 
like many other non-episcopal missionaries, tended to take what
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may be described as a more practical (that is, less doctri­
naire) stance on the question of divorce than their counter­
parts in the Anglican and Catholic missions. In his "Notes on 
the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance", Fraser stated as fol­
lows :
While we do not desire to give any facilities for divorce, 
and in most cases deprecate it, we feel that any form of 
relief is very hard to obtain, and that however high we 
may put our ideal of marriage, Government is not justified 
in making the difficulties of relief so great to natives 
in their present state of civilization. /"For examplej, 
should parties residing in any part of the Livingstonia 
Mission sphere seek divorce, they are required to travel 
several hundred miles to and from Blantyre to state their 
case. They may obtain a decree nisi, but six months after 
the same journey, involving several months travel for the 
women, has to be taken again for the full decree (decree 
absolute).69
Although the men were not free from these problems, it was the 
women who often suffered most. As Fraser pointed out:
...a woman, whose husband has deserted her and has been 
away for years in the mines of the South /"South Africa7 
or of Belgian Congo and has sent her no maintenance, can­
not obtain divorce under the law of England, nor obtain 
any relief unless she undertakes this very long journey.70
A concrete example of such hardship appeared in the month­
ly report for the Nkhota-Kota District for August 1919. The 
example also highlighted the other aspects of the problem. The 
relevant part of the report read:
The Marriage Ordinances are causing a good deal of trouble 
as few of the natives who have allowed themselves to be 
persuaded to be married under them realised in the least 
what they were really binding themselves to, and the 
practical inability of obtaining divorce
...an unfortunate woman whose husband has deserted her and 
gone to Salisbury /Southern Rhodesia/ZimbabweJ has been 
asked to pay £6 in fee before proceedings can be taken in 
the High Court.71 This is of course impossible. She is
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destitute but cannot marry again without liability to 
prosecution. In this District there are at present half 
a dozen similar cases as even where the husband is in 
the Protectorate recourse to Blantyre is impossible to the 
ordinary native woman. As a result both parties form il­
legitimate connexions and the marriage law is brought 
into contempt.72
Fortunately for the woman in this case, her costs were met from 
a special fund established by the Government. As Jackson, the 
Acting Judge of the High Court who dealt with the matter, noted,
however, the case was only a single instance of a "general"
. . 73crisis.
It was not that no attempt had been made to improve the
situation. The principal Divorce Ordinance, 1905, had been
74amended in 1913 by the Divorce Amendment Ordinance, to enable 
the Governor to authorise (by Notice in the Gazette) any magis­
trate holding a District Native Court to exercise jurisdiction 
under the Divorce Ordinance with respect to marriage^celebrated 
under the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912.^ The 
amendment had been initiated by Dr Hetherwick. Although far 
from completely resolving the problems in obtaining divorce, 
the conferment of jurisdiction upon magistrates would obviously 
have constituted an improvement. Occasionally, some magistrates 
actually assumed jurisdiction and granted divorces with respect 
to marriages celebrated under the 1912 Ordinance.^  This assump­
tion of jurisdiction was, however, based on an erroneous belief 
that the 1913 amendment had automatically extended divorce jur­
isdiction to magistrate courts. This was not the case. A ma­
gistrate could only exercise jurisdiction after authorisation 
by the Governor's Notice in the Gazette. As things turned out,
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the Governor never made any authorisation throughout the life 
of the 1912 Ordinance.
Those magistrates who bothered to ask in fact discovered 
that the Government was unwilling to make any such authorisa­
tions. In 1916, for example, the Resident for Zomba District 
requested such authorisation, stating that a man married under 
the 1912 Ordinance had come to him wishing to divorce his wife;
The grounds for divorce appear ample, but under the Di­
vorce Amendment Ordinance, 1913, I only have jurisdic­
tion in such cases if authorized by Notice in the 
Gazette.... 77
The request was turned down and the Resident was told to refer
78the case at hand to the High Court. No reason was given, 
but the Chief Secretary's minutes of 15th August, 1916, provide 
a glimpse into the reasoning behind the Government's reluctance 
to utilise the 1913 amendment. The reasoning reflects the ap­
parent high regard in which marriage under the Ordinance was 
held, and echoed the sentiment expressed in the Nigerian case 
of Cole v. Cole (1898). It was minuted that:
Educated Christian natives who marry under the Ordinance 
£1912j ipso facto lose their rights and position as mem­
bers of a native community and acquire rights and duties 
of a totally different nature.79
It was thus observed that divorce for such "Christian natives" 
should not be taken lightly; that the jurisdiction of magis­
trates would be unprecedented and diminish the gravity of mar-
80riage under the 1912 Ordinance. Divorces granted by magis­
trates with respect to marriages contracted under the 1912 Ordi­
nance were therefore technically void for want of jurisdiction.
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The question of divorce under the 1913 amendment is further 
discussed in a later chapter.
e) The Question of Christian Marriage Outside the 
Framework of Statutory Law
During the period of the operation of the 1912 Ordinance, 
the Nyasaland administration adopted the view of the Colonial 
Office, namely, that the celebration of informal religious mar­
riages outside the provisions of the existing Ordinances was 
unlawful. The contrary view expressed by Nunan had clearly 
been abandoned. The officials, though unwilling to implement 
the relevant penal provisions against any missionary, made it 
clear that they regarded the informal Christian marriage cere­
monies as being unlawful.
The Bishop of the Universities Mission made several at­
tempts to persuade the Government to change its attitude so 
that the missionaries could be allowed to continue with the 
practice of adding a Christian blessing to a customary-law mar­
riage - without subjecting the parties thereto to the princi-
81pies of the Marriage Ordinance. The Bishop's pleas were re­
jected. Indeed, the Government's response was striking in the 
way it echoed Cox's remarks on the issue. The Bishop's requests 
were characterised as an attempt on the part of the missionar­
ies :
...to give benediction and sanction to what must be solely 
regarded as pagan and polygamous contracts. The Acting 
Governor cannot but feel that such a procedure is open to 
grave objections; for apart from the fact that the so- 
called "marriage" of natives by the reading of the ordina­
ry service of the Church of England over them in an unli­
censed church, and without having first complied with the
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requirements of the law, renders the Minister liable to 
prosecution,82 it may be assumed that the contracting 
parties themselves have been deluded (unintentionally 
of course) into believing that they had by reason of- 
the church ceremony above referred to, contracted a legal 
Christian marriage which would be recognised by the 
Boma.83
It was further stated that:
...marriage celebrated "according to native law and 
custom" is a pagan contract which, though it admits of 
a legal polygamous union, is not intended for Christian 
natives, but to legalise the marriages of the heathen in­
habitants of the country.84
There was no statutory provision expressly prohibiting 
African Christians from contracting marriage under customary 
law. As already noted, however, the assumption that Africaiv 
Christians would abandon customary marriage systems and adopt 
the imported English system tended to be reflected in the ac­
tual provisions of the 1902 Ordinance. Thus, the Ordinance 
recognised only Christian marriages which were contracted in 
accordance with its provisions (as read with the 1912 Ordi­
nance) and clearly seemed to proscribe any other forms of 
church marriage ceremonies. To the extent that they were bound 
to have their marriages blessed by the churches, African Chris­
tians had also to be bound by the obligations of the Marriage 
Ordinance.
The kind of church ceremony demanded by the Bishop of the 
Universities Mission was intended simply to constitute an appen 
dage to a customary marriage and not a form of marriage sui 
generis. Since the customary marriage had already been given 
legal recognition, there does not seem to have been any proper
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reason for the Government to deny the missions the power to 
bless such marriages. Of course, the view of the Government 
on the matter underlined the belief that customary marriage was 
wholly incompatible with Christianity. Surely, however, the 
missions rather than government officials were the better judge 
on the question of whether or not customary marriage was so re­
pugnant to Christianity as to warrant the exclusion of a reli­
gious blessing. The view of the Government amounted to a some­
what unwarranted interference with church practice.
At first, many of the missions in the territory do not 
seem to have been unduly perturbed by this aspect of the law. 
Indeed, for some years after 1912, the administration felt that 
the position it had taken on the matter had the support of the 
majority of the missions. Until later, the Bishop of the Uni­
versities Mission was almost the only person who is recorded
85as having seriously questioned the Government's policy. With 
experience of the actual difficulties involved in applying the 
provisions of the Marriage Ordinances to their converts, however, 
an increasing number of missionaries, and even government offi­
cials, begCUi to sympathise with the views of the Universities 
Mission. By 1920, it had become clear to most of the people 
concerned that drastic changes in the law were desirable. In­
deed, afterwards, it was the Government which was to become the 
true advocate of the idea advocated by the Universities Mission.
3. The Blantyre Conference of 1920
A circular letter from the Acting Chief Secretary, dated 
12th November, 1919, addressed all the heads of the leading mis­
sions as follows:
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The GovernO'T has had under consideration various ques­
tions and difficulties which have been represented to 
him to have arisen from time to time in the application 
of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and the Christian Native 
Marriage Ordinance, 1912, so far as Natives are concerned. 
There appears to be more or less a consensus of opinion, 
official, clerical and lay, that some reform in the law 
in this regard is desirable and with a view to the fuller 
elucidation of the points at issue and a more complete 
study of amendments required in the Ordinances quoted.
His Excellency thinks it will be well if a conference can 
be arranged between the various missions and the Attorney- 
General and another Government officer to be hereafter 
selected.86
The suggested task of the conference was to:
...consider and report upon the operation of the Marriage 
Ordinance, 1902, and of the Christian Native Marriage 
Ordinance, 1912, as affecting marriage between natives 
and the amendments, if any, which are desirable in the law 
relating to marriage between natives in accordance with 
the rites of the Christian churches.87
The response from the missionaries invited was enthusias­
tic. The only missions evincing some signs of hesitation were 
the Universities Mission and the White Fathers (Catholics).
The reason for the former's hesitation had nothing to do with 
the merits of the proposed conference. It happened that the 
Head of the Mission, Bishop Cathrew Nyasaland, was going to be 
away in England on mission business. It was the Bishop who for 
the preceding four years had been pressing the Government for 
such a conference. So cautious and suspicious, however, was 
the Bishop that he could only agree to send a representative on
the condition that the Universities Mission would not be bound
88by the outcome of the conference. His explanation was that 
whereas any other member of the Mission had a detailed knowledge 
of the problems of his own station, he (the Bishop) was the only 
one who had been "in contact with the whole". He could thus not
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entrust the task of negotiating at the conference to any other 
person. He wrote:
...as things are it will be best for the UMCA to take no 
part in the conference. I can only hope that legislation 
on the subject will not again be rushed, as it was with 
regard to the 1912 Ordinance. All the difficulties that 
have arisen in consequence of it might have been avoided 
if time had been given for its consideration.89
Members of the Universities Mission seem to have been
fearful of the influence of Dr Hetherwick of the Church of
Scotland, whom they believed^hav^ been responsible for the enact-
90ment of the 1912 Ordinance. Without the equally authorita­
tive voice of the Bishop, it was feared that the proposed con­
ference would result in the enactment of a law unacceptable to 
them. However, as a result of a personal interview between the 
Governor and the Bishop on 8th December, 1919, the Universities 
Mission in the end agreed to send a representative without any 
preconditions. Indeed, it might have been naive on their part 
to believe that non-participation in the conference would have 
helped them. For much as the Government wished for the broadest 
consensus on its reforms, once enacted, the new law would be 
binding upon any missionary, irrespective of whether or not such 
missionary had participated in the antecedent negotiations.
Father M. Guilleme of the White Fathers, after stating 
that he had no serious objection to the proposed conference, ob­
served :
....Still, if I consider the result of a similar conference 
hold /sic7 in 1912, I cannot help to believe that the 
Government, after a written consultation may, by itself ar­
range the matter of marriages by an Ordinance which will 
. satisfy every body.91
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He went on to spell out what he thought would be desirable 
changes in the existing law,. the substance of which will be 
cited in the following discussion. The White Fathers ultimate­
ly agreed to send a delegate to the conference, at which the 
views of Father Guilleme were reiterated.
In all, nine missionary officials attended the conference, 
representing a total of twelve missionary societies. The At-
also represented the Government. The Blantyre District Resi­
dent, C.A. Cardew, was appointed to represent the interests of 
Africans.
The conference was held in Blantyre over three days, 7th,
8th and 9th April, 1920. The first day was devoted to a gener­
al meeting at which the various representatives presented their 
views on the existing law and made suggestions as to the pos­
sible directions of reform. On the second day, the Attorney- 
General (and Chairman) reduced the various ideas expressed at 
the meeting of the previous day into specific proposals in the 
form of two bills, tagged "Bill A" and "Bill B". The missions 
spent the day in informal consultations amongst themselves.
The general meeting was reconvened on the third and last day.
The various delegates, now split into defined positions, presen­
ted their views on the two Bills prepared by Jackson. The con­
ference closed with each of the delegates expressing his prefer­
ence for one or the other of the two Bills.
a) The Missionary Viewpoint
The repeal of the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912,
92was unanimously recommended by the missions. The key problems
torney-General, E st.J. Jackson, chaired the conference and
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of the missions have just been described in the foregoing out­
line of the provisions of the Ordinance. At the 1920 Blantyre
conference, Dr Hetherwick recapitulated the main objections of
93the missions to the 1912 law.
Firstly, Hetherwick observed that the 1912 Ordinance did not 
represent the wishes of those missionary bodies whose represen­
tations had led to its enactment. It may be noted, however, 
that Hetherwick and some of his colleagues had actually taken 
part in the preparation foTthe 1912 Ordinance. It was Hether­
wick who had campaigned for the introduction of the model of
QZ l
the 1903 Uganda law in British Central Africa. The 1912 Ordi­
nance had been modelled on the aforesaid Uganda law. The enact­
ment of the 1912 Ordinance represented a recognition of Hether­
wick1 s arguments. In fact, Hetherwick and the other missionar­
ies who had attended the meeting of 1912 with the Acting Attor­
ney-General , had not raised any objection to the Christian Native 
Marriage Bill. On the contrary, they seemed happy with its con­
tents. Indeed, Hetherwick indicated later, after the 1920 con­
ference, that, at first, he had been happy with the Ordinance;
that his realisation that it was unworkable had come only as a
95result of the experience with its actual operation.
Secondly, it was pointed out that the reservation of jur­
isdiction to the High Court made it impossible for many people 
to obtain any remedy.
Thirdly, the penalties prescribed for violation of the pro­
visions of the Ordinances were described as being excessive,
"in view of the state of native life". Moreover, it was observed,
361
the administration had not demonstrated any willingness to en­
force any of the penal provisions, thereby bringing the law, as 
well as the officiating Ministers, into disrepute in the eyes 
of the Africans. Hetherwick observed that the non-observance
of the law had become the rule rather than the exception.
Fourthly, it was stressed that, apart from the procedural 
difficulties of contracting marriage under the Ordinance, the 
missionaries were not happy with most of the consequences flow­
ing from the statutory marriage. Most notable among these con­
sequences was the substitution, in case of intestacy, of the 
English law of succession for customary law. Hetherwick ob­
served that:
Among certain tribes the provisions of the Ordinance as 
regards the law of succession to property made too
abrupt a change in the social life of the people.
It must be noted by way of comment on Hetherwick's observation 
that there is no evidence that the succession clause had any­
where been invoked with respect to Africans.
Some modern commentators on the history of marriage legis­
lation have tended to single out the question of succession as 
the main, or even only, factor leading to the repeal of the 1912 
Ordinance and, hence, the enactment of the Native Marriage 
(Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923.^ As must be 
clear from the present discussion, this was not the case. In 
fact, missionary feeling on this point was not as strong as it 
was on the other issues more related to missionary work - for 
example, declarations with regard to divorce, penalties pre­
scribed against officiating Ministers for procedural irregular­
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ities, etc. The Bishop of the UMCA, the chief critic of the 
1912 law, even had a word of sympathy for the provision relat­
ing to succession; although like other missionaries, he wanted 
it removed. He once wrote:
...with its /the succession clause'sj object I am much in 
sympathy if, as I take it, it is intended to help African 
husbands to realise their duty to their wives and chil­
dren. To effect this, however, I cannot see that it is 
in any way necessary to say that their property should be 
distributed according to the law of England. No African, 
and few missionaries97 are in a position to study such 
laws, and it is not easy to explain them. It would be 
far better to say simply what is wished, e.g. that a 
named proportion, a half or a third, whatever it may be, 
shall go to the wife and children...98
He added, however, that even an arrangement on the suggested 
lines might not be effective, considering "the Zexisting7 state 
of Native custom". It is interesting to note that, in fact, it 
was on these lines that the Wills and Inheritance Act, 1967, 
would be patterned.
What clearly emerges from the relevant transactions is that
the missionaries were, perhaps naturally, mainly interested in
ensuring the smooth-working of their programmes for bringing
Christianity to Africans, and not in the formulation of an ideal
law for Africans, let alone in the preservation of indigenous 
99customary law. It can be seen from the foregoing discussion 
that most of the objections raised against the 1912 Ordinance 
were equally (or even more) applicable to the Marriage Ordinance, 
1902. It can also be noted that the terms of reference for the 
conference as suggested by the Governor covered the working of 
the 1902 Ordinance as well... "so far as natives fwerej con­
cerned". The conference, however, virtually confined its
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recommendations to the repeal of the 1912 Ordinance. Indeed, it 
was expressly recommended at the conference that the law of the 
1902 Ordinance (in its existing form) should continue to be 
available to Africans. The missionaries were more or less in­
different to the difficulties or consequences of marriage under 
the 1902 Ordinance insofar as such difficulties or consequences 
did not affect them or their relationship with their converts. 
There was still room for such application of the 1902 Ordinance 
to Africans as would not be detrimental to the missionaries.
The same did not hold for the 1912 Ordinance as this Ordinance 
had been enacted specifically for those Africans whose marriages 
fell within the ambit of missionary concern.
Enacted specifically to help the missionaries, the Chris­
tian Native Marriage Ordinance had failed to do so. It had to 
be replaced by a more acceptable and useful formula. There 
could be little doubt that in terms of substantive principles 
marriage under the Ordinances reflected the ideals of Christian 
teaching. There were some exceptions, of course: for example,
in relation to divorce, as far as the episcopal missionaries 
were concerned, and with regard to some aspects of the law 
governing the prohibited degrees. However, the objectives of 
state law and those of the missionaries were not and could not 
always be complementary. The methods of the former, with their 
emphasis on definition and enforcement by physical sanctions, 
could hardly suit the latter, whose main concern was the propa­
gation of the Christian ideals among a people steeped in radi­
cally different beliefs and often hostile to the new teaching. 
The missionaries would seem to have realised that they could
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discharge their tasks more efficiently by a direct ecclesias­
tical approach than under the heavy and often cumbrous armour 
of secular legislation. The safe place to proselytise the in­
digenous population was in the shallow waters of simple but 
firm church propaganda and not in the rough depths of civil 
sanctions. It is in the light of the foregoing observations 
that the apparent missionary preference for indigenous customary 
law to the imported law of the Ordinances with respect to the 
marriages of their converts must be viewed. Basically, the mis­
sions wanted some measure of autonomy and flexibility in dealing 
with African Christian marriages.
The missions were not in complete agreement as to how far 
African Christians should be excluded from the application of 
the imported English legal principles.
The views of the Universities Mission echoed the ideas of 
Nunan. In a letter which had finally persuaded the Governor to 
call for the 1920 conference, the Bishop of the Mission com­
plained that the law treated Christians unfairly:
....A native not a Christian can be married in his village 
with no trouble at all. As a Christian he wishes for 
nothing more, and as missionaries we wish for nothing more 
for him, than to be allowed to have his marriage sancti­
fied and blessed with a Christian service. The Priests of 
the Mission are ready to take such services where the 
Christian is entitled to them but the Ordinance steps in 
and say$ that the Christian blessing may not be given un­
less the marriage is legalised in the European sense, a 
thing which very few natives the least wish, and which al­
ways involves a great many formalities which they do not 
fully understand. Sometimes ... it is impossible without 
long and troublesome ulendos /'journeysj of several days 
duration.
The Ordinances which are therefore meant to help 
Christian marriage result in very seriously penalising 
every Christian who simply wishes - surely a very innocent
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wish - to sanctify his marriage with a Christian service. 
I cannot believe that this is your wish or that of His 
Excellency.101
The Bishop developed this theme in his letter of 2nd December,
1021919, to the Chief Secretary, in which he proposed as fol­
lows :
....What is really needed is the repeal of the 1912 Ordi­
nance in toto, and the addition of a clause to the 1902 
Ordinance, stating that, while no religious service of 
Marriage shall have any legal effect, unless the provisions 
of the Ordinance are first complied with, and that the 
law will take no cognisance whatever of such service, yet 
there was no objection whatever to such being held in the 
same way that other sacramental services, such as baptism 
and confirmation are held, of which the law takes no notice. 
... .Practically, all we want is that our ordinary people 
where they qualify for it and desire it, should be able to 
obtain the sacrament of marriage without having to conform 
to elaborate regulations, no doubt necessary and proper to 
establish a legal marriage in the European sense, but which 
seem to be quite unsuitable to the general level of native 
life here.103
It is tempting to associate this position of the Universi 
ties Mission with what has been observed as a distinctive fea­
ture of their general policy in Africa. Professor McCracken 
writes:
....The UMCA, with a recruitment policy which ensured that 
almost every missionary would have his own private income, 
was almost exclusively staffed by what an observer de­
scribed as "charming, and devoted priests and laymen of 
great culture and refinement". With their public school 
and largely Oxford or Cambridge backgrounds these sons of 
country parsons and small-town solicitors were often ignor 
ant of or repelled by the dynamic, self-assured world of 
Victorian industry. They thus sought in Africa, not to 
transform societies, but to insert Christianity into them 
with as little disturbance as possible. "It is not our 
wish to make the Africans bad caricatures of the English­
men", wrote Bishop Smythies. "What we want is to Chris­
tianise them in their own civil and political conditions; 
to help them to develop a Christian civilisation suited 
to their own climate and their own circumstances".104
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This policy seems to have been exemplified by the stand of the 
Mission on the question of marriage legislation. However, 
there is no evidence that the Universities Mission was any more 
committed to the preservation of indigenous marriage institu­
tions than other missions. Indeed, in terms of church doctrine, 
the Universities Mission tended to be less tolerant of customary 
marriage than most, if not all, of the missions in the territory. 
The position of the Mission on the questions of marriage legis­
lation was influenced not so much by any liberal attitude towards 
customary law as by a general antipathy towards the interven­
tion secular authority in marriage matters. This will be ela­
borated in later discussions, especially in relation to the 
question of divorce.
Be that as it may, the Universities Mission representa­
tive^^ at the 1920 conference reiterated the Bishop's propos­
als. In the end the view of the Universities Mission was en­
dorsed also by the Catholic missions. At the beginning, the 
latter had presented their own proposal. Whereas the Universi­
ties Mission had called for a total exclusion of "European" law 
from the marriages contracted by simple Christian rites, the 
Catholics had initially not gone as far as that. In his letter 
of 25th November, 1919, for example, Father M. Guilleme had urged 
the Government:
...to adopt simply the Ordinance of 1902 which is the 
English law, and to apply it to the Protectorate in a 
liberal spirit as it is applied, as far as I know, in 
all British colonies.107
The "liberal spirit" the Father had in mind included: the ap­
pointment of church Ministers as Registrars of Marriages with
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full powers - so that neither the parties nor the officiating 
Ministers would be required to contact any civil authorities.
The latter would be involved only as depositories of Marriage 
Registers; and the exclusion of all declarations, as to divorce, 
from the marriage ceremonies, entries or certificates. These 
suggestions were reiterated at the 1920 conference by Father 
Martem (of the Marist Fathers) and Father Maze (of the White 
Fathers). However, as noted above, the Catholics subsequently 
abandoned their proposals in favour of those submitted by the 
Anglicans.
The general principle of the Anglican proposal was also 
reflected in the proposals of the non-episcopal missionaries 
attending the conference. The latter were not, however, pre­
pared to allow all questions of marriage celebrated by Chris­
tian rites to be governed by customary law. They urged that 
a distinction ought still to be maintained between such mar­
riages and marriages contracted purely under customary law. In 
particular, they recommended specific provisions to deal with 
the questions of divorce and monogamy.
The Blantyre conference of 1920 can be seen as a turning 
point in Government policy. At least since 1912, the Govern­
ment had maintained that African customary marriages were 
"pagan" contractswhich should not be given Christian benediction 
or sanction. At the Blantyre conference, the strongest support 
for the proposals of the Universities Mission came from the of­
ficials of the administration, Cardew and Jackson. As will be 
seen shortly, Jackson's support for the proposal of the Universi­
ties Mission was to prove all crucial in the end.
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b) Bills of the Blantyre Conference, 1920 
As already noted, the views submitted by the missionaries 
on the first day of the above conference were summarised by the 
Attorney-General and Chairman of the conference, Jackson, in 
the form of two bills, labelled "Bill A" and "Bill B". The full 
title of each of the two Bills was stated as "The Christian 
Native Marriage Zt)rdinance7» 1920".
"Bill A" embodied the wishes of those who wanted Christian 
African marriages to be governed completely by customary law. 
The Bill had five clauses, but its essence was contained in 
clauses (2) and (3). Clause (2) provided that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Marriage Ordi­
nance of 1902, it shall be lawful for any person licensed 
by the Governor for the purpose of celebrating marriage 
under this Ordinance to celebrate marriage at any hour and 
in any place, according to the rites or usages of the 
church or other religious body to which such person belongs, 
between any two natives between whom there is a subsisting 
marriage contract according to native law or custom govern­
ing marriage between such natives.
And clause (3) read:
No ceremony of marriage performed under this Ordinance 
shall be deemed to alter or affect in any way the status 
or consequences which the previously subsisting native 
marriage may have in accordance with native law or custom 
governing such marriage and all questions and legal pro­
ceedings arising out of any such marriage shall be within 
the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts of the Protec­
torate and shall be decided in accordance with native law 
and custom.
Unexpectedly perhaps, rather harsh penalties - £100 fine or 2 
years imprisonment - were prescribed for persons who would know 
ingly and willingly celebrate marriage without the Governor's 
licence or otherwise in contravention of the Bill.
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Africans making use of the proposed Ordinance would first 
have to fulfill the formalities requisite to a valid customary- 
law marriage. The Christian ceremony would not be a substitute 
for the customary-law contract. Apparently, the Christian cere­
mony would not even be accepted in a court of law as evidence of 
the intention to be bound by a customary-law marriage contract. 
Hence, there was no need to make any provision for registration. 
Any difference between marriage under the proposed law and mar­
riage contracted purely under customary law would lie merely in 
the fact that parties to the former would be subject to the ec­
clesiastical discipline of their church. In the eyes of secular 
law, the two marriages would absolutely be the same. Indeed, it 
is for this very reason that the penalties prescribed for irre­
gularities in the celebration of the marriage appear to be too 
severe.
"Bill B" embodied the wishes of those who wanted some dis­
tinction to be made between marriage celebrated by Christian 
rites and marriage contracted purely under customary law. The 
general principles of the Bill were the same as those of "Bill 
A": Notwithstanding the provisions of the 1902 Ordinance, it
would be lawful for any licensed person to celebrate marriage 
under the proposed Ordinance according to the rites or usages of 
his church between any two Africans. Marriage so celebrated 
would (except as stated below) be governed by the customary law 
of the parties thereto. The same penalties as in "Bill A" were 
prescribed.
The main difference between the two Bills was that "Bill B" 
specifically provided that:
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...a decree of divorce [by subordinate courts7 shall not 
be granted to a petitioner for the dissolution of a mar­
riage celebrated under this Ordinance except for the fol­
lowing reasons:-
(a) adultery of the respondent
(b) desertion by the respondent without 
reasonable excuse for a period of three 
years or more!08
The proviso was no doubt inspired by the belief that restric­
tions on the grounds upon which divorce could be obtained would 
strengthen the marriage tie which, it was generally accepted, 
was weak under indigenous systems of law. The clause was se­
verely criticised by Cardew, the official representing African 
interests:
....It appears to me that the missions in favour of this 
divorce clause wish the civil law to strengthen their 
hands in a matter which rests solely on religious doctrine 
and which should therefore be left to the control of reli­
gious authority.109
Further, "Bill B" expressly prohibited the celebration of mar­
riage :
...between two natives either of whom is already married 
to any other person than the person with whom the inten­
ded marriage is to be performed, either by the law or 
custom of the tribe to which either party to the intended 
marriage belongs, or in any manner recognised by the law 
of the Protectorate.110
In practice, as will become clear in a later chapter, it was of 
course unlikely that any of the missionaries would knowingly 
celebrate marriage to which one party was already married to a 
third party. The Bill also contained express prohibitions of 
marriage between persons between whom there were impediments of 
consanguinity or affinity under their respective systems of
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customary law and marriages celebrated without the requisite 
customary-law parental consents.
Under "Bill B", marriages would be subject to registration 
at missionary level. The main reason for registration was that 
evidence would be required, in the event of divorce, to show 
that a marriage is one that can only be dissolved on the basis 
of the grounds specified by the Bill. It was also the view of 
the missionaries supporting the Bill that in future there might 
be changes in the status of marriages celebrated under the pro­
posed law, and therefore that records of such marriages had to 
be kept.
Both Bills purported to repeal the Christian Native Mar­
riage Ordinance, 1912, and the Christian Native Marriage (Amend­
ment) Ordinance, 1913. The Bills left the Marriage Ordinance, 
1902, intact.
Members of the conference informally made declarations as 
to which of the two Bills their respective missions would sup­
port. Subsequently, a full report of the conference with the 
two Bills attached was prepared by Jackson and dispatched to all 
who had taken part for their formal signatures. With their sig­
natures, they were also required to make formal confirmations as 
to which Bill they supported. The final tally was: For "Bill
A":- (1) The Attorney-General (and Chairman of the conference),
Jackson; (2) Cardew, representing African interests; (3) G.H. 
Wilson for the Universities Mission; (4) Father Regent for the 
Marist and White Fathers. For "Bill B":- (1) Dr Hetherwick
for the Church of Scotland Mission and also on behalf of Charles
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Stuart of the Livingstonia Mision; (2) J.J. Holmes for the 
Zambezi Industrial Mission, the Nyasa Industrial Mission, the 
Baptist Industrial Mission, and the South African General Mis­
sion; (3) G.A. Ellingworth for the Seventh Day Adventist Mis­
sion; and (4) W.H. Murray for the Dutch Reformed Church.
The underlying differences in attitudes between the respective 
supporters of "Bill A" and "Bill B" will be discussed later 
when considering the specific questions of monogamy and divorce. 
In qeneral, it will be shown that the differences had nothing 
or very little to do with attitudes towards customary law itself.
4. The Enactment of the Native Marriage (Christian Rites)
Registration Ordinance, 1923
After further exchanges among colonial officials, and 
after a rather long period, the Native Marriage (Christian 
Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, was enacted as the re­
sponse to the presentations of the missions at the Blantyre con­
ference of 1920. Although the Ordinance resembled "Bill A" of 
the Blantyre conference, its text did not derive directly from 
that Bill.
Viewed exclusively from what had transpired at the Blantyre 
conference, "Bill B" would seem to have been more favourably 
placed for adoption than "Bill A". Perhaps because of Jackson's 
own inclinations, this view was not, if at all, adequately con­
veyed in the final report of the conference, which in turn 
formed the basis of the Governor's report to the Colonial Of- 
fice. A clear majority of those who had attended the confer­
ence had voted in favour of "Bill B". Not only that, but fur­
ther, those missions which had voted for "Bill A" had made an
373
express, albeit informal, commitment that they would not object 
to "Bill B" if it were to be enacted. On the other hand, those 
in support of "Bill 6"  did not make a similar commitment about 
"Bill A".
While expressing his support for "Bill B", Dr Hetherwick 
refused to subscribe to Jackson's final report of the conference. 
Hetherwick1s letter to Jackson, fills in some of the details as 
to what had transpired at the conference. He wrote:
....It should have appeared that the large majority of mis­
sionary opinion /"at the conference./ were entirely in favour 
of Bill B. And the Representatives of the other Missions 
... stated that they would not object to Bill B as it was 
not necessary for them to make any use of the clause in 
that Bill regarding proceedings for divorce in the civil 
courts.
The conference thus separated with an implied consen­
sus amongst the missionary representatives as to the accep­
tance of Bill B. This would have settled the whole ques­
tion as far as missionary opinion went....
Without the provision relative to the divorce of 
Christian marriages in the civil courts there is the danger 
of a collision between these courts and the churches ... a 
thing to be avoided at all costs especially in this coun­
try. The report reads as if this were a small point of 
difference between the two Bills. To my mind, it is large 
and vital. The clause in question safeguards the position 
of the marriage of the Native Christians. To remove it and 
make no provision for it as Bill A does is to wipe out of 
the legislature (sic) of the Protectorate any recognition 
of the position that Christian marriage has secured in the 
Native community and to throw the Native regislature (sic) 
of the Protectorate back into the conditions of heathen­
ism. 113
He went on to express his firm opposition to "Bill A". Almost 
simultaneously, the Rev. H. Murray of the Dutch Reformed Church 
made similar observations. Indeed, even the representative 
of the Universities Mission seems to "have left the conference 
with the impression that "Bill B" would become law. This comes
out clearly throughout his report on the conference to his
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superior, Archdeacon A.G.B. Glossop. Thus, for example, he 
ended his report with the consolatory observations that, al­
though the next Ordinance might still contain references to di­
vorce, the missionaries at least would not have to explain it 
to the parties. "We can stand entirely aloof from it as a 
church", he wrote.
Jackson's report, on the other hand, put much emphasis on 
those arguments which favoured the adoption of "Bill A". Thus, 
even though the Governor's covering letter to the Colonial Sec­
retary did not expressly indicate which of the two Bills was 
being recommended for approval, it was implicit that the Govern­
ment was pressing for the approval of "Bill A". The overall 
conclusions of the Colonial Office were in favour of "Bill A"; 
although it was strongly recommended that a provision should 
be made for the registration of marriage celebrated in accor­
dance with the provisions of the proposed law. It was noted 
that registration would be desirable for statistical purposes; 
that there might be a change in future in favour of altering the 
legal status of such marriages; and that registration would en­
hance the "native's" respect for marriage. Instead of directly 
approving the enactment of "Bill A", however, the Colonial 
Secretary referred the Governor in Nyasaland to the law of Nor-
5
thern Rhodesia as a posjible answer to the problems of the mis­
sions in Nyasaland.
It was in relation to the law of Northern Rhodesia, it 
would seem, that the Colonial Office had first departed from 
its previous firm opposition to any arrangement whereby Christian
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missions would bless marriages contracted in accordance with
customary law. When North Eastern Rhodesia and North Western
Rhodesia were amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia, in 1911,^^
each territory had its own marriage legislation. North Eastern
Rhodesia had what were known as Marriage Regulations^-^  enacted
from the draft Ordinance received from the Foreign Office in 
1181902. These provisions were, of course, similar to the pro­
visions of the British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance. Most 
importantly, they were theoretically available to Africans.
North Western Rhodesia received a draft Marriage Proclamation
from the Colonial Office in 1904. After some involved exchan-
119ges between the Colonial Office and the local administration,
1 90
the draft was enacted in 1906. In 1918, the two statutes
121were consolidated.
In one important aspect, the resulting Marriage Proclama­
tion followed the North Western Rhodesia Marriage Proclamation 
of 1906. This latter Proclamation had never applied to Afri­
cans. So too, Section 47 of the Northern Rhodesia Marriage
Proclamation excluded from its application marriages contracted
122between "natives". Thus, Northern Rhodesia stood out, al­
most throughout the colonial period, as the only British terri­
tory where the option of a statutory marriage was entirely de­
nied to the African population. The local officials in North
Western Rhodesia had anticipated innumerable problems if the
123Marriage Proclamation was to be applied to Africans. It
must be pointed out that the exclusion of Africans from the re­
levant law was the result of the same kind of thinking which
had characterised the official reaction to the Marriage Ordinance
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in British Central Africa. In contrast to the officials in 
Whitehall, the local colonial official tended to be less en­
thusiastic about the application of the imported English mar­
riage law to the indigenous populations.
The position in Northern Rhodesia was that Christian mar­
riages between Africans could be celebrated in church, after 
the requisite customary-law formalities had been completed.
The church ceremony had no legal consequences other than those 
flowing from the customary-law contract. There was no statutory 
instrument specifically providing for this arrangement. There 
was merely an informal arrangement between the administration
and the missions, in particular, the Bishop of Northern Rhodes-
10/
ia. The arrangement had received the approval of the Colon­
ial Office.
When the Bill "to make provision for the registration of 
Native Marriages celebrated according to Christian rites" was 
ultimately prepared in Nyasaland in 1923, it reflected some of 
the ideas of the Blantyre conference, the suggestions of the 
Colonial Office, as well as the experiences of the neighbouring 
territory of Northern Rhodesia. The Native Marriage (Christian 
Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, as the resulting statute 
came to be known, provided under Section 3 that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Marriage 
Ordinance it shall be permissible for any minister and at 
any place to celebrate marriage according to the rites of 
the Church, Denomination or Body to which he belongs be­
tween any two natives:
Provided that the celebration of marriage under this 
Ordinance shall not as regards the parties thereto alter 
or affect their status or the consequences of any prior
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marriage entered into by either party according to native 
law or custom or involve any other legal consequences what 
ever.
"Minister" was defined as any person:
...duly ordained, appointed or authorised by any Christian 
Church, Denomination or Body to celebrate marriage between 
natives according to the rites of such Church, Denomina­
tion or Body.126
Thus, unlike the proposal under "Bill A", a "Minister" under 
the 1923 Ordinance had no official status as an appointee of 
the Governor. Further, the Ordinance contained provisions for 
registration. Apart from the obligation to transmit annual 
records of marriages celebrated under its provisions to the Re 
gistrar-General, the Ordinance left all matters of preliminar­
ies for each church to decide.
Unlike the case of Northern Rhodesia, Africans in Nyasa­
land could still, if they so wished, contract marriage under 
the Marriage Ordinance, 1902. The argument which finally won 
the day was that:
....In the existing circumstances of native life and men­
tality the natives of Nyasaland are not sufficiently ad­
vanced to understand and appreciate that higher sense of 
the marriage tie inculcated by the tenets of the Christian 
Churches and that it would be better to maintain the civil 
status recognised by native law or custom in general to 
the union of natives.127
It must be noted, however, that the 1923 Ordinance was hardly 
the outcome of any firmly held policy on the part of the colon­
ial Government. ' It can be seen, for example, from the remarks 
of the Colonial Office about the need for registration, that 
the Ordinance was regarded as a temporary measure while efforts
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continued to find a satisfactory formula. The Ordinance was 
introduced primarily for the convenience of Christian missions.
It had not been intended as a formula for integrating the in­
digenous laws of marriage into any framework of some adminis­
trative philosophy. Its main intended achievement was that it 
freed the missions from the fetters of bureaucratic control in 
celebrating marriages between African converts.
5. The Proposals to Repeal the 1923 Ordinance
Although the 1923 Ordinance met some of the main objections
by the missions to the regime under the 1902 and 1912 Ordinances,
it was not welcomed by all the missions. For those missions
who had supported "Bill B", the Ordinance had clearly failed to
take into account some of their main concerns. The implication
of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance was that, for legal purposes,
the marriages celebrated under the Ordinance would be treated
128entirely as though they were ordinary customary marriages.
The supporters of "Bill B" had wanted the application of custo­
mary law to be excluded with respect to divorce and the number 
of spouses a person could have. The enactment of the Native 
Authority Ordinance in 1933, which inaugurated the system of 
Native Authority courts with jurisdiction over matters relating
to customary law, added a new dimension to the question of Af-
129rican Christian marriage. Even the missions that had sup­
ported "Bill A" at the Blantyre conference gradually became dis­
enchanted with the 1923 Ordinance. The following discussion is 
merely a historical outline of missionary attempts to have the 
1923 Ordinance repealed and replaced by some other formula. The 
main issues raised by the relevant proposals are examined more 
fully in later chapters.
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The attempts to repeal the 1923 Ordinance spanned the years 
between 1934 and 1948. In 1934, the Synod of the Church of 
Central Africa, Presbyterian submitted a draft Bill to the Gov­
ernment with the request that the Bill be enacted in the place
130of the 1923 Ordinance. The Bill in question was a revamped
version of "Bill B" of the 1920 Blantyre conference. In 
the relevant communication, the Clerk of the Synod informed the 
Government that the situation created by the 1923 Ordinance was 
"wholly unsatisfactory". There were mainly two related objec­
tions to the position under the 1923 Ordinance.
The first was that the Ordinance failed to "recognise the
status of Christian natives in the rapidly increasing native
132Christian community". This was because marriages celebrated
under the Ordinance involved no legal consequences whatever and 
were therefore indistinguishable from purely customary marriages. 
Secondly, the missions wanted the 1923 Ordinance repealed be­
cause of "the new situation created by the Native Authority Or- 
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dinance, 1933". The minutes of a meeting of a committee of 
the CCAP Synod in 1933 noted, as some of the problems created 
by the introduction of the Native Authority courts, as follows:
(i) That there is no uniformity in District Commissioner's 
Courts in dealing with marriage cases before them. From 
which it would be inferred the District Commissioners have 
no guiding principle.
(ii) That when the District Commissioner hands such cases 
over to Native Courts, the chiefs, if a pagan or Mohamme­
dan, often penalises the Christian.
(iii) In a Native Court, divorce is often granted for rea­
sons of which the church cannot approve and which are re­
pugnant to the Christian conscience.134
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After several exchanges between the Synod and the Government, 
and between the Government and the episcopal missions, it was 
agreed that a conference should be held between Government of­
ficials and representatives of the various religious denomina­
tions. The conference was held on 16th October, 1936.
In 1934, both the Catholic and the Anglican missions had 
refused to support the Synod's demand for the revival of "Bill 
B" and had expressed satisfaction with the 1923 Ordinance. At 
the end of the 1936 conference, however, a motion was unanimous­
ly passed proposing that:
....Legislation be enacted on the lines of draft Bill 'B' 
making provision for the celebration of Native Christian 
marriages. That the legislation contain a penalty not 
exceeding 12 months I.H.L. for failure to comply with any 
provision.
Provision also to be made for the governing bodies 
of the various religious denominations to make, with the 
approval of the Governor-in-Council, rules for the divorce 
of natives married in accordance with their respective 
religions and for the nullity of such marriages.135
This was the first indication that the attitude of the Catholic 
and Anglican missions towards the 1923 Ordinance was changing.
The issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Native Author­
ity courts was the decisive factor in the change of attitude on 
the part of the episcopal missions. Hitherto, these missions 
would seem to have been under some misapprehension as to the 
jffV.plication of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance on the question 
of jurisdiction. It will later be seen that even some govern­
ment officials were not sure about the implication of Section 3 
of the 1923 Ordinance as regards jurisdiction. At the 1936 
conference, the representative of the White Fathers Mission,
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Fr. Paradis, for example, insisted that Native Authority courts
had no jurisdiction over marriages contracted under the 1923 
1 36Ordinance. The fact that this view was contradicted by
137other participants, in particular the Attorney-General, ap­
prised the episcopal missions to the full consequences of Sec-
1 "3 O
tion 3 of the 1923 Ordinance. Thus, for the first time, all 
the European missions in the territory formed one strand of 
opinion which pressed for change.
Relying mainly on the argument that Africans were not yet 
ready for the kind of marriage law proposed by the missions,
139the Government rejected the above motion of the 1936 conference. 
This, however, was not the end of the matter. The missions con­
tinued to press the Government for new legislation. However,
World War II intervened in 1939 and therefore little happened 
until 1945.
In 1945, the Government appointed a standing committee 
which was charged with the task of considering "all questions 
affecting Native Christian Marriages" and to make recommenda­
tions for legislation which would have the support of all mis­
sions. The first meeting of the Committee took place on 6th
November, 1945, in Zomba.^^ At this meeting, the Committee 
drew up a list of proposals for inclusion in any new legislation.
I/O
A subcommittee was appointed to draft a Bill on the lines 
agreed upon by the Committee. The relevant proposals were based 
on the views of the various missions.
A draft Bill, entitled "The African Christian Marriage 
^Ordinance^, 194_" was soon prepared. The Bill contained the most
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radical provisions that had ever been proposed regarding African 
Christian marriages. Hitherto, the missions1 objections to 
the 1923 Ordinance had been confined to questions of jurisdic­
tion, divorce and monogamy. The proposed Bill on the other hand, 
purported to provide for further matters, including widow inheri­
tance, the support of widows and children after the death of the 
husband, and, in relation to matrilineal societies, the right of 
a husband to remain in the village of the deceased wife. The 
Bill also sought to end the availability of customary marriage 
law to African Christians.
Although representing the definite views of the missions,
the 1945 Bill was not intended for immediate submission to the
Government for enactment, but was intended to provide a basis
for further consultation with various groups of people within
the Protectorate. The draft was widely circulated and attracted
a great deal of criticism, especially from colonial officials in
144the districts and from African commentators. It can be noted
in this connection that discussions relating to the enactment of 
the 1902 Marriage Ordinance and the enactment of^Christian Native 
Marriage Ordinance, 1912, had been carried out only by Foreign/ 
Colonial Office officials, the top officials of the local admini­
stration and a few missionaries. There had been no African par­
ticipation. Still only a few administrators, but a greatly in­
creased number of missionaries had taken part in the discussions 
leading to the enactment of the 1923 Ordinance. Again, however, 
no Africans had.participated, although, by that time, there was 
a sizeable number of Africans holding responsible positions in 
the missions as well as government institutions. The absence
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of African participation partly serves to illustrate the atti­
tude of paternalism, the tendency to treat Africans as though 
they were all minors, for whom important decisions had to be 
taken by the European officials. It also tends to underline 
the fact that the relevant discussions were not so much concerned 
with the social advancement of the African people as with the 
resolution of conflicts between government policies and mission­
ary interests.
In contrast, the discussions involved in the attempts of 
the missions to have the 1923 Ordinance repealed were character­
ised by fairly representative and widespread participation, in 
particular from the 1940s. More importantly, Africans began to 
be treated as subjects rather than mere objects of the contro­
versies over the marriage question. Significantly, active par­
ticipation in discussions dealing with the question of marriage 
legislation started with the CCAP Synod. As early as 1931, the 
Synod began to include Africans in its various committees, which 
had been set up in preparation for the proposals which the Synod 
submitted in 1934 and 1936.*^ At the conference of 1936 re­
ferred to above, an African clergyman was among the Synod's dele­
gation. Indeed, the original intention had been to send three
148African representatives, one from each Presbytery. However,
the plan was abandoned, it would seem on the advice of the Chief 
Secretary, who had warned that unless the conference was to be­
come "unwieldy" the mission had to limit the number of represen-
149tatives. In the Committee appointed in 1945, two places were
reserved for Africans.
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African participation was not confined to church officials, 
although the relevant proposals were confined to African Chris­
tians. In 1936, for example, the Blantyre Native Association 
(without any invitation from either the Government or the mis­
sions) formally submitted its objections to the suggested repeal 
of the 1923 Ordinance. The publication of the recommenda­
tions of the Committee on Christian marriage legislation after 
its first meeting in 1945 led to far more widespread African 
participation. The recommendations were circulated to all dis­
tricts for comment by the District Commissioners, African
chiefs "and other responsible Africans, whether Christian or
11 152 not .
After considering the various criticisms, and after making
a few changes, the Committee submitted its final report and
153final draft Bill in 1948. When the report was forwarded to
the Colonial Office, the latter expressed reservations on cer­
tain key aspects of the Bill,^^ and asked the Nyasaland Govern­
ment to make the necessary revisions. In Nyasaland, the matter 
was considered between the Chief Secretary and the three Provin­
cial Commissioners. These failed to find any satisfactory solu­
tion to the objections raised by the Colonial Office and recom­
mended that the whole attempt to change the law should be aban­
doned for the time b e i n g . H . C . J .  Barker, Provincial Commis­
sioner of the Northern Region, recommended the abandonment of 
the attempted reform with the observation that, at the existing 
stage "of the development of the African":
...it is impractical to reconcile religious conceptions of
moral conduct with statutory obligations, and for this
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reason I can see no possibility of success in trying to 
introduce a specially designed Marriage Ordinance when 
there is such conflict of ideas between the parties con­
cerned ....156
The conflicting views referred to by Barker will be considered 
in detail in relation to the questions of divorce and monogamy, 
after the following chapter.
Thus, it can be noted, the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) 
Registration Ordinance, 1923, was the last principal legislation 
to be introduced as far as African marriages were concerned. The 
only other main legislation was the Asiatic (Marriage, Divorce 
and Succession) Ordinance in 1929. This Ordinance was modelled 
on the Tanganyika Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) 
Ordinance, 1921. The Ordinance provided for the regulation of 
marriage, divorce and succession on death to property of non- 
Christian Asiatics in the territory. The Ordinance falls out­
side the ambit of this study.
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THE IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF COLONIAL MARRIAGE LAWS
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS GOVERNING THE 
REGISTRATION OF CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the introduction and significance of legis­
lation dealing with the registration of marriages contracted 
under customary law.* To this day, no attempt has ever been 
made to introduce a general statutory provision for the regis­
tration of marriages contracted purely under customary law. The 
1923 Act/Ordinance, which in effect contains the earliest pro­
vision for the registration of customary marriages, is applica­
ble only to marriages which are solemnised in accordance with 
Christian rites. The registration of marriages contracted pure­
ly under customary law was first provided for under Rules passed 
by various Native Authorities. These Rules were later adopted 
in basically common form by the District Councils, which consti­
tute units of local government today.
The bulk of the material examined in this chapter will out­
line the history of Native Authority registration schemes. At 
the core of the discussion is an attempt to assess the contri­
bution of these schemes to the development of customary marriage 
law, especially with reference to the formalities of marriage.
The exercise constitutes a small, but important, aspect of the 
broader endeavour of the study, which is to highlight the role 
of colonial legislative machinery in the development of African 
marriage law. Registration of marriage was practically the 
only way in which African authorities directly contributed to
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the development of marriage legislation. It is useful to set 
some of their concerns alongside those of the colonial offi­
cials who dominated the national legislative machinery, con­
trasting the respective aims of these two sets of legislators. 
The registration of marriages under the 1923 Ordinance is also 
considered in this chapter as part of the attempt to determine 
the implications of Section 3 of that Ordinance for customary 
marriages. Thus, one of the issues discussed is the question 
whether and, if so, to what extent registration under the 1923 
Ordinance conflicted with, or obviated the need for, registra­
tion under Native Authority registration. The wider implica­
tions of this question will become apparent in the following 
two chapters, which contain even more detailed discussions of 
the interactions of African law, Christianity and secular stat­
utory regulation of marriage.
2. The Introduction of Native Authority Rules
Under Section 18 of the Native Authority Ordinance, 1933, 
Native Authorities were for the first time empowered, subject 
to the approval of the Governor, to make rules "for the peace,
good order and welfare" of Africans within their respective
2
areas of jurisdiction. It was in pursuance of this power that 
Native Authorities introduced Rules providing for the registra­
tion of marriages contracted under customary law.
Until 1946, the Rules introduced by the Native Authorities 
did not seek to impose any obligation to register marriages; 
they merely provided for a procedure by which marriage could be 
registered voluntarily. Among the common features of these
398
Rules was the provision enabling either party to a marriage con­
tracted within the jurisdiction of a particular Native Authority 
to apply, either to the Native Authority or to a Subordinate 
Native Authority, to have the marriage registered. Upon such 
application, the Native Authority would hear evidence on the 
particulars of the marriage intended for registration. These 
included the names of both parties to the marriage, the names of 
their witnesses, their villages, the Native Authority (or Auth­
orities), district(s), the date of the marriage, the amount of 
malobolo paid and the balance due. If satisfied that a valid 
marriage had been contracted, the Native Authority would regis­
ter the details and issue a certified copy of the registration 
to the party applying; if requested, a second copy could be is­
sued to the other party to the marriage. Many Rules also provi­
ded for the registration of marriages contracted before the com­
mencement of Native Authority registration schemes. There was 
also provision for the replacement of lost or destroyed certifi­
cates. Provision was made for the cancellation of a certificate 
upon divorce. The responsibility for initiating such cancella­
tion was in many of the Rules placed on the party who had ap­
plied for the initial registration. It is perhaps important to 
mention that the activities of the Native Authorities in this 
regard fell within their administrative, and not their judicial 
capacities.
From 1946 the Rules providing for voluntary registration 
began to be replaced by Rules providing for the compulsory re­
gistration of marriages. Under the latter Rules, the male par­
ty to a marriage was placed under a legal obligation to apply
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for registration with the Native Authority or Subordinate Native 
Authority within one month after the marriage had been contrac­
ted.^ A penalty, the most common being a fine of ten shillings 
or one month imprisonment, was imposed for failure to apply for 
registration or to comply with any of the other obligations re­
lating to registration. For reasons which will be considered 
later, failure to register did not, and could not, affect the 
validity of marriage which had been duly contracted under cus­
tomary law. In many other respects, Rules providing for compul­
sory registration were patterned on the earlier models providing 
for voluntary registration.
The change from voluntary to compulsory registration models 
of Native Authority Rules was not dictated by any recognised 
change in the social needs of the African people. In fact, the 
whole programme of Native Authority registration was character­
ised by the absence of any clear conception as to the objectives 
or desirability of registration. It is useful to mention that 
the form and content of the Native Authority Rules were deter­
mined mainly by the European colonial officials and not by the 
Native Authorities themselves. The Native Authorities did not 
have any real power to adopt independent policies. The whole 
process of introducing registration Rules had received its in­
itial impetus from the central government, which also issued 
models upon which Native Authorities patterned their legisla­
tion. Attempts to depart from the standard models did not usual 
ly succeed, but -would be blocked, mostly by Provincial Commis­
sioners or the Chief Secretary.
[
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Thus, even before 1946, some Native Authorities had indica­
ted that they wished to introduce compulsory registration of 
customary marriages.^ Some District Commissioners had suppor­
ted, or even prompted, the attempts to introduce compulsory re­
gistration.^ Compulsory registration had, however, been opposed 
by senior colonial officials. The view of the Government had 
been that the majority of Africans living in the rural areas 
would not only be apathetic to, but also that such Africans had 
little need for, registration. The best course, it had been 
contended, was to introduce registration gradually and on a volun­
tary basis.^
Throughout the colonial period, only in one respect was the 
need for registration keenly felt on the part of Africans. This 
was in the context of the growth of the migration of workers to 
neighbouring territories. In 1936, for instance, a memorandum 
by a government officer who had just returned from Southern 
Rhodesia noted that:
....Many cases connected with marriage were brought to 
the courts of the Native Commissioner £in S. RhodesiaJ by 
Nyasaland Natives but lack of evidence that a valid state 
of marriage existed constituted the great difficulty in 
dealing justly with such cases.8
In 1939, the Nyasaland Government learned, not for the first 
time, from the Nyasaland Labour Office in Salsbury that:
....Married couples from Nyasaland often find difficulties 
in obtaining quarters through being unable to establish to 
the satisfaction of the Southern Rhodesia authorities, 
that their marriages are regular and in accordance with 
native laws and customs of Nyasaland.9
Registration of marriage would be the obvious solution to such
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difficulties. It may also be noted in passing that officials 
in Southern Rhodesia had long been used to the idea of compul­
sory registration of customary marriages. Southern Rhodesia 
was one of the few territories which from a very early period 
had adopted statutes on a national basis imposing compulsory 
registration of customary marriages.^
The problem of migrant workers no doubt highlighted the 
need to adapt customary marriage practices to the complexities 
of modern life. However, in introducing the registration Rules, 
the Native Authorities generally did not think in terms of the 
modernisation of customary law and its adaptation to new condi­
tions. On the contrary, registration schemes tended to be as­
sociated with the desire to reinforce traditional values and 
authority.
It can be seen, for example, that the Native Authorities 
rarely viewed the problems of migrant Africans in terms of proof 
of marriage in foreign jurisdictions. For many Native Authori­
ties, the problem more readily associated with the introduction 
of registration was the emigration of women. In particular, 
the registration of marriages was seen as an aspect of measures 
that could be introduced to control the movement of unmarried 
women from rural areas to the towns, especially those of South­
ern Rhodesia and South Africa. This, for example, was the main 
objective of a Rule unsuccessfully proposed by Native Authority 
Gomani in 1937 which stated that:
No native woman shall apply to the District Commissioner 
for a pass to leave the Protectorate unless she is in 
possession of a marriage certificate issued under the
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Registration of Native Marriage Rules 1937 or under the 
Marriage Ordinance or other legislation providing for 
the registration of marriages.il
Since 1935, the Atonga Tribal Council Native Authority in
Chintheche had made similar attempts to curb the movement of
unmarried women from Nyasaland to the neighbouring territories.
None of these attempts received the approval of the colonial 
12authorities. In practice, the District Commissioners were al­
ready able to restrict the movement of women by utilising their 
administrative powers to withhold the necessary "identification
certificates". Without these certificates it was difficult to
13travel either to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa.
The desire to control the movement of women partly arose 
from the need to strengthen the traditional structures of auth­
ority. These structures of authority were closely linked to the 
control over access to women. The movement of women to distant 
cities, where the elders could not hope to exercise their power 
of control, clearly threatened the social fabric of traditional 
life. The Native Authorities also shared the apprehension of 
many Africans about the social effects of modern urban life, to 
which they attributed what was perceived as a decline in moral 
standards.^ In its attempts to restrict the emigration of 
women, the Atonga Tribal Council, for example, expressed the 
fear that, when abroad, unattached women lapsed into immoral 
ways and, on their return were a bad influence and also "brought 
diseases".
The initial introduction and subsjequent proliferation of 
Native Authority Rules providing for the introduction of the
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registration of marriages owed more to the desire to raise funds
than to any commitment on the part of the Native Authorities or
the colonial officials to modernise customary marriage law.
When Native Authority M'Mbelwa proposed to introduce compulsory
registration in 1937, he emphasised that the raising of revenue
16
was the main object of the proposal. The proposed measure 
was rejected by the Provincial Commissioner, who noted that 
there were many people who should not be bothered with the sug­
gested regulation:
...particularly as it is primarily a revenue raising mea 
sure i.e. disguised poll tax of 6d for the year of init­
ial registration.17
When, in 1935, Native Authority Kyungu in Karonga proposed to 
introduce compulsory registration, setting a fee of two shill­
ings for such registration and a fine of ten to twenty shillings 
for failure to register, the District Commissioner minuted:
This is prompted, I am afraid, by a desire to raise reven­
ue, nevertheless such rules will have a beneficial effect 
on domestic relationships.18
In Ncheu District, Native Authority Gomani clearly seemed 
to interpret the authority to introduce registration as an auth­
ority to levy tax on marriage. Responding to a missionary who
had accused Gomani of impeding missionary work because he had
19introduced registration, Gomani stated:
....I do not do anything without approval from the Govern­
ment; and know this, that between all people, there are 
various taxes - some are paid to the mission, and some to 
the Government as well. Now then, how could the tax paid 
to me abase the country?
Furthermore, I did not command the people to pay these 
taxes to ... me at all. They do these things according to 
their own wishes as to do honour to their leading men.20
The focus on the collection of revenue characterised the 
whole history of Native Authority legislative activities. This 
was perhaps inevitable. Indigent Native Authorities received 
nothing by way of grants or subsidies from the central govern­
ment. Itself convulsed in financial paralysis, the central
government, to use the words of one colonial administrator,
21"could afford no largesse for the Native Authorities". Native 
Authority expenditures had to be met solely from local rates, 
dues, and fines. Inevitably, far from introducing Rules "for 
the peace, good order and welfare" of their people as anticipa­
ted under the 1933 Ordinance, the Native Authorities became pre­
occupied with schemes which had the potential to bring in reven­
ue. Legislation on such matters as agricultural methods, fish­
ing, beer-brewing, tree-cutting and so on, wove a maze of re­
strictions whose ultimate result would only be the entanglement 
of an unwary people into violations and consequent fines and 
penal labour. In this climate, even such seemingly sanguine 
Rules as those concerned with the registration of marriages had 
a distinct oppressive aura about them. This aspect of Native 
Authority legislation tended merely to reflect the character of 
the colonial administration in general, which, in the words of 
one historian:
...seemed to devote nearly all of its energy to the col­
lection of taxes and the punishment of defaulters.22
It was probably due to financial pressures that from 1946, 
the Government began not only to approve, but actually to en­
courage, the introduction of compulsory registration by Native 
Authorities. Almost suddenly, a circular was issued by the
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Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioners on 14th November,
231946. Enclosed with the circular were model Rules for Native 
Authorities providing for compulsory registration of marriage. 
The circular contained instructions to the Provincial Commis­
sioners to determine whether registration of all African mar­
riages should be made compulsory, and whether the enclosed model 
Rules were suitable for the purpose.
The circular of 1946 may have been prompted by a resolution 
passed at a meeting of the African Provincial Council of the 
Southern Province which had been held the previous month. Un­
fortunately, it has not been possible to secure a full record 
of this meeting. All that is known is that a resolution had 
been passed by twenty-one votes to two to the effect that "all
native marriages should be registered with the Native Authori-
0 /
ties". Details of the meeting would perhaps have shed some 
different light on the desirability of compulsory registration. 
Equally regrettable was the fact that the circular of the Chief 
Secretary failed to elicit any detailed comments on the desira­
bility of compulsory registration. Whether rightly or wrongly, 
Provincial Commissioners, and in turn District Commissioners 
and Native Authorities, seem to have interpreted the circular 
simply as an invitation to introduce compulsory registration.
The Native Authorities simply responded by replacing the old 
Rules for voluntary registration with new Rules requiring the
registration of all customary marriages. By 1947, compulsory
25registration as government policy was firmly rooted.
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3. The Legal Status of Registration Under the 1923 Ordinance 
The introduction of Native Authority registration of mar­
riages immediately raised the question as to the exact relation­
ship between such registration and the registration of marriage 
under the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance, 1923. This question largely centred on the implications 
of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance. Section 3, it may be re­
called, was the operative clause and provided, inter alia, that:
...the celebration of marriage under this Ordinance shall 
not as regards the parties thereto alter or affect their 
status or the consequence of any prior marriage entered 
into by either party according to native law or custom or 
involve any other legal consequences whatever.
This clearly raised the question as to whether the registration 
of marriage under the 1923 Ordinance had any legal utility so 
as, for example, to obviate the need for further registration 
under Native Authority Rules. Could a certificate or other evi­
dence of registration under the Ordinance properly be accepted 
as evidence of the existence of a valid marriage? Could a 
court of law dispense with the traditional methods of establish­
ing the existence of a customary-law marriage merely because 
registration under the Ordinance has been proved? Put differ­
ently, was registration under the Ordinance merely a record of 
the religious ceremony or was it also a record of the customary- 
law contract which was supposed to precede or accompany such a 
religious ceremony? The attempt to answer these questions in 
the present discussion constitutes merely one aspect of a broad­
er endeavour, pursued throughout this study, to define or deter­
mine the meaning of Section 3 of the Native Marriage (Christian
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Rites) Registration Ordinance and to assess its implications 
for the development of customary marriage law.
In the Nyasaland High Court case of Gombera v. Kumwembe 
7 ft
(1958), Spencer-Wilkinson, C.J. unequivocally hinted that 
registration under the 1923 Ordinance could be utilised in the 
same way as, for example, registration under the Native Author­
ity Rules. The facts of the case were as follows. A marriage
had been arranged between Kumwembe and Gomera's daughter. Fol-
27lowing the matrilineal custom of the parties, Kumwembe built 
a house for his prospective bride on land provided by Gombera. 
Subsequently, however, Gombera prevented the wedding from tak­
ing place. Kumwembe thereupon instituted proceedings in an 
African court to recover sundry expenses incurred in contempla­
tion of the marriage, including compensation in respect of the 
house. Eventually, the case came in appeal before a Provincial 
Commissioner. Details of the judgements are not particularly 
pertinent to the present discussion. On the final appeal to 
the High Court, it was alleged that the parties had intended to 
solemnise their marriage under the Native Marriage (Christian 
Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, in addition to customary 
law.
A point of law was raised to the effect that the African 
court of first instance had no jurisdiction to try the case be­
cause it was a case "in connexion with marriage other than a 
marriage contracted under or in accordance with Mohammedan or 
Native Law or Custom"; that Section 11 of the African Courts 
Ordinance had expressly stated that no African court should
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have jurisdiction to try such a case. No attempt will be made 
here to unravel the numerous legal points raised by this sub­
mission. It is sufficient to relate that the High Court re­
jected the submission on the basis of what in our view was gen­
erally a correct interpretation of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordi­
nance. Commenting on the Section, Spencer-Wilkinson stated:
The proviso to this Section is a very wide one and ap­
pears to provide that the ceremony of marriage conducted 
as between two Africans shall of itself have no legal 
consequences of any kind. I read this as meaning that 
the marriage in such a case is completed by the carry­
ing out of whatever is necessary to be carried out accord­
ing to native law or custom, and that the /religious7 
ceremony is merely an additional matter which enables the 
marriage to be registered under the Ordinance instead of 
Being registered with the Native Authority or otherwise.28
With regard to the relevant question before the court, the 
above view of Section 3 is unimpeachable. The 1923 Ordinance 
was not intended to confer any special status on marriages sol­
emnised in accordance with its provisions. To argue that Afri­
can courts had no jurisdiction over these marriages - an argu­
ment frequently encountered throughout the history of this 
29statute - was to render meaningless the whole of the proviso 
to Section 3. What presently requires detailed comment is the 
implication of the underlined part of the above quotation. The 
suggestion here clearly seems to be that the 1923 Ordinance pro 
vided an alternative mechanism for effecting the registration 
of customary-law marriage to that provided under Native Author­
ity legislation. Registration under Native Authority Rules was 
not without legal utility. A certificate of marriage resulting
from registration under these Rules served as prima facie evi-
30dence of the existence of a valid customary marriage. The
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suggestion that registration under the 1923 Ordinance could be 
substituted for that under Native Authority Rules carried the 
implication that the former could similarly be utilised as evi­
dence of the existence of a valid customary marriage.
Before considering the immediate issue regarding the re­
lationship between registration under the 1923 Ordinance and 
that under Native Authority schemes, it may be useful to recapi­
tulate the background to the enactment of the 1923 Ordinance.
It is worth emphasising that the issues leading to the enactment 
of this Ordinance focussed on the conflict between missionary 
interests and existing Government legislation on marriage which
consisted of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and the Christian
31Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912. The issues had little or 
nothing to do with the development or improvement of indigenous 
customary marriage law, even for Christian Africans. The in­
clusion of clauses providing for the registration of marriage 
in the 1923 Ordinance was not motivated by any desire to alter 
or improve the means of proving the existence of marriage under 
customary law. The question whether registration under the Or­
dinance could be so utilised was never considered.
It will also be recalled that of the two bills proposed at 
the Blantyre conference of 1920, the one which was closer to 
the provisions of the 1923 Ordinance, "Bill A", did not contain 
any provision for registration. Such provision had been deemed 
as unnecessary, since there was to be no legal difference be­
tween marriage solemnised under the anticipated Ordinance and
32marriage contracted purely under customary law. It was the
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unsuccessful bill, "Bill B", which had purported to provide for 
some form of registration, the assumption being that marriage 
under the anticipated law would have certain special consequen­
ces. The principle of monogamy and the restricted grounds for 
divorce, which were to characterise marriage under the law of 
"Bill B" made registration imperative, because it would be neces 
sary to distinguish these marriages from marriages contracted 
under customary law. As already noted, it was at the behest of 
the Colonial Office that clauses providing for registration
were incorporated in what in essence was "Bill A" of the Blan-
33tyre conference.
A Colonial Office memorandum on the subject tends only to 
confirm the absence of any intention behind the proposal for 
registration to provide the parties solemnising marriage under 
the proposed law with any special facility that would obviate 
the need, for example, to have such marriage registered under 
Native Authority schemes. Commenting on the argument offered 
for the absence of any provision for registration under "Bill A", 
the memorandum stated:
But whatever the logic of this reasoning, I cannot believe 
that it is sound to give up the registration of marriages 
which are celebrated in accordance with Christian Rites.
For statistical purpose, if no other, such registration 
seems to be desirable and I should prefer to retain the 
existing arrangements /*i.e. under the 1912 Ordinance^, 
which cannot in effect be very burdensome to those who have 
to carry them out. Moreover, someday even if native Chris­
tian marriages were now introduced which had no legal con­
sequences, the time might come when it would be desired to 
revise this policy, and presumably it would be necessary 
then to have a record of the marriages.34
As already noted, the 1923 Ordinance was viewed by many of 
the participants in its enactment as a temporary measure, while
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the search continued for a more satisfactory formula. It was 
mainly, if not solely, in anticipation of possible future chan­
ges in the law that it had been deemed necessary to make some 
provision for registration in the 1923 Ordinance. The provi­
sion, as seems clear from the above quotation, had not been 
viewed as having any immediate utility. It is normal for instru­
ments providing for registration to state expressly that a cer­
tificate of marriage resulting from the registration would serve
35as prima facie evidence of marriage. No such provision was 
made in the 1923 Ordinance.
Further, and perhaps more decisively, must be the consider­
ation that the 1923 Ordinance did not place any obligation on 
the officiating Minister to ascertain whether or not a contract 
of marriage under customary law in fact existed before perform­
ing the religious ceremony. True, in practice, particularly as 
more and more Africans began to assume responsible positions in 
missionary institutions, clergymen would normally ascertain 
whether or not the necessary customary-law formalities had been 
concluded before solemnising marriage under the Ordinance. Ne­
vertheless, a ceremony of marriage under the Ordinance was pos­
sible without the parties first fulfilling the relevant custom-
q f.
ary-law formalities. It is clear that in such a case the par­
ties to the ceremony could not legally be considered as husband
q 7
and wife. The existence of a customary-law marriage could not 
be inferred merely from the existence of the religious ceremony 
under the Ordinance. To do so would amount to an "alteration" 
of the status of the parties under customary law, which would be 
that of an unmarried couple. Such an "alteration" would of
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course constitute a contravention of the express fiat of Section 
3 of the Ordinance. It follows that where the existence of a 
customary marriage was at issue proof of a ceremony of marriage 
under the 1923 Ordinance was irrelevant.
The view expressed above was, for example, implicitly en­
dorsed in the High Court judgement of Kandoje v. Mtengerenji 
38(1966). In this case, which is considered more fully under
39the subject of monogamy, it was held that a couple who had 
gone through a ceremony of marriage under the 1923 Ordinance 
were bound by a contract of marriage under customary law. This 
was of course an obvious inference from the words of Section 3. 
What is important is that the existence of the customary-law 
contract was not established on the basis of the religious cere­
mony. The court had to base its finding as to the existence of 
the customary marriage on the husband's averment and the wife's 
concession that there had been a meeting of the traditional ad­
vocates before the Christian ceremony.^
4. The Application of the Native Authority Rules to Marriages
Under the 1923 Ordinance
The dominant view among officials involved in the framing 
of Native Authority Rules for the registration of marriage was 
in favour of extending the application of these Rules to mar­
riage solemnised under the 1923 Ordinance.
Initially, Native Authorities had been supplied with model 
Rules in which the phrase "non-Christian marriage" had been used 
to define marriages capable of registration by the Authorities.^* 
This phrase was liable to cause some confusion, for the converse
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phrase, "Christian marriage", had no definite legal meaning.
The phrase "Christian marriage" was sometimes used to describe
what Lord Penzance had characterised as "marriage ... in Christ- 
42endom", that is, traditional Western monogamous marriage, ir­
respective of whether or not such marriage had been solemnised 
in accordance with Christian rites or whether or not the parties 
thereto professed the Christian religion. In Nyasaland, "Chris­
tian marriage" could, according to this usage, simply have meant 
marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, 1902; or under the (re­
pealed) Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912. The phrase 
"non-Christian marriage" could have been construed as including 
marriage under the 1923 Ordinance. However, the phrase "Chris­
tian marriage" was in Nyasaland also used to describe what in 
reality was a customary marriage, but to which a Christian cere­
mony of marriage had been added. The phrase "non-Christian mar­
riage" used in the Native Authority Rules could thus have been 
read as excluding marriage under the 1923 Ordinance. The latter 
seems to be the way the phrase was subsequently understood.
This was shown most clearly by the fact that those who advocated 
the application of Native Authority Registration to marriage 
under the 1923 Ordinance always felt the need to substitute a 
different phrase for "non-Christian marriage".
One example of such substitution was made in Ncheu District 
by Native Authority Gomani. In 1935 Gomani had passed registra­
tion Rules in which the phrase "non-Christian marriage" had been
/ *5
used. Gomani had no intention of excluding Christians from 
Native Authority registration of marriage. In this, he had the 
full support of the District Commissioner in Ncheu. As a result,
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a new set of Rules which contained the phrase "native marriage" 
instead of "non-Christian marriage" was proposed. Explaining 
the need for the change to the Provincial Commissioner,^ the 
District Commissioner for Ncheu District observed that the earl­
ier phrase had seemed to exclude marriage under the 1923 Ordi­
nance from Native Authority registration. He went on:
The intention is, I think, that such registration should 
be in respect of what may be termed the native "civil" 
ceremony, through which the majority of natives go even 
if married according to Christian rites.45
Similarly, the phrase "native marriage" was substituted for 
"non-Christian marriage" in the Rules passed by Native Author­
ity M'Mbelwa Jere of Mzimba District in 1937.^ The intention 
was the same as that of Gomani, namely, to extend Native Author 
ity registration to marriages solemnised under the 1923 Ordi­
nance. To the same effect, the Atonga Tribal Council, compris­
ing Native Authorities Kabunduli, Mbwana and Boghoyo in what 
was then known as Chintheche District, rephrased their Rules of 
registration in 1943. The District Commissioner in Chintheche 
recommended the change in the following words:
Marriages in the areas in question ... have hitherto been 
registered under the Registration of Non-Christian Mar­
riage Rules which are now in force. In practice, however,
I find that all marriages, whether of Christians or other­
wise, have been registered under the present rules and it 
is considered desirable, in order to regularize the posi­
tion and to obviate the necessity for invidious distinctions 
which would be entailed by the correct application of the 
present rules, that the latter should be repealed.47
On its part the -central government not only approved these chan­
ges, but also issued a new model of Rules in 1939 which reflec­
ted the desire to include marriages celebrated according to the
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1923 Ordinance under Native Authority registration.^® The 
phrase "non-Christian marriage" was furthermore, discarded in 
the model Rules providing for compulsory registration issued in 
1946.49
The legal consideration for wishing to extend Native Auth­
ority registration to marriage under the 1923 Ordinance was 
clear. Registration under the 1923 Ordinance had no legal ef­
fect. A certificate of marriage issued under the Ordinance was 
of no legal utility whatsoever. Thus if Africans "married" 
under the Ordinance wished to have documentary evidence of the 
existence of valid marriages, they could only obtain such evi­
dence by registering their marriages with the Native Authorit­
ies. It is important to emphasise that what the Native Authori­
ties purported to register was not the religious ceremony, but 
the customary-law contract which preceded such religious cere­
mony. The point was well put by a Provincial Commissioner in 
1937 in reply to a query from the District Commissioner in 
Nkhota-Kota. In a letter dated 26th August, 1937, the District 
Commissioner had put the following question to the Provincial 
Commissioner:
Incidentally, I would like your ruling as to whether a 
Native Court should accept a Christian Native Marriage 
(1923 Ordinance) 'Certificate' as proof of marriage. It 
would seem that a Parson's "certificate" has no legal 
standing in a Native Court and consequently that Chris­
tians will also be required to register their marriages 
in the Native Court (sic).50
The Provincial Commissioner, after consulting the Attorney- 
General, replied in the following terms:
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I presume that the reference is to marriages celebrated 
under Cap. 82. Such marriages are not "legal" marriages 
(Section 3) and therefore in my opinion Certificates 
under Cap. 82 cannot be accepted by a court nor can such 
marriages be registered ... under the proposed rules.
It is however probable that in such cases there is a 
"civil" ceremony in the village of such a nature as to 
bring them within the scope of the rules.51
E.C. Barnes, Senior Provincial Commissioner in 1952, and 
an influential figure in the history of marriage legislation 
in Nyasaland, defined the relationship between Native Authority 
registration and marriage under the 1923 Ordinance in almost 
the same terms. In a letter to the Zomba District Commissioner, 
dated 22nd August, 1952 he wrote:
You should remember that marriages celebrated in church 
under the 1923 Ordinance have no legal consequence, as 
it is expressly stated in that Ordinance. For that rea­
son, no court can take cognizance of any such marriage, 
because, at law, there is no valid marriage. However, 
in most cases there is also a marriage by Native Law and 
Custom, and where there is such a marriage it should be 
registered by the Native Authority, for that marriage is 
a valid marriage. To sum up, it is immaterial whether a 
marriage ceremony has been performed in church or not. 
What is material is whether there is a valid marriage by 
Native Law and Custom.52
Despite such certainty as to the law, the Government was
not dogmatic on the issue. For example, it accepted the wishes
of those Native Authorities who had decided to exclude marriage
under the 1923 Ordinance from their registration. The Rules
for compulsory registration passed by Native Authorities Kyungu
and Mwafulirwa in 1947, for example, departed from the model
issued by the Chief Secretary by expressly exempting marriage
53under the 1923 Ordinance from compulsory registration. The 
reluctance on the part of the Government to take a definitive 
stand on this question perhaps resulted from the desire to avoid
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direct confrontation between the Government and the missionar­
ies .
Records of missionary reaction to the specific question 
of the extension of Native Authority registration to marriage 
under the 1923 Ordinance are scanty. Even with such dearth of 
information, however, it is clear that the attitude of most mis­
sionaries to Native Authority registration was at best one of 
grudging tolerance and at worst one of open hostility. This is 
evident, for example, from a statement by one senior official 
who, arguing against the introduction of compulsory registra­
tion in 1937, cited as one of the complications:
...the mission difficulty regarding Christian marriages 
which crops up from time to time and has not yet been 
settled. I apprehend that while the missions tolerate 
voluntary registration they would object to compulsion.54
On the face of it missionary objections to Native Author­
ity registration seemed to focus on the question of fees. For 
example, it was alleged by some missionaries in Ncheu District 
that Africans celebrating marriage under the 1923 Ordinance 
were refusing to pay the fee charged by the church on the ground 
that they (the Africans) were already paying registration fees 
to the Native Authority. The Rev. S.J. Jordan of the Zambezi 
Industrial Mission, for instance, complained to Native Authority 
Gomani in the following terms:
....I heard you were trying to get the Christian people 
when wanting to marry to pay two taxes. A chicken to the 
village Headman55 and one shilling to yourself. The heath­
en are expected to pay only these two taxes whereas the 
Christians must pay to the church fas well7.
I was very surprised to hear of this wish of yours 
and I hope you will realize that this is a step backwards
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for your country. Even now it is difficult to get Chris­
tian marriages - with your wishes fulfilled there will 
hardly be even one.56
However, missionary hostility towards the application of 
Native Authority Rules to marriage under the 1923 Ordinance 
went beyond the question of fees. Beneath the squabbles about 
fees was a more fundamental question regarding the status of 
African Christian marriage. The question here was not simply 
one of how Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance was to be interpre­
ted. The missionaries were unlikely to approach the question 
of Native Authority registration in isolation from their at­
tempts to have the 1923 Ordinance replaced by a more acceptable 
formula. The very introduction of the system of "indirect 
rule" through Native Authorities in 1933 heightened the desire 
on the part of a large section of the missionary establishment 
to have the 1923 Ordinance repealed.^ The implementation of 
the proposal to repeal the 1923 Ordinance, as already shown, 
would have had the effect of removing marriages of African 
Christians from the jurisdiction of Native Authorities. The 
fate of the 1923 Ordinance was the subject of discussion at the 
very time the Native Authorities were introducing their regis­
tration Rules. For the missionaries, the extension of Native 
Authority registration to Christian marriages represented the 
very problem they sought to remove.
5. The Impact of Registration Laws on Customary Marriage
The introduction of the laws providing for the registra­
tion of customary marriages has not had much formative impact 
on the development of African marriage practices. The contri­
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bution of the relevant legislation to the development of the 
law may be assessed in relation mainly to the formation and 
proof of marriage. Firstly, however, it is useful to consider 
the question of the actual utilisation of the law by the people 
contracting customary marriages.
a) The Resort to Registration Facilities 
It can be stated at the outset that the only form of re­
gistration of marriage to which Africans have resorted on a 
large scale is that instituted by the Native Marriage (Christian 
Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923. Thousands of marriages 
have been registered under this Ordinance/Act since its coming 
into force in 1923. Actual records have not been kept in any 
consistent or systematic manner. In 1934, for example, 3,017
marriages were registered under the Ordinance (compared to only
581 marriage registered by an African under the 1902 Ordinance).
In 1964 5,297 marriages were registered under the 1923 statute
59(compared to 18 marriages registered under the 1902 Act). In 
1970 8,550 were registered (compared to 96 registered under the 
1902 Act).60
In contrast, registration under Local Authority laws, which
cater for the majority of marriages contracted by Africans, has
not been utilised so extensively. Although there have been no
actual figures, it is clear that few people have taken interest
in registering their marriages under these laws. In 1947, for
example, the Colonial Annual Report noted that only about 1 to
33 out of 1,000 marriages contracted under customary law were
6 1
registered with the Native Authorities. The provisions imposing
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penalties for failure to register marriage remained a dead 
letter. The passage of time has not eroded the general apathy 
towards registration.
Illiteracy may be cited as a possible factor to the gen­
eral absence of interest in registration. Even in a literate 
society, however, the success of registration would have depen­
ded, in a great measure, on what people perceived to be the 
practical utility of such registration. In the past, only in 
relation to people travelling abroad, especially where husbands 
sought to be joined by their wives in their countries of employ­
ment, was registration seen as valuable. Today, it is mainly in 
urban areas that registration has remained popular. As will 
later be shown, however, registration in urban areas has often 
been used in a manner not originally intended under the relevant 
provisions. The resort to registration in urban areas has thus 
only tended to highlight what the relevant registration laws 
have actually failed to provide for.
It is not the actual notc(rial aspect of registration, but 
the Christian marriage ceremony itself, which accounts for the 
popularity of the 1923 legislation among Africans. African 
Christians are under a religious obligation to have their mar­
riages blessed in church. Willy-nilly, the church ceremonies
ft 9
have to be registered under the provisions of the 1923 statute. 
Even apart from the religious obligation, the Christian mar­
riage service has acquired the character of an imperative social 
convention in modern African communities. In the eyes of most 
people, even those who are only marginally "Christians", a
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customary marriage without a church blessing tends to lack in 
prestige. Denuded of many of the traditional ceremonial ac­
companiments, customary marriages have tended to gain much of 
their solemnity from such modern accompaniments as the church 
ceremony. Thus, it is not always entirely out of religious 
commitment that some people marry in church. This could also 
be true even in some Western European societies.
A familiar explanation for the popularity of the 1923 leg­
islation as opposed to the 1902 Act has been that Africans do 
not wish to be bound by the legal obligations engendered by a 
contract of marriage under the latter, especially with regard 
to succession, divorce and the adherence to monogamy. This ex­
planation can only be correct to a point. It fails to take into 
consideration the possibility that most people contract mar­
riages without any clear knowledge of the alternative system of 
marriage law available under the 1902 Act, let alone of the de­
tailed legal implications of the relevant provisions. Indeed, 
many of the people who have solemnised marriage under the 1923 
law, have done so under a genuine, though essentially erroneous, 
belief that they are contracting a binding monogamous marriage 
which can only be dissolved with the approval of the church.
The differences in legal consequences between the 1902 and 1923 
legislation are not usually so fully appreciated as to form the 
basis of decisions whether to register marriage under one or the 
other of the two instruments. A more relevant factor would seem 
to be the fact that few people, particularly in rural areas, are 
familiar with the procedure for registering marriage under the 
Marriage Act. Even among the middle-class, urban residents, the
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procedure for contracting marriage under the Marriage Act is 
not well-known.
b ) Registration and the Formation of Customary Marriages
Of the many problems relating to the adaptation of tradi­
tional customary marriage law to the conditions of modern life, 
the one mostly associated with the introduction of registration 
is the problem of marriage formalities.
As already observed, marriage under customary law is first 
and foremost conceived as a contract between the elders of the 
respective families of the parties, rather than between the par­
ties themselves. Although nowadays the agreement between the 
bride and the bridegroom may be a necessary preliminary, the 
actual marriage can only be validated by a contract between the 
elders. This is particularly the case in matrilineal societies, 
where marriage does not involve the payment of malobolo to the 
bride's people.
Thus, in Amani Ali v. Christina Mhango (1970),^ the High 
Court of Malawi upheld an appeal against the judgement of the 
Blantyre Traditional Court, "dissolving" a "marriage" between 
the appellant and the respondent, and ordering the appellant to 
pay £30 compensation to the appellant for breaking up the mar­
riage. The appellant and the respondent had met in the city of 
Blantyre where they started to live together as husband and 
wife. They never went through a ceremony of marriage. Four 
children were barn as a result of the association. One died, 
but three survived. After a period of six years, the wife 
filed a suit in the Blantyre Traditional Court, alleging that
423
she was not getting support from the appellant and that the 
latter had chased her from the "matrimonial’' home. On his part, 
the appellant alleged that the respondent had deserted him and 
stated that he no longer wanted her back in his house. The 
court proceeded to dissolve the "marriage" and to make the com­
pensation order without receiving any evidence as to the exis­
tence of marriage. This judgement was upheld by the Blantyre 
Traditional Court of Appeal.
On further appeal to the High Court, the question as to 
the existence of a marriage was raised. It was observed that 
in matrimonial cases, a court of law had to establish the exis 
tence of a marriage before proceeding to grant any relief. As 
to the existence of marriage in the particular case, Chatsika, 
J., observed as follows:
Marriage is a special type of contract which is governed 
by well established principles. It has been common ground 
in this case that the proposal for marriage was made by the 
appellant personally to the respondent. No other parties 
were involved, and the respondent went to live with the ap­
pellant. One of the essential formalities which constitutes 
a valid marriage in this country is the getting together of 
advocates from either party who meet to arrange the mar­
riage contract. It is not sufficient for the parties to 
marry merely to make verbal arrangements between themselves 
and regard their union as a marriage. The assessors have 
unanimously advised me that in their opinion no valid mar­
riage existed between the appellant and the respondent.
With respect, I agree with their advice and now find that 
no valid marriage was in existence.65
The National Traditional Appeal Court of Malawi has in recent
66
years passed many decisions to the same effect. Thus, even 
if, in the context of the general law, the parties who seek to 
get married are not minors, they can contract valid customary 
marriages only with the consent of their elders.
The fact that people have purported to contract marriage 
without consulting their parents, as in Ali v. Mhango, under­
lines the ascendancy of individualism and the breakdown of 
family authority. Needless to say, this phenomenon is more com­
mon in the urban centres, such as Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and 
Zomba, than in the rural areas, although the latter are by no 
means altogether exempted. In urban areas, the traditional re­
quirement that the arrangement of marriage should involve the 
parents of the parties can also be expensive, cumbersome or even 
impossible to fulfill. Marriages contracted in urban areas so 
often involve parties who not only belong to different customary- 
law systems, but also whose elder relatives reside in different 
and distant parts of the country. How, to take an extreme exam­
ple, does a customary marriage between a man and a woman who 
meet in Blantyre get arranged, where the man's elder relatives 
reside in Chitipa in the North and the woman's relatives reside 
hundreds of miles away in Nsanje in the South?
Apart from the difficulties of fulfilling the traditional 
requirements of marriage in distant urban centres, there is a 
more general, and perhaps more important, conceptual or ideolog­
ical question as to the suitability of emphasising the inter- 
parental as opposed to the inter-spousal agreement as the basis 
of legal validity in the formation of customary marriages. As 
must be evident from the discussions in Part I of the study, 
parties to customary marriages have tended to become less depen­
dant on the wider kin in their married lives. The superimposi- 
tion of the courts and other state structures over kinship and 
clan ties; the introduction of the money economy; improvements
425
in, and the introduction of new, communication systems; the in­
troduction of European forms of education: all these factors 
have combined to diminish the individual's reliance on tradi­
tional superiors and kinfolk. The availability of the state 
judiciary, for example, has enabled individuals to seek and ob­
tain legal remedies without or with minimal involvement of mem­
bers of the kin-group. Legal rights can be enforced and obliga­
tions discharged outside traditional structures. In the light 
of such realities, it may be argued that a shift in emphasis is 
necessary from inter-parental to inter-spousal agreement (or 
transaction) as a basis of the customary marriage contract.
The local authority registration laws in this country were 
not introduced with any design to modify customary marriage for­
malities. The type of registration envisaged under these laws 
could not properly be utilised to accommodate the new develop­
ments in African social life. Registration under local author­
ity laws was not analogous, for example, to registration under 
the Marriage Ordinance, 1902. In the case of the latter, regis­
tration and the execution of marriage formalities were one and 
the same process. In contrast, registration under local author­
ity laws was intended merely as an appendage to an already com­
pleted customary marriage. The formation of the customary mar­
riage and its registration were not intended to be simultaneous 
transactions. Registration had to follow all necessary arrange­
ments under customary law. Neither could registration alone 
constitute a, nor could the absence of registration vitiate an 
existing, valid customary marriage.
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In practice, however, there is a growing tendency in the 
urban centres to utilise local authority registration laws as 
though such laws provided for an alternative mechanism for con­
tracting customary marriage. Without any prior marriage ar­
rangement under customary law, the parties simply go to a District 
Council Office where registration takes place and a marriage cer­
tificate is issued. The question whether the parties have duly 
completed the marriage formalities under customary law does not 
seem to receive adequate treatment by the relevant officers.
In most cases, it suffices if the parties bring with them two 
people, each of whom is presented as a witness of either spouse. 
Often, the witnesses are friends, workmates or relatives of some 
sort - people not qualified to act as "sponsors" under strict 
traditional practice. As T.D. Thomson pointed out, under strict 
traditional law, the marriage sponsors or ankhoswe ...
are not merely casual witnesses to a ceremony but may be 
described as the trustees for the two parties.... They 
meet before the actual marriage and discuss all the neces­
sary arrangements, they are always charged with the preser­
vation of the marriage and with the settlement of any dis­
putes which may arise in connection with it.67
The witnesses under consideration are far removed from the tra­
ditional marriage sponsors as described above. Their function 
is more analogous to witnesses to a marriage under the Marriage 
Act, 1902, than to ankhoswe under customary law. Often, they 
are picked at short notice and their role as "marriage witnesses" 
is forgotten almost before the ink is dry on the marriage certi­
ficate. Nevertheless, it has been suggested by the National 
Traditional Appeal Court that unions arranged in this way could 
still constitute valid customary marriages.
\I
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In the controversial and rather unsatisfactory decision of
C. O
Justina Malenje Kakhobwe v. Samson M. Kakhobwe (1981), the 
National Traditional Appeal Court dealt with an appeal against 
a judgement of the Blantyre District Traditional Court. In the 
lower court the respondent (Samson Kakhobwe) had petitioned for 
dissolution of marriage on the ground that the respondent was 
"unco-operative" and "quarrelsome". The court dissolved the 
marriage, but on the basis of the petitioner's behaviour and 
refusal to live with the appellant. The petitioner was ordered 
to pay MK270 to the appellant and also to pay for the transpor­
tation of the appellant and the children of the marriage to the 
woman's home, which was in Lesotho. In her appeal against this 
judgement, the appellant contended that the (Blantyre) Tradition­
al Court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage and, in 
the alternative, that the compensation ordered was too small for 
her needs and those of the children.
For the purposes of the present discussion most of the de­
tails of the case can be omitted. However, mention should be 
made of the following facts. The appellant's original home was 
Lesotho, whereas the respondent was from Malawi. The two had 
met when the respondent was studying in Lesotho. The marriage 
was arranged in Malawi and the woman had to fly from Tanzania 
where she was a student. From the record of the court, it would 
seem that the marriage arrangements had consisted of three things. 
Firstly, there had been the registration of marriage with the 
Blantyre District Council. Secondly, the registration had been 
accompanied by the appointment of "ankhoswe" . Thirdly, it was 
alleged that the man had paid MK600 as malobolo. As regards the
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last item, the judgement leaves several questions unanswered.
It does not indicate the person to whom, and at what stage of 
the proceedings the malobolo had been paid. Furthermore, the 
court made no ruling as to what should be done with the malobolo 
after the divorce. Nevertheless, the allegation as to malobolo 
was critical to the appellant's contention that the Blantyre 
Traditional Court had no jurisdiction. The respondent's person­
al law in Malawi followed the matrilineal system where the pay­
ment of malobolo was not required. On the other hand, the 
woman's personal law in Lesotho followed the patrilineal system 
in which lobola was an essential element of marriage. The pay­
ment of malobolo in the particular case was a strong indication 
that the parties had sought to contract their marriage under
Sesotho law, which in Malawi was foreign law and perhaps subject
69to the jurisdiction of the High Court. The reasoning of the 
National Traditional Appeal Court in holding that the Blantyre 
District Traditional Court had jurisdiction over the case is 
not pertinent to the present discusion and therefore shall not 
be considered here. The same applies to the final judgement on 
the appeal.^
More pertinent to the present discussion is the issue re­
lating to the ankhoswe. The exact role played by the alleged 
ankhoswe in arranging this particular marriage is not known.
One may be justified in suspecting that they did nothing more 
than merely witness the registration at the District Council 
Office. That aside, however, the important thing in this case 
is that the nkhoswe representing the woman was none other than 
a relative of the man. Thus, even if the nkhoswe had been
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actively involved in the arrangement of the marriage, the re­
sulting marriage contract would not have exactly conformed to 
the classical definition of a customary marriage as a contract 
between two families. This choice of the woman's nkhoswe was 
necessitated by the fact that all the woman's relatives were in 
Lesotho. She had come to Malawi alone. In the view of the 
National Traditional Appeal Court, however, the fact that the 
woman was represented by a complete stranger did not vitiate 
the marriage. The court observed:
...at custom it was not unoften (sic?) that a man or a 
woman left his home for some far away land [andj while 
there he would decide to marry. It was not strictly re­
quired that the actual ankhoswe should be called. In 
such a case the one who intended to marry would ask the 
man in whose hands he was to stand for him in that mar­
riage. That marriage would still be valid at customary 
law. In the instant case there was a valid marriage be­
tween the appellant and the respondent at customary law.71
It is necessary to emphasise that no court, including the 
National Traditional Appeal Court, has ever held that mere reg­
istration under local authority schemes can constitute a valid 
customary marriage. However, the view expressed in the Kakhobwe 
case, as to which persons can act as marriage sponsors, in ef­
fect clears the way for people who seek to utilise such regis­
tration as an alternative form of contracting customary marriage 
to do so. For even while accepting that registration does not 
in itself constitute marriage, it can still be argued that the 
witnesses to such registration simultaneously fulfill the cus- 
tomary-law requirement of chinkhoswe. The fact that a person 
other than some particular elder relative of a party can act as 
a "marriage sponsor" or nkhoswe does blur the distinction (in 
terms of both legal character and function) between the tradi-
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tional ankhoswe and what Thomson characterised as "merely casu-
72al witnesses to a marriage ceremony".
The view that someone else can be substituted for the tra­
ditional nkhoswe in formalising a customary marriage undoubted­
ly constitutes an attempt to adapt customary law to modern con­
ditions of urban life. However, it would have been useful had 
the National Traditional Appeal Court clearly laid down the 
conditions upon which a "substitute" nkhoswe could be legally 
recognised. Can a party elect a "substitute" nkhoswe entirely 
on his or her own? Or is it necessary for the parents, however 
far they may be, to give some consent or direction as to the 
choice? What degree of hardship in securing the presence of 
the "real" nkhoswe is necessary to justify the use of a "substi­
tute" nkhoswe? How much involved in the marriage arrangements 
should a person be in order to be considered as a valid nkhoswe 
or "sponsor"?
Supplying definitive answers to the above questions is 
perhaps more properly the task of the legislature than the 
courts. The phenomenon of urban customary marriages clearly 
underlines the inadequacy of traditional princples of customary 
law in a society that is becoming increasingly complex. As must 
be clear from the foregoing discussion, the existing schemes for 
the registration of customary marriages have not altered the 
substantive requirements of customary law. Cases like Kakhobwe 
v. Kakhobwe do however, point to the need for some revision of 
the existing registration laws, so that these laws could actual­
ly provide for alternative ways of contracting customary mar­
riages. As far as the validation of marriages is concerned,
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there is perhaps a need to replace family-orientated with state- 
orientated mechanisms. The latter would not only provide a 
convenient facility for the parties involved, but would also 
establish a degree of public control over the formation of cus­
tomary marriages, in cases where traditional social structures 
are weak.
c ) Registration and Proof of Marriage Under Customary Law
The most readily acknowledged effect of registration of 
customary marriage is that it simplifies or facilitates proof 
of marriage. At least in theory, a certificate of marriage con­
stitutes an important improvement upon traditional methods of 
proof, which invariably involve the calling of actual witnesses 
to tender oral evidence as to the existence of a valid marriage.
The exact nature of the information required to prove the 
existence of marriage under customary law varies from community 
to community. In general, as already noted, it is the agreement 
between the elder relatives of the parties that constitutes mar­
riage. However, each group follows its own procedures in effect­
ing such an agreement and, indeed, variations may exist even 
within one group. To generalise, a distinction may be drawn be­
tween those groups which follow the matrilineal system and those 
which follow the patrilineal system. At least for marriage pur­
poses, all the districts in the Northern Region today follow the 
patrilineal system. All districts in the Southern and Central 
Regions, again at least for marriage purposes, follow the matri­
lineal system. There are exceptions to this provided by some 
sections of Ngoni communities, for example, in Ncheu, Dowa,
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Nchisi and Dedza Districts, and a section of the Senas in 
Nsanje District. These tend to follow patrilineal practices, 
albeit in a diluted form.
The main characteristic of marriage under the patrilineal
systems is that it involves the making of substantial payments
by the man's side to the woman's side. Upon marriage, the woman
normally leaves her people to reside among the husband's people.
On the other hand, marriage under the matrilineal systems does
not involve any payments of legal consequence. Instead, the
man is required to live with the wife's people during the period
of coverture. These are the broad distinctions between the two
sets of systems, which, in reality, constitute a continuum con-
73taining intricate variations. In the local parlance, the 
terms chikamwini and lobola are usually employed to describe 
the matrilineal and patrilineal systems respectively.
As far as marriage under the chikamwini system is concerned, 
evidence that there are ankhoswe on both sides (or that there 
has been chinkhoswe)^  is all the courts ask for in order to 
establish the existence of marriage.^ The courts never go into
C.
such details as to whether the woman was actually handed over to 
the man for cohabitation;^ or whether one or the other of any 
particular ceremonial was followed.^ It would seem that any 
such ceremonials are not absolutely necessary to the creation of 
a valid marriage. This aspect of customary marriage may be an 
important factor in developments such as those detailed above in 
relation to the use of "substitute" nkhoswes in marriages contracted 
in urban communities.
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On the other hand, in determining whether marriage under 
the lobola system exists, the courts have tended to put empha­
sis on the payment of malobolo. Indeed, the National Tradition­
al Appeal Court seems to hold that marriage under the lobola 
system can only be fully validated by the actual payment of malo­
bolo or part thereof. This principle was clearly stated, for
78example, in Martin Yohane v. Kepson Ntondo (1979). In this 
case, the respondent's daughter had been betrothed to the appel­
lant. The latter had paid what was described as a "betrothal 
fee". At the time, the girl in question was still very young.
It was agreed between the respondent and the appellant that 
upon the girl reaching the age of maturity, she would commence 
cohabitation with the latter. This part of the agreement had 
been fulfilled. However, there had been a further agreement to 
the effect that, after the birth of three children, the appel­
lant would pay malobolo worth MK30. Although three children 
were born, the appellant failed to pay the MK30, whereupon the 
respondent "repossessed" his daughter and "gave" her to another 
man. The appellant had commenced the proceedings to gain cus­
tody of the children and for the return of the "betrothal fee". 
The lower court awarded the "betrothal fee" to the appellant 
but refused to give him custody of the children unless he could 
pay MK66. The decision must have been based on the assumption 
that a valid marriage had been created, albeit imperfectly, 
otherwise the order as to custody could be construed as an im­
plicit endorsement by the court of a "child-sale". On appeal 
to the National Traditional Appeal Court, however, it was held 
that:
In those areas where the payment of lobola is the pre­
requisite for the contraction (sic) of a valid marriage, 
there can be no marriage until lobola, or part thereof 
has been paid.... This court and other Traditional Courts 
does not (sic) and will not recognise a union with cohabi­
tation of any duration as marriage.79
This principle has been reiterated in many other decisions
80of the court. Clearly, the court does not seem to accept
81that a mere agreement concerning malobolo is enough. This is 
rather unfortunate. Where there is an agreement as to malobolo 
and the woman has actually been handed over to the man for co­
habitation, there seems to be little point in insisting that no 
marriage exists. Of course, in certain particular cases, fail­
ure to pay the malobolo after they have been announced may sig­
nify an unwillingness to formalise the marriage. It is submit­
ted that whether such is the case in any given instance must be 
ascertained as a question of fact and not predetermined as a 
matter of legal principle. It is submitted that mere failure 
to pay an already agreed amount of malobolo should only give 
rise to a right of action in favour of the woman's people and 
not vitiate the marriage contract. Indeed, the lower court in 
Yohane v. Ntondo (above) followed what would seem to be a prin­
ciple of more respectable antiquity than the absolute rule of 
"no-lobola-no-marriage".
Where all proper arrangements had been made and the woman 
had been handed over to the man, but the latter had failed to 
pay the malobolo, it was not usual to hold that there was no 
marriage. The courts used to hold merely that there was an 
"imperfect" marriage which could be perfected by the man or his 
relatives by effecting the payment, even upon divorce or death
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8 2of either of the parties. The marriage was "imperfect" only 
in the sense that the man forfeited certain rights that would 
normally have accrued to him, for example, the rights with re­
gard to children. He could still proceed against a third party 
who committed adultery with his wife. Indeed, even with regard 
to such rights as those concerning children, "suspension" rather 
than absolute "forfeiture" was the idea.
There is an illuminating case on the point decided by the
court of Native Authority M'Mbelwa II, in 1934. The facts of
83the case, Simon Chavula v. Kamzati Nyirenda (1934), were as 
follows:
John Nyirenda (deceased) was the brother of the defendant 
Kamzati Nyirenda. John had married the sister of Simon 
Chavula, the plaintiff. Four children, all girls, were 
born of the marriage. John's wife had died shortly after 
the birth of the fourth girl. Following his wife's death, 
John had sent all the children of the marriage to their 
maternal grandparents - the plaintiff's natural parents. 
Later, John himself had died without having paid any malo­
bolo for his wife. The children had continued to stay 
with the Chavulas. When the first of the daughters got 
married, Chavula's father received four cows as malobolo 
for her, which he kept. On the marriage of the second 
daughter three cows were received as malobolo. Acting as 
John's successor, Kamzati collected two of the three cows 
and left one for the Chavulas.
Simon Chavula, who during the two marriages had been away from 
Nyasaland, instituted the proceedings to regain the two cows 
taken by Kamzati. He also sought the court's declaration to 
the effect that he should be entitled to any subsequent payments 
made on the marriages of the other two daughters. Chavula's 
case was that John had not paid any malobolo for his sister and 
that, since her death, the children had been cared for entirely 
by the Chavulas without any help from the Nyirendas. The
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defendant's case was that although his brother had failed to
pay malobolo, the omission had been rectified when the first
of John's daughters got married and the Chavulas had been al-
84lowed to retain the malobolo paid for her. In other words, 
the daughter's malobolo had cancelled out the debt owed by her 
father to her maternal grandfather. After the marriage, all 
the rights that may have been denied to the Nyirendas had been 
restored to them. Thus, the defendant was entitled, not only 
to the malobolo of the second daughter, but also to those of 
the remaining two daughters.
The Native Authority court decided in favour of the defen­
dant as regards both the malobolo on the second daughter and 
any subsequent malobolo on the marriages of the other two
t i
daughters. The j? ) s  appeal to the District Commissioner 
was emphatically dismissed. The District Commissioner (S.J. 
Oliver) stated:
....The court questioned the elders at the hearing as to 
the Angoni law and custom on this matter, and found that 
a father is entitled to the dowry of his children whether 
he brought them up in their Youth or not, since they are 
his flesh and blood. In this case Kamzati did not claim 
dowry for the first daughter as his brother John had not 
paid dowry on his wife. But when the second daughter mar­
ried he claimed two of the three cows paid for her dowry, 
to which according to Angoni custom he is entitled. He is 
also entitled to any further dowry which may be paid on 
the two remaining daughters.S3
It is useful to note that the use made of the malobolo paid on 
the first daughter was only possible on the assumption that 
John was the legal father of the children, and hence that the 
marriage between John and the plaintiff's sister had been a 
valid one. It is interesting in this case that the father of
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the plaintiff had allowed the defendant to take the malobolo of 
the second daughter. It was only upon the plaintiff's return 
from abroad that the dispute started.
This case would seem to be a particularly strong one on 
the relevant point of law. On pure grounds of conscience, the 
defendant's case was a very weak one. Indeed, on those grounds, 
he hardly had any case. The Nyirendas had all but abandoned 
their daughters. They only appeared to remember their responsi­
bility to the daughters when it came to the collection of malo­
bolo . Furthermore, if it is taken into account that Kamzati was 
not the natural father of the children, the law would seem to 
have been particularly strong in his favour. The relevant law, 
if applied in its full force, is clearly unsatisfactory as the 
Kamzati case seems to demonstrate. It is nevertheless submitted 
that the approach advocated by the National Traditional Appeal 
Court, whereby it is insisted that a marriage is vitiated unless 
the malobolo or part thereof have actually been paid, is not the 
best way of reforming the law. Moreover, there are some parents 
who altogether waive the payment of malobolo on their daughters'
marriages. Even the National Traditional Appeal Court would in
86such cases be prepared to accept that valid marriages exist.
The important point for the purposes of the present discus­
sion is that proving the existence of marriage under whatever 
system of customary law may be a cumbersome process. Registra­
tion offers certain advantages. A certificate of marriage can 
be carried about easily and at no expense. Its evidential value 
is not diminished with the passage of time. Unlike human beings,
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if lost or destroyed, a certificate can be replaced. Its use 
can help to avoid the waste of time involved in hearing oral 
evidence. The circumstances of marriage, for example, with 
respect to the amount of malobolo paid or agreed upon, can eas­
ily be forgotten or distorted for the sake of a particular dis­
pute at hand. Indeed, where malobolo payments are made in in­
stalments over a long period of time, there may be different 
witnesses to each instalment. With registration, each payment 
can be recorded on a certificate and notorised.
It has to be noted, however, that under strict traditional
practice, the presence of the elders or other members of the
families of the parties to a matrimonial dispute is required,
irrespective of whether or not the validity of marriage is at
issue. Such third parties are required to take an active or
8 7even the main part in the proceedings. A court of law can 
correctly refuse to entertain a petition if, for example, the 
marriage "sponsors" of the parties are not present. Therefore, 
even if a party is in possession of a marriage certificate, he 
or she may still have to be accompanied by third parties when 
attending matrimonial judicial proceedings. Indeed, perhaps 
in this limited respect, the introduction of registration laws 
may be said to have underlined the conceptual transformation 
taking place in customary marriage. All registration schemes 
introduced by the local authorities in this country have either 
expressly or implicitly provided for the acceptance of a mar­
riage certificate by a court of law as prima facie evidence of 
the existence of a valid marriage. These provisions seem to re­
flect a social and legal setting in which marriage or disputes
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about marriage are first and foremost a matter for the husband 
and the wife and not between wider social units.
In practice the availability of registration schemes has 
made little difference. Two factors have accounted for this. 
Firstly, as already observed, the majority of marriages con­
tracted by Africans under customary law are not registered. So, 
even where the existence of marriage is disputed the parties
have had to do with the traditional procedures of proof. Second-
88ly, the principle, stated by Chatsika, J., in Ali v. Mhango, 
that in matrimonial cases, the first consideration by the courts 
must be to establish the existence of a marriage has rarely been 
followed. The practice of first establishing the existence of a 
marriage before attending to the substantive issues of a dispute 
reflects the procedures of the imported English law and has un­
derstandably tended to be confined to the High Court. In the 
majority of cases decided by "African" courts, the validity of 
marriage is assumed unless one of the parties disputes it.
6. A General Comment
Neither the Native Authority Rules providing for the regis­
tration of customary marriages nor the 1923 Ordinance, which 
also in effect made provision for the registration of customary 
marriages, had been introduced with any intention to alter the 
principles of customary law. The Native Authority Rules had 
been introduced, primarily, it would seem, as one of the numer­
ous methods of raising Native Authority revenue. Their only 
real utility has been the furnishing of ready documentary evi­
dence of marriage, especially for people involved in travel or
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employment. In urban centres, some people have resorted to the 
relevant registration laws as an alternative way of contracting 
customary marriages. This is an improper use of the law and 
only serves to underline the limited scope of the registration 
system fostered. The 1923 Ordinance, as already discussed in 
the preceding chapter, had been enacted solely to facilitate 
the celebration of African Christian marriages. The Ordinance 
had nothing to do with the improvement of African customary law. 
Registration under this statute entails no legal consequences 
whatever. It is not surprising therefore that, in real terms, 
the introduction of the laws providing for the registration of 
customary marriages has had little formative impact on African 
marriage law and practice.
However, there was perhaps some sentimental, or even his­
torical, significance to the introduction of Native Authority 
Rules providing for the registration of customary marriages.
The Rules can be seen as the beginning of a more complete and
formal recognition of African customary marriages within the
8 9colonial legal system. Under the British Central Africa 
Order-in-Council, 1902, the institution of customary marriage 
was recognised only obliquely, as part of the recognition given 
to the application of customary law in general. Customary mar­
riages were given more direct statutory recognition under the 
Marriage Ordinance, 1902. As already noted, however, there was 
a sense in which the provisions of the Ordinance tended to be 
associated with the idea that the recognition of customary mar­
riage practices would be an interim measure - necessitated by 
the practical consideration that most Africans were not yet
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sufficiently "civilised" to comprehend the European system of 
marriage. Even when the 1923 Ordinance was being enacted, cus­
tomary marriages had never really been recognised as a permanent 
feature of the legal system.
The sanctioning of Rules providing for the registration of 
customary marriages, which took place under an administrative 
set-up fostered by the philosophy of indirect rule, appeared to 
accord the institution of customary marriage a more permanent 
and more respectable status within the legal system. The regis­
tration of customary marriages had the potential, not actually 
realised, to enhance the solemnity of customary marriages and to 
enable such marriages to command greater respect among Africans. 
This may indeed have contributed to the resentment of some of 
the missionaries against the relevant Native Authority laws.
To the missionaries, the registration of customary marriages may 
have been seen as a move to perpetuate an "uncivilised" form of 
marriage systems, instead of leaving them to die a natural
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NOTES
Chapter Seven
1. The relevant laws also deal with the registration of 
divorce.
2. Hitherto, the chiefs or "Principal Headmen" had been 
used only administratively.
3. See e.g. Rules passed by NA M'Mbelwa in Mzimba Dis­
trict, in 1938, MNA NN1/21/16.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AFRICAN MARRIAGES AND THE QUESTION OF MONOGAMY
1. Introduction
The superimposition of rules of monogamy upon indigenous sys­
tems of marriage constitutes one of the most important features 
in the development of the law of marriage in Malawi. As al­
ready noted, in the traditional African societies, the ability 
of any man to marry more than one wife was not limited by any 
legal, social or moral principle. How this position has been 
affected by the general process of social change has already 
been considered.^ The main aim of this chapter is to discuss 
how, and to what extent, the traditional position has been af­
fected by colonial marriage laws and policy.
The notion of monogamy as the ideal form of marriage was 
first introduced into African communities through the agency 
of Christian missionaries. Monogamy was among the main insti­
tutions of Western Christianity which the missionaries impressed 
upon those Africans towards whom their evangelical and "civilis- 
ing" activities were directed. The view that polygyny is in­
compatible with both Christianity and civilised standards of 
life in general was almost a universal one among Christian mis­
sions in Africa. The differences and controversies which arose 
amongst the missions or missionaries related almost entirely to 
the question of what methods should be adopted or supported in 
the implementation of this belief.^
One aspect of this question concerned policies regarding 
the admission of polygynists or their spouses to church member­
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ship. This was largely a purely ecclesiastical matter, though, 
from the missionary viewpoint, the most important one. With 
the introduction of secular legislation, the missionaries were 
presented with a new set of problems. Should secular law be 
utilised to reinforce the Christian teaching against polygyny? 
Should secular law attach any significance to the religious 
view of a marriage by Christian rites as a monogamous one? As 
already shown, these latter questions provided one of the cen­
tral issues surrounding the enactment of the Native Marriage 
(Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923. The questions 
continued to form a central issue in the subsequent history of 
this Ordinance.
It was through the British Central Africa Marriage Ordi­
nance, 1902, that monogamy as a legal institution was first 
introduced among the African population. One important aspect 
of this Ordinance was the provision of legal penalties against 
those who violated the principles of monogamy as defined in 
the Ordinance. The enforcement of these provisions against 
members of the African population was, and continues to be a 
focus of discussion regarding the operation of the relevant 
statute. Why were these provisions included in the Ordinance, 
and what has been the basis of official attitude towards their 
enforcement? Did the colonial administration and the mission-
4
aries seek to work hand in hand to eradicate polygyny?
As must be clear from the discussion in one of the previ­
ous chapters,^ the colonial administration never actively 
worked towards the abolition of polygyny. However, this is not 
to deny that colonial rule engendered a less favourable climate
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for the practice of polygyny.^ It is clear both from the pro­
visions of the 1902 Ordinance and from official statements 
that colonial officials viewed the practice of polygyny as re­
presentative of inferior systems of marriage and as incompati­
ble with civilised ways of life.^ The officials assumed that, 
through the influence of Christianity and European civilisa­
tion, polygyny would eventually give way to monogamy. Polygy­
ny was nevertheless not regarded as being so repugnant or so 
objectionable as to warrant direct intervention by the Govern-
Q
ment.
The extension of the policy of non-interference with Afri­
can traditional social systems to the case of African Chris­
tians was an issue over which the Government had sharp disagree­
ments with some of the missions. It is clear that disagreements 
between administrative officials and the missionaries seldom 
reflected any real differences in the way they viewed such as­
pects of customary marriage as polygyny. Their differences 
arose largely from their different understanding of the nature 
and potential of African society and of the individual African. 
The attitudes of administrative officials towards African com­
munities not only le^td to disagreements with the missionaries, 
but also influenced official responses to the implementation of 
the penal provisions of the 1902 Ordinance in cases of viola­
tions by Africans. The widely-acknowledged ineffectiveness of 
these penal provisions cannot be explained simply in terms of 
the inherent incompatibility of African customs and the Western 
institution of monogamy. Attitudes of administrative officials 
also played a crucial role.
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It is possible, on the basis of official reluctance to en­
force the penal provisions, to underestimate the practical im­
pact of marriage under the Marriage Ordinance on the legal po­
sition of members of the indigenous African community. The 
principle of monogamy under the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, did 
not only involve criminal penalties, but it also made it legal­
ly impossible for those to whom the Ordinance applied to con­
tract more than one marriage at a time. Thus, it will be seen 
that the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance provided - as 
they still do - an effective avenue to monogamy as far as the 
rights of the parties vis-a-vis each other were concerned. It 
is also possible to exaggerate the resilience of traditional 
customary law if the institution of polygyny is seen merely in 
terms of the ability to contract valid marriages with more than 
one wife simultaneously. It is equally important to ask wheth­
er, and if so, to what extent, the law is changing and is begin­
ning to recognise and even safeguard the wishes of women who are
parties to potentially polygynous marriages. This question has
o
already been examined elsewhere in the study. In this chapter, 
it will only be examined in relation to the provisions of the 
existing statutes.
This chapter falls into three main parts. It begins with 
a brief general review of missionary policies and African re­
action with regard to the admission of polygynists into church 
membership. This provides the necessary background to the dis­
cussion of issues arising from the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, 
and the 1923 Ordinance; which respectively constitute the second 
and third parts of the chapter.
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2. Christianity, Monogamy and African Custom
The polygynous character of indigenous African customary 
marriage has, in the words of Arthur Phillips, constituted ’’the 
central point of conflict between Christian marriage and Afri­
can custom".^ It may be added that the question of polygyny 
has perhaps received more attention, and given rise to more 
rancour, in missionary circles than any other question arising 
from the encounter between Christianity and indigenous African 
cultures. Polygyny constituted one of the main obstacles to 
the spread of Christianity among African communities.
a) Church Law and Practice
Polygyny was an obstacle because the missionaries had made 
adherence to monogamy a sine quo non for the admission of Afri­
cans into full church membership. As Eugene Hillman put it, 
adherence to monogamy had been elevated in importance to the 
"level of ... faith itself" as a condition for the admission of 
Africans "into Christian fellowship".^  Practically all the 
missions refused to baptise any man who had more than one wife.
A polygynous convert seeking baptism was required to put away 
all but one wife. A baptised man who relapsed into polygyny 
was excommunicated. In many cases, wives of a polygynist were 
also denied baptism unless they renounced their marriages.
Furthermore, children of unbaptised parents were generally not
12eligible for baptism.
The requirement that a converted polygynist should give 
up his additional wives before he could be baptised was from the 
beginning one of the most controversial issues and one that has
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attracted much criticism. The application of the rule tended
to undermine another vital teaching of the church, namely the
13indissolubility of marriage. Of course, some missions (most 
notably the Catholics) regarded all subsequent marriages as 
void ab initio. On conversion only the first marriage was trea­
ted as v alid.^ Convenient as this view was for purposes of 
doctrinal consistency, it failed to meet another serious criti­
cism, namely that the application of the rule in question in­
volved much deprivation, suffering, betrayal and ill-feelings 
among those involved. As Hillman asks:
....What sort of public image of the Christian God is pro­
jected by this application of moral principles in societ­
ies which traditionally regard polygamy as a preferential 
form of marriage? Is the proclamation of the Gospel sup­
posed to threaten family stability, disrupt social coven­
ants, and even separate mothers from their children?
Where, in this approach is the patient pedagogy of Yahweh, 
the God of the Old Testament who is the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ?15
John Colenso, the celebrated first Anglican Bishop of 
Natal (South Africa), asked similar questions when he confronted 
the Anglican establishment over the issue in mid-19th century. 
While upholding the principle of monogamy as the highest form 
of Christian m a r r i a g e , h e  vigorously attacked the rule which 
called upon a converted polygynist to give up his additional 
wives. He observed:
...the practice of requiring a man, who may have more than 
one wife at the time of his conversion, to put away all 
but one before he can be received to Christian Baptism, is 
unwarranted by the Scriptures, unsanctioned by Apostolic 
example or authority, condemned by common reason and sense 
of right and altogether unjustifiable.17
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In an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the relevant 
rule, it was sometimes insisted that the converted polygynist 
should make provision for the discarded wives before he could 
be baptised. Even assuming that all that the discarded wife 
would have needed was provision for her material well-being, 
it is difficult to see how the missionaries expected this to be 
effectively done. It would have been possible in an industri­
alised and predominantly cash economy. In the peasant and sub­
sistence economies with which the missionaries were dealing, 
nearly all the services rendered by a man to his wives (and vice 
versa) were of a personal nature, including the preparation of 
gardens, the mending and repairing of houses, stores etc., pro­
tection from physical, as well as supernatural, dangers; advo­
cacy during litigation and so forth. It was clearly not very 
practical to expect a man to provide such services to women whom 
he had effectively divorced.
18Despite strong criticisms and African resistance, mission­
ary establishments in Africa have to this day not abandoned this 
approach to the question of converted polygynists. Very few, 
mostly smaller, missions have made some attempts to abandon this 
approach. The most notable examples are the Evangelical Luther­
an Church in Liberia and other smaller Protestant missions in 
1 9
West Africa.
The other difficult question for the missionaries concerned 
was the baptism of wives of a polygynist. The pressure to de­
part from the rule which denied baptism to wives of polygynists 
tended to be greater. This was largely because women were per­
ceived to be victims, rather than active perpetrators, of custom.
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Because of this, for example, some Anglican missions in West
Africa advocated the baptism of such women "if believed to be
20true converts". Their counterparts in Central Africa had 
some qualms about such baptisms. They either baptised such 
women grudgingly or refused to baptise them altogether. Thus, 
Bishop Smythies of the Universities Mission to Central Africa 
(Zanzibar) once wrote:
....We have baptised the wives of polygamists, but I have 
not felt satisfied that it was right without an effort ... 
to prevent what seems an invasion of the purity of the 
church.
He went on:
....I knew it was hard ... and against the customs of the 
country for a woman to take any action, but it was for 
the church to establish new customs ....21
Indeed, the Anglican church in Nyasaland has alternately rejec-
22ted and accepted the baptism of such women.
Although Christian missions in Africa were so ready to ex­
clude polygynists from church membership, it is to this day an 
open theological question whether or not monogamy is essential
23to Christianity or is merely an aspect of Western civilisation. 
There is a respectable school of thought which holds that mono­
gamy, together with many other notions about Christian marriage, 
are not dictated by the scriptures, but derive from Western 
cultural traditions (in particular Greco-Roman pagan customs).^ 
By insisting on the renunciation of polygyny as a condition for 
church membership, the missionaries were, according to this 
view, merely guilty of cultural arrogance, cultural imperialism,
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or European ethnocentricism. The missionaries, the argument 
goes, had assumed the universality of Western European cultur­
al values and that Christianity could exist only within the 
context of these values. Hillman, a strong proponent of this 
view, writes:
Missionaries, ill-acquainted with the findings of the 
social sciences and burdened with the cultural pride of 
their own Western world, have been notoriously obtuse 
in their approaches to the peoples of the larger world.
Many of them, so like the "Judaizers" in the very first 
period of the church's missionary history, have become 
Christianity's self-assured "Westernizers". For them, 
Euro-American social institutions and cultural values 
were inseparable from Christianity; so their evangelical 
mission was very much a matter of what Jomo Kenyatta re­
fers to, with appropriate scorn, as "civilizing and up­
lifting poor savages". Where indigenous social structures 
and cultural patterns were not condemned, they were gradu­
ally supplanted or merely ignored. This at any rate, was 
the usual procedure. For the usual type of missionary 
imagined that what was good for the peoples of the West 
would also be good for the peoples elsewhere; so these 
foreigners, as Stephen Neil says, "intended to reproduce 
as nearly as possible a replica of the society in which 
they grew up", and the missionaries' insistence on the 
monogamy rule is "the classic example of the perils in­
volved in the transference of the principles of one soci­
ety which has been developed on very different principles".25
The view that monogamy is not essential to Christianity is 
not very new. It has a respectable pedigree, traceable to the 
writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-430). It is based 
mainly on the examples of Old Testament patriarchs who practised 
polygyny and yet are said to have found favour with God, and on
the absence of direct condemnation of polygyny in the New Test-
2 6ament. This view never had much practical use in relation to 
the converts of the Western world. There had been some isola­
ted exceptions. The notorious matrimonial affairs of Henry VIII 
and Phillip of Hesse during the 16th Century in England and 
Germany, for example, became foci of theological debates about
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27the compatibility of polygyny with Christianity. There had 
also been actual attempts to practise polygyny at a collective 
scale. In the 16th Century, the Anabaptists of Munster in 
Germany, and three centuries later, the Mormons of Utah in the 
United States, embraced the above interpretation of the scrip­
tures and made the practice of polygyny an integral part of
their religion. The Miinsterite "revolution" was foiled by
28Catholic and Lutheran armed intervention. The upsurge of
polygyny among the Mormons was checked by threats of military
29intervention by Federal Forces.
In Africa, discussions regarding whether or not monogamy 
is essential to Christianity have constituted an integral part 
of attempts at the indigenisation of the Christian church.
Over the years, and with the growth in numbers of African < 
clergy, a new openness has emerged among church authorities in 
their attitudes towards polygyny. It is no longer usual to 
cast polygyny in simplistic terms of sexual excess and moral 
inferiority, as most early missionaries did. Nor is African 
resistance to the principle of monogamy regarded merely as evi­
dence of the backwardness of African converts and as a measure 
of the size of the church's task in establishing new values. 
Increasingly, the question of polygyny is viewed in the con­
text of the adaptation of the Christian religion to African 
30culture. It is mainly in this context that an increasing 
number of theologians have come to question the orthodox ap­
proach, which assumed that monogamy is an essential element of 
Christianity. However, this change of attitude has seldom been 
translated into actual church policy. The unconditional accep­
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tance or even encouragement of polygyny has been a character­
istic of some independent African churches. The policies of 
these churches constitute an aspect of African resistance or 
reaction, rather than an example of the emergence of any liber­
al thought within the missionary movement.
b) African Reaction
Individual Africans reacted in a variety of ways to the 
missionary demand that they should give up polygyny in order to 
be admitted to full church membership. Some Africans did aban­
don their polygynous marriages in order to lead full Christian 
lives. It would appear that more women than men were willing 
to do so. As one missionary once complained:
....Polygamy remains a great stumbling-block in the way 
of our work. Few men of any standing are willing to 
give it up and be baptized, hence /we havej more women 
than men.jl
Many tried to lead monogamous lives, but subsequently relapsed. 
Countless Africans refused outright to give up polygyny. The 
missionaries almost invariably viewed the latter as being moral­
ly or temperamentally weak. High-minded, equitable and consci­
entious grounds upon which Africans based their decisions were 
ignored. One missionary noted a typical occurrence, as follows:
....It is a matter of perplexity and difficulty to find 
out the truth about the lives of those men who have mar­
ried several wives. Many of our men hearers had to be 
rejected for catechumanate, principally in consequence 
of their unwillingness to put away the several wives for 
one. Makelani, one of the most brilliant and attentive 
of the men had a struggle with himself, but he finally 
gave way, and said he could not turn away his wives after 
having married them for so many years. They had hoed his 
gardens and cooked food for him. Who would protect them 
now /that7 they were old?32
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Some polygynous marriages came about only as a means by which
surviving relatives of a deceased man could provide shelter
and succour to aged widows. Yet, the men involved in these
marriages attracted even more vehement denunciations from the 
33missionaries.
To some Africans, adherence to monogamy was not a simple 
matter of giving up extra wives. Monogamy would upset tradi­
tional roles, frustrate important social expectations and 
threaten an intricate network of relationships. These consi­
derations had to be taken into account by individual Africans 
confronted with the choice between baptism and polygyny. Lin­
den's account of the experiences of the Catholic missionaries 
with the Ngoni paramount, Kachindamoto, at Mua Mission /Nyasa- 
landy, highlights this aspect of African response admirably. 
Throughout his chieftaincy, Abraham Kachindamoto was a man torn 
between Christianity and tradition. In 1907, he entered the 
catechumenate with the Catholic mission with a view to baptism. 
This was strongly opposed by his traditional adviser (nduna). 
Linden explains:
The principal role of the Ngoni paramount was to provide 
a focus for life in his territory. A constant supply of 
food was expected to be on hand at the inkosini34 for 
visitors. Quite apart from the socio-religious aspects 
of royal polygamy, simple functions such as this modest 
but unfailing hospitality depended on the chief's poly­
gamous wives who cooked for, and served, the visitors.
The older nduna rightly feared that the missionaries' in­
sistence on monogamy as a condition for baptism risked 
undermining the Ngoni way of life. He warned the young 
chief that disrespect for the customs of his ancestors 
would result in disrespect for the chief himself.
The explanation continues:
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....The social structure of an Ngoni village was so inti­
mately bound up with the institution of polygamy, even 
down to the arrangement of huts, that the missionaries’ 
insistence that all but one wife should be renounced was 
unlikely to be heeded. The priests were not just asking, 
as they thought, for a personal conversion but for the 
transformation of a society that had survived for almost 
a century. Some Ngoni's did choose one of their wives, 
supported the rest, and submitted to a church marriage, 
but usually they relapsed. The majority remained polyga­
mous and perpetual catechumens.
As for Abraham Kachindamoto:
...the catechumate lasted from 1907 until his death on 
2 December 1931. He had fifteen wives, attended mass 
regularly, and always summoned a Catholic catechist to 
accompany him where he went shooting, in case he was 
wounded mortally in a hunting accident and died without 
baptism.35
It was a measure of the missionary success that many Afri­
cans, like Kachindamoto, continued to worship as Christians even 
after being denied full church membership. Africans could simp­
ly have reverted to their traditional forms of worship; or 
worse still from the missionary viewpoint, they could have em­
braced Islam under which polygyny was allowed.
The missionaries were understandably apprehensive about 
Islam. Its apparent simplicity and what the missionaries saw 
as its easy terms would have been more appealing to Africans 
than the Christianity preached by the missions. As one mis­
sionary put it in describing the teachers of islam:
....They, too, teach the existence of a God, but the para­
dise they promise has material joys to be understood, and 
here on earth they allow many indulgences, including plur­
ality of wives.36
That Africans might indeed have found Islam a preferable reli­
gion because of its tolerance of polygyny was indicated by one
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Yao writer, in the following words:
....Speaking of God, I do not see any difference between 
Mohammedanism and Christianity except the outside cere­
monies. After all, do we not all pray to God? Does it 
then matter much which great prophet we follow? There is 
one thing in Mohammedan law which is better and that is 
plural wives, and I think that always Africans will prefer 
it thus.37
African opposition to the policies of the missionaries re­
garding polygyny was most forc£fully expressed through the medi
38um of independent African churches. In contrast to European 
missions, most of these churches baptised their converts immedi 
ately upon confession. In particular, they accepted or even en 
couraged polygyny. Theological, nationalistic and even socio­
logical grounds were canvassed in support of this approach. In 
general, these grounds underlined a desire on the part of the 
founders of these churches to adapt Christianity to the condi­
tions and traditions of the African people. The constitution 
of The Last Church of God and His Christ, founded by a Tonga 
of Northern Nyasaland, Jordan Msumwa, in 1923, is a clear exam­
ple of the conceptual sophistication attained by some founders 
of these churches. The constitution justified the admission 
of polygynists in the following terms:
...man should live according to his religion and not mere­
ly be a nominal member of a church whose rules he cannot 
carry out. Like other countries, Africa is in need of a 
church that would correspond with her God-given customs 
and manners. We believe the commission of the Christian 
church to Africa was to impart Christ and education in 
such a way as to fit in with the manners and customs of 
the people and not that it should impose on the Africans 
the unnecessary and impracticable methods of European 
countries, such as having one wife ... which have no bib­
lical authority.
We believe that the immoralities now prevailing among 
us are the direct result of the unnatural position into
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which the African has been driven coupled by the false 
and misleading theory that outside one's own church 
beliefs, others can do no good. We believe in the father­
hood of God and brotherhood of man regardless of cohour 
and creed and that the African religion with its tradi­
tions, laws and customs was instituted by Him so that 
the African may realize Him by their observance.
The aim of this church is the uplifting of the Afri­
can ... as well as winning those who are considered bad 
because of polygamy and drink and are /said to have no7 
latent qualities for doing good any more ... and [to] re­
store an atmosphere of a deep ... naturally religious life 
as prevailed in the day of long ago.39
As is clear from the foregoing quotation, one of the many 
and complex aspects of these churches was to assert the compa­
tibility of African traditions with Christianity. European mis­
sionaries in general proceeded on the premise that African tra­
ditional beliefs, customs and institutions were wholly incom­
patible with Christianity. They had hoped to transform African 
society by eradicating or ignoring the various aspects of tra­
ditional life. Sometimes, they paid lip-service to the creation 
of a genuinely indigenous church, but, as McCracken points out, 
these missionaries "had sufficient confidence in the virtues of 
Western society to reject any major compromise with habits or 
beliefs which ran counter to their o w n " . ^  Thus, their main 
way of operation was, as one missionary put it, "simply to cut 
the Gordian knot and make a clean sweep altogether". ^  Leaders 
of the independent African churches were opposed to this method 
of operation. They regarded it as arbitrary and as an aspersion 
on themselves, their polygynous parents and ancestors.
The missionaries not only offered the door to spiritual 
salvation, but also provided what soon became the most effective 
means of social and material advancement. However, they denied
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these means to Africans who failed to comply with their dictates. 
Education and employment opportunities offered by the mission­
aries were thus only made available to a small though growing 
elite whose isolation from the rest of traditional communities 
the missionaries seemed to welcome. Leaders of independent 
African churches were themselves usually part of this small 
elite. One main aim of these churches was to open the doors 
of spiritual salvation and material advancement to a wider Afri­
can audience. They hoped to do so partly by pulling down what 
they saw as arbitrary and unnecessary barriers. Monogamy was 
one of those barriers.
Of course, the policies of the relevant independent chur­
ches towards polygyny were based on the view that polygyny was 
not condemned by the scriptures. The condemnation of polygyny 
by the missionaries was seen merely as an example of what to­
day may be called cultural imperialism. The missionaries were 
seen to be deliberately corrupting the word of God in order 
to despise African traditional customs. What they were doing,
advised Charles Domingo (a prominent separatist), could not be
/ o
called "Christendom", but "Europeandom". Africans were 
often equally perplexed at what they saw as the absence of 
Christian charity and compassion on the part of the missionar­
ies when dealing with African congregations. Charles Chinula, 
for example, founded the Eklesia Lanangwa (Church of Freedom) 
in 1934 as a direct counter to the rigid, impersonal and le­
galistic approach of the Livingstonia Mission towards such 
matters as polygyny. Chinula himself had been suspended from 
the pastorate on charges of adultery. For four years he had
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"worked devotedly to demonstrate his sincere repentance ..."
/ ^
but the Livingstonia Presbytery refused to readmit him. As 
a result, he left the mission and founded his own church whose 
theology emphasised the transforming power of repentance and 
Christ's infinite forgiveness.^ Chinula is today best known 
for the beautiful Tumbuka hymns he composed. These hymns too 
bear the imprint of Chinula's theology. They underline Christ's 
infinite love for sinful and an undeserving humankind. Accord­
ing to Africans like Chinula, European missionaries had neglec­
ted this spirit of Christianity and emphasised such minor or 
even unnecessary lessons as those relating to polygyny, drumming, 
dancing and beer-drinking.
There was also a political, nationalistic dimension to in­
dependent African churches. Assertions of African cultural 
traditions in some cases served to express African rejection 
of European foreign rule. Leaders of some independent African 
churches enthralled their audiences by their denounciations 
of Government taxes and colonial rule in general.^ It may be 
noted in this respect that some of these leaders were also much 
involved in African secular movements such as the Native Asso­
ciations.^ Furthermore, with the emergence of more effective 
African political organisations, independent African churches 
became less important, thus underlining their originally politi­
cal orientations. Rotberg puts the matter in somewhat exagger­
ated terms as follows:
Where the reaction to colonialism could not be expressed 
directly, or where healthy protest failed to bring any 
appreciable amelioration, the conquered people cloaked 
their rejection of colonialism in religious garb. Where-
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ever there were no other outlets, Africans formed indepen­
dent religious bodies to exploit or to remedy their grie­
vances. In /both Northern Rhodesia andj Nyasaland a suc­
cession of indigenous quasi-Christian groups played upon 
this theme from the first years of the twentieth century. 
They expressed separatist or Chiliastic ideas, subverted 
the tenets of established mission churches, defied the 
colonial governments, and acted as a major channel of na­
tionalistic sentiment.47
It would be wrong to suggest, as Rotberg seems to do, 
that independent African churches were merely disguises for 
political agitation. The leaders of most of these churches 
were committed to the spread of the Christian message, to the 
creation of alternative educational institutions, and in general 
to the social and even material advancement of the African 
people. It was perhaps only unfortunate, as Pachai points out, 
"that the founding fathers of Christianity in Africa came from 
an alien culture whose exclusiveness and righteousness they 
often insisted upon".^® For in the majority of cases, again to 
quote Pachai:
...the African voice of dissent was not sounded because 
of its hatred of the church, rather from its love for it 
and regret that certain practices were irreconcilable.49
The question of polygyny was certainly one of those issues 
where reconciliation proved difficult.
3. Monogamy Under the Marriage Ordinance, 1902
As already noted in earlier c h a p t e r s , o n e  of the main 
features of marriage celebrated under the Marriage Ordinance, 
1902, was that it bound the parties thereto to the obligation 
of monogamy. The monogamous character of marriage under the 
Ordinance was indicated by a number of clauses, which will now 
be analysed.
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Section 43 of the Ordinance provided that:
Whoever is guilty of bigamy shall be liable to imprison­
ment, with or without hard labour for a period not ex­
ceeding five years.51
The term "bigamy" was not defined anywhere in the Ordinance. 
However, it may be deduced from other clauses of the Ordinance 
that the term was used in a rather narrow sense. The inclusion 
in the Ordinance of analogous, but distinct, offences shows 
that these offences were not regarded as falling within the 
ambit of "bigamy". Firstly, there was Section 44:
Whoever, being unmarried, goes through the ceremony of mar­
riage with a person whom he or she knows to be married to 
another person, shall be liable to imprisonment, with or 
without hard labour, for a period not exceeding five years.52
Then there was Section 51, which provided as follows:
Whoever contracts a marriage under the provisions of this 
Ordinance, or any modification or re-enactment thereof, 
being at the same time married in accordance with native 
law or custom to any person other than the person with 
whom such marriage is contracted, shall be liable to im­
prisonment with or without hard labour for a period not 
exceeding five years.
Section 52 stated:
Whoever, having contracted marriage under this Ordinance, 
or any modification or re-enactment thereof, during the 
continuance of such marriage contracts a marriage in ac­
cordance with native law or custom, shall be liable to 
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a period 
not exceeding five years.
The term "bigamy", as used in the Marriage Ordinance, 
could thus be construed as an offence committed only when the 
offender contracted a statutory (or non-customary) marriage with 
one person during the subsistence of a similar marriage with
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another person. The provisions of the Marriage Ordinance were
formulated at a time when it was widely held that a polygynous
or potentially polygynous marriage could not afford a founda-
53tion for the prosecution of bigamy. The view underlined the 
now discredited attitude towards customary-law marital unions, 
namely, that such unions did not constitute "marriage" so proper 
ly called.^ The fact that customary-law marriages were poten­
tially polygynous mainly accounted for this attitude. The Penal 
Code clearly departed from this narrow definition of bigamy, al­
though this was achieved only by utilising certain provisions 
of the Marriage Ordinance. What is now Section 162 of the 
Penal Code stated that a person committed the offence of bigamy:
...who having a husband or wife living, goes through a 
ceremony of marriage which is void by reason of its 
taking place during the life of such husband or wife....
Section 33(1) of the Marriage Ordinance included, in its delin­
eation of invalid marriages, a marriage:
...where either of the parties thereto at the time of the 
celebration of such marriage is married by native law or 
custom to any person other than the person with whom such 
marriage is had.
Thus, Section "162" of the Penal Code, as read together with 
Section 33(1) of the Marriage Ordinance, extended the defini­
tion of bigamy to include the offence described under Section 
51 (above) of the Marriage Ordinance.
Since it was legally impossible for a party to a subsist­
ing marriage under the Ordinance to contract a marriage with
55anyone (including ones own spouse) under customary law, it
can be argued that the offence of bigamy under the Penal Code
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also covered the offence described under Section 52 of the Mar­
riage Ordinance. On the other hand, however, the definition 
of bigamy under the Penal Code required that the second mar­
riage should be void specifically because of a subsisting mar­
riage to a third party. The basis of the invalidity of an in­
tended customary marriage under Section 35 of the Marriage Or­
dinance was not a subsisting marriage to a third party, but 
simply a subsisting marriage under the Ordinance. An intended 
customary marriage would still be invalid even if the marriage 
was being had with the very person who was the party to the 
subsisting Ordinance Marriage. Although there is no judicial 
authority on the point, owing to the fact that there have hard­
ly been any prosecutions based on the above provisions, it may 
be safe to assume that the principles governing the offence of 
bigamy under the Penal Code equally applied to the offences 
under the Marriage Ordinance. Most notably, defendants charged 
with these latter ofjences should have been able to utilise the 
defence of presumption of death after seven years absence where 
the facts warranted such a presumption.^
The provisions of the Marriage Ordinance just outlined 
also applied to marriages contracted under the Christian Native 
Marriage Ordinance, 1912.^ Indeed, it was mainly with refer­
ence to marriages under this Ordinance and, later, to marriages 
under the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance, 1923, rather than to marriages celebrated under the 1902 
Ordinance itself, that discussions about the application of the 
English-law notion of monogamy to Africans were conducted.
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A word of comment on Section 44 (above) is in order. The 
clause was obviously not intended to abolish polygyny in gen­
eral. It never became part of colonial policy to do so. The 
phrase "the ceremony of marriage" in this Section must be in­
terpreted to mean the ceremony of marriage under the Marriage 
Ordinance. Thus interpreted, it would seem that there was no 
offence on the part of an unmarried person who went through a 
ceremony of marriage under customary law with a person already 
married to a third party under the Ordinance. The intended 
marriage would of course be void, and the other party to it
would be liable to prosecution under both the Penal Code and
58the Marriage Ordinance. Neither the Penal Code nor the Mar­
riage Ordinance, however, would seem to have provided any basis 
for the prosecution of an unmarried person who went through a 
customary-law marriage ceremony with someone who was already 
married to a third party under the Ordinance. Whether this was 
intended or was merely an omission on the part of the draftsman 
is difficult to tell. If intentional, it would seem to show 
the care taken by the relevant policy makers that the burdens 
imposed by the Ordinance applied only to those people who con­
tracted or intended to contract marriage under the Ordinance.
It would have been unpleasant, even unconscionable, to punish 
an African person for going through a customary-law marriage 
ceremony just because the other party to the intended marriage 
was already married under the Ordinance. The former may even 
have been someone who had no knowledge of the provisions of,
59or the existence of a marriage under, the Marriage Ordinance.
Considering that the practice of polygyny among Africans 
was still tolerated, it is appropriate to ask why it was thought
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necessary to extend the application of the above penal provi­
sions to those Africans who decided to solemnise their marriages 
under the Ordinance. The mere fact that an African contracted 
marriage under the Marriage Ordinance could not have changed 
what appears to have been the view of the administration that
60
polygyny as practised by Africans was not socially repugnant. 
Clearly, if there was any social advantage in penalising viola­
tions of the principle of monogamy, there could be no compel­
ling reason to confine the relevant penalties only to Africans 
married under the Marriage Ordinance. It is equally clear, 
however, that colonial legislative activities in this field 
were not aimed at the introduction or improvement of social in­
stitutions beneficial to the general African public. A combin­
ation of social snobbery and an optimistic view of the trans­
forming effect of European civilisation on African social atti­
tudes were mainly responsible for the inclusion of the relevant 
penal provisions. It would seem, as must be apparent from ear­
lier discussions,^* that the need to subject Africans married 
under the Marriage Ordinance to the relevant penalties arose, 
firstly, from the need to avoid the subversion of the institu­
tion of marriage as understood under Western European cultural 
traditions. It was feared that such an institution of marriage
would be undermined if Africans were "left free to slide in and
6 ?
out of monogamy at will". The relevant provisions were not
inserted to help the missionaries in the efforts to eradicate 
6 ^
polygyny. The missionary presence was undoubtedly taken into 
account by the legislators during the preparation of the Ordi­
nance .
470
As already noted, it was mainly with Christian converts in 
mind that the application of the provisions of the Ordinance 
was extended to the indigenous African population.^ There 
was no evidence, however, of any intention on the part of the 
legislators to strengthen the hand of the missionaries in their 
dealings with their African converts. The local colonial ad­
ministration was, of course, enjoined, to the'utmost of its 
power, "to promote religion and education among the native in-
c c
habitants". This, however, did not mean, or at least was 
never interpreted to mean, that the administration should take 
sides with the missions and actively participate in combating 
what the missions regarded as pagan customs. It would seen 
that the authors of the Marriage Ordinance merely assumed that 
Africans converted to Christianity would want their family 
relationships to be governed by the imported law with all its 
implications. A related assumption was that Africans seeking 
to contract marriage in accordance with imported European 
formularies would be doing so with the desire to abandon their 
indigenous marriage practices, including polygyny. This lat­
ter assumption underlined the belief that indigenous African 
marriage systems were incompatible with "civilisation", and 
that the supposedly civilised Africans could not subscribe to 
such practices.
4. Official Attitudes and the Implementation of the Penal
Provisions
The actual operation of the Marriage Ordinance was (and 
the operation of the Marriage Act today continues to be) char­
acterised by frequent violations in practice of the penal pro­
visions outlined above.
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It may be noted in parenthesis that some of the men who 
have broken the law of monogamy have done so without any desire 
of reverting to polygyny. Sometimes, the intention of the men 
has been to abandon their first wives and they have merely 
failed to take the appropriate steps to effect valid divorces.
The attitude of the government officials within the Pro­
tectorate put a seal on the total ineffectiveness of these 
clauses. A memorandum issued by the Attorney-General, E. st. j  
J. Jackson, in 1919 would seem to have been the furthest the 
colonial administration had ever gone in giving any hint of a 
willingness to implement the penal provisions of the Ordinance 
against Africans. Jackson's memorandum advised, inter alia, 
that:
....Persons who have reason to believe that a criminal 
offence against the Marriage Ordinance,1902,or the Chris­
tian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912,has been committed 
should give information to the District Resident who will 
hold a preliminary enquiry with a view of committing the 
accused for trial by the High Court should evidence 
justify that course. The fact that jurisdiction under 
both those Ordinances is reserved to the High Court ... 
does not obviate the necessity of a preliminary enauiry 
by a magistrate in the case of a criminal offence.o6
The memorandum had been prompted by a letter of Donald 
Fraser of the Livingstonia Mission to the Registrar-General, 
in which the former had observed that the lack of prosecutions 
had encouraged flagrant violations and suggested that one or
6 7
two demonstrative prosecutions would deter further violations. 
Fraser had also pointed out that magistrates in the districts 
had been refusing to entertain complaints about violations of 
the Ordinance for want of jurisdiction. Of course, it was a 
correct view of the law that Residents (or magistrates) had no
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jurisdiction over matters arising from the Marriage Ordinance. 
However, there was something more behind the attitude of dis­
trict government officials than the mere technical point about 
jurisdiction. Indeed, as was stated in the above memorandum, 
the mere want of jurisdiction need not have prevented the dis­
trict officers from transmitting (and some did indeed transmit)
information relating to violations of the law to the relevant 
69officials. However, central government officials barely con­
cealed their opposition to prosecutions based on the provisions 
of the Marriage Ordinance. Jackson's memorandum must be seen 
rather as merely an attempt to clarify the theoretical legal 
position than as an indication of any resolve on the part of 
the Government to implement the penal clauses of the Ordinance.
To some officials, there was something fundamentally 
wrong in those measures of the Ordinance which made it a crimi­
nal offence to take subsequent wives under customary law while 
already married under the Ordinance. The obvious implication 
in the punishment of anyone for contracting a customary mar­
riage during the subsistence of an Ordinance marriage was that 
the two types of marriage represented one and the same insti­
tution. Even during the late years of colonialism, few Euro­
pean administrators could have subscribed to any idea of parity 
of status between traditional African marriage and marriage 
under the imported law.
Thus, the objection to the relevant measures was that cus­
tomary marriages fell too far short of "proper marriages" to 
provide adequate bases for criminal prosecutions. The remarks 
of T.L. Moggridge in 1919, then Resident for Mzimba District,
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are typical of this attitude. In response to Fraser's remarks 
about the lack of prosecutions, Moggridge wrote:
....If a native so charged were advised by counsel (and 
he should be if prosecuted by a European), I should 
think he would take the line that the second marriage 
(the native one) was no marriage at all. If he likes 
to take unto himself a concubine and also likes to give 
[the] said concubine's parents a present of cattle or 
money, is he doing anything that cannot be paralleled in 
thousands of legally immune households in St. John's Wood 
and elsewhere? Native marriage is so slight a bond that 
to convict him would go near to making any infidelity by 
a married man a matter for five years - a result which 
might well give an English Judge pause.70
Moggridge was clearly not thinking only in terms of actual 
concubinage. He went on to state as follows:
....Of course the taking of the woman and the payment of 
the dowry constitutes a native marriage and you may fair­
ly describe my proposed defence as a quibble. I wonder 
if it wouldn't have a good chance of succeeding though.
If it did I should think that in this case the quibble 
was no bad thing, since the charge itself rests on the 
false assumption that two wholly different things are 
similar and equivalent.71
It is very doubtful whether the above argument could have 
stood up to judicial scrutiny. Although European judges were 
likely to share Moggridge's view about the nature of customary 
marriage, they could not have disregarded the express and un­
equivocal intention of the relevant statutory clauses. It may 
also be observed that the whole tenor of the Marriage Ordinance 
was characterised by the idea that customary marriages were in­
ferior and representative of a lower state of civilisation.
It was therefore rather ironical that this very idea should be 
utilised to impede the full operation of the clauses of the
Ordinance.
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More generally, opposition to the enforcement of the penal 
provisions of the Ordinance underlined basic doubts among ad­
ministrative officers about African readiness for the type of 
social relationships defined by the Marriage Ordinance. Des­
pite the introduction of Christianity and Western education by 
the missionaries, most administrative officers believed that 
generally, Africans were socially, mentally and morally far 
too backward to understand or appreciate the Western concepts 
of marriage.
This attitude was not confined to marriage-law issues,
but manifested itself in various spheres of colonial rule.
72From the early days of Harry Johnston to the time that the
73Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was instituted in 1953, 
Africans were more or less viewed as children, capable of lit­
tle else apart from acting as a reservoir of labour for the 
growing European economy. Professions of Christianity or 
achievements in formal education on the part of many Africans 
were viewed with scepticism. Some of the main differences be­
tween government officials and the missionaries, more specifi­
cally, the Scottish misionaries, arose from the different ways 
in which they viewed the African people. Writing about a quar­
rel between the Blantyre MiSfeion of the Church of Scotland and 
the British Central Africa Administration between 1890 and 1905, 
the Rev. Andrew Ross makes the following observation about the 
missionaries involved:
....D.C. Scott, Hetherwick and their leading associates 
saw Africans as people .... They believed individual 
Africans to be capable of absorbing Western culture, 
which was not to be left for their far-distant descen-
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dants. They did not just speak and write these things, 
but acted on them.74
On the basis of the actual abilities and good character of in­
dividual Africans, the Blantyre Mission constantly appealed 
to the European population "to act and live in a spirit of 
brotherhood and mutual respect with the African people".^
These appeals, Ross observes, "seem to have had little effect
on Europeans, many of whom saw Africans as 'niggers' and
7 f)
'kaffirs'". People like Hetherwick and Scott believed that 
Africans were morally and mentally capable of participating 
fully in the social and economic life introduced by Europeans.^
The stand taken by government officials on questions of 
marriage legislation to some extent represented a readiness on 
their part to assign attributes of moral and mental inferiority
to Africans. A clear example of this were Nunan's observations
7 8in the Storey case. It was the introduction of indirect rule 
in the 1930s which tended to bring some ideological respecta­
bility to the stand taken by government officials. The offi­
cials began to speak in terms of the "right" of the African 
people that their laws should be developed on the basis of 
African social institutions and beliefs rather than on the 
Western standards. This way of thinking, however, did not en­
tirely replace the crude rationale based on the supposed infer­
iority of African societies and the African personality. At 
least in the experience of Nyasaland, European administrators 
did not fully come round to the view, attributed to the follow­
ers of indirect rule, that:
...customary marriage was no primitive relic of the barbar­
ic past, but a law certainly not inferior and probably
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preferable in the context of the social conditions of 
/*AfricaJ to the alien form of marriage imposed ...
by the Marriage Ordinances.79
The reluctance of European officials to punish Africans 
for bigamy was not motivated by any respect for the African 
institution of polygyny. It is possible that such reluctance 
resulted from a belief that it had been a mistake in the first 
place to allow Africans to contract marriage under the Mar­
riage Ordinance.
5. The Proposed African Christian Marriage Bill of 1945
To make marriage celebrated in accordance with Christian 
rites monogamous in the legal, rather than merely ecclesiasti­
cal, sense was one of the main objectives of the missions in 
all their attempts to have the 1923 Ordinance repealed. This 
had also been the object of "Bill B" of the Blantyre conference 
of 1920. Unlike the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, however, "Bill 
B" had not prescribed any positive sanctions against those vi­
olating the principle of monogamy. Dr Hetherwick, the chief 
proponent of this Bill, was in fact the very person who had
moved for the exclusion of any penalties from legislation deal-
80ing with African Christian marriages. The only penalties in­
cluded in "Bill B" were the ones which also appeared in the 
rival "Bill A", and these had been directed at the officiating 
officers or people acting in that capacity.
As already noted, the attitude of the missions towards 
the penal provisions was somewhat ambivalent. The delegates 
at the Blantyre conference of 1920 were unanimous in their 
condemnation of the penal provisions contained in the 1902
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Ordinance. Some missions had realised, from experience, that 
government officials were after all reluctant to enforce the 
relevant provisions; others were of the view that the penal­
ties were too harsh, considering that polygyny was socially 
acceptable among Africans; the majority feared that threats of 
criminal prosecutions would only frighten Africans away from 
Christian marriage.
All that the supporters of "Bill B" had wanted was a 
declaration of principle to the effect that marriage contracted 
in accordance with Christian rites would be monogamous. The 
relevant clause contained in "Bill B" might not have produced 
the desired effect. The clause would clearly have prevented a 
married person from celebrating a marriage with a third 
party under the proposed law. However, it did not specifically 
place any obligation on someone married under the terms of "Bill 
B" not to contract marriage with a third party under some other 
law. It is clear, however, that the supporters of "Bill B" had 
wanted to prohibit even such subsequent marriage. This was 
implicit in one of the clauses dealing with divorce. One of 
the two grounds for divorce specified under "Bill B" was "adul­
tery", and this last term was defined as:
...sexual intercourse by a party to the marriage with any
person other than the other party to the marriage.81
Under customary law sexual intercourse between a polygynist 
and any of his wives did not, of course, constitute adultery 
with respect to the other wife or wives. However, a man mar­
ried under the law of "Bill B" could not have engaged in lawful 
sexual intercourse with any woman other than the party to the
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marriage under the said law. It would not have mattered wheth­
er such other woman had gone through some ceremony of marriage 
with the man. The above definition of adultery clearly assumed 
that a person married under the terms of "Bill B" could not 
contract a lawful marriage with a third party during the sub­
sistence the first marriage. The supporters of "Bill B" 
had intended to make marriage contracted in accordance with 
Christian rites a monogamous affair in all respects.
The 1945 proposals, on the other hand, included a penal 
clause. The intention to rule out polygyny from Christian mar­
riages was much emphasised in the 1945 proposals. Thus, sig­
nificantly, the term "marriage" in the draft Bill submitted by 
the Committee in 1945 was specifically defined as:
...the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman 
(either or both being Christians) to the exclusion of all 
others.... 82
The inclusion of such a definition was clearly an improvement 
on the rather ineptly drafted clauses of "Bill B" of 1920.
The 1945 Bill also contained a clause which would have made it 
an offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years for anyone
...having contracted marriage under this Ordinance, during 
the continuance of such marriage shall marry any other
rovisions of this Ordinance or the Mar-
The inclusion of this clause constituted a departure from pre­
vious missionary positions on the question of penalties. Still, 
it was perhaps a measure of missionary antipathy towards legal 
penalties that the offence in the above clause was so narrowly
who:
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defined. The offence was confined to what may have been con-
84sidered as bigamy proper; it excluded from the definition 
the taking of a subsequent spouse under customary law. Still, 
such taking of subsequent spouses under customary law would 
have been prohibited under the proposed law. The definition 
of "marriage" noted above was clearly intended to rule out 
polygyny. Further, Christians would in any case have been pre­
vented from contracting marriage under customary law whatever 
the circumstances. The draft Bill contained a provision which 
stated that:
No marriage by native law and custom contracted by a - 
Christian is of any legal effect.85
The inclusion of the penalty for bigamy was much criti­
cised by government officials, especially District Commission­
ers. Many suggested that the proposed penalty would come too
prematurely for most Africans and would only lead to consider-
86able misunderstanding, confusion and bitterness. The mis­
sions were themselves confident that the Christian community in 
Nyasaland had reached that stage of development when the appli­
cation of penalties for bigamy would not lead to any serious 
problems.
According to the missions, the African Christian community 
had not only increased since 1920, when the 1923 Ordinance was 
conceived, but had also reached a level of development which 
had not been attained earlier and which had therefore not been 
reflected in the 1923 Ordinance. In the words of Dr Murray of 
the Dutch Reformed Church:
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...What we have been pleading for all along is that the 
status of native Christian marriage should be recognised 
by the state. Meantime, the native Christian community 
has grown not only in numbers, but also in its realisa­
tion of the meaning of Christian marriage. There are 
large numbers, many thousand of natives to-day, who do 
to a considerable extent understand the implication of a 
Christian marriage as a binding contract. I again deli­
berately make that statement. There is a big difference 
between the view of marriage on the part of many native 
Christians and on the part of raw heathens.87
The missions were standing on the horns of dilemma. Cri­
tics were bound to observe that, if the African convert was a 
genuine Christian, there was no need for legal penalties to 
keep him in line. If, on the other hand, the African convert 
was one who was fickle and liable to revert to polygyny, then 
it was so much the less justifiable to bind him or her to the 
legal obligation of monogamy. Thus, even before the proposed
Bill was finally rejected entirely in 1950, the relevant penal
88clause was removed. Indeed, as the relevant offence was so 
narrowly defined, it is unlikely that the clause would have 
had much practical use. An African who was ready to lapse 
into polygyny was unlikely to do so by taking a subsequent 
spouse under the proposed law or under the Marriage Ordinance. 
Such subsequent marriages were likely to take place under cus­
tomary law and accordingly would not have fallen foul of the 
penal clause. Up to the end, however, the missions insisted 
that as a matter of legal principle, marriages celebrated in 
accordance with Christian rites were to be treated as monoga­
mous. This in itself was more important than criminal sanc­
tions. Indeed, the overall aim of the missions was not to 
criminalise polygyny, but to safeguard the monogamous character 
of Christian marriage.
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The stand taken by most colonial administrative officers
was that the development of such concepts as monogamy among
Africans should be left to the influence of missionary reli-
89gious teaching and not forced by legislative intervention.
This idea was of course embodied in the 1923 Ordinance and re­
mained the central feature of colonial marriage legislative 
policy in Nyasaland. The assumption was that the missions 
could easily concentrate on the religious aspect of marriage 
and disassociate themselves from the legal implications even if 
the two were incompatible. Indeed, this was the position ear­
lier advocated by the Catholic and Anglican missions. As will 
be shown presently, it was a policy which appeared attractive­
ly simple in theory, but which proved very difficult to imple­
ment in practice.
Theoretically, there could be little doubt that the effect
of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance was that marriages celebra-
90ted under this Ordinance were potentially polygynous. How­
ever, of course, the intention of those missions who had sup­
ported "Bill A" on which the Ordinance had been based had not 
been to countenance polygyny among their converts. The Cath­
olic and Anglican missions were as fiercely opposed to polygy­
ny as their counterparts, who had endorsed "Bill B". By sup­
porting "Bill A", the relevant missions had only hoped to dis­
tance themselves from the legal implications of marriage and 
to be concerned solely with the spiritual side. Perhaps un­
derstandably, these missions did not prove very successful in 
this respect. The attitude of these missions towards the 
operation of the 1923 Ordinance became somewhat ambivalent.
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While appearing to support the principle of Section 3 of the 
Ordinance, which entailed the application of customary law to 
African Christian marriages, these missions in fact expected 
the courts to treat these marriages differently from ordinary 
customary marriages. For example, Father Paradis of the White 
Fathers Mission, Bembeke, once observed that the courts should:
...not ignore the religious nature of obligations arising
out of the rites and usages according to which the mar­
riage has been celebrated.91
In particular, the missions expected the courts to protect 
women married under the 1923 Ordinance if their husbands viola­
ted the religious vows and took subsequent wives under custom­
ary law. Under the terms of Section 3, men married in accor­
dance with Christian rites were no less entitled to practise
polygyny than their compatriots married purely under customary
92law. Yet, even Catholic and Anglican missionaries expected 
the courts to provide special remedies for the wives. Thus,
in a letter dated 21st December, 1925, the district magistrate
for Nkhota-Kota referred to the problems he was experiencing 
with the Anglican missionaries who, according to the report, had 
been insisting that, in cases of reversion to polygyny:
...the man should support the woman for the rest of her 
life, as by their church law, she is not permited to mar­
ry again.93
As long as disputes involving Christian Africans were handled 
by European magistrates, the missionaries believed that there 
was a better chance for Christian precepts to be taken into 
account. It was an entirely different matter with Native Auth­
ority courts. The general view of the missionaries was that
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Native Authorities were practically all pagans and lacking in
competence to deal with questions relating to Christian mar- 
94riage. The missionaries expected the courts to take into 
account the religious aspect of the marriage, as a factual 
background to the legal settlement of relevant disputes. The 
missionaries could not conscientiously ignore how, for in­
stance, the courts treated wives who, on account of religion, 
refused to cohabit or remain with husbands who had lapsed into 
polygyny. Such refusal would entail legal consequences against 
which mere church discipline was no answer. The view that the 
church could ignore the legal aspect of marriage and concern 
itself solely with the religious aspect was less attainable in 
reality than it appeared to be in theory.
6. The Proposals to Repeal the 1923 Ordinance and African 
Opinion
95As already noted, the proposals to repeal the Native 
Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, led 
to widespread African participation.
In 1936, the Blantyre Native Association had urged the 
Government that:
...before passing any further legislation views or infor­
mation should first be obtained from the natives them­
selves - either through their Native Authorities as to 
what the best method they think (sic) and not only from 
the evidence given by the representatives of [a] Chris­
tian minority, as any change to the existing Ordinance 
(1923) unless agreed by the natives themselves will be 
detrimental to native law and customs.96
Evidently, Africans were not prepared to watch passively while 
decisions were being made that would affect important aspects
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of their social life. However, it would be a mistake to con­
clude that the encouragement of African participation was moti­
vated simply by the altruistic desire to satisfy African inter­
ests. Both supporters and opponents of the 1923 Ordinance in­
voked "the African viewpoint" for their own strategic ends. To 
a significant extent, the Africans who participated in the de­
bates were, so to say, "used".
The missions were only too aware of Government reluctance 
to repeal the 1923 Ordinance. They knew that their case would 
be helped if the repeal of the Ordinance was seen to be desired 
by the African Christian community. The Africans elected to 
speak for the missions were generally those who were prepared 
to follow the course paved by their European "counterparts".
Independent a man as he was in relation to other Africans,
9 7Lewis Bandawe, for example, was a model mission graduate 
whose orthodoxy sometimes verged on obsequiousness. He stood 
in sharp contrast to Charles Chinula, and the respective views 
of both men in the Marriage Committee formed in 1945 virtually 
epitomised the diversity of African opinion.
The Rev. Stephen Kundecha was one of the representatives 
sent by the Blantyre Mission to the 1936 conference of mission­
aries and government officials. At that conference, Kundecha 
assured the conference that African Christians wanted a change
in the law on the lines proposed by the missions. He added
a
that time had already arrived "when polyg^y was out of touch
98 ^with circumstances". This view was echoed by Bandawe in
1945 during the first meeting of the Marriage Committee. The
report of the Committee noted that Mr Bandawe had drawn "the
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attention of the Committee to the injustices which were being
99done in the guise of native custom". This remark by Bandawe 
was put before a large meeting of Africans in Nkhota-Kota. 
According to the report of the District Commissioner there, the 
remark was received with laughter and angry denials. The Com­
missioner noted:
....One man got up and asked, "was that Lewis Bandawe who 
said that?" - Perhaps already known for his unorthodox 
views on native customs.100
Bandawe's was by no means the only African voice in favour 
of the new proposals. In Karonga District, two members of the 
Livingstonia Mission, Aram Gondwe and Robert Gwembe Nyirenda, 
agreed with most of the new proposals, including the "penal 
clause for b i g a m y " . I n  supporting the removal of the juris­
diction of Native Authorities, Gondwe is reported to have put 
emphasis on:
...the inability of Native courts to appreciate the rights 
of women. They are inclined to regard the jealousy of a 
wife as something unnatural and not to be able to see she 
has a right to be jealous.102
In Dedza District, an ex-elder of the Dutch Reformed Church, 
and clerical officer at the office of the District Commission­
er, Rufus Jezana, pointed out that bad African customs had to 
go. He noted that the punishment of bigamy was good, although
he also expressed the view that a maximum of three years im-
103prisonment would be preferable to five years. Although
strongly opposed to the removal of the jurisdiction of Native
Authorities, the Nyasaland African Congress seemed to agree
104with Jezana at least on the issue of bigamy.
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It was partly to counter missionary claims of African sup­
port that the administration decided to seek the views of as 
many Africans as possible. It is useful to bear in mind that 
the proposed law was only to apply to Christian Africans. Sig­
nificantly, however, the administration insisted that due 
weight had to be given even to the views of non-Christian Afri­
cans, in particular the Native Authorities and other influential 
Africans. The inclusion of Rev. Chinula in the 1945 Marriage 
Committee was obviously not fortuitous. During the delibera­
tions of the Committee, Chinula presented a very different ver­
sion of African opinion from that given by Bandawe. On his own, 
Chinula carried out a series of consultations with fellow Afri­
cans, and in conscious opposition to the resolutions of the 
Committee, he submitted a memorandum in which he argued, inter 
alia, that:
1. African rights and liberties, based on their own law 
and customs, which are not repugnant to justice, should 
be protected.
2. Africans being also a people just like others have 
their own institutions to work against which would be 
working against their conscience.105
Chinula criticised the missions for failing to follow 
what he claimed to be the teaching of Christ, namely, that "an 
erring brother's case should be dealt with by the church". He 
expressed regret that:
...some missionaries, instead of love and persuasion, 
threaten their Christians that on breaking marriage vows, 
they will be prosecuted by the state. If we do so, we 
build Christianity on fear and not on faith in our saviour. 106
Chinula, who had worked under Donald Fraser at Loudon (Embangweni),
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was speaking from personal experiences with the Livingstonia 
Mission. At one time before 1923, Fraser, Chinula's mentor, 
had attempted to introduce a type of marriage for African con­
verts which would be ’’distinguishable from the normal marriage 
in church by the absence of legal provisions as laid down by 
the state". The proposal had been rejected by the Presby­
tery and as McCracken narrates:
Livingstonia came to demand of her church members and 
catechumens that they be married under the provisions of 
the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance of 1912, which 
contained the penalty for those lapsing into polygamy of 
up to five years in goal.108
Chinula subscribed to the view that Africans in Nyasland were
not "educationally, financially and politically fit to under-
109stand all what was involved in European law". However, for
Chinula, fitness to understand European law need not lead to 
the destruction, but only to the purification, of African 
c u s t o m s . O n  the other hand, he did not criticise Africans 
who of their own free will decided to rid themselves of custom­
ary law and marry under the 1902 Ordinance.
Many of the Africans contacted by District Commissioners 
throughout the territory objected to the proposed law. The 
majority of Africans never specifically referred to the 1923 
Ordinance. Nevertheless, they did endorse the principle that 
a Christian marriage ceremony, or mere conversion to Christian­
ity, should not involve the imposition of an alien law of mar­
riage .
Some of the general arguments against the imposition of 
different laws on Christian Africans are considered in other
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chapters of this study. It can be observed, however, that the 
arguments from Africans in the districts tended to suffer from 
lack of originality. They seem to have been heavily influenced 
by ideas of District Commissioners and the latter were practi­
cally unanimous in their opposition to any changes in the 
status quo. It must also be noted that the views of most Afri­
cans were collected through meetings presided over by District 
Commissioners. The missions had little opportunity to counter 
whatever influence the District Commissioners exerted at these 
meetings. The initial suggestion that surveys of African opin­
ion should not be confined to Christians only resulted in the 
opposite error. A disproportionate amount of weight would 
seem to have been placed on Native Authorities and other Afri­
cans associated with the district administration. Government 
officials were content simply to doubt whether the missionary 
proposals had the backing of African congregations. No serious 
attempt was made to probe the views of these congregations.
For, although it must be admitted that Native Authorities and 
African communities in general had a genuine interest in the 
proposed law, it was Christian Africans who were to be direct­
ly affected by it. In particular, was it not strange that a 
law which would have drastically affected the legal position 
of women was being discussed apparently without any participa­
tion by the women? For understandable reasons, it is amongst 
women in general, and Christian women in particular, that the 
resentment against African customs, particularly polygyny, has 
been mostly manifested. The views of women would obviously 
have contributed greatly to a more balanced assessment of Afri­
can opinion.
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Be that as it may, it would have been a great surprise 
had the majority of Africans endorsed a law which purported 
to abolish polygyny, even if such a step was to be confined 
to Christian marriages. Polygyny occupied an important and 
hallowed place in most traditional African societies. In some 
instances, specific problems were cited to justify the rejec­
tion of monogamy. It was contended for example, that polygyny 
was the best solution where a problem of infertility arose on 
the part of the first wife. A.T.N. Mkisi, a Senior Hospital 
Assistant in Port Herald, warned as follows:
....What happens is that when the young couple have been 
married ... all people in village are anxious to
see when the woman is going to be conceived. But if 
there is no child within a period of one or two years 
people will begin to laugh at them that they are sterile, 
you will soon see he has married a second wife....
There are many thousands of African Christians (sic) 
because they are producing, but it is hard to those who 
do not produce to remain Christians. The Africans like 
children. The Committee should consider into (sic) this 
matter.111
Many Africans rejected monogamy because it was simply not 
part of African custom. At a meeting with the District Commis­
sioner in Nkhota-Kota, for example, the Africans attending 
simply observed that polygyny and monogamy were respectively 
African and European customs. They expressed the wish that 
the European custom should not be imposed on Africans, nor
112should the custom of one church be imposed on other churches. 
This last point was perhaps a reference to the independent 
African churches, which did not condemn polygyny. The con­
scious search for reasons or justifications for polygyny must 
be regarded as a reaction to early attacks and imported atti­
tudes against polygyny. From a purely traditional angle,
polygyny could not have required any justification. On the 
contrary, it was monogamy perhaps that required conscious 
justification. Like marriage itself, once it had evolved, 
polygyny was an institution that was accepted in its own 
right. Of course, individual people, and even whole communi­
ties collectively, consciously utilised it for particular 
social ends. It was believed to increase the number of chil­
dren. It was used to ensure wealth and prestige in agricul­
tural and pastoral societies. It was used to widen political 
and social ties and influence. It was utilised to provide sup­
port for widows. It was a solution to problems of wife infer­
tility. It complemented numerous sexual taboos - in some 
cases, for example, a woman could not have sexual intercourse 
during the usually-long periods of lactation. It enabled 
ageing couples to enlist the services of younger partners. The
institution of polygyny was consciously exploited to further a
113variety of social and economic ends. These ends, however,
only served to explain why polygyny was preferred to monogamy. 
They did not serve to justify it. Africans, at least those of 
Chinula's type, regarded polygyny as an institution that was 
inherently valid and not as an evil, whose existence had to be 
justified either on the basis of its social and economic value 
or as a concession to a still primitive people. It can be seen 
therefore that, although their respective viewpoints pointed to 
the same result, namely, the retention of the 1923 Ordinance, 
the Africans and the colonial officials were thinking at dif­
ferent and even contradictory levels.
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7. The Judicial Interpretation of the 1923 Ordinance
As already noted, the theoretical implication of Section 
3 of the 1923 Ordinance was that marriage celebrated in accor­
dance with Christian rites would be no different from marriage 
celebrated purely under customary law, as far as the legal po­
sition of the parties was concerned. It is useful to consider 
how, in relation to the question of monogamy, the principle of 
Section 3 has been reflected in actual judicial decisions.
The majority of the cases bearing on the issue have been di­
vorce proceedings brought by women who have objected to their 
husbands’ subsequent marriages with other women. The courts 
have generally confirmed the principle that the mere celebra­
tion of marriage by Christian rites does not bar a man from 
taking subsequent wives under customary law. This was, for 
instance, so held by the High Court in the case of Kandoje v . 
Mtengerenji (1966),**^ perhaps the most important judgement on 
the 1923 Ordinance to date.
The following were the pertinent facts of the case, which 
came before the High Court by way of appeal from the Blantyre 
Local Appeal Court:
The respondent wife petitioned the Blantyre Local 
court for the dissolution of her marriage to the appel­
lant and sought compensation and the custody of the 
children of the marriage.
The parties were married in church under the 
/NativeJ Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance. At that time both were Christians and the husband 
promised in the ceremony not to take another wife. The 
respondent refused to accept the validity of the second 
marriage and brought proceedings, contending that her 
own marriage was a "legal one"ll5 which disentitled her 
husband from marrying again both legally and in the eyes 
of the church. The appellant also contended that the 
marriage was "legal" but that it was a customary-law mar­
riage entitling him to marry polygamously.116
The court of first instance ordered a divorce, but char­
acteristically, did not spell out the legal grounds for doing 
so. From the fact that it made no order for compensation and 
gave the custody of two young children of the marriage to the 
husband, it can be concluded that the court had viewed the 
respondent's petition for divorce as groundless. The wife ap­
pealed to the Blantyre Local Appeal Court where the decision 
of the first court was set aside. The appeal court refused 
to entertain the petition for divorce, observing that the mar­
riage in question was a "legal marriage" and therefore that 
the court had no jurisdiction. (This was a recurrent error 
which is considered elsewhere in this study.) Despite the de­
cision that it had no jurisdiction over the case, the Blantyre 
Local Appeal Court went on to order the husband to pay compen­
sation and maintenance in respect of the children who were ap­
parently supposed to remain with the wife. The husband appealed 
to the High Court, contending that, while it might have been 
contrary to the rules of the church to take a second wife, it 
was not contrary to the law of the land. He maintained that 
he was legally entitled to take a second wife and that the re­
spondent was wrong to insist on the abandonment of the second 
wife as a condition for reconciliation. As it was the wife 
who was in the wrong, he prayed the High Court to set aside 
the orders for compensation, maintenance and custody.
On the interpretation of the law, the High Court, predic­
tably, agreed with the appellant. Cram, J., observed:
....This court required the appellant to produce an ex­
tract copy from the register of the Registrar-General.
This document is headed: "African Marriage (Christian
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Rites) Registration Ordinance", whereas a monogamous mar­
riage certificate in terms of the Marriage Ordinance 
bears the words "Marriage Ordinance, Section 26".
The assessors, having had S.3 of the African Mar­
riage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance read to 
them, and having listened to the parties' submissions, 
expressed the opinion that the marriage was a customary 
one, unaffected in law by the Christian rites. The mar­
riage, therefore remained a potentially polygamous one 
and so the husband had a legal right to take a second 
wife. He could not of course commit adultery with a 
lawful wife.117
Thus, the wife's contention that a Christian marriage ceremony 
under the 1923 Ordinance prevented the man from taking a 
second wife was rejected by the court. Even so, the court's 
decision went in favour of the wife. Whether or not the hus­
band was entitled to take a second wife was obviously not the 
only question at issue. There was another, related, question 
involved, namely, whether the woman was entitled to leave her 
husband on account of his polygyny. The opinion of the asses­
sors, which the court accepted, as to principle under customary 
law was as follows:
...if the first wife objected to the husband taking a 
second wife, and would for this reason, no longer live 
with her husband, he had a right to divorce her. If, 
however, the husband did not wish to exercise this right, 
as here, the wife had a duty to live with her husband as 
the elder wife and accept the junior wife. If the wife 
refused to cohabit, as was the case here, then the mar­
riage had irretrievably broken down. In this dilemma, 
divorce was permissible at customary law, but understand­
ably, the wife, who was in the wrong, would receive no 
compensation.118
To this statement may be added, parenthetically, the fol­
lowing older decisions of lower courts. In Mwamkumbira 
Msowoya v. David Mtegha (1 9 4 0 / 4 1  the Mzimba District Com­
missioner held that the refusal of a woman to stay with her
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husband because the latter had taken a second wife amounted 
to blameworthy conduct entitling the husband to part of the
i of)
malobolo he had paid. The case of Kamwendo v. Amery (1938)
was an interesting one in the sense that a second wife was the
one objecting to the husband taking a third wife. Village
Headman Jawa, who was called to advise on the relevant Ngoni
custom, stated that a second and subsequent wives were not
even entitled to consultation if the husband sought to take
more wives. The objecting wife was asked to rejoin her husband
and warned that if she refused to do so, she would be the
party liable for the consequent dissolution of the marriage.
121In Eley Petros v. Jannes Jackson (1955), a woman who had 
refused to stay with a husband because the latter had taken an­
other wife was ordered to pay £4 10/- compensation for "wrong­
ful divorce". These cases, and the opinion of the assessors 
in Kandoje v. Mtengerenji, of course, represent the position
under strict traditional law, which, as already noted, has not
122always been adhered to by the courts.
The reason for the decision in Kandoje v. Mtengerenji vir­
tually amounted to a nullification of the import of Section 3 
of the 1923 Ordinance. Cram, J., stated:
....In this instance, however, the husband had entered 
into a collateral agreement to induce his wife to marry 
him on the understanding that he would not take a second 
wife, even if he had a legal right to do so. The wife 
had married on the strength of this promise that she 
would be the only wife. As the husband had broken his 
collateral promise, the party suffering would be entitled 
to an award* of compensation . . . .123
He continued:
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....Customary law never contemplated the superimposition 
of a church ceremony on customary marriage by which the 
husband, entitled to take a second wife, vowed not to do
so. To be in breach of this collateral promise could be
a species of cruelty entitling the wife to stay away
from the matrimonial home.124
Accordingly, the court decreed divorce. It also held that 
the wife was entitled to an award of compensation of £25. Ac­
cording to the relevant customary law, apparently, the husband 
was legally entitled to custody. However, the court held that 
the children were still very young and that it was in their
best interest that the mother should have custody and not the,
125husband who had taken a new wife. The husband was also or­
dered to pay £1 per month for the maintenance of each child 
till each reached the age of seven years. Afterwards, he 
would pay £2 per month per each child. The wife could apply 
to the Blantyre Local Court for an increase in the maintenance.
The husband, on the other hand, could also apply for custody
126after each child reached the age of seven years.
It is clear from the judgement that the so-called colla­
teral contract was not deduced from any private transaction 
between the parties but from the very public exchange of reli­
gious vows. It may be observed, with respect, that many Afri­
can people who go through Christian church marriage ceremonies 
do so in the hope or with the intention of living monogamous 
lives. The obvious exceptions are those Africans who go 
through Christian marriage ceremonies in those independent Afri­
can churches which allow polygyny. The association of polygyny 
with a Christian marriage ceremony is, generally speaking, con­
trary to public expectation. Having said this, however, it
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must be submitted that the vows made during a Christian mar­
riage ceremony are in substance, though not in form, under­
takings by each party towards the church rather than towards 
the other party. To interpret those vows as a species of 
private contract amounts to a distortion of their function. 
Even admitting that such vows constitute a collateral agree­
ment between the parties, it is a doubtful proposition that 
any principle of customary law can be altered by private 
treaty. Authorities on the point are hard to come by. The 
National Traditional Appeal Court, at least, appears to have
rejected this proposition in the case of Kakhobwe v . Kakhobwe
127(1981). In the course of its judgement, the court stated:
....If two parties chose to follow a certain custom in 
the celebration of marriage, this court will follow the 
dictates of that custom as to the status, obligations 
and rights that pertain to the parties both during or 
after the marriage has been dissolved or brought to an 
end by death. The custom will be followed with all its 
forcefulness and effect notwithstanding the spouses' 
intention or representations to the contrary.128
Thus, the only way two people can effectively bind themselves 
to monogamy would be to solemnise their marriage under the 
Marriage Ordinance /"ActJ, 1902.
Equally, or even more important! , was the wording of 
Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance. The proviso in that Section, 
it may be recalled, emphatically stated that the religious 
ceremony of marriage:
...shall not as regards the parties thereto alter or 
affect their status or the consequences of any prior 
marriage entered into by either party according to 
native /“African/ law or custom or involve any legal 
consequences whatever.
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This clause would clearly seem to have been intended to rule 
out the very argument used by Cram, J., in Kandoje v. Mtenger- 
en ji. A "collateral contract" could certainly not be regar­
ded as not amounting to "any legal consequence whatever". In 
addition, if the religious vows were to be regarded as amount­
ing to a "collateral contract", why stop at the issue of mono­
gamy? There would have been no reason, for example, why a 
Christian marriage ceremony in a Catholic or Anglican church 
could not have amounted to a "collateral contract" ruling out 
divorce. To date, Kandoje v. Mtengerenji remains the most 
authoritative judicial decision on the 1923 Ordinance as far 
as the question of monogamy is concerned. With much respect, 
however, the decision is not a satisfactory one. It ascribes 
to a Christian marriage ceremony those legal consequences 
which the legislators had expressly refused to attach to such 
a ceremony. On the other hand, the decision can also be viewed 
in the broader context of changing attitudes towards polygyny.
Kandoje v. Mtengerenji, like the other cases considered in a
129previous chapter, can be seen as an example of judicial re­
luctance to apply the full force of the traditional principle 
of polygyny and as an example of the growing recognition of 
the right of women to opt out of customary marriages which 
have become polygynous in fact rather than merely in potential.
8. African Marriage and Statutory Monogamy
Although noone has ever been prosecuted for bigamy in 
Malawi, the courts have always given effect to the monogamous 
character of marriage under the Marriage Act (Ordinance) when 
dealing with the rights and obligations of the parties vis a 
vis each other.
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In practically all the cases bearing on the subject, the 
actions have been either for divorce or for the restitution 
of conjugal rights. The earliest cases are those decided by 
the District /"Magistrates'] Courts which, without proper juris­
diction, often settled disputes arising from marriages contrac­
ted under the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912. In
one such case, decided by the Blantyre District Court in
1301913, the husband petitioned the court for an order for the 
return of his wife who had deserted him. The wife's refusal 
to live with her husband was based on the ground that the lat­
ter had violated the original marriage contract by taking a 
second wife. A certificate of marriage celebrated in a church 
of the Zambezi Industrial Mission under the 1912 Ordinance was 
produced. The court held for the wife, observing that the man 
had violated and was continuing to violate his marriage con­
tract and would therefore not expect the respondent to fulfill 
her obligations. In another case held in 1914, the same court 
observed that a man who had taken another wife when married 
under the 1912 Ordinance was in breach of his contract of mar­
riage with the first wife and this constituted for the other
131party a sufficient ground for divorce.
132G-A-B Khondiwa v. Evelyn Mtambalika (1965) is a case 
that came before the High Court by way of an appeal from the 
Blantyre Local Appeal Court. The case deals with a few other 
important points, but these will be left out for the moment.
The facts were as follows. The parties had first contracted 
marriage under customary law. After two years, they went 
through another marriage ceremony at the Blantyre Mission. Al-
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though it is not at all certain from the evidence that this 
was the case, the High Court found that the second marriage 
had been contracted under the terms of the 1902 Ordinance.
In the lower court the woman had complained that her husband 
had "divorced" her by marrying another woman. The complaint 
that one is being "divorced" is a familiar way of instituting 
divorce proceedings in African courts. What the petitioner 
wants is a divorce decree, but he or she does not want to ap­
pear to be eager for divorce as this may prejudice his or her
rights regarding compensation etc. In the present case, how­
ever, the petitioner would seem to have assumed that the re­
spondent had effectively terminated the marriage by sending 
her away and by "marrying" another woman under customary law. 
Thus, she simply asked the court for compensation from her 
husband and for an order that the husband should build a 
house for her and provide maintenance for the four children 
of the marriage. It would seem that the lower court had
viewed the matter in the same way as the petitioner. It or­
dered the husband to pay £75 compensation, to build a brick 
house for the wife and the children and to provide maintenance 
for the latter. The Local Appeal Court upheld the decision of 
the lower court, but further made a specific order that the 
husband should pay 15/- per month for each child in mainten­
ance .
In the High Court, Cram, J., was not sure whether the 
lower court had'purported to dissolve the marriage or had 
merely assumed that the marriage had been brought to an end by 
the husband's unilateral repudiation. Whatever the case, it
was held by the High Court that the second marriage ceremony 
between appellant and respondent constituted a marriage under 
the 1902 Ordinance. As such, the Local Court had no juris­
diction to dissolve it. It was declared that the second mar­
riage would still subsist "prohibiting either spouse during 
its subsistence from contracting a second polygamous marriage". 
Cram, J., was non-committal on whether or not a customary-law 
marriage is obliterated if the same parties go through a sub­
sequent marriage ceremony under the Marriage Ordinance. Ex
abundanti cautela^ he went on to dissolve the customary mar­
riage on the ground of total incompatibility. The husband 
was adjudged to be the guilty party as he had put his wife 
away and was "living in adultery with another woman". The or­
ders of the lower court were allowed to stand. The relation­
ship of the appellant with the other woman was "adulterous" 
because, by virtue of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, the inten­
ded customary marriage was null and void ^b initio.
In the more recent case of Eva Chigulu v. Patrick Chigulu
133and Mrs Chigulu (1982), it was the marriage under the Mar­
riage Act, 1902, that was declared null and void. The peti­
tioner and the first respondent had gone through a marriage 
ceremony at the Registrar of Marriages at Zomba under the pro­
visions of the Marriage Act. During the ceremony, the respon­
dent had described himself as a widower. In fact, unknown 
to the petitioner, the respondent's wife (the second respon­
dent) was still alive and her customary marriage to the re­
spondent was still subsisting. Later, the respondent and co­
respondent resumed cohabitation. As a consequence, the
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petitioner instituted the proceedings praying for the dissolu­
tion of her marriage to the respondent on the ground of adul­
tery (joining the respondent's "first" wife as co-respondent) 
and, in the alternative, for a declaration that her marriage 
was null and void ab initio. It was held, Villiera, J., pre­
siding, that the marriage of the respondent to the petitioner 
was null and void because of the subsisting customary marriage 
between the respondent and co-respondent.
It may be observed in relation to the legal principle 
discussed in the two last cases that more difficult problems 
can arise. This is particularly so in relation to the posi­
tion of the woman in the bigamous marriage. Apart from cases 
of misrepresentation like the Chigulu case, in a society where 
polygyny is otherwise allowed, women are likely in good faith 
to contract marriages with married men. How should such 
women be treated? It is rather invidious to view them as 
"adulterers", to put them on the same moral footing as casual 
lovers or even prostitutes. Yet, under existing law, this 
would seem to be the position they are in. Their children 
would be fillius nullius. Before 1967 (when the Wills and 
Inheritance Act came into force) such children would probably 
have been excluded from inheritance on the intestacies of 
their biological fathers. Fortunately, however, the Wills 
and Inheritance Act does not distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate children. However, women parties to bigamous 
marriages would seem unlikely to benefit upon their partner's 
intestacy. The exact position would perhaps depend on the 
type of marriage between the man and his lawful wife. If the
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marriage contracted under the 1902 Act is the one which is 
valid then intestacy would be governed by Sections 18 and 19
1 Q /
of the 1967 Act. Under these provisions, it is very un­
likely that the surviving partner to the invalid marriage 
would benefit at all. If, as in the Chigulu case, it is the
customary marriage which is valid, then intestacy will be
135governed by Sections 16 and 17 of the 1967 Act. Under
these provisions, the surviving partner to the invalid mar­
riage might claim as a "dependant". A "dependant" under 
the Act need not be a wife, a child or a relative of the de­
ceased. In either case, however, the woman's position would 
be nowhere close to that of a "widow". There is certainly a 
dilemma here. If the law were to be relaxed to give some 
recognition to the bigamous marriage, this would obliterate 
the distinction between enforceable monogamy and polygyny. 
Already, the alternatives are limited for a woman whose hus­
band decides to violate his undertaking by taking an addition­
al "wife". If the man insists on continuing with the biga­
mous relationship, the woman's only way out of a polygynous 
situation is to seek divorce. A criminal prosecution would 
be spiteful and would be of no use to her. Indeed, except 
for the question of intestacy, the fact that divorce is vir­
tually the only real remedy against a husband's bigamous mar­
riage brings the positions of women married under the Marriage 
Act and women married under customary law (especially if the 
customary marriage is also blessed under the 1923 Act) very 
much closer.
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9. Monogamy, Law and African Society .
In conclusion, it may be observed that the influence of 
Christianity and other important aspects of European presence 
have rendered polygyny (in its extreme form, whereby scant 
attention would be paid to the wishes of women as regards the 
type of married life they should lead) less acceptable social­
ly and, it would seem, legally. To this limited extent, the 
enactment of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and even the abor­
tive formulae put forward by the missions can be credited 
with the merit of pre-emption. It will be noticed, however, 
that the relevant provisions of the Marriage Ordinance/Act not 
only fail, but were in the first place never intended, to meet 
the needs of African society.
The most serious objection to the Marriage Act is that, 
with regard to those married under its provisions, it subjects 
polygyny to criminal prosecution. Violations of the penal 
provisions have been ignored by government officials. Alleg­
edly, judges of the High Court have sometimes referred cases 
involving violations of these provisions to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. Noone, however, has yet prosecu­
ted for the relevant offences. The reluctance of colonial 
officials to prosecute Africans on account of bigamy and rela­
ted offences was sometimes influenced by negative attitudes 
toward Africans and their social institutions. Still, it is 
submitted that the offences created by the Act have no rele­
vance whatsoever to African social problems. Their enforce­
ment may well pose a greater social menace than polygyny it­
self. Although many individual Africans may prefer monogamy
504
to polygyny, it can hardly be said that violations of the 
principle of monogamy constitutes such outrageous or anti­
social behaviour as to warrant criminal prosecution, let alone 
five years imprisonment.
In Eskia Mphahlele's novel, Chirundu, one conversation of 
two of the protagonists turns on the central issue of the 
novel's plot - a charge of bigamy in a Zambian court brought 
against a Cabinet Minister:
....'Bigamy, bigamy', Chieza says, as if he has been lis­
tening to his own private conversation. 'What a petty 
thing for a Cabinet Minister to be hauled up for.'
'That's part of the reason for my contempt, See.*
Why would the blinking idiot go and legalise a city 
piece when he could have access to it without all that 
paper and dotted line and ring stuff? The people who 
will be looking on must think him an ass because they 
have extra-mural interests all over the place while they 
play the dutiful husband and father. Why would the 
daffer do this kind of thing, why?' /Pitso observes^.
'The way I read you, the line between contempt and 
sympathy is very, very thin.' /Chieza retorts^.13o
A man charged with bigamy is more likely to attract the sympa­
thy rather than the contempt or condemnation of, at least, his 
fellow men. Polygyny even by those married under the Marriage 
Act, could hardly be said to offend the public conscience. 
African society has been a poor soil for the principle of mon­
ogamy in its extreme Western form, whereby its violation may 
even lead to criminal prosecution.
Even in the context of the English legal system from 
where the relevant penal provisions were borrowed, doubts have 
been expressed as to the existence of an adequate rationale
for the severe penalty (seven years imprisonment) prescribed
137for bigamy. Glanville Williams observed that:
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....The only anti-social consequences that are necessar 
ily involved in the mere celebration of a bigamous mar­
riage are (1) the falsification of the state records, 
and (2) the waste of time of the Minister of religion 
or Registrar.138
may still fulfill a useful purpose in one type of case, namely 
"where the other party is innocent and is deceived into taking
They emphasise, on the other hand, that "where both parties 
know the facts and marry to make their cohabitation more re­
spectable the offence is a relatively minor one" and that the 
punishment of seven years imprisonment is "altogether out of
Professors J.C. Smith
139a highly detrimental course of action". Such conduct, they
argue, should be severely discouraged by criminal law.^^
proportion".
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CHAPTER NINE
THE QUESTION OF DIVORCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF STATUTORY MARRIAGE LAW
At every crucial stage in the history of the law of marriage 
in Malawi, the subject of divorce has been one of the most 
central and controversial. This chapter details some of the 
key points already mentioned in preceding chapters and pre­
sents further relevant material. It will be seen that it is 
in relation to the subject-matter of divorce that some of 
the basic issues of marriage-law policy can best be high­
lighted.
The structure of the law governing divorce generally cor­
responds to the structure of the law of marriage. Divorce and 
related disputes arising from marriages contracted under the
Marriage Act fall under one legal regime within which the Di­
ce
vorce Act is the principal legislation. For the purposes of 
this study it is unnecessary to examine that Act and its ori­
gins in detail.^- The discussion of the Divorce Act /"Ordinance^ 
in this chapter will be concerned mainly with the question of 
its application to Africans, and with the relationship between 
the Ordinance and other legislation passed or merely proposed 
with respect to the marriages of African Christians.
The other type of divorce law is that applicable to mar­
riages contracted under customary law. The main principles 
of this law have already been described in an earlier chapter. 
Apart from local authority by-laws dealing with the registra­
tion of marriages and divorces, there has never been any
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legislation on the customary law of divorce, nor has any ques­
tion of introducing such legislation ever been mooted. Thus, 
the task of adapting customary law to the needs and ideas of 
modern life has rested entirely on the courts.
Between the law under the Divorce Ordinance, which was 
designed primarily for Europeans, and customary law, which was 
preserved solely for Africans, the Native Marriage (Christian 
Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, occupied a somewhat ambi­
valent place and this was in turn a reflection of the ambiva­
lent position or status of African Christians within the colon­
ial social and legal structure. The history of this Ordinance 
will be reviewed with specific reference to the question of 
the application of customary divorce law to African Christians. 
The current practice in divorce cases involving African Chris­
tians will be considered and the question will be raised whether 
the 1923 Ordinance has had any impact on the evolution of cus­
tomary divorce law.
1. The Divorce Ordinance, 1905, and its Application to
Africans
3
When originally enacted in 1905, the Divorce Ordinance 
was specific (although by no means entirely clear) as to the 
categories of people to whom its provisions would be available. 
More specifically, it was clear that members of the indigenous 
population could not avail themselves of its provisions unless 
they had been married under the provisions of the Marriage Or­
dinance, 1902. The relevant clause of the Divorce Ordinance 
read:
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Nothing hereinafter contained shall authorize - 
The grant of any relief under this Ordinance unless 
the petitioner resides in the Protectorate at the time 
of presenting the petition; and (a) is not an aboriginal 
native of Africa, or (b) being an aboriginal native of 
Africa has been married under the provisions of the Mar­
riage Ordinances in force in the Protectorates of East 
Africa, Uganda, or British Central Africa....4
Thus, save for the condition of residence, it would seem that 
the Ordinance was available to any person who was not "an 
aboriginal of Africa". On the face of the Ordinance, this 
would still include, for example, an aboriginal Nigerian or 
South African.^
Later editions, including the present Act, are not as' 
specific. The only people they seem to exclude are those who 
have not acquired domicile in the country. Thus, it is only 
by implication, from those provisions of the Marriage Ordi­
nance expressly preserving customary law, that marriages con­
tracted under customary law can be said to be excluded from 
the statutory law of divorce.
Perhaps even less clear in both the Divorce Ordinance/Act 
(even as originally enacted) and the Marriage Ordinance/Act is 
whether or not it is obligatory that a marriage contracted 
under the latter statute should be dissolved in accordance 
with the provisions of the former. The Marriage Ordinance 
made it clear that jurisdiction over marriages contracted under 
its provisions would be reserved to the High Court - and the
c
relevant clause still forms part of existing legislation. Yet 
the mere fact that the High Court would exercise jurisdiction 
did not mean that the Divorce Ordinance necessarily provided
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the only law applicable. As long as the parties to a dispute 
were Africans, the High Court had power to apply custom­
ary law, so long as the same was not repugnant to justice and 
morality or contrary to any written law. Thus, in theory cus­
tomary law could have been applied (by the High Court) to dis­
solve a marriage contracted under the Marriage Ordinance be­
tween Africans.^
At least in practice, it has never been questioned, how­
ever, that a statutory marriage can only be dissolved in ac-
8cordance with the statutory law of divorce. This undoubted­
ly must also have been the intention of the relevant legisla­
tors. Indeed, it can be observed in this regard that the Di­
vorce Ordinance, like the Marriage Ordinance, was framed in a 
way which seems to indicate an intention to lay down what 
would be a general law of the land. The conditions upon which 
divorce could be granted, for example, were expressed in 
clearly exclusive terms. Thus, the only instances in which 
the court could apply some different law had to be those ex­
pressly provided for under some statute.
As already indicated, the Christian Native Marriage Ordi­
nance, 1912, had been enacted simply to facilitate missionary 
compliance with the requirements of the law in celebrating 
statutory marriage between African Christians. The substan­
tive law applicable to marriages contracted under the Ordinance 
was to be exactly the same as that applicable to marriages con­
tracted under the principal Marriage Ordinance. This also 
meant that the position with respect to divorce would be the 
same.
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In 1913, the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, was amended to en­
able the Governor to authorise (by notice in the Gazette) any 
magistrate holding a District Native Court to exercise juris­
diction with respect to marriages celebrated under the 1912 
Ordinance.^ To this day, the 1913 amendment remains the 
only statute ever actually enacted in an attempt to extend 
jurisdiction under the Divorce Ordinance/Act beyond the High 
Court.
The 1913 amendment was - as far as can be ascertained -
never officially invoked until its repeal in 1923.^* Still
in 1913, the Christian Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912, was
itself amended to allow magistrates holding District Native
Courts to hear and determine applications for the removal of
12caveats with respect to marriages under the 1912 Ordinance. 
Unlike this latter amendment, the amendment to the Divorce 
Ordinance did not automatically extend jurisdiction to magis­
trates. Yet some of the magistrates seem to have assumed that 
such was the case. The enactment of the Native Marriage 
(Christian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923, probably com­
pounded this confusion. Marriages solemnised under the 1912 
Ordinance could have been confused with those contracted under 
the 1923 Ordinance. That some magistrates mistakenly exer­
cised jurisdiction with respect to marriages contracted under
13the 1912 Ordinance is clearly shown by the court records.
The relevant judgements of the District Courts do not 
contain sufficient detail as to fact or law. Thus, it is gen­
erally difficult to tell how scrupulously the provisions of 
the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, had been observed. The pronounce-
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ment of decree nisi in most of the cases (instead of immedi­
ate dissolutions of marriages) would suggest some adherence 
to the provisions of the Divorce Ordinance. In one case,*^ 
a Mzimba District Court refused to hear a petition for di­
vorce brought by a wife in the absence of her husband or in 
the absence of proof that the latter had been served with
notice of the petition. The husband was away and the petition
had been brought against his father. This was acceptable 
practice under customary law, but the relevant marriage had 
been contracted under the 1912 Ordinance. Even the grounds 
upon which the decrees had been made seemed to meet the re­
quirements of the Divorce Ordinance. On the other hand, how­
ever, the relevant cases would seem to have been decided with 
the minimum of formality. The parties were never legally re­
presented. Elaborate technicalities and procedures were 
never insisted upon. The judgements themselves were spare, 
devoid of any elaborate reasoning. Indeed, it is interesting 
that records of the relevant cases were not even kept separ­
ately, but in the same books as those used for recording cases 
arising from customary-law marriages.
It may be noted In general that the legal position under
the Divorce Act is drastically different from that obtaining
under traditional customary law. Divorce can only be granted 
if the petitioner proves the existence of at least one of an 
exclusive list of grounds.^ Even on proof of any of the pre­
scribed grounds, a decree for divorce may still be refused for 
various reasons specified by the A c t . ^  Further, the jurisdic­
tion of the High Court under the Divorce Act must be exercised
520
in accordance with the law in matrimonial proceedings in the 
High Court of Justice in England. The Matrimonial Causes 
Rules, 1950, as amended by the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) 
Rules of 1951 of England have been specifically adopted in 
Malawi by subsidiary legislation.^^ The implication of this 
is that, to obtain divorce under the Act, highly formalised 
and relatively complex procedures have to be followed. Legal 
representation is practically indispensable. Worth noting is 
the fact that the decided cases, few as they are, clearly 
show that the High Court has scrupulously applied the provi­
sions contained in, or imported under, the Divorce Act. The 
provisions of the Act have been applied without any allowance 
being made for the different social circumstances of African 
litigants. The mores and standards prevailing in African com­
munities have not been allowed to influence the interpretation
18of the Divorce Act. English precedents have been used prac­
tically as the sole guide in the interpretation of the law.
2. Conflicting Mission Attitudes to Divorce Among African
Christians
As already observed, the views of the non-episcopal mis­
sions at the Blantyre conference of 1920 were embodied in 
"Bill B". Like its rival "Bill A" or the 1923 Ordinance, the 
general principle of "Bill B" was to remove African Christian 
marriages from the regime of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, 
and the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, and to place them under the 
regime of customary law. "Bill B", however, departed from 
this general principle partly by excluding the application of 
customary law insofar as the grounds for divorce were concerned.
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The Bill expressly specified the grounds upon which divorce
could be obtained. These grounds, as already noted, were
adultery on the part of the respondent and desertion for a
19period of three years or more.
Under the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, as it stood at the
time of the 1920 conference, a husband could apply for divorce
20on the ground of the wife's adultery simpliciter. This was 
the only ground available to the husband. The wife was not 
entitled to petition for divorce on the mere ground that her 
husband had committed adultery. To constitute a ground for 
divorce, the husband's adultery had to be coupled with incest, 
bigamy, marriage with another woman, cruelty or desertion for 
two years or upwards. The wife could also petition for di­
vorce if the husband was guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. 
Further, the wife could petition for divorce if her husband 
had changed his profession of Christianity for the profession 
of some other religion and had gone through a ceremony of mar­
riage with another woman.
The practical differences between "Bill B" and the law 
under the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, can be underestimated. Al­
though providing for only two grounds for divorce, the proposed 
law under "Bill B" would have significantly widened the scope 
for divorce. For the husband and wife, an additional ground - 
desertion - would be available. Under the Divorce Ordinance, 
the ground of desertion was not available to the husband. It 
was not available to the wife either, unless it was coupled 
with adultery. Under the law proposed in "Bill B", the wife
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would be placed on the same footing as the husband as regards 
the offence of adultery. Like the husband, she would be able 
to petition for divorce on the ground of adultery simpliciter. 
For the wife, the law under the Divorce Ordinance seemed to 
provide a wider scope for divorce in that there were addition­
al grounds (of sodomy, bestiality, rape and the abandonment 
of Christianity coupled with marriage to another woman) upon 
which divorce could be obtained. Although actual figures do 
not exist, it is clear from court records, however, that it 
was adultery and desertion which ranked among the most common 
matrimonial offences. Sodomy, bestiality and rape, on the 
other hand, were hardly heard of in the courts. In practice, 
it is thus the law under "Bill B" which would have been less re­
strictive. It must be noted in this connection that indirectly, 
an offence such as rape would probably have been available as 
a ground for divorce under "Bill B", as the ground of adultery 
could easily have been interpreted to include rape.
However, it was not the primary aim of the proponents of 
"Bill B" to widen the scope for divorce. The relevant clause 
in "Bill B" does not seem to have been suggested with the law 
under the Divorce Ordinance particularly in mind. The concern 
was mainly with the position under customary law. The primary 
aim of the clause was to restrict the operation of customary 
law, under which there was virtually no limit to the grounds 
upon which divorce could be granted.
The Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance, 1923, reflected the terms of "Bill A". Like the 1923 
Ordinance, "Bill A" provided for the application of customary
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law to relevant marriages without qualification. However, 
the disagreement between the episcopal missions, who had sup­
ported "Bill A", and the non-episcopal missions, who had sup­
ported "Bill B", did not essentially arise from any differ­
ences in the way they viewed the law of divorce under customary 
law. The disagreement largely reflected differences in their 
conceptions of the nature of "Christian marriage" in general.
The Catholic and Anglican missions were opposed to di­
vorce regardless of the circumstances. The following quota­
tion from an address by the Anglican Bishop of Nyasaland in 
1926 contains a vigorous affirmation of the opposition to di­
vorce. He stated:
....Although divorce in law does allow re-marriage, and 
such marriages are perfectly legal,21 yet we cannot re­
gard a divorce decree as having any canonical effect 
whatever. The man, as we believe, in the sight of God 
remains bound in marriage to his wife till death, how­
ever she may have sinned against him, and the man cannot 
put asunder what God has joined. If he marries another, 
she is not his wife from the Christian standpoint, and 
neither he nor the new wife, whatever her legal status, 
can be in Christian communion. It follows from this 
that the circumstances which led to the divorce hav^> 
nothing whatever to do with the matter. A man or woman 
may have been grievously wronged, have been entirely 
innocent of any sort of provocation, and if he remains 
single he may and should seek the help which he will 
assuredly receive in regular communion, but however sorry 
one may be for him, and however much one may wish to help 
him, his complete innocence of all cause of complaint 
cannot make a second union a real marriage if the first 
continues to exist, or justify his living in such union.22
The rigours of the doctrine of indissolubility would in 
some cases legitimately be avoided by invoking the rather ela­
borate doctrine of nullity or other ecclesiastical variations 
of it. As one writer put it in relation to the canon law in 
early England, the doctrine of nullity was essentially that:
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....The church was unwilling to end a marriage. It was 
/however.7 willing to say that a marriage had never began. 
In the words of the Common Prayer - ’Those whom God hath 
joined together let no man put asunder*. But curiously 
enough it was permissible to say that God should never 
have joined them together in the first place.23
01
The grounds for nullity recognised by the churches tended
to be far wider than those specified under the Divorce Ordi- 
25nance. With a minimum of ingenuity, it was possible to ex­
tend the grounds for nullity in such a way as would easily 
have made the dissolution of marriage under ecclesiastical 
practice a far easier task than under the Marriage Ordinance. 
Under church practice, for example, a marriage could be an­
nulled if it was found that at the time of the celebration of 
it one party had not understood the nature of marriage as a 
life-long union with the other partner to the exclusion of 
others. In fact, the finding of ignorance as to the nature 
of marriage would often be deduced from conduct subsequent to 
the celebration of marriage, for example, wanton adultery or
9 A
taking another wife. This was more readily done in mar­
riages between baptised Christians and non-Christians or non­
baptised converts. Indeed this ground for nullity could even
be abused to enable a married Christian to abandon his or her
27unconverted partner for a fellow Christian. Still, in prin­
ciple, the episcopal missions were totally opposed to divorce. 
They, thus, eschewed and sought to steer clear of any legis­
lative measure which could compromise their stand on divorce. 
Both "Bill B" and the 1912 Ordinance were considered to consti­
tute such measures.
Of course, these missions opposed any kind of divorce, in­
cluding divorce granted under customary law. However, the
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generalised terms of "Bill A" with its reference to customary
law were not in themselves offensive to these missions, unlike
the specific references to divorce appearing in "Bill B" and
in the 1912 Ordinance. The main attraction of "Bill A" to
these missions was its omission of any specific reference to
divorce. It is important to note that according to Catholic
and Anglican doctrines, marriage was essentially a religious
28sacrament and not a civil contract. The relevant missions 
did not go to the extreme of denying any role to the state in 
the regulation of marriage. Still, they were in favour of 
limiting state involvement in matters of marriage to the mini­
mum. Marriage to them essentially belonged to the sphere of 
the church and not the state. In the event of any conflict, 
the view of the episcopal missions was that the law of the 
church was supreme. In theory, customary law was more likely 
to lead to conflict than the law under either the existing 
Ordinances or "Bill B". On the other hand, however, customary 
law lacked the authoritative rigidity of statutory regulation. 
Although customary law was regarded as an impediment to Chris­
tian married life, the missionaries were already used to the 
idea of ignoring or supplanting it whenever it conflicted 
with their teaching. It would be more difficult to ignore or 
supplant any specific rules or principles embodied in legisla­
tion.
In contrast, the non-episcopal missions did not regard
marriage as a religious sacrament. The religious ceremony was
viewed merely as attaching the implications and obligations of
29a Christian marriage to what was otherwise a civil contract.
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Thus, the non-episcopal missions tended to be more concerned 
about the content of secular law than their episcopal counter­
parts. Ideally, even the non-episcopal missions accepted the 
principle that marriage was a lifelong union. Divorce was, 
however, admitted in certain circumstances. In fact, any di­
vorce properly granted in a court of law would be regarded as 
valid by the church. A member was expected to adhere to the 
regulations of his church governing divorce, but a divorce 
obtained against the rules of the church would, strictly, 
still be regarded as valid. The party contravening the rules 
would, however, be subject to discipline. Obviously, it 
would have been ideal for the missions if the courts granted 
divorces only in cases where those involved would not be ex­
posed thereby to church discipline.
3. The Question of Divorce and the Proposals to Repeal the
1923 Ordinance
The question of divorce was no doubt the most significant 
of the issues raised in connection with the proposals to repeal 
the 1923 Ordinance. Two interrelated matters were involved, 
namely: which body of law should be applied to, and which
courts should exercise jurisdiction over, marriages between 
African Christians. For convenience, details of the proposals 
relating to the two matters will be presented separately.
There can be no question, however, that the underlying policy 
considerations in relation to these matters were the same. 
Discussion of the policy issues will follow the presentation 
of the actual proposals.
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a) The Lav Governing Divorce
The solemnisation of marriage under the 1923 Ordinance
30entailed no legal consequences whatever. Thus the Chris­
tian ceremony would not affect the grounds - determined solely
31by customary law - upon which divorce could be granted.
It is difficult to tell how, in the period between 1923 
and 1933, the courts had actually interpreted Section 3 of 
the 1923 Ordinance. Available official correspondence sug­
gests that there was a measure of confusion among district 
magistrates as to the import of the section. It is clear 
that not all the magistrates were sure as to whether customary
law was applicable to the relevant marriages or whether some
32other law was applicable. The Committee of the Synod of 
the Church of Central Africa, Presbyterian at its meeting of 
5th October, 1933, as already seen, also complained of a lack
of uniformity between the courts in dealing with cases re-
33ferred to them. In the absence of relevant court records 
for this period, and the cases could not have been all that 
many, one cannot be sure how serious this "lack of uniformity" 
had become.
The non-episcopal missions were already opposed to the 
formula of the 1923 Ordinance and whatever experience they had 
had of its actual working seems only to have hardened their 
opposition. As already noted, the issue of divorce was para­
mount. The Committee of the CCAP Synod noted how, in cases 
involving Christians:
...divorce is often granted for reasons of which the 
church cannot approve and which are repugnant to Chris­
tian conscience.34
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In the letter addressed to the Chief Secretary in 1936, the 
Synod underlined the need for new legislation by stressing 
the fact:
...cases still continued to occur in the courts and de­
cisions given which were at variance with Christian 
principles.35
This was reiterated at the 1936 conference of missionary and
O fi
government officials. The Rev. J.F. Alexander commented 
that "any trifling reason from the Christian standpoint /wasJ 
sufficient" to enable a person to obtain a divorce. In an­
other statement at the same conference, he observed that:
...the great trouble is that divorces are given for dif­
ferent reasons and also for reasons which are not valid 
in our own eyes such as failing to produce children.37
It was at the same time clear that "Bill B" of 1920 could 
not be revived in its entirety. The full support of the epis­
copal missions was a necessary condition for any chance of 
success in the anticipated reforms. A clause in any measure 
specifically providing for the grounds upon which divorce 
could be obtained was bound to alienate the episcopal missions 
who, at least before 1936, seemed bent on continuing with the 
1923 Ordinance. On the question of divorce, a new formula was 
necessary, not so much to bridge as to bypass the doctrinal 
gulf between the episcopal and non-episcopal missions.
At the meeting of the Committee of the CCAP Synod, the 
idea was mooted -that instead of enacting one piece of legisla­
tion specifying the grounds for divorce, the Government could 
draw up a parent Ordinance under which rules could be made for
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38separate denominations. Auspiciously, a suggestion on al­
most identical lines was made by a member of the Roman Cathol­
ic mission in 1934. In a letter to the Chief Secretary,
Father Paradis of the White Fathers Mission suggested as an 
improvement on the proposals of "Bill B", that:
...questions concerning the severance of the marriage tie 
/*should7 be decided in accordance with the Rules or Us­
ages of the church or other religious body to which the 
parties belong.39
He continued:
....The consequence of /this7 ought to be that churches 
or religious bodies allowing for divorce could obtain a 
decree at their own request, and that churches or reli­
gious bodies which do not allow the practice of divorce 
would also have an Ordinance which would suit their 
tenets on the marriage question.40
There can be little doubt that this rather accommodating 
idea helped to secure the support of the episcopal missions 
for the proposed repeal of the 1923 Ordinance at the 1936 con­
ference. At this conference, a resolution was unanimously 
adopted which called for the repeal of the 1923 Ordinance and 
the enactment of another Ordinance on the lines of "Bill B" 
of 1920. The latter would, inter alia, include a provision 
under which the governing bodies of the various religious de­
nominations would, with the approval of the Governor-in- 
Council, make Rules for the divorce of Africans married in 
accordance with their respective religions.^ The Committee 
appointed to consider the question of African Christian mar­
riages adopted this formula in its preliminary draft Bill 
that was submitted in 1945. The relevant clause provided 
that:
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No marriage celebrated under the provisions of this 
/brdinance7 may be dissolved except in accordance with 
the tenets and rules of the church in which the parties 
to the marriage were married....42
The above formula was satisfactory to all the mainstream 
missions. The formula was, however, unacceptable to many
Africans and the opinion of most administrative officials was
/ ^
also highly critical. The Committee was ultimately com­
pelled to drop the proposal. In the final report to the Act­
ing Governor, submitted in 1948, it was stated:
....Your Committee’s greatest problem has been to decide 
what recommendations to make as to the dissolution of 
marriages between African Christians. Some of us are 
wholly opposed on religious grounds to the dissolution 
of Christian marriage validly /contracted^. But we 
recognise that, as other Christians are legally entitled 
to seek dissolution of their marriages in the courts, 
any measure which deprived African Christians of a simi­
lar remedy could only be regarded as discriminatory, 
that consequently Your Excellency would be precluded 
from giving your assent to such a measure ... and that 
there could be no prospect of the secretary of state 
advising His Majesty not to disallow it.44
The report here was simply echoing the criticisms which many 
Africans and administrative officials had voiced against the 
1945 preliminary proposals. The final recommendation on the 
question under discussion was closely tied to the recommenda 
tion on the question of jurisdiction and these matters will 
be considered presently.
b ) The Question of Jurisdiction
Prior to 1933, disputes arising from marriages contracted 
under the 1923 Ordinance fell under the jurisdiction of Dis­
trict (or Subordinate) Courts. The same courts had also exer­
cised jurisdiction over marriages contracted purely under
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customary law. Although never expressly stated in the Ordi­
nance itself, that these courts would exercise jurisdiction 
over marriages under the 1923 Ordinance was tacitly under­
stood by those involved at the 1920 conference. The creation 
of Native Authority courts, with jurisdiction over customary 
marriages, in 1933 introduced a new element into the whole 
subject of African Christian marriages. It must be noted that 
even those who had endorsed "Bill A", and were therefore in 
support of the principle of Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance, 
had not envisaged the assumption of jurisdiction by Native 
Authority courts. At the time of the 1920 conference the 
only alternative to giving jurisdiction to the Subordinate 
Courts was to reserve jurisdiction to the High Court. As al­
ready seen, the very reservation of jurisdiction to the High 
Court had constituted one cause for complaint against the 
working of the 1902 and 1912 Ordinances
Section 3 of the 1923 Ordinance stated that:
...the celebration of marriage under this Ordinance shall 
not as regards the parties thereto alter or affect their 
status or the consequences of any prior marriage entered 
into by either party according to native law or custom 
or involve any legal consequences whatever.
This left little doubt that the Native Authority courts would 
exercise jurisdiction over marriages celebrated under the 1923 
Ordinance. This was, indeed, the interpretation officially 
adopted by the administration. The interpretation is not con­
fined to Native Authority courts, but also holds true with 
respect to the later "African" or traditional-law courts.^
On the other hand, officials within the lower hierarchy of the
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judiciary have not always been ready to apply the jurisdic­
tion of customary-law courts to marriages which have been 
celebrated in Christian churches. Hence sometimes "African" 
courts have refused to entertain divorce petitions brought 
by Christian parties.^ In one case which came before the 
Zomba District Commissioner, a judgement of Native Authority 
Chikowi was quashed on the (erroneous) ground that the latter 
had no jurisdiction over a marriage which had been celebrated 
under the 1923 Ordinance.^® In the early 1930's it was also 
the belief of some missionaries, especially those of the epis­
copal churches, that the Native Authorities had no jurisdic­
tion over African Christian marriages celebrated under the 
1923 Ordinance.
The debate about the possible repeal of the 1923 Ordi­
nance proceeded on the correct assumption that the Native Auth­
ority courts had jurisdiction over marriages celebrated under 
this Ordinance. The unanimous view of the mission was that 
Native Authority courts were not competent to adjudicate on 
matters concerning the interpretation of Christian l a w . ^  As 
already seen, the missionaries, expressed the belief that 
African chiefs were either "pagans" or "mahommedans" and had 
no experience or knowledge of Christian marriage.^ A sugges­
tion to the effect that, in cases involving marriages of Afri­
can Christians, the Native Authorities could sit with African 
52church elders never found its way into any concrete proposal. 
Thus, the missions were agreed that Native Authority courts 
should be denied jurisdiction over African Christian marriages. 
In fact the very introduction of Native Authority courts was a
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major reason for the proposed repeal of the 1923 Ordinance.
In the preliminary report of 1945, it was recommended that 
first- and second-class Subordinate Courts should have exclu­
sive (first instance) jurisdiction over marriages contracted 
in accordance with the proposed Ordinance.
Again the proposal to exclude the Native Authorities 
from exercising jurisdiction over African Christian marriages 
was bitterly contested by most Africans and administrative 
officials. The Committee was forced to drop the 1945 recom­
mendation in its final report of 1948. Instead, it was recom­
mended that Native Authorities and Subordinate Courts should 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction under the proposed Ordinance. 
The idea was that the parties themselves would choose whether 
to take their dispute before a Subordinate Court or a Native 
Authority. The proposal was nothing short of an admission 
by the Committee that it had failed to agree upon a formula 
that would satisfy the various viewpoints on the matter.
The final proposals as to which law of divorce would ap­
ply, and which courts would exercise jurisdiction, with re­
spect to marriages of African Christians were not reduced 
into any specific clauses, and were not included in the final 
draft Bill. The Committee merely recommended, firstly, that 
the Divorce Ordinance, 1905, should be amended so as to allow 
first- and second-class Subordinate Courts to exercise juris­
diction in cases of divorce of Africans married not only
under the proposed African Christian Marriage Ordinance, but
53also under the 1902 Marriage Ordinance. Secondly, the rele­
vant section of the Native Courts Ordinance, 1947,^ would
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also be amended "to make it clear that Native Courts might 
exercise jurisdiction in cases of marriages" contracted under 
the proposed African Christian Marriage Ordinance. The in­
tention was to extend the application of the provisions of the 
Divorce Ordinance to all African Christians married under the 
proposed law. When hearing cases involving Africans married 
under this law the Native Authority courts would also be re­
quired to apply the provisions of the Divorce Ordinance.
As already n o t e d , e v e n  the final report of 1948 did 
not provide an acceptable alternative to the 1923 Ordinance. 
The Ordinance was left to stand and is still law today. On 
the particular questions of divorce and jurisdiction the 
Government found no justification for the proposal to confer 
the powers under the Divorce Ordinance on any court other 
than the High Court, let alone on the Native Authorities.^
It is rather puzzling how a process which had been in­
itiated partly because the missionaries believed that the 
Native Authorities were not competent to deal with Christian 
marriages should end with a recommendation enabling the 
Native Authorities to exercise jurisdiction under the Divorce 
Ordinance.
Of course, the Committee could not recommend that the 
Native Authorities be excluded from jurisdiction over African 
Christians, because this idea had already been rejected by 
most Africans and administrative officials. It was widely 
pointed out, and the Committee accepted this, that many 
Christian Africans still adhered very closely to African
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customs despite their conversion.^ There was not much wisdom, 
therefore, in ousting the jurisdiction of Native Authorities 
as these were the people most familiar with the customs. How­
ever, it could be pointed out in counter argument that Chris­
tians were adhering to African customs because under the ex-
58isting law this was inevitable. Under the proposed law, 
Christians would have no need to adhere closely to customary 
law. Admittedly, it might have been realised that there 
would have been no difference in practice even had marriage 
under the 1923 Ordinance entailed enforceable legal consequen­
ces. Experience has shown that even those Africans who marry 
under the Marriage Act also tend to adhere to customary law.
For example, where it is the custom, men pay malobolo even 
though they intend to solemnise their marriages under the 
Marriage Act. This has been recognised by legislation defin­
ing the powers of "African" courts. Although these courts 
have been denied jurisdiction over people married under the 
Act, they have been allowed to entertain claims arising purely
from the customary-law contract - for example, claims for the
59return of malobolo.
It was pointed out in the report of the Committee that 
the Native Authorities had already been handling divorces in­
volving Christians and therefore that they would not have 
much difficulty in applying the provisions of the Divorce Or­
dinance. This was a non sequitur. The marriages handled by 
the Native Authorities were customary-law marriages and the 
divorce law applied was customary divorce law, not Christian 
or any other foreign law. It must be pointed out that, even
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by people opposed to the repeal of the 1923 Ordinance, it was 
generally admitted that the Native Authorities could not ad­
minister Christian or other foreign law. In fact it was 
partly because of this that the whole issue of reform had been 
raised by the missions.
One of the fears expressed by the administration, in its 
rejection of the proposal under consideration, was of the 
danger that the Native Authorities would seriously depart from 
the principles of statutory law, which they would theoretical­
ly be expected to apply. In reply to this objection, the 
Report of the Committee presented an ingenious, although per­
haps fallacious, argument. In 1947, an amendment to the Di­
vorce Ordinance had brought the law regarding the grounds for 
divorce to what it is at present. The distinction between 
husband and wife was removed and either spouse could petition 
for divorce on the basis of any of the following grounds: 
adultery, desertion for at least three years, cruelty or in­
curable unsoundness of m i n d . ^  According to the Report of 
the Committee, these grounds of divorce had made the law 
under the Divorce Ordinance identical to that obtaining under 
customary law, so that there was little fear of a Native Auth­
ority court granting a remedy which would not be available in 
the High Court or before a magistrate.^  A further safeguard 
had been recommended, namely, that Native Authority courts 
should not entertain cases between Christians until the auth­
orities of the church or denomination to which the parties 
belonged had first had an opportunity of settling the differ­
ences between the parties.
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True, in practice divorces under customary law were nor­
mally granted on grounds similar to those appearing in the 
Divorce Ordinance. As already seen in a previous chapter, 
however, a court under customary law is not confined to any 
exclusive list of grounds in granting a divorce. More impor­
tantly, however, the grounds of adultery, desertion and cruelty 
under the Divorce Ordinance were highly technical in character, 
to such an extent that their legal content could hardly be 
equated with that of corresponding grounds under customary law. 
The equally technical defences, rules of evidence and procedure 
further distinguished the grounds under the Divorce Ordinance 
from those available under customary law. Moreover, the Di­
vorce Ordinance not only provided for divorce, but also for 
other remedies such as judicial separation, which had no paral­
lel under customary law. There was no sufficient basis for 
the supposition that Native Authorities would be able to handle 
applications under the Divorce Ordinance without seriously 
undermining the principles of that Ordinance.
Of course there were even more serious objections to the 
initial proposals of 1945, apart from the fact that they were 
strongly opposed by many Africans and government officials.
The proposal whereby the law governing divorce would be deter­
mined in accordance with the various bodies of religious law 
was, to say the least, rather unrealistic. In theory, the 
rules enacted pursuant to the relevant proposal would have 
taken on the character of subordinate legislation and would 
have been considered as part of the civil law. In reality, 
however, the proposal would have led to the direct involvement
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of secular courts in the implementation of Christian morality 
and church discipline. Even in England, the law did not go 
that far. The passing of the proposed law would have made 
divorce for African Christians more difficult than for Euro­
pean Christians married under either the Marriage Ordinance 
or the law in England. Only faith and conscience would pre­
vent a convinced English Christian from having recourse to 
the remedies of secular law. The state did not step in to 
compel a professed Christian to adhere to the teachings of 
his or her religion. Clearly to implement the proposed re­
form would have been incongruous as English law had itself 
evolved in the very opposite direction, from a law solely con­
cerned with the preservation of ecclesiastical values to a 
law reflective of social reality. Under the proposed law 
not only would divorce have been made difficult, but, in some 
cases, it would have been made legally impossible altogether. 
In addition, the proposals of 1945 would have led to further 
social divisions and subdivisions in the application of di­
vorce law and therefore to greater complexity and confusion.
The exclusion of Native Authority courts from exercising 
jurisdiction would clearly have been necessitated by the ap­
plication of church laws to marriages of African Christians. 
The Native Authorities might have been not only unable, but 
perhaps also unwilling to apply Christian rules where the lat­
ter clearly conflicted with African custom. Even the ability 
of the Subordinate Courts to administer church law ought not 
perhaps to have been taken for granted. Especially in rela­
tion to the episcopal missions, church doctrines relating to
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divorce were complex and usually a subject of much controversy. 
Their interpretation was never a straightforward matter. It 
must be pointed out that even were the law under the 1923 Or­
dinance to apply, the missions would have preferred the subor­
dinate courts to the Native Authorities. This preference was 
not and could not have been, based on any objective experience 
on the part of the missions. The campaign against the Native 
Authority courts by the missions had started as early as 1933, 
too early for any objective assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of those courts. In fact the impression conveyed 
by the court records is that the Native Authorities spent 
more time on divorce cases and made a greater effort to recon­
cile the parties than the Subordinate Courts had done. In­
deed, the practice is now well established, whereby "African" 
courts refuse to dissolve marriages involving Christians 
until church authorities have had the opportunity, and have 
failed, to reconcile the parties. Of course, there is no 
legal obligation that Christian parties should consult their 
churches before seeking divorce. The obligation is purely 
an ecclesiastical one. However, this fact is not always 
readily appreciated by those involved and Christians who seek 
divorce are sometimes greatly inconvenienced thereby.
4. General Basic Viewpoints and Arguments Relating to the
1923 Ordinance
It is essential further to clarify and comment on some 
of the main viewpoints regarding the Native Marriage (Chris­
tian Rites) Registration Ordinance, 1923.
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a) The Position of the Episcopal Missions
As already explained, the episcopal missions were init­
ially in agreement with the principle embodied in the 1923 
Ordinance. Their initial stand was influenced by the belief 
that the relevant principle would foster a complete separa­
tion of the religious aspects of marriage from the legal as­
pects. Ideally, these missions would have preferred to dis­
associate themselves from the secular/legal implications of 
marriage. Indeed, in the eyes of many of its advocates, it 
was this supposedly clear separation of law from religion 
which made the 1923 Ordinance an attractive formula.^
In fact, the 1923 Ordinance did more than merely separ­
ate the religious ceremony or sacrament from the legal con­
tract. It completely subordinated the religious aspects or 
obligations of marriage to the customary-law rights and obli 
gations. The subsequent position of the episcopal missions 
in favour of the repeal of the 1923 Ordinance was primarily 
a reaction to some of the practical implications of the sub­
ordination of the religious contract to the customary-law 
contract - particularly on issues relating to divorce. Un­
like their non-episcopal counterparts, who tended to see the 
problem of marriage legislation in a broader c o n t e x t , t h e  
episcopal missions viewed the problem in purely theological 
or religious terms. Their sole concern was to preserve the 
integrity of religious teaching. Thus, their objections to 
the 1923 Ordinance were mainly directed to ensuring that the 
operation of the law did not hamper or disadvantage parties 
who had a desire to uphold the teaching of the church.
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To take a typical case, a man and a woman would solemnise 
their marriage in a Catholic church in accordance with the 
provisions of the 1923 Ordinance. Under the law of the church 
the man was not allowed to take a second wife and neither party 
was allowed to divorce the other. Under customary law, how­
ever, the man was entitled to take additional wives and divorce 
could be obtained for a variety of reasons. The man would 
take advantage of customary law and take a second wife. A 
conscientious wife would refuse to cohabit with such a husband. 
Her refusal would of course not be justified under customary 
law and the husband would be entitled to divorce or he would 
be abso/i/ed from the obligation to maintain her. The wife 
could not seek divorce because this would violate the tenets 
of her church. She would thus be in a dilemma. It was with 
reference to problems of this type that the episcopal mis­
sions sought a change in the law.
The position of these missions was, for example, stated 
in the following extract from a letter (undated) of the Cath­
olic Archbishop, Mathew, to the Chief Secretary:
....In our view provision should be made to enable the 
Christian wife to retain her status in the community 
after her husband's re-marriage. The custody of chil­
dren should be accorded to the innocent party or by the 
use of discretionary powers to the party upholding the 
Christian marriage. The question of payment for con­
tinued maintenance should be examined, nor do we forget 
the situation in certain parts of Nyasaland in which 
the Christian husband is left in a weak position in the 
event of the dissolution of his marriage.66
The letter went on to express doubts as to the ability of 
Native Authorities to afford the requisite protection to the 
parties who had been faithful to the Christian teaching. A
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similar stance as the one above was taken by officials of the 
Universities Mission.^
The changes sought by these missions were of a practical 
type. It can be seen, however, that the suggested changes 
amounted to a suggestion that secular law should be employed 
as an instrument of church policy. State law would have been 
utilised to penalise those who had disobeyed, and to reward those 
who obeyed, church law. This perhaps could not have been a 
commendable role for the law. Even from the viewpoint of the 
church, the use of state law to reinforce moral teaching could
C O
have been counterproductive.
b ) The Arguments of the Non-Episcopal Missions
A basic assumption in the arguments in favour of retain­
ing the 1923 Ordinance was that African Christians would con­
tinue to behave in a way which accorded with the general prac­
tices of other Africans, rather than in a way which would re­
flect their conversion to Christianity. In their arguments 
against the 1923 Ordinance, the non-episcopal missions seemed 
clearly to reject this assumption. The arguments of these mis­
sions underlined the view that African Christians constituted 
a subcultural group distinct from the rest of African society. 
According to these missions there was an analogy between the 
position of African Christians and that of non-Christian 
Asians. Under the Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) 
Ordinance, 1929, the law had accorded recognition to non- 
Christian Asians as constituting distinct social groups, by 
allowing their marital relations to be regulated by the laws 
of their respective religions. According to the view of these
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missions, the 1923 Ordinance constituted an enforced integra­
tion of two distinct social groups. Dr Turner of the CCAP 
Synod observed:
...we have as you might say two communities, we have 
the pagans and the Christians, and they have different 
social relationships. Now if you demand that Christian 
Natives who marry must do so under the pagan customs, 
you are withdrawing them from the social relationships 
and consequences of their own community and insisting 
that they should be married under the relationships of 
another community.69
He continued:
...when dealing with something so intimate as marriage 
the fact remains that if you insist that Christians 
should for all time have the social relationships of 
their marriages determined by the native relationships 
of the community out of which they have come, you are 
withholding from them the possibility of progressing 
in the direction which they desire to go. If there is 
no legal difficulty, I cannot see why the demand of 
the natives for such a legal recognition of the Chris­
tian marriage as a binding contract should be with­
held.70
This was a rather ingenious argument tending as it did 
to anticipate any charge that the missions' proposals were 
an attempt to enlist the aid of secular authority to impose 
Christian moral values on Africans. It could be argued that 
it was under the 1923 Ordinance that.the law was being used 
to impose social values which African Christians had already 
renounced. Customary law, according to the above argument, 
did not reflect the social reality of African Christians.
The proposed change would bring the law closer to such reality.
As already stated, there was no evidence that African 
Christian congregations had actually asked for the proposed 
reforms. The expatriate missions were clearly acting on their
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own initiative. However, whether or not it had really become 
imperative for different legal standards to be applied to the 
relations of African Christians was largely not affected by 
the question as to who had initiated the proposed reforms.
Of course there could be no doubt that customary law did not 
meet with the expectations of the missions themselves as to 
how African Christians should conduct their marital affairs. 
There were various marriage practices under customary law of 
which the church disapproved. Africans who were to remain 
Christians had to give up, for example, such practices as 
polygyny, widow inheritance, and in some cases, divorce. This 
in itself, however, did not necessarily warrant the bold as­
sertion that African Christians had been transplanted into a 
radically different social sphere from that of their unconver­
ted counterparts.
The argument that African Christians had somehow out­
stripped other Africans on the ladder of social progress 
seemed to assume that there was a clear distinction between 
Christians and non-Africans. In fact the distinction was very 
blurred. Between a core of individuals who were clearly 
"Christian" in the formal sense and the unconverted masses, 
there was a grey area of "converts" whose commitment was not 
at all clear. Was a "Christian" anyone who had enrolled with 
a church, a catechumen or only someone who had been baptised? 
More importantly, however, whatever formal criterion was used 
to define them, African Christians did not live in physical 
or social seclusion from the rest of African society. This 
was indeed one of the main obstacles in the work of Christian
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missions. Formal conversion to Christianity did not usually 
mean a rejection of African modes of life. This was shown 
time and again particularly in marriage matters. The prac­
tice of fulfilling customary-law requirements before solem­
nising marriage in church was not necessitated by the terms 
of the 1923 Ordinance. This happened even in relation to 
marriages under the Marriage Ordinance. The concept of mar­
riage for the Africans was still grounded in African tradi­
tions, rather than in the formal teachings of the missions. 
Even for African Christians, marriage was not just a set of 
a few formalised rules regulating the relationship of one man 
and one woman. It was a whole series of relationships with­
out which the mere celebration of marriage in church or before 
a civil registrar would have made little sense to most Afri­
cans. Christianity merely added a new dimension to the rela­
tionships of the people involved, it was not a substitute for 
the traditional networks of relationships.
Christianity did not have such a total transforming ef­
fect on individual Africans as the missionaries claimed it 
had, or hoped it would have. The emerging elite forged by 
missionary teaching still had its roots in African traditions. 
On the other hand, the impact of missionary activities was 
more extensive than the missionaries seemed to realise. The 
argument of the missions under discussion conveys the wrong 
impression that the rest of African society was insulated 
from the forces .of social change of which forces the very ac­
tivities of the missions constituted a main ingredient .,
Even in terms of specific missionary teachings on marriage,
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the impact was not confined to a select group who had formally 
declared their allegiance to Christianity, The values embed­
ded in Christian teachings constituted one basis for critical 
self-evaluation on the part of African authorities and Afri­
can communities in general and in the development of custom­
ary law.
Admittedly, there was some ambivalence in the status and 
activities of African Christians. They were, in a sense, 
children of two worlds - the new world of European culture 
and the old world of African traditions. With the advent of 
European colonialism and European culture, on the other hand, 
all Africans in a sense became children of two worlds. The 
special position which seems to attach to African Christians 
was to an important extent merely symbolic of a wider duality. 
On the whole, it is submitted that a rigid legal distinction 
between African Christians and the so-called heathen or pagan 
Africans would not have been fully justified.
c ) The African Viewpoint on the Position of African 
Christians
The statement of Chief Chimombo of Port Herald District,^
that "many people who ZcalledJ themselves Christians fdidj
7 7
not really understand what this /meant7", expressed a typi­
cal reaction of many Africans and officials of the administra­
tion to the proposals of the missions regarding African Chris-
73tian marriage legislation. As already noted, the range of 
people who could be regarded as "Christians" was not clearly 
defined. The phrase "African Christian" could indeed have
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included even persons who were only minimally acquainted with 
the teachings of the church. The view that many professed 
Christians were in fact ignorant of what Christian marriage 
really entailed partly underlined what has already been said, 
namely that the distinction drawn by the missions between the 
positions of Christian, and non-Christian Africans was not en­
tirely born out by factual evidence. However, this reaction 
in a way obscured another important point which was raised 
in connection with the proposals to repeal the 1923 Ordinance.
It was generally taken for granted by the missions that 
the establishment of a separate legal regime for African Chris­
tian marriages would be socially beneficial. Many Africans, 
on the other hand, questioned and rejected the idea of legally 
segregating the people on any pretext other than on the bases 
of differences already existing between the different tradi­
tional systems. The letter of the Blantyre Native Association 
to the Southern Province Commissioner, dated 15th October,
1936, contains one example of this attitude. The letter ex­
plained that two systems existed under customary law, namely 
the patrilineal and the matrilineal systems. As to the propo­
sals to establish another legal regime for Christians, the 
letter stated that:
...any change of native marriage legislation should not 
be legislated for the benefit of the Christian minority 
only, but for the benefit of all natives generally. 74
Native Authority Kaphuka and Chief Kachele in Dedza District 
were to echo this view in 1946, during discussions relating 
to the legislative proposals of 1945. With reference to the
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proposal to oust Native Authorities from jurisdiction over 
African Christian marriages, Kaphuka simply stated:
...we want all cases which come from all Africans [to] 
be tried by native courts, we do not want our people to 
be divided into two parts.75
Chief Kachele stated:
...we do not want to be divided into three parts, i.e. 
the Boma, the missions and the Native Authorities.76
As one District Commissioner observed, the proposals of 
the missions could be perceived as an "attempt to make Chris­
tian Africans into a favoured status class".^ The Africans 
were raising a fundamental objection to the creation of elit­
ist groups within their ranks. Customary law and the Native 
Courts should be there for all Africans. If in some way 
these institutions were found wanting, there was no justifi­
able basis for effecting any reforms for Christians alone.
Even those Africans who were in support of the proposed chan­
ges did not specifically endorse the idea of separate develop­
ment for African Christians. They criticised African law and 
African-based institutions in general terms and not with spe­
cific reference to Christians. Indeed, they tended to express
the hope that certain African customs could be abandoned by
7 8all Africans and not just by Christians.
The observation that many Africans who called themselves 
Christians did not really understand what it meant to be a 
Christian, tended to obscure an important point which was well 
grasped by many Africans, but which was apparently missed or 
overlooked by the missions : Marriage was not a simple matter
of legal formulae. Marriage was the matrix of complex social 
institutions and relationships. It was part and parcel of 
African social structure. Unless Christians were to abandon 
completely many other aspects of African social life, many 
matters relating to their marriages would continue to be pe­
culiarly African in character. Christians were not normally 
the urban type of people who had been completely "detribal- 
ised". They were people whose ways were still very much 
rooted in traditional social relationships. Thus, the mere 
fact that one was able to understand the meaning of "Chris­
tianity" or "Christian marriage" did not provide a sufficient 
basis for exclusion from customary law and from the Native 
Authority jurisdiction. The position taken by people like
Rev. Charles Chinula more clearly underlined this point. As
79already seen elsewhere in this study, Chinula and other 
spokesmen of independent African churches believed that 
Christianity and Christian values, however sincerely embraced 
by Africans, could only flourish on the foundations of Afri­
can customs and traditions. A faith had to be built on what 
people already had and knew. One did not have to lo^se his 
"Africaness" in order to become a Christian.
Even were it true that in fact African Christians were 
beginning to evolve along their own separate path, tradition­
alists like Chinula would have deplored such a development 
rather than seen it as a justification for the introduction of 
a special legal regime. Such a development could only serve 
to undermine traditional law and authority. Even from a gen­
eral practical viewpoint, rather than merely from the view-
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point of African traditionalists, there was no obvious social 
or administrative utility in fragmentation. It must be noted 
in this respect that the ultimate objective of the missions 
themselves was not to create divisions within the African com­
munity. They too sought the creation of a universal social 
order, namely one based on Christian values. Their methods 
and short-term objectives, however, were divisive. One of the 
ways they sought to influence social developments in Africa 
was by example. The select group of African Christians, 
though not meant to stand alone forever, would be used as an 
example, and the individual Christians as ambassadors, to the 
rest of African society.
d ) The 1923 Ordinance and Colonial Administrative Policy
The Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Ordi­
nance, 1923, was not enacted in pursuance of any specific ad-
80ministrative policy. Mainly, it was merely an aspect of 
the practical prudence of the colonial administration which 
had initially led to the "preservation" of African customs, 
subject to the "repugnancy clause". The general preservation 
of customary law as such was never seriously challenged, at 
least within the Protectorate. As to the specific question 
concerning the application of African marriage customs to Afri­
can Christians, the enactment of the 1923 Ordinance was, as 
already seen, influencedby certain beliefs as to the mental
and temperamental capabilities of Africans to understand and
81participate in European social institutions. More impor­
tantly, at the time of its enactment, the Ordinance was regar­
ded not as reflecting any firm policy, but merely as a temporary
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measure while efforts continued to find a satisfactory form­
ula.
Subsequently, however, the 1923 Ordinance came to be 
seen as providing the ideal formula for integrating the laws
of marriage into the administrative policy of indirect rule.
82Generally associated with the ideas of Lord Lugard, but more
specifically as elaborated by other British colonial adminis-
83trators such as Donald Cameron in Tanganyika, the policy of 
indirect rule was first inaugurated in Nyasaland in 1933 with 
the enactment of the Native Courts and the Native Authority 
Ordinances. Its general declared aim was "to ensure the pol­
itical development of the Africans as a steady and continuous 
84process". One aspect of the policy was the utilisation, as 
far as possible, of existing African social and political in­
stitutions. In the words of Morris:
....One of the fundamental premises upon which this 
policy rested was that customary society should, as far 
as practicable, be shielded from alien institutions and 
concepts likely to undermine it and should be controlled 
through the customary law operative in the native courts. 
To those who held these views, there was no justifica­
tion for subjecting an African, just because he became 
a Christian and had his marriage celebrated by Christian 
rites, to the English law in matters so fundamental to 
the preservation of traditional society as family rela­
tions . 85
It was in the writings of Martin Parr, once Governor of 
the Equatorial Province of the Sudan, that the legislative 
formula which was embodied in the 1923 Ordinance was first 
clearly linked to the administrative policy of indirect r u l e .  
Parr was highly critical of the approval by the British Govern­
ment in African colonies:
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...of 'practically standardized ordinances' (which ig­
nored the existing civil laws of the tribes) to regu­
late the matrimonial laws of such members of hundreds 
of African tribes as are Christians.87
Some of the ordinances were not,in principle, restricted to 
Christians. Still, it was with specific reference to Chris­
tians that the application of the ordinances to Africans were 
approved.
The case of Nyasaland was excepted by Parr, as offering
go
a different, and the more acceptable, approach. This, of • 
course, was because of the 1923 Ordinance. Before its enact­
ment, the law in Nyasaland was like that in other territories 
and as deplored by Parr. Even after 1923, the law in Nyasa­
land was not entirely exempt from Parr's criticism. The Mar­
riage Ordinance, 1902, was still available to Africans with 
the same consequences as those deplored by Parr. Neverthe­
less, there was a clear option after 1923 to solemnise mar­
riage in accordance with Christian rites without a commitment 
to alien legal consequences, for example, as regards divorce. 
Parr's criticism was, however, even more relevant in relation 
to the proposals of the missions in Nyasaland for the repeal 
of the 1923 Ordinance. The view of Martin Parr was that:
....There £was] no justification on administrative 
grounds or even on religious grounds, for selecting cer­
tain individuals who profess themselves Christians out 
of African communities and compelling them to have their 
matrimonial affairs regulated by an alien state law and 
depriving them of access to the civil law and the courts 
of the community to which they and their relatives belong. 
(N.B. The relations who are deeply concerned in marriage 
and divorce of individuals are probably not themselves 
Christians.)S9
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He noted that in England a person professing to be a Christian 
was not subjected to a law of marriage and divorce quite dif­
ferent from that which his non-Christian brother or sister is 
bound. No special reason, according to Parr, had been shown 
why a different policy was being pursued in Africa.
One possible answer to this would have been that in Eng­
land, even though there were some differences between church 
and state law on marriage, the two were basically the same in 
the sense that they reflected one and the same cultural heri­
tage. Thus there was not the same mutual incompatibility be­
tween the two as was the case in Africa between church l a w  
and customary law. In fact the view of the missions would 
have been that customary law was repugnant to Christian con­
science. Actually, acceptance of the extension of the prin­
ciple of indirect rule to the law of marriage also tended to 
involve a rejection of the ethnocentric assumptions of the 
missions that European social systems were superior to thoe 
of African societies. The argument that there was no justifi­
cation in excluding African Christians from the operation of 
their own indigenous laws also underlined the assumption that 
customary marriage law was not a "primitive relic of the bar­
baric past".90 Government officials in Nyasaland clearly re­
cognised that the repeal of the 1923 Ordinance and its replace­
ment by a law on the lines suggested by the missions would
amount to a reversal (on a limited scale) of the policy that
91had been inaugurated in 1933. The impression given by com­
ments of many district administrators, however, is that the 
main concern was not so much with ideological consistency as
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with the fact that the implementation of the proposals of the
missions would bring more work to already overburdened of- 
92ficers.
Another aspect of the policy of indirect rule received 
even greater emphasis from officials in Nyasaland in connec­
tion with the proposed repeal of the 1923 Ordinance. Indirect 
rule also implied the need for fuller consultation of African
interests and viewpoints on all important matters concerning 
93them. The general disregard for this aspect of the policy 
of indirect rule on many important matters in the administra­
tion of the country greatly contrasted with the emphasis it 
received on the issue of African Christian marriage legisla­
tion. A typical comment on the proposed Bill of 1945 was by 
a District Commissioner in Cholo /’Thyolo^ District, who stat­
ed that:
...the form and fate of this Bill should no longer rest 
on the result of argument or agreement between represen­
tatives of religious bodies, and others such as adminis­
trative officers, but that the African population them­
selves should now be allowed to comment on the Bill, and 
to decide whether it should be introduced or not, either 
in its present or amended form. I think that if they are 
not in favour of its introduction it should not be 
brought before Legco /legislative council*/ at all because 
they will not be in a position directly to contest it 
there. I therefore reiterate my ... recommendation that 
the Bill should be presented in the vernacular and 
freely distributed, so as to enable adequate considera­
tion to be given to it by the Protectorate Councils of 
chiefs, the African congress and all other Native Associ­
ations . 94
One reason for emphasising African opinion in this matter has 
already been alluded to in another chapter, namely that Afri­
can opinion was expected to confirm, rather than contradict, 
the view taken by many of the administrative officials. More
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importantly, however, it must have been clear that on a mat­
ter so intimately close to people's lives as marriage, no 
legislative measure would be successful without the consent 
of the people involved.
One point of criticism on the arguments against direct 
interference with customary marriage laws and institutions 
was that these arguments tended to ignore the fact that Afri­
can society was itself rapidly changing, under forces over 
which noone in particular had any control. The question 
whether African customs and social institutions could readily 
adapt themselves to the changing environment was never ade­
quately addressed. Would the Native Authorities be equal to 
the task of adapting customary law to the changing needs of 
the African people; or would they be so tradition-bound as 
to stultify any real development in the law? Was there not 
the danger of artificially sustaining rules or institutions 
which had all but ceased to serve any useful social function?
On the other hand, the relevant arguments were also un­
derlined by the rather naive assumption that preceding de­
cades of colonial occupation had left intact traditional Af­
rican social and political institutions. In fact, as Cu^tru- 
felli states:
....In retrospect, it is hard to justify the enthusi­
asm of those early anthropologists who, as they car­
ried out their field research came to regard African 
socieities as 'intact1, that is unaffected by European 
influence.' In fact, since 1500, well before the colon­
ial conquest, even though the European presence was 
confined to short coastal tracts, it fostered profound 
political and economic changes; slavery had either 
directly or indirectly caused the breakdown of the old 
societies : through slave trade the Western economy had
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made itself felt in the remotest areas of Africa, even 
before the tribes of the interior had met a single 
white man.95
To this must be added the social upheavals which caused the
pre-colonial mass movements of the African peoples themselves.
People with very different social systems had suddenly been
thrown together, leaving in the process systems that were
96highly eclectic.
The actual advent of colonial rule had a decisive impact. 
In many cases, traditional African authority was severely un­
dermined, if not completely destroyed, with the further con­
sequence that many social institutions were undermined as 
well. The very Native Authority courts which were being so 
staunchly "defended" had only just been introduced after 
three decades of "African justice" being dispensed directly 
by expatriate magistrates. These officials continued to 
wield much power over the development of customary law both 
in their appallate jurisdiction and in their role as advisers 
to the Native Authorities. Both in form and content tradi­
tional social institutions had been radically transformed by 
the sheer weight and pervasiveness of the European-based ad­
ministrative structure superimposed upon them.
The foregoing observations on the arguments against inter­
ference with African social institutions do not, on the other 
hand, in any way constitute a justification for the direct 
transplantations of European marriage systems, as embodied in 
the Marriage Ordinances of the colonial administration or as 
proposed by Christian missionaries into African communities.
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e ) An Alternative Theological Approach 
In concluding this chapter it may be useful to consider 
whether there could be any valid alternative approaches to 
the fundamental theological issues raised in connection with 
African marriage.
The case for rejecting the proposals of the missions 
for the introduction of a separate legal regime for African 
Christian marriages has been further underlined by the views 
of a growing number of theologians who have come to reject 
the ethnocentricism and cultural obtuseness which once char­
acterised the missionary movement in Africa. Principally, ■ 
it has come to be understood that Christianity alone does 
not create the whole social and cultural complex. In the
course of history Christianity "should take on the cultural
97flesh of one new people after another". As Father Hillman 
argues:
...the church cannot improve the moral life of a people 
by issuing decrees from the outside, by importing ready­
made ethical rules, or by importing extrinsic modifica­
tions that have been borrowed from some foreign culture, 
some profoundly different historico-cultural experi­
ence .... 98
According to this view, it is a mistake to project Christian­
ity as a distinct new set of values or rules. Christianity 
must be projected as merely serving to give a new perspective 
to old values and traditions.
Christian missions generally operated on the assumption 
that they had to destroy in order to build. The basis of 
their attitude to African customs and culture is well reflected
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in the following quotation from a statement of Hendrik Kraemer 
(1938):
....The missionary is a revolutionary and he has to be 
so, for to preach and plant Christianity means to make 
a frontal attack on the beliefs, customs, the apprehen­
sions of life and the world, and by implication ... on 
the social structure and basis of ... society.99
African social institutions were seen as obstacles and not as 
bases upon which the Christian faith could rest. What they 
did not realise was that in the process of undermining African 
traditional social institutions, they could be creating a 
vacuum in social relationships with consequences that were con­
trary to Christianity itself. Particularly in urban areas, 
the emergence of prostitution, the weakening of the marriage 
bond, and the increasing incidence of irregular unions, can 
all in varying degrees be related to the weakening or total 
disappearance of traditional forms of social control.
Some recognition by Christian missions and theologians 
that African traditions and social institutions could comple­
ment Christianity could have pointed to an altogether differ­
ent approach to the question of African Christian marriage 
law. It is indeed illuminating in this respect to cite some 
of the conclusions of the All-African Seminar on The Christian 
Home and Family Life held at Mindolo in Kitwe, Northern Rhodes­
ia, between February and April, 1963.^^ This was an ecumeni­
cal seminar and had been sponsored by the All African Church 
Conference in collaboration with the World Council of Churches. 
Some of the issues discussed concerned the questions what 
should be the attitude of the church towards customary marriage
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and whether there was any basis for combining customary mar­
riage with Christian marriage. The conclusions of the sem­
inar on these questions were, firstly, that any marriage was 
"God's Ordinance". It was asserted:
...that a union properly entered into, with full consent, 
by a man and a woman competent to marry one another, and 
publicly recognised in the society in which they live, is 
a valid marriage in its own right.101
So long as the above minimum conditions had been fulfilled, 
there was a marriage which the church should not automatically 
refuse to recognise. The fact that under customary law such a 
marriage was potentially polygynous and that under the civil 
law the marriage could be dissolved should not render the mar­
riage any less valid even in the eyes of the church. Secondly, 
it was emphasised that substance rather than form should esta­
blish whether or not a marriage was "Christian". A marriage 
should be considered to be "Christian" not necessarily because 
it was solemnised in church, but because the parties thereto 
were Christians and intended to lead Christian lives. It was 
pointed out that many of the qualities attributed by the church 
only to "church marriages" were in fact universal ideals for 
any marriage. It was observed, for example, that:
...indissolubility is natural to marriage, to all mar­
riage : it is not an extra strictness imposed by Chris­
tianity. Dissolution of marriage is regarded as an ill 
to be avoided in all human societies; and the Christians 
do no good or service either to humanity or to their 
faith by derogating from the integrity of customary or 
civil marriage - by elevating, so to speak, into a 
/"distinguishing^ mark or characteristic what is only a 
corruption due to sin.102
It would not reflect well on the church if the idea was encour­
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aged that non-Christian customary marriages were easier to
dissolve than Christian marriages. Were the Christian church
to remain true to the Ordinance of God, it had to teach the
indissolubility of all marriages, not of church marriages 
103only. There was a core of values to every marriage which
the church had a duty to promote:
....In short, our notion of a choice between customary 
marriage and marriage in church is a false one; and as 
we have argued ... the task of today is for the church 
to devise some method of integrating these two elements 
both purged of their accretions, into one.104
The other theme underlining the resolutions of the Mindolo 
seminar was that the church's duty in society was not only owed 
to its professed converts, but to society as the whole. In the 
theological language of Father Hillman: "the salvation announced 
and accomplished in Christ is not the salvation of a favoured 
elite, but of humanity Thus, it was resolved at the
Mindolo seminar that:
....The church will be in a strong position to help and 
advise /"the state on matters of African marriage legisla­
t i o n  when it shows itself to be concerned (as it ought 
to be concerned) not with Christian marriages only, but 
with all marriage : with the fundamental dignity and 
rights of men and women and families as such.106
In other words, the church should be a voice for universal 
social justice.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION : A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION 
OF AFRICAN MARRIAGE LAWS IN MALAWI
This study has surveyed various aspects of the customary laws 
of marriage and the key issues relating to the introduction 
of marriage legislation in Malawi. The broad aim of the 
discussions has been to highlight the impact on, and the im­
plications for, African marriage law and practice of the ad­
vent of British colonialism and Western European influences 
in general. This concluding chapter seeks to identify the 
main elements and themes in the evolution of African marriage 
law.
1. Colonialism, Social Change and African Marriage
It can be seen that even had European colonial authori­
ties, secular as well as missionary, left family matters to 
be determined solely by the African people themselves, the 
nature of African marriage would still have undergone signif­
icant transformation as a result of the colonial experience. 
The mere establishment of a European presence, especially 
in terms of economic activity, provoked radical change in 
African societies.
Change and adjustments in response to the stimulus of 
external forces were not, of course, a novel phenomena to 
the majority of the African peoples in the area. As de­
scribed in the introductory chapter, in the period immedi­
ately preceding the establishment of the British administra­
tion, the area had been thrown into political and social
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turmoil as slaving activities, warfare and migrations inten­
sified. These convulsive interactions had caused major chan­
ges in the life patterns of the people involved. The clash 
between patrilineal and matrilineal groups, for example, 
often resulted in major adjustments in the social practices 
of one group or the other.
It was the advent of European colonisation, however, 
which triggered off the most radical and fundamental changes, 
which are still underway even today. The growth of a market- 
orientated economy and wage labour, resulting in labour mi­
gration and urbanization, provided the main thrust for so­
cial change. Simple pastoral or agricultural communities 
began to be drawn into the industrial and commercial spheres 
of the Western world. Even in basically rural areas, an 
urban-orientated culture started to emerge as small "trading 
centres" - usually consisting of a few shops, an open-air 
"market", a grinding mill and even a school - mushroomed.
In the process, familiar patterns of life and established 
values began to be threatened. The result was often the 
spread of instability in the indigenous social systems. 
Contradictions and tensions began to characterise African 
familial structures. These structures had been inextricably 
linked to the traditional economic systems which were being 
replaced by new systems. Marriage was a key mechanism for 
the maintenance of traditional socio-economic systems. Any 
dislocation in these systems was bound to have significant 
implications for the institution of marriage itself.
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Obviously, the process of social change has never been 
uniform throughout the country. Some areas have been af­
fected more than others. Such heavily modernised places as 
Blantyre (the main commercial and industrial city) or 
Lilongwe (the capital city) are characterised by greater so­
cial stress and dislocation than the rural areas. Indeed, 
for purposes of marriage-law policy, a distinction between 
the highly urbanized areas and the rural areas might be a 
useful one. It would seem that the social structures of 
matrilineal communities have tended to be more vulnerable 
to the advance of the Western capitalist systems than those 
of patrilineal communities. Yet, it may be noted that the 
greater part of the areas occupied by matrilineal communi­
ties also coincide with areas of high colonial economic ac­
tivity. The almost-exclusively patrilineal Northern Region 
of Malawi even used to be dubbed the "Dead North", on 
account of the low level of economic development in the 
area during the colonial era.
2. The Missionary Intervention in African Marriage
It is submitted that the direct involvement of colonial 
institutions in African family matters constituted the single 
most important ingredient in the evolution of African mar­
riage law as we know it today. This is obviously true with 
respect to the development of the statutory part of African 
marriage law. There can be little doubt, however, that this 
is equally true in relation to the evolution of customary 
marriage law. In fact, it was within the sphere of custom­
ary law that the activities of colonial institutions affected 
African social relationships in a really practical way.
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Christian missionaries were the first outsiders to 
intervene directly in African marriage matters. Firstly, 
however, it must be observed that the missions played the 
most vital role of introducing literacy to the African 
communities. They provided a major catalyst to the process 
of social change in general. Secondly, the missions also 
played an active part in the formulation of existing mar­
riage legislation. This aspect of the missionary contribu­
tion is addressed later on. Presently, the point to be 
noted is that the missionaries purposely sought to impose 
an entirely new set of values and patterns of social life on 
the African people. The main ingredient of these values was 
the Christian teaching regarding marriage.
As Martin Chanock puts it, the "Christian missions in 
Central Africa saw themselves as fighting a dramatic and in­
tensely important battle on the marriage front".* The dis­
cussion of the question of monogamy in this study best il­
lustrates the context in which the missions addressed them­
selves to the question of African traditional social prac­
tices. Polygyny was not, however, the only aspect of Afri­
can marriage which the missionaries condemned. Their cen­
sure extended to many other aspects, including : the greater 
extent to which individual initiative (particularly in the 
case of women) was subordinated to the will of the kin; the 
payment of malobolo (which the missions at first construed 
as a commercial transaction); and generally what the missions 
saw as a looseness in marriage ties. In fact, the missionar­
ies had initially viewed the whole African traditional insti­
tution of marriage as totally incompatible with any kind of
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civilised society. They thus set about, in effect, to sub­
vert African traditional values and customs, in the belief 
that they were contributing to African civilisation and 
African moral and social advancement. Clearly, what the mis­
sions insisted upon as the virtues of a Christian marriage 
were in some cases merely the cultural and social traditions 
of the industrialised societies of Western Europe.
The various denominations, through their respective sys­
tems of maintaining ecclesiastical discipline, introduced 
what may indeed be characterised as another set of marriage 
"laws". Church laws of course applied only to those Afri­
cans who had been admitted to church membership and whose 
marriages had been blessed by the church. It was the posi­
tion of African Christians that became problematic with re­
gard to the actual working of the marriage laws. Marriages 
between Christians in effect came to be regulated by two 
largely incompatible codes of moral and social behaviour.
The theoretical distinction between the legal and the reli­
gious consequences of marriage involving Christian parties 
has not been an easy one to maintain. In fact such a dis­
tinction has been of little help in resolving the practical 
dilemma of the individuals concerned. Conformity to the de­
mands of church law has many times brought individual parties 
(especially women) into conflict with traditional authority. 
On the other hand, adherence to the mores of traditional com­
munities has attracted ecclesiastical Censure or even expul­
sion from the church.
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The implications of the efforts of the missions to in­
troduce new values and ideas regarding marital relationships 
must, however, also be viewed in a wider context than merely 
that of African Christians. There is a sense in which the 
larger part of the African society can be said to have been 
"Christianised". In the first place, the mere presence of 
missionary stations in the midst of African communities 
tended to alter the balance of power, especially in favour 
of the traditionally subordinate sections, the women and 
the young. This had some effect on the way people began to 
conceive their social relationships. Secondly, the Chris­
tian message attacking African traditional customs was heard 
by an audience which extended beyond the formal or official 
church congregations. Many other Africans were aware of 
what the missions were teaching. It was simply a question 
of refusing to respond positively to the Christian message. 
African^ themselves did not live in isolation, but remained 
within their established African communities, living along­
side their relatives who did not necessarily adopt Christi­
anity. The marriages and marriage problems of African Chris­
tians were not simply a matter between themselves and the 
missions. Other people, including those outside the church, 
would also be involved. Thus, even the "outsiders" were 
daily exposed to the views of the missions on the question 
of marriage.
The mere knowledge of what the missionaries considered 
as the ideal form of marriage was bound to have an effect on 
the way Africans would view their own traditions. In varying
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degrees, many of the views advocated by the missions came to 
be accepted as part of African marriage practices. The teach­
ings of the missions, of course, have constituted only one 
of the many factors that have contributed to the changes in 
the social attitudes of the African people. Thus, the gener­
al trends in customary marriage law on such matters as the 
age of marriage, the consent of the parties, widow inheri­
tance, polygyny, and divorce owe as much to the teachings of 
the missions as to the growth of new economic systems and to 
the involvement of colonial officials in African marriage 
disputes. On the other hand, there are still many features 
of African marriage which are fundamentally at variance 
with Western European Christian doctrines. On the whole, 
what have tended to emerge are African communities with 
highly ambivalent characteristics, reflecting the dual and 
basically contradictory heritage of the people.
3. Colonialism and the Development of Customary Law
There can be no doubt that the intervention of the Bri­
tish colonial officials in African family affairs was the 
most important factor in the development of existing custom­
ary marriage law. In fact, the intervention of British colo­
nialism was a crucial factor in the development of customary 
law in general. The significance of the British interven­
tion may be underlined by contrasting some features of tradi­
tional law with those of contemporary law. Of course, it is 
impossible at the present day to ascertain the precise nature 
of the social systems of pre-colonial African communities. 
However, as Professor Read observes (with respect to East 
Africa), "some features of the old traditional laws may be
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beyond question". Read mentions the following as one of 
such features:
Clearly the realm of law was not articulated, defined, 
or formalized: it was an element of social life inex­
tricably entwined in the religious, political, social 
and moral structures of traditional societies.4
There was nothing which was specifically a "system of law".^ 
Law was based and existed in the day-to-day community inter­
actions. Indeed, under some schools of jurisprudence (now 
widely rejected in favour of more encompassing analyses) the 
term "law" would even be inappropriate to describe the tra­
ditional processes of social regulation or control.^
It is obvious that the kind of customary law which the 
courts have been applying, or indeed the kind of marriage 
law whose main aspects have been examined in Part I of this 
study, is hardly a mirror of the traditional law. Natural­
ly, the British authorities could not administer customary 
law in its undifferentiated form, as part of general commun­
ity interaction. It was not possible for the British auth­
orities to be involved in the processes of social regulation 
without at the same time fundamentally altering the nature 
of those processes. They had to resort to an "articulated, 
defined, or formalized" law. The ideological rationale for 
such intervention and for the choice of customary law rather 
than any other body of law is a matter that may be postponed 
for reference later. What is more relevant presently is 
that the institutional framework fostered under the colonial 
regime led to the emergence of a customary law whose essence 
lay in the existence of a definable body of rules.
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The "customary law" applied by the courts during and 
after the colonial period is something of a conceptual con­
struct. In the words of Bennett, "rules which were origin­
ally the product of a community-based interaction have been 
abstracted from their social setting and applied in new con­
texts and new ways".^
Some observers have gone further and maintained that 
customary law was peculiarly a product of the colonial 
period, something which had no real link with the structures 
and institutions of pre-colonial communities. Martin 
Chanock, for example, argues that "customary law" (in what' 
is now Malawi and Zambia) emerged through the very processes 
of the interaction of British colonial institutions, con­
cepts and strategies with African communities caught in
Q
novel social and economic circumstances. According to this 
thesis, what had happened was not that customary law had 
survived in spite of the major transformations wrought 
through European penetration, but that customary law had 
emerged because of the very transformations that were taking 
place. The customary law that was recognised and applied in 
the courts was, according to the argument, a new "invention" 
used as an instrument of power in the hands of both the colo­
nial authorities and the Africans themselves.
In Chanock's own words:
The law was a cutting edge of colonialism, an instru­
ment of the power of an alien state and part of the 
process of coercion. And it also came to be a new way 
and a weapon within African communities which were 
undergoing basic economic changes, many of which were 
interpreted and fought over by those involved in moral 
terms. The customary law, far from being a survival,
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was created by these changes and conflicts. It cannot 
be understood outside of the impact of the new economy 
on African communities. Nor can it be understood out­
side the peculiar institutional setting in which its 
creation takes place.9
Put very briefly, one central point in Chanock's argu­
ment is that, at the time of the intervention of the colonial 
regime, the various aspects of customary law were "matters of 
the most intense conflict". His view of the half century 
which immediately preceded the advent of European rule is 
that it had been characterised by drastic changes within 
which very little by way of systems of such institutions as 
marriage, "law" etc. could be regarded as having been estab­
lished. Thus, according to this view, African evidence 
about customary law must not be taken at face value, as de­
scriptions of historical fact. Such evidence was more about 
the circumstances and changes the Africans were facing and 
about how they sought to cope with them. Statements about 
custom were "competitive" rather than "descriptive"; they 
were arguments for a particular kind of social order.
There can be little doubt that the extent to which 
"long-standing indigenous institutions had been there in the 
first place and then survived"^ has sometimes been greatly 
exaggerated. The discussions of customary marriage law car­
ried out in Part I of this study offer many examples of how 
"customary law" had started to change in both content and 
form as a result of colonial intervention. However, Chanock 
goes beyond asserting that the law had changed in content 
and form; the claim he makes is that the whole phenomena of 
customary law had emerged as part of the colonial process.
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The argument is rather difficult to sustain. It is difficult 
to see how "customary law" could have commanded so much au­
thority and acceptance among the African people if it was 
merely a new creation. As Simon Roberts observes:
The very strength of customary law, the source of its 
supposedly coercive power, lies in the links it can 
claim with a past, established, approved state of af­
fairs. Foreign novelties do not lay claim through ex­
isting commitments; yet that is what custom does if it 
does anything.11
The possibility that both the colonial and the African au­
thorities utilised "customary law" for certain coercive pur­
poses cannot be ruled out. To go further and argue that 
"customary law" had in fact been "invented" specifically for 
such purposes, however, seems to be stretching the point and 
the evidence rather too far. Any possible use of "customary 
law" for coercive ends would be a question more of exploit­
ing already-existing social institutions. In the process, of 
course, the nature of these institutions would undergo a 
radical transformation.
There is an extent to which traditional customs (if not
"customary laws"), with all their implications of "continui-
12ty, cultural identity and orderly existence" must have 
been established before the colonial era. The various groups 
of people, later to be identified with the different "shades" 
of customary law, were not entirely creations of the colonial 
era. True, there had been a great deal of migrations, inva­
sions and mingling of people. Still, in many cases, a measure 
of group identity had been maintained to a sufficient degree 
as to allow, for example, the continued existence of linguistic
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divisions. If different languages or dialects could be main 
tained, so too could other cultural identifications such as 
the modes of social relationships. The division between the 
matrilineal and patrilinal communities seems to underline 
this.
What must be beyond doubt is that the intervention of 
the colonial institutions greatly altered the nature of 
"customary law". Firstly, the law became more abstract; it 
came to be associated more with the courts than with the ac­
tual interactions within the communities. To all intents 
and purposes, the courts became the ultimate authority for 
customary law. This point is not always readily appreciated 
as can perhaps be seen, for example, whenever the question 
of codifying customary law is mooted. A familiar argument 
against codification is that such codification would fossi­
lize, destroy the adaptive character of, the law. The as­
sumption is that customary law continues to operate within 
a basically traditional context where any changes within 
the law would occur simultaneously with changes in actual 
social practice. In such a context there could be no ques­
tion of a lag between law and social change, because the 
two phenomena would be a manifestation of one and the same 
process. Codification in this case could seem to render 
the law less adaptive. Yet it can be seen that it is not 
so much the fact that the law has been committed to writing 
which makes it less* adaptive to new circumstances. What 
makes the law less adaptive is the fact that it has been 
abstracted from its social context. Thus, even without ac­
tual codification, once the law assumes an existence of its
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own, independent of the social context, it becomes less re­
sponsive to social change. The reverse is also true; so­
cial practice may lag behind the norms or standards imposed 
from the outside. The various rules associated with the 
matrilineal principle, for example, have continued to be in­
sisted upon by the courts when actual social practice would 
seem to have changed significantly. On the other hand, the 
courts began to reject most customs relating to the levi- 
rate and sororate institutions at a time when such prac­
tices were still widely accepted (at least by the men).
Secondly, the law began to be conceived in more gener­
alised terms so that the numerous divisions in the systems 
of customary law became less relevant. It must be noted in 
parenthesis that the classification of "systems" of custom­
ary law in Malawi today is somewhat problematic. How 
should systems of customary law be identified?
Pre-colonial systems are likely to have been confined 
to small diverse jural communities. At the same time, it 
is unlikely that there were any clear-cut boundaries between 
these units. At present, the two most common ways of iden­
tifying systems of customary law are by traditional (or 
tribal) groupings and by district administrative areas. The 
two ways to some extent coincide, but this is not true in 
every case. Indeed, without proper care, a great deal of 
confusion can arise. Some administrative districts encom­
pass more than one distinct cultural group, while on the 
other hand, certain traditional groups are split into dif­
ferent districts.
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Ibik's Restatement provides one example of how this 
state of affairs can lead to confusion. The Restatement 
basically classifies the systems of customary law in accor­
dance with traditional groupings such as the Chewa, Nyanja, 
Yao, Tumbuka or Ngoni. Yet his "panels" of advisors would 
seem to have been organised, at least partly, along admin­
istrative district divisions. Thus, for example, in gather­
ing the evidence on Ngoni law, Ibik relies mainly on the 
panel in either Dowa, Lilongwe, Dedza, Ncheu, Blantyre, or 
(what was) Fort Manning District. In each of these districts 
there are "immigrant" Ngoni communities, but most of these 
have adopted the matrilineal customs of their host communi­
ties. Thus, when Ibik purports to describe Ngoni law, he 
ends up describing what is basically Chewa or Nyanja matri­
lineal marriage law. He refers to the patrilineal practices 
of the Ngoni of Mzimba as a "local variation". Yet it is 
the practices in Mzimba which basically represent Ngoni law, 
which is of the patrilineal type.
Another example of the problem of classifying systems
of customary law can be found in the Wills and Inheritance
Act which implicitly defines the systems of customary law
along district lines. The communities in Nsanje District,
for example, are treated as though they were all following
13patrilineal customs. Yet, the Mang'anja communities in 
the district are matrilineal. The higher courts, mostly 
the National Traditional Appeal Court, also usually iden­
tify the different laws along district lines. It is not 
possible, with the evidence available, to determine whether 
/TDistrictJ Traditional Appeal Courts ever draw any distinc-
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tions between the various communities within the districts.
At least with respect to marriage, there is no evidence 
in general of any real conflict today between the various 
systems of customary law. Many significant differences be­
tween the various systems have either disappeared or been 
suppressed. The only real distinction which the courts 
have maintained is that between matrilineal and patrilineal 
systems. Even the differences between these two systems 
have narrowed down to a few basic issues. Indeed, the dif­
ferent characteristics of each system have tended to be 
attached not so much to particular groups of people as to - 
particular types of marriage. A marriage is characterised 
either as a "lobola marriage" or a "chikamwini marriage".
In matrimonial causes, the tendency, particularly in the 
higher or urban courts, is to ask what procedure had been 
followed by the parties in contracting a particular mar­
riage and not where they come from or which group they 
belong to. In this sense, customary laws may be seen to be 
losing their character as "personal laws" and developing 
into one general pool of rules, principles and concepts - a 
kind of "local" or "indigenous" common law. Clearly, as 
communities become even more integrated, the characteristic 
features of customary marriage law will to an even greater 
extent be linked more to the legislative and judicial frame­
work within which it operates than to any particular social 
grouping.
In short, the intervention of colonial institutions can 
be seen to have started a process whereby customary law in­
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creasingly began to share the characteristics of Western 
law. This was true not only in terms of the form the law 
began to take and the mode of its administration, but also, 
and more importantly, in terms of its content. It is obvi­
ous that the character and attitudes of the courts which 
applied the law was a major determinant of the ultimate 
content of the law. At least up to 1962, when the Local 
Courts were introduced, European expatriates were the domi­
nant force even in the administration of African customary law. 
These expatriates acquired their knowledge of customary 
laws through various sources including personal observa­
tions, missionary accounts and from African assessors; some 
of the officials would later pass on their knowledge to 
others in official "notes" or memoranda, although this was 
rather rare in Nyasaland. It is also likely that some of 
the officials relied on knowledge they had acquired through 
experiences in, or from texts based on peoples of, other 
African countries. Clearly, these officials did not share 
the social outlook of the people to whom they were suppossed 
to dispense justice; they had their own notions or preju­
dices about social justice, law, marriage and even about 
African social institutions.
Yet, it is difficult at the present day to pass judge­
ment on the European expatriates, regarding their understand­
ing of African customs. It is useful to remember that much 
of the existing evidence of particular rules or concepts of 
customary law has been handed down through the writings, ob­
servations and, more importantly, the court decisions of
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these same expatriates. One of the assumptions behind the 
1969-70 reforms of the court system of Malawi, reforms 
which inaugurated the present system of Traditional Courts, 
was that European judges did not fully understand or appre­
ciate indigenous African notions of justice. It must be 
pointed out, however, that this view was influenced mainly 
by a few notorious criminal cases and not by any painstaking 
analysis of the available court records. From the numerous 
cases discussed in this study, it does not appear that the 
present Traditional Courts have added any especially "tradi­
tional" quality to the law. In the National Traditional 
Appeal Court, the tendency to incorporate English-law no­
tions into customary law is as pronounced as it was in the 
High Court, and is certainly more pronounced than it was in
the courts manned by the European District Commissioners.*^
4. The Development of Customary Marriage Law
It is evident that the major features in the evolution
of customary marriage law are rooted in the impact of colo­
nial, capitalist economic systems on traditional African so­
cieties and in the intervention of colonial judicial and 
administrative structures into African family disputes. The 
break-up of the traditional extended family and the ensuing 
emergence of the modern nuclear family; the trend towards 
individualism as opposed to the profoundly anti-individual­
istic weltanschauug of pre-colonial and pre-industrial com-
A
munities; the dislocation of traditional social hierarchy 
and all *hat this implied with respect to relationships be­
tween elderly kin and the young and between men and women 
respectively; the growing importance of interests in property;
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all these are some of the key aspects of the impact of the 
colonial economic systems on African societies.
One of the features which have been noted to have typi­
fied marriage under traditional African practice was the 
private nature of the institution. Marriage was essentially 
an inter-family social arrangement. It is hard to tell to 
what degree, in the arrangement of marriage, some conformity 
with the norms of the community was necessary. There were, 
perhaps, some normative constraints within which marriages 
would have been arranged and, obviously, some procedures 
which would habitually have been followed. Yet the inter-' 
vention of a state organ or official was not required to 
validate the marriage or its dissolution. In the final anal­
ysis, the creation and termination of marriage depended upon 
the wishes of, and agreement between, the two families.
Hence it is possible that any existing norms of the community 
did not operate as conditions for the validity of marriage 
or its dissolution. The implication of this is that marriage 
is likely to have been less a matter of rules and procedures 
than a matter of social interaction and manipulation.
The intervention of state-created courts into African 
family disputes began to alter the nature of customary mar­
riage as a private institution. This can be seen, for exam­
ple, in the powers assumed by the courts to deny legal vali­
dity to marriages entered into under certain circumstances - 
for example, where a party is under age, has not consented 
to a marriage, or where the parties fall within the prohibi­
ted degrees of consanguinity or affinity. The position is
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as though the validity of customary marriages were potential­
ly subject to state approval, through the courts. The pri­
vate nature of marriage under customary law can be seen to 
be even more dramatically undermined with the development 
and virtual domination of judicial divorce. Attitudes, both 
lay and judicial, would seem to have swung so much in favour 
of judicial divorce that the very validity of a "private" 
divorce within the lineages has become rather doubtful.
This has made customary marriage increasingly look like a 
public as opposed to a private institution.
The transition of the customary marriage from the pri­
vate to the public sphere has also involved a process where­
by legal regulation begins to replace other, kin-based and 
manipulative, processes of social control. It is with the 
intervention of the courts that the need arises for more 
articulated and formalised rules, defining the conditions 
for a valid marriage, the modes of its dissolution and the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Customary marriage was a matter between the families, 
not only in the sense that it excluded state regulation, 
but also in the way the families as corporate units tended 
to be the subjects of the marriage transaction. From the 
standpoint of the spouses themselves, marriage could thus 
be seen to have been less private a matter. The shift from 
the wider families to the individual spouses as the basis 
of the marriage contract and of marital rights and obliga­
tions can easily be detected in the decisions of the courts. 
This is another important element in the development of
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customary marriage law. It is a development which mainly 
reflects the changing patterns of economic relationships in 
African communities. However, it also reflects the direct 
imposition of European conceptions of social relationships 
by the courts.
It was not just the intervention of the colonial courts 
in African family affairs that was crucial, but also the 
fact that the relevant courts were either manned or controlled 
by British officials with their own deep-seated preconceptions 
of legal relationships and social justice. Chanock demon­
strates how initial European judgements of African "morality" 
had an important effect in Central Africa. It was such 
judgements, according to Chanock, which led to a willingness 
to intervene in African marriage.^ It is submitted that 
European judgements and attitudes as well as legal and so­
cial preconceptions were also important in the way they 
helped actually to mould African customary marriage law.
The fact that such African practices as polygyny were never 
abolished by the colonial administration may lead to an exag­
gerated view of the extent to which the traditional African 
ideas about marriage were recognised and allowed to continue. 
In fact, the European officials re-shaped African marriage 
law to a far greater extent than may readily be recognised.
Colonial officials were usually torn between two consid­
erations in their involvement in African family disputes.
On the one hand, they, correctly, perceived a correlation be­
tween social stability and the traditional authority of the 
kin over the individual, between social and moral anarchy
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and the diminishing authority of elderly kin over the young. 
On the other hand, traditional authority seemed to be gross­
ly authoritarian. The officials were thus also concerned to 
use their authority to promote individual liberty and initia­
tive .
Chanock points out, and he makes a similar point with 
regard to the missionary approach, that the officials were 
at first more concerned with the liberation of women, but 
that later the emphasis shifted to the need to check marital 
breakdown and sexual indiscipline or anarchy.^ It is sub­
mitted that the supposed concern for the liberation of women 
was in fact broader in scope, covering matters in relation 
to the liberty of the individual in general. Admittedly 
most of such matters tended to involve women : forced or 
slave marriages, the pledging of girls of tender years to 
older men, widow inheritance etc. Yet there was also con­
cern, for example, about the weak position of husbands vis- 
a-vis the wife's kin in matrilineal systems.
From the generalised pronouncements occasionally made 
by the officials, the impression may be created that British 
colonial administrations were more concerned with the pre­
servation of the traditional African social order than with 
the promotion of individual liberties. This impression 
emerges, for example, from official statements during the 
1930's in relation to allegations about forced marriages in 
British African Protectorates. A typical observation was 
made by the Governor of the Gambia, T.W. Southorn, who 
warned that:
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It should be realised that this progress /in the li­
beration of womei\7 is causing some consternation in 
a society founded for centuries on patriarchal au­
thority and having all the deep-rooted conservatism 
characteristic of an agricultural people. Adminis­
trative officers in the Protectorate/sJ are receiv­
ing with increasing frequency expressions of alarm 
from the older members of the society concerning the 
liberties being demanded and taken by their women, 
and in the present transitional stage any artificial 
interference by legislation or otherwise in order to 
hasten the change might have the most disruptive 
effects.17
Such pronouncements must, however, be weighed against 
the actual decisions of colonial magistrates when confronted 
with concrete disputes. It is useful to bear in mind that 
the officials were not usually specifically concerned with' 
the broad questions of policy in deciding cases. Still, 
underlying their judgements on a wide range of issues was a 
distinct antipathy to what was seen as an irrational author­
itarianism of the kin. "Child" and "forced" marriages were 
the earliest victims of the new ideas about personal liber­
ties. Enforced "widow inheritance" was another. In matri­
lineal societies, the right of the matrikin that the hus­
band should settle in their village began to be interpreted 
very narrowly. The initiation of divorce, its prosecution 
and consequent rights and obligations or "penalties" began 
to depend almost solely on the wishes, interests and behav­
iour of the individual spouses. In short, the notion that 
marriage was a social pact between two families began to be 
emptied of its substantive content. Of course, changes in 
African patterns of personal relationships were taking place 
independently of the courts, because of the changes in the 
social and economic circumstances. Nevertheless, it was 
the courts which provided the institutional framework within
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which the individual could challenge the dictates of the kin 
and within which changes in patterns of relationships could 
be translated into legal norms.
With respect to the alleged change in emphasis on the 
part of the colonial officials, it would seem that most 
African practices which tended to limit the freedom of the 
individual, for example, forced marriages or child mar­
riages, had been more successfully tackled by the officials 
than had been the problems of marital breakdown or sexual 
indiscipline. Cases of obvious coercion of children into 
marriages, for example, had steadily decreased within a re­
latively short time of colonial rule. Problems arising 
from marital breakdowns and sexual indiscipline, on the 
other hand, were unlikely to decrease. The very economic 
forces and influences unleashed by colonial rule tended to 
compound problems of this nature. It is thus not so much 
that there had been a shift in emphasis or ideological ori­
entation on the part of the officials as simply that one 
problem had subsided whereas the other had persisted.
It is also useful to remember that in some cases where 
the law had changed to the apparent benefit of women, it 
was the interests of the men that were really being served. 
The obligations relating to widow inheritance can be cited 
as an example of this. The refusal of a widow to be inheri­
ted created an obligation against the widow’s guardian 
towards the kin of the widow's deceased husband. The latter 
would be entitled to the return of malobolo paid by or on 
behalf of the deceased husband. The claim for the return of
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malobolo would be against the guardian of the widow and not 
the widow herself. Thus, the "freedom" which the magis­
trates often conferred on the widows was in effect the free 
dom of the widows' male guardians from the obligation to 
return malobolo.
Indeed, there is sometimes a danger in taking a male- 
versus-female perspective when dealing with questions of 
customary marriage. Customary marriage conflicts, if 
closely analysed, were not usually conflicts between men 
and women, but between men regarding rights over women.
Of course, this in itself was a comment on the weak or in-' 
ferior position of women in society.
Another important development is that the steady ero­
sion of the extended or collective nature of customary mar­
riage has also led to the tendency to conceive the rights 
over children in terms of the interests between husband and 
wife. As noted in the relevant discussions, the law on 
this matter is especially unsatisfactory and typifies the 
rather haphazard manner in which principles of customary 
marriage law have tended to be developed. In patrilineal 
systems, the unsatisfactory state of the law on the issue 
can be seen also to represent a failure by the courts to 
address the question as how best to reconcile the tradi­
tional institution of lobola and the need to strengthen 
the social position of women. With respect to both the 
matrilineal and patrilineal systems, principles which 
would have made sense in the traditional setting of strong 
extended families can have disastrous implications,
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particularly in urbanized communities. More specifically, 
while the principles applied in the courts underline a pre­
occupation with the competing rights of the parents over 
children, the obligations of either party after divorce is 
increasingly becoming the more critical issue. This arises 
from the fact that, in a money economy, children are not so 
much an asset as an economic liability. It is submitted 
that, more than any other aspect of marriage, the law re­
garding the duty of the parents to maintain their children, 
whether such children are born within or outside wedlock, 
calls for urgent reform. Society cannot afford a vague or 
ill-defined law when it comes to the welfare of children.
The study has also shown that, because of European in­
fluences, especially Christian missionary teaching, monoga­
my has tended to be viewed as the ideal form of marriage in 
many African communities. Thus, although customary mar­
riages continue to be regarded as being potentially polygyn- 
ous, the courts have tended to interpret the husband's power 
to take additional wives rather guardedly. There has been a 
movement to a position where the courts seem to reject the 
idea that a husband has an absolute right to take a second 
wife irrespective of the wishes of the first wife. Of 
course the courts have only gone to the extent of refusing 
to make adverse orders against women who divorce their hus­
bands on account of the latter's polygyny. Still, the shift 
detected in court decisions may be said to constitute an 
important feature in the development of customary marriage 
law.
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The shift may be seen as underlying judicial attempts 
to improve the social and legal position of women. Such 
attempts should, however, be considered alongside develop­
ments in other areas of the law where the courts would 
seem to re-inforce the traditionally inferior position of 
women. Claims relating to illicit sexual relations are a 
clear example of an area of the law which is strongly in­
fluenced by the notion that a woman, from her birth to her 
death, must perpetually be under the tutelage of some man. 
The right of the husband to recover compensation on account 
of the wife's adultery and the absence of a corresponding 
right on the part of the wife are examples of double stan­
dards in the law which the courts have done little to reme­
dy. Yet any possible reform on this matter must be carried 
out cautiously. The law upon which liability for illicit 
sexual relations is based is clearly geared towards the 
protection of the quasi-proprietary interests which men 
seem to have in women. However, the same law can also be 
seen as providing a crude legal framework for the protection 
of women against sexual exploitation. Perhaps the existing 
law can be adjusted so that it can function more clearly 
and more directly as a protection against the women them­
selves and not as some kind of insurance in favour of the 
male guardians.
It has also been observed that the new economic oppor­
tunities have led to the accumulation of expensive items of 
property within families. Quarrels about property within 
families are thus beginning to constitute a major part of 
family litigation. The division of expensive modern property
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marks one of the many new frontiers in customary marriage 
law. Together with many other topics (for example, the 
prevalence of marriages between people of different tradi­
tional groupings or between a Malawian and a foreign citi­
zen), the subject regarding the division of family property 
raises the question whether the law can really be left to 
develop merely through judicial application, without some 
deliberate and direct attempt at reform.
5. The Development of Colonial Marriage Legislation
It is not only under customary law that African mar­
riages may be contracted in Malawi. Like in many other 
parts of Africa, marriages between African parties can also 
be contracted in accordance with the imported English sys­
tem of law, under statute. As shown in the study, the 
principles governing statutory marriages are in many re­
spects radically different from those governing customary 
marriages. Jurisdiction is also exercised by different 
courts. Although the trend in customary law has been 
towards "Westernisation", the basic differences between the 
two types of marriages are still very much a problematic 
issue.
In this study, an attempt has been made to determine 
why the colonial administration made allowance for a dual 
system of marriage law. This has been done in the course 
of examining the history of the main legislative provisions 
on marriage. Clearly, the matter is not as straightforward 
as may seem at first sight. It has been observed in the 
study that the English system of marriage law was first
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introduced in British Central Africa Protectorate in 1902 
primarily to cater for non-African expatriates who sought 
to contract marriages locally. However, why the relevant 
law was introduced in the first place is not the only ques­
tion. The really pertinent questions are why the relevant 
authorities deemed it necessary to extend the application 
of the imported law to members of the African population, 
and why the indigenous systems of marriage law continued 
to be recognised. For if there was any compelling reason 
for the extension of the application of the new law to Afri­
cans, that same reason should have served to justify the 
eradication of the indigenous systems. The matter is even 
less straightforward when it is realised that the English 
system of marriage law was not introduced at the behest of 
the missionaries seeking the support of legal sanction in 
their crusade against traditional African marriage prac­
tices .
The present framework of the laws governing African 
marriages in Malawi did not come about as a result of any 
single, clearly-formulated policy on the part of the Bri­
tish authorities. Taken as a whole, the law represents 
different and often contradictory philosophies, ideals and 
considerations. There is a sense in which the present 
structure of the marriage laws can be said to underline a 
failure to reconcile the conflicting points of view which 
characterised the long-running discussions and arguments, 
mainly involving the local colonial officials, the offi­
cials in Whitehall and the missionaries, relating to African 
marriage legislation policy.
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A pervasive assumption among the people of the West 
involved in the "opening up" of Africa was that the areas 
they colonised were a kind of tabula rasa, a social and 
moral void, upon which the first principles of civilisa­
tion could be imprinted. African institutions, arts, cus­
toms and beliefs were viewed as belonging to a savage and 
chaotic past and did not appear worthy of any permanent 
place in the kind of society the Europeans intended to es­
tablish. It was generally assumed that the death of au­
tochthonous cultures, and their replacement by Western 
European institutions and ideas, could only be to the good 
of the colonised people. "Civilisation" or "progress" on 
the part of the African people tended to be viewed exclusive­
ly in terms of the adoption of Western European mores and 
standards. However, as to how to translate these assump­
tions into concrete policies, there were different and con­
tradictory views and approaches. Practical considerations 
also sometimes weighed against any attempt at a complete 
displacement of indigenous systems or institutions.
British colonial policy in Africa is usually contras­
ted with the French and Portuguese policies of "assimila­
tion". The latter may be said to have been more brusque in 
their dismissal of indigenous customs and institutions.
The African citizens were expected to abandon their old laws 
and adopt European laws, even in such intimate matters as 
marriage. A characteristic feature of the colonial history 
of the relevant countries is the way legislation was often 
employed to discourage African traditional practices, for 
example, polygyny. The British, on the other hand, recognised
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the practical need to work through "traditional" institu­
tions. They were also less inclined to resort to legisla­
tive measures as a means of fostering social change in 
African communities. The policy of "indirect rule", as the 
British approach came to be known, must, however, be seen 
as providing only a rough guide to British thinking when it 
comes to the question of marriage legislation in /MalawiJ. 
This study has shown that the main assumptions leading to 
the enactment of existing marriage legislation had little 
in common with the philosophy of indirect rule . In this 
respect, it is useful to recall that all the principle 
statutes on marriage had been passed before the policy of 
indirect rule was even formally introduced in the country.
It will be seen that on a continuum of approaches be­
tween one approach which fully incorporated the indirect 
rule concept and the other which completely embraced the 
assimilation concept, the assumptions underlying the enact­
ment of the British Central Africa Marriage Ordinance, 1902, 
tended to be closer to the latter end of the continuum. The 
underlying assumptions of the provisions of the Ordinance 
were assimilative in character. This was the case despite 
the fact that the Ordinance was not imposed upon the terri­
tory as part of any formulated policy to replace indigenous 
systems of marriage law.
As was noted at the end of Chapter Five, implicit in 
the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance, and in the related 
official exchanges, was the belief that, eventually, custom­
ary marriage would disappear under the weight of European
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influences. At least during the early period of colonial 
rule, there was seldom any dispute among European officials 
that the traditional African systems of marriage were in­
herently inferior and incompatible with "civilised" social 
relations. The English system of marriage was viewed as 
being intrinsically superior. It was assumed that the adop­
tion of such system of marriage by the Africans could only 
be to the latter's benefit. At least initially, there was 
no conscious policy on the part of the British administra­
tion to develop African marriage law from the existing 
African social institutions. The long-term development of 
African marriage law was not seen as a matter of improving 
on the indigenous institutions, but was viewed almost ex­
clusively in terms of the African people adopting the Euro­
pean system.
The continued recognition of indigenous marriage sys­
tems was necessitated mainly by practical, as opposed to 
any ideological or philosophical, considerations. The 
shortage of staff and other resources meant that "English 
law" could not be administered on a large scale. There was 
also some apprehension that any attempt to impose the new 
law on African communities would poison relations with the 
people. The need to consolidate British rule was more ur­
gent than any desire to promote the ideals of Western civi­
lisation. However, the main justification for the preserva­
tion of customary marriage systems was the supposed mental 
and moral backwardness of the African people. The view of 
many officials was that most Africans were still too primi­
tive to understand or appreciate European social systems
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and standards. The implication of this was that, as Afri­
cans became more "progressive", the indigenous systems of 
marriage would fade away. It can be seen therefore that 
the dualistic system of marriage law was not really intend­
ed to be a permanent feature of the law of the land. It 
was intended mainly as a stop-gap measure, necessitated by 
what were seen as temporary circumstances.
The enactment of the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) 
Registration Ordinance, 1923, constituted a significant de­
parture from some of the key assumptions underlying the pro­
visions of the Marriage Ordinance. The analysis of certain 
provisions of the 1902 Ordinance indicates, and the accom­
panying official exchanges confirm, that the architects of 
the 1902 Ordinance did not envisage any marriage of African 
Christians outside the framework of statutory law. It was 
assumed that the statutory marriage would be the only suit­
able type of marriage for African Christians. This assump­
tion was an aspect of the whole attitude towards customary 
marriage, namely, that such marriage was incompatible with 
civilised standards. Conversion to Christianity or church 
membership was assumed to confer a new, "civilised", status 
on the Africans involved. It has been shown that the resi­
dent colonial officials in British Central Africa did not 
subscribe to this view. The local officials were evidently 
not enthusiastic about the extension of the Western system 
of marriage law'to members of the indigenous population.
(Even less enthusiastic were their counterparts in the 
neighbouring territory of Northern Rhodesia where, for the
greater part of the colonial period, Africans were altogether
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excluded from the application of the imported statutory mar­
riage law.) This lack of enthusiasm, it must be emphasised, 
did not emanate from any sanguine view that the customary 
marriage was a noble institution, deserving of respect.
These officials were simply less optimistic about the social 
progress which had been made in African communities. Thus, 
they did not see the minority African Christian converts as 
being any more "civilised" than the non-Christian masses.
The officials simply did not believe that the African 
people were ready for the kind of grand "innovations" as 
those contained in the Marriage Ordinance. It was this view 
which led to the administration's endorsement of the formula 
embodied in the Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registra­
tion Ordinance, 1923. It will be recalled that this was the 
formula whereby it became possible for marriages celebrated 
in accordance with Christian rites to remain under the re­
gime of customary law.
The conflicting attitudes between the episcopal and 
non-episcopal missions towards the formula of the 1923 Ordi­
nance have been fully surveyed in the course of this study. 
It has been shown that the differences between these mis­
sions tended to narrow after the inauguration of the system 
of indirect rule, when it became clear that Native Authori­
ties would exercise jurisdiction on all customary marriages, 
including those contracted between Christians. The episco­
pal missions, particularly the UMCA, had been the most out­
spoken critics of the legal framework fostered under the 
Marriage Ordinance, 1902, and the supplementary Christian 
Native Marriage Ordinance, 1912. They had allied with the
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administration in the support for the 1923 formula. Again, 
this does not mean that the episcopal missions had a more 
liberal attitude towards customary law than the non- 
episcopal missions, who had opposed the enactment of the 
1923 Ordinance.
The attitude of the episcopal missions on the question 
of African marriage legislation was influenced mainly by 
two related factors. Firstly, and more importantly, was 
their view that marriage was primarily a religious sacra­
ment. The implication of this was that these missions tend­
ed to be less concerned about the secular or legal aspects 
of marriage. Their main concern was to minimise government 
interference with ecclesiastical regulation of marriage.
The missionaries could ignore the requirements of customary 
law with impunity. With customary law they were able to 
act as though they were operating in a legal vacuum. Things 
were different with regard to statutory marriage law. De­
viations from the requirements of the law amounted to crimi­
nal offences and exposed the missionaries involved or their 
converts to threats of prosecution and severe penalties.
The second factor was the identification of the Catholic 
and Anglican bodies with the kind of education programmes 
which sought merely to make Africans better Christians and 
better citizens, without radically altering their social, 
political and even economic environment. Statutory mar­
riage tended to carry with it the implication that the Afri­
cans affected had ceased to be part of their indigenous com­
munities, an idea often eschewed by the missionaries in
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question. It has been explained how the practical difficul­
ties of maintaining the stance taken by the episcopal mis­
sions became more apparent with the introduction of the sys­
tem of Native Authority courts and how the position of these 
missions drew closer to that of the other missions.
In contrast, the non-episcopal missions' conception of 
marriage was that it was primarily a civil contract. The 
church ceremony was intended merely to bless the marriage 
and not to convert it into a religious sacrament. Thus, 
these missions were concerned to ensure that the obliga­
tions arising from the civil contract coincided with the 
teaching of the church. In addition, the non-episcopal mis­
sions, especially the Scottish ones, espoused a broader view 
of their role in Africa. What they advocated was practical­
ly the total Westernisation of those Africans who came under 
their influence. Their desire to "create a purified Chicago 
in Central Africa" was not confined to "industrial" matters, 
but also to the social aspects of life. While admitting 
that the consequences entailed by marriage under the Marriage 
Ordinance, 1902, were too onerous, the relevant missionaries 
regarded it as a slur on their work and on the African Chris­
tians for the Government to pass legislation under which 
"Christian marriages" were accorded the same status as cus­
tomary marriages. The efforts of the missionaries to have 
the 1923 Ordinance repealed and replaced by another Ordi­
nance, the criticism which these efforts attracted, and ul­
timately the failure of the administration to reconcile the 
various conflicting views, have all been fully discussed in 
the foregoing study.
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The Native Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Or­
dinance, 1923, was a unique piece of legislation in Common­
wealth Africa. The only other country where an arrangement 
similar to the one provided for under the 1923 Ordinance of 
Nyasaland had been officially, albeit informally, approved 
was in Northern Rhodesia. However, the situation in the 
latter country was rather different because the imported 
English law did not in any case apply to Africans. The 
1923 Ordinance was seen by some commentators as a vindica­
tion of customary marriage, as an extension of the policy of 
indirect rule under which traditional social and political 
institutions came to be regarded as the preferable ones to 
the alien institutions imported from Europe. The philoso­
phy of indirect rule contrasted with earlier assumptions 
under which African social and political progress was con­
ceived exclusively in terms of the adoption of Western 
European systems. Indeed, it was on the basis of such a 
view of the 1923 Ordinance that many Africans expressed op­
position to the attempts of the missions to have the Ordi­
nance repealed.
There is little doubt that the 1923 Ordinance dove­
tailed into the structure of indirect rule when the latter 
was formally introduced in 1933. It can be seen that the 
new formula proposed by the missions would have taken Afri­
can Christians outside the jurisdiction of the Native Author­
ity courts and, on many aspects of marriage, outside the 
operation of customary law. As has been shown, the impli­
cation of the 1923 Ordinance was to preserve both the juris­
diction of the Native Authority courts and the operation of
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customary law in its entirety. However, it is also clear 
that the 1923 Ordinance was enacted on the basis of very 
different assumptions from those which informed the prin­
ciple of indirect rule. From the viewpoint of the adminis­
trative officials involved, the enactment of the Ordinance 
was more of a pejorative comment about the nature of Afri­
can Christianity than a complementary appraisal of custom­
ary marriage. The officials continued to regard marriage 
under the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, as being intrinsically 
superior to customary marriages. This latter Ordinance con­
tinued to be available to Africans and it was widely as­
sumed that the more "progressive" Africans would make use 
of it.
The historical importance of the 1923 Ordinance perhaps 
lies more in the sphere of Christian missionary theology 
than in the field of colonial administrative policy. The 
central principle of the Ordinance, the possible implica­
tion that a customary marriage could co-exist with the Chris­
tian status, could have been utilised to underline a new and 
more liberal pastoral approach towards African marriage.
The Ordinance clearly accords with the views of those theolo­
gians, like Fr. Hillman, who call for a healthier attitude 
towards indigenous African institutions and for a Christi­
anity that is shorn of the Western cultural ethnocentricism. 
It can be observed, however, that the missionaries involved 
in the formulation of marriage legislation policy were them­
selves not quite ready for any such new approach.
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It is submitted that the colonial legislative activi­
ties in the field of marriage have not had the same great 
impact on the social relationships of the African people 
in Malawi as those colonial activities which have impinged 
upon the development of customary marriage law. The whole 
process of colonial marriage legislation is open to the 
criticism of sheer irrelevancy, as far as the majority of 
the African people were concerned. The African people 
themselves were treated more as objects than as subjects 
of the controversies over the question of marriage legisla­
tion. The relevant discussions were geared more towards 
resolving the ideological differences amongst the various
groups of Europeans involved than towards the real develop­
mental issues in African marriage law. The focus on the 
narrower issue of African Christian marriages serves to 
underline the fact that the people involved were not prin­
cipally concerned with the development of African marriage 
law as such. In the whole process, there was no reference
to the actual state of customary marriage law and the prob­
lems it presented, save in vague and generalised terms.
The assumption of some legislative powers by the Native 
Authorities did not have any significant impact either on 
the marriage-law scene. The laws providing for the regis­
tration of customary marriages and divorce - the only 
noticeable legislative contribution by the Native Authori­
ties - failed to address the really urgent issues about cus­
tomary marriages in the changing society. This failure 
well reflected the parochial concerns of the Native Authori­
ties in introducing the relevant laws.
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6. Basic Current Problems of Marriage Law and the Question
of Reform
The marriage laws currently operating in Malawi are
still those which had existed during the colonial period.
It may be noted that analogous bodies of law in a number of
other African countries have come under much criticism from
the new African governments. Since the early 1960's, there
has been a movement towards the reform of the laws of mar- 
18riage. Even in Malawi, the continuing existence of the 
colonial structure of marriage law is largely a result of 
legislative inertia. The law can hardly be said to be 
working satisfactorily. The enactment of the Wills and In­
heritance Act in Malawi in 1967 underlines the general per­
ception that the bodies of family law inherited from the 
colonial period are unsuitable for modern African societies. 
What the 1967 Act has introduced in the field of succession 
are the same kind of features which governments in other 
African countries have been attempting to introduce in the 
field of marriage law. Basically, these features are the 
modernisation and unification of the laws. It is not with­
in the scope of this study, which is mainly concerned only 
with the broad aspects in the development of law, to deal 
comprehensively with the specific current problems of mar­
riage law. This is clearly a matter on which further re­
search is necessary.
Most of the practical problems of marriage law in its 
present state relate to customary law. The customary law 
of marriage is in need of a major overhaul and modernisa­
tion. Despite the transformation which has taken place,
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customary marriage law has retained many features which 
render it unsuited to the needs of the modern, complex, 
society. The law is generally fluid, uncertain and indefi­
nite. Its actual operation is characterised by many contra­
dictions and inconsistencies. The outcome of many disputes 
depend largely on the arbitrary views of the individuals 
deciding the cases. Many of the substantive rules and forms 
of customary marriage law are outdated and require modifica­
tion. The many innovations made by the courts have not been 
synchronised or properly co-ordinated. The absence of legal 
representation in the courts where customary-law disputes 
are held has also meant that relevant judicial innovations 
have been made without the benefit of considered arguments. 
Often, customary-law rules have been changed or "invented" 
without any attention being paid to the implications of 
the relevant changes on other existing principles or on 
the whole conceptual framework of the law. Thus, many of 
the rules or principles which the courts have adopted and 
applied to customary marriages can be seen to be conceptu­
ally contradictory, with some underlining the African tra­
ditional conception of marriage as a social pact between 
two families and others reflecting the Western European 
notion of marriage as a state-sanctioned contract between 
man and woman. If left to develop in this manner, the 
customary law of marriage is likely to degenerate into an 
unwieldly and chaotic body of rules.
The existing statutory marriage law has not provided 
a viable alternative to customary law. For various rea­
sons, some of which have nothing to do with the nature of
609
the law itself, only a negligible number of Africans have 
actually made use of the provisions of the Marriage [kctj. 
The law under this Act, and under the accompanying Divorce 
Act, could also be improved - the procedures for contract­
ing marriage could be simplified and the number of Marriage 
registrars increased; such unsuitable provisions as those 
which make polygyny and related conduct criminal offences 
could be modified or altogether removed; and the grounds 
and procedures for divorce could be simplified and adjusted 
to the local social environment. Indeed, with respect to 
divorce, it may be noted that the English law upon which 
the present Malawi Divorce Act was based has long since 
been changed.
It is submitted, however, that any scheme for the re­
form of marriage law in Malawi must first address the ques­
tion of devising a single system of marriage law, replacing 
the different types of marriage which now exist. The 
availability of the imported European system of marriage to 
African communities, which have their own indigenous mar­
riage laws, is potentially one of the most problematic as­
pects of marriage law in Malawi. Indeed, in those African 
countries where there have been post-colonial attempts to 
reform the laws of marriage, the unification of the laws, 
as far as this has been deemed to be possible, has consti­
tuted a vital aspect of the reform programmes.
The absence of a unified system of marriage law can be 
a source of various complications and confusion in the ad­
ministration of marriage law. All kinds of conflict may
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arise, not only as to which set of rules should be applied 
in a particular instance, but also as to which court should 
exercise jurisdiction. Even more intractable are the prob­
lems associated with the phenomenon of so-called "double 
marriage" or "combined marriage". This arises when two 
people who are already married under one type of law go 
through a second marriage under another system. It is use­
ful to highlight this problem a little bit more, because 
this would illustrate the inherent defectiveness of the 
existing structure of marriage law.
Strictly, the question of a "double marriage" can arise 
only where the customary marriage precedes the statutory 
marriage ceremony. Parties whose marriage has been valida­
ted under the provisions of the Marriage Act cannot validly 
contract a subsequent marriage under customary law, even 
with each other. Any attempt to do so is in fact a crimi­
nal offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years impris­
onment. Thus, the question of "double marriage" should 
arise only when the customary marriage precedes the statu­
tory one. It must be noted, however, that even the latter 
type of situation is not expressly provided for under the 
Marriage Act or any other statutory provision. That a 
statutory marriage may be validly contracted between parties 
who are already married under customary law is merely impli­
cit in the provision of the Act which prohibits anyone from 
contracting marriage under the Act while ...
being at the same time married in accordance with 
/customary lawj to any person other than the 
person with whom such marriage is being had.19
In practice, the volume of litigation involving prob­
lems of "double marriage" is negligible, largely owing to 
the fact that only a small number of Africans have contracted
marriage under the Marriage Act. Even in the West African
countries of Ghana and Nigeria, in relation to which coun­
tries there have been particularly heated debates on the 
20subject, the type of cases under discussion do not seem 
to have been that frequent. The interest in the subject of 
"double marriage" with respect to these countries has tend­
ed to be generated by cases where a customary marriage has
been followed by a ceremony of marriage under some foreign
21law, more often English law. The phenomenon of "double 
marriage" either in Ghana or Nigeria has thus tended to be 
discussed merely as an aspect of the endeavours to under­
stand a wider problem of private international law. How­
ever, with specific reference to Malawi, the number of Afri­
cans contracting marriage under the Marriage Act is bound to 
increase. Should the law continue in its present form, 
"double marriage" will perhaps become a more common phenome­
non in the courts. This will of course depend upon whether 
any increase in the popularity of statutory marriage is not 
at the same time accompanied by a decrease in the popular­
ity of customary marriage.
The courts have never really been able to deal with 
the phenomenon of "double marriages" satisfactorily. The 
basic problem lies in determining the legal effect of the 
subsequent statutory marriage on the prior customary mar­
riage. The Marriage Act is silent on the matter. It is
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expressly provided in the Act that nothing contained therein 
shall affect the validity of any marriage contracted in ac­
cordance with customary law "or in any manner apply to mar-
22riage so contracted". This seems to be a reference only 
to customary marriages between parties who have not also 
gone through a ceremony of marriage under the Act. The 
clause in question is therefore irrelevant insofar as the 
question of "double marriage" is concerned.
The only statutory provision which comes close to 
shedding some light on the matter is Section 11(b), at 
first of the Native Courts Ordinance, 1947, and now of the 
Traditional Courts Act. The Section has operated to ex­
clude African courts from exercising jurisdiction over
...any proceedings concerning marriage or divorce 
regulated by the Marriage Ordinance [kct] , or the 
Divorce Ordinance [kctj, unless it is a claim 
arising only in regard to bride-price or adultery 
and founded only on native law and custom.
The reference here must necessarily be to cases where the 
same parties have gone through both a customary and a 
statutory marriage. More significantly, the Section seems 
to imply that a prior customary marriage is not necessarily 
completely extinguished or obliterated by a subsequent 
statutory marriage.
One possible view of the phenomenon of "double mar­
riage" would be that the customary marriage is, for all in­
tents and purposes, superseded by the statutory marriage. 
Customary rights and obligations could thus no longer be 
enforced between the parties. Early colonial courts, at
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least in relation to analogous laws in West Africa, may
23indeed have been inclined to this view. It is submitted
that this is a view which accords with what the architects
0 /
of the relevant statutes are likely to have intended.
The subsequent history of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902,
(and the subsequent history of corresponding statutes in 
other African countries) can be seen in terms of a movement 
away from the above old approach. Section 11(b) of the 
/Native Courts OrdinanceJ can be regarded as an aspect of 
this movement. Yet it is still difficult to determine the 
exact implications of this provision.
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In G-A-B Khondiwa v. Evelyn Mtambalika (1965), Cram, 
J., cited Section 11(b) (then of the Local Courts Ordinance, 
1962) to support the view that, in the situation under 
consideration, there is a status of co-existence between the 
customary and statutory marriages. In this case the parties 
had been married under customary law for two years. Then 
they went through a ceremony of marriage at a licensed 
place of worship. The High Court found as a matter of fact 
that this subsequent ceremony was a marriage under the terms 
of the Marriage Ordinance, 1902. Later the respondent com­
menced proceedings in a Local Court, complaining that the 
appellant had in effect divorced her. What had actually 
happened was that the appellant had chased the respondent 
from the matrimonial home and had purported to marry another 
woman under customary law. The Local Court in effect agreed 
with the view that the appellant had "divorced" the respon­
dent. The former was ordered to pay £75 to the respondent 
and to build a brick house for her. He was also ordered to
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pay maintenance for the children of the marriage. On ap­
peal to the High Court, Cram, J., presiding, it was ob­
served that the lower court had no jurisdiction to dissolve 
the statutory marriage. It was also further observed that 
the husband could not effectively dissolve the customary 
marriage by a unilateral act of repudiation. His purported 
marriage to the other woman was held to be null and void.
The High Court declared that the statutory marriage 
still subsisted, "prohibiting either spouse during its sub­
sistence from contracting a second polygamous marriage".
The customary marriage was declared dissolved "by decree of 
divorce on the ground of total incompatibility". It is not 
clear whether the customary marriage was being dissolved by 
the High Court itself or whether the High Court was merely 
inferring a decree of divorce from the judgement of the 
lower court. Whatever the view of the court on this mat­
ter, on the basis of the dissolution of the customary mar­
riage, the High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal 
against the award of £75 compensation and the orders regard­
ing the house and maintenance.
The analysis of the phenomenon of "double marriage" in 
Khondiwa v. Mtambalika reflects the same view as that under­
lined by the decision in the English case of Ohuchuku v . 
Ohuchuku (1960). In this latter case, the parties, who had 
contracted a customary marriage under Nigerian law, subse­
quently contracted a monogamous marriage under English law. 
Wrangham, J., held that he could dissolve the English-law 
marriage but not the Nigerian-law marriage. The view
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fostered by these cases is that two parallel marriages are 
created between the same parties, that a decree of divorce 
granted in respect of one marriage does not dissolve the 
other. This way of viewing the situation is clearly unsat­
isfactory. The contradiction in the status of the parties, 
as being divorced and married at one and the same time, is 
inherently problematical. In a case like Khondiwa v .
Mtambalika - what would happen if it has been decided to 
dissolve the statutory marriage? Could the High Court make 
further, or even different, orders as regards maintenance, 
custody of children etc.? Could it be a ground for divorce 
if, after the dissolution of the customary marriage, the 
wife stayed away in the house built for her by the husband 
in pursuance of the previous court order?
In fact, Cram, J., was not altogether consistent in 
Khondiwa v. Mtambalika. When considering the question 
whether the parties could validly have contracted a second 
marriage, he observed that the 1902 Ordinance had provided 
for the "conversion of a customary marriage into a monoga­
mous one". If what the statutory ceremony does is to con­
vert the nature of the pre-existing customary marriage, 
then really there can only be one marriage, rather than two.
The view that the statutory marriage converts the cus­
tomary one may not easily be reconciled with Section 11(b) 
of the /Native Courts Ordinance^. If the customary mar­
riage is converted, then there cannot possibly be any ques­
tion of a claim arising "in regard to bride-price or adul­
tery and founded on native law and custom". To say, without
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qualification, that a customary marriage is converted into 
a monogamous statutory one amounts to saying that the sub­
sequent statutory marriage ceremony obliterates the custom­
ary marriage altogether. While this view represents what 
might well have been the original intention of the archi­
tects of the Marriage Ordinance, it has become less accep­
table ideologically. A better understanding of a customary 
marriage, in its ideal form, is that it is not just an 
agreement between two people, but a social pact between two 
families which entails complex structural rearrangements.
In the social context of most African people, the unilateral 
act of the spouses (of entering into a statutory marriage 
contract) should not readily be interpreted as an attempt 
to jettison the complex relationships arising from the cus­
tomary marriage contract. This is unlikely to be the in­
tention of the parties. People who subsequently contract 
statutory monogamous marriages do so to build upon, and not 
to destroy, pre-existing customary arrangements.
It is perhaps more accurate to view the situation of 
’’double marriage" in terms of the fusion of the two mar­
riages into one, hybrid, marriage. Clearly customary law 
cannot operate to defeat the express prescriptions of the 
Marriage Act. With respect, Khondiwa v. Mtambalika must be 
regarded as unsatisfactory insofar as it suggests that two 
different types of decrees, one under customary law and the 
other under the Divorce Act, are required to dissolve a
o c
"double marriage". The status of the parties, as a mar­
ried couple, should be capable of dissolution only by a 
decree of the High Court under the Divorce Act. Similarly,
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a husband cannot invoke customary law to take a second wife, 
and this was underlined by Khondiwa v. Mtambalika itself. 
Before 1967, the Marriage Act also expressly provided for 
the devolution of intestate property on the death of Afri­
cans married under its provisions. Customary law was thus 
excluded from matters of succession. Even today, succes­
sion upon the death of those married under the Marriage 
Act is governed by different provisions of the Wills and 
Inheritance Act from those applicable to people whose mar­
riages are governed solely by customary law.
The really difficult question is which law should 
apply on matters which have not been expressly provided for 
in the Marriage Act. It must be noted that this question 
is not confined to the situation of "double marriage". It 
can also arise with respect to Africans who contract mar­
riage solely under the Marriage Act, since customary law is 
primarily regarded as the personal law for Africans. It is 
not within the scope of this study to go into this matter 
in much detail. The leading Malawian case on the subject 
is Kamcaca v. Nkhota, decided by Bolt, J., in 1968.
The question in this case was which law should apply 
to decide who should be given guardianship of children, be­
tween the petitioner, Grace Kamcaca, and the relatives of 
her deceased husband, the respondents. Grace Kamcaca and 
her deceased husband, Milton Kamcaca, had met in Southern 
Rhodesia. Sometime in 1962, they began to live together 
as husband and wife, following what seemed to be a ceremony 
of marriage under Southern Rhodesian customary law. In
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1964, the parties entered into another marriage under the
Malawi Marriage Ordinance, 1902. The first ceremony did
not constitute a valid customary marriage as it had not
been registered in accordance with the requirements of the
27Rhodesian Native Marriages Act, 1950. However, although 
there was no valid marriage in terms of this Act, it was 
held that there was a "customary union" which, for the
purposes of customary law regarding guardianship, would be
28regarded as a valid marriage. The marriage ceremony of 
1964 was held to constitute a valid marriage under the 
Marriage Ordinance, 1902. The specific question before 
the court was whether Rhodesian (Ndebele) customary law or 
English law should apply to determine the issue of guardi­
anship .
Eolt, J., applied Rhodesian customary law and ordered
the respondents to deliver the children they had been hold-
29ing to the petitioner. There was no doubt on the part 
of the court that a subsequent marriage under the provi­
sions of the Marriage Ordinance brought about a change in 
the status of the parties. It was noted in particular 
that such marriage would change the law regarding the dis­
tribution of intestate property. It vrould also affect the 
status of the parties regarding divorce, for example,
"they /would7 longer be able to obtain divorce on 
grounds recognized by ... customary law". However, it 
was held that such change in status did not affect the law 
regarding guardianship. Bolt, J., was of the view that 
the maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius (the express
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mention of one thing is the exclusion of another) applied 
in this matter. Thus, it was held in effect that where 
Africans subject to customary law contract marriage under 
statutory law, customary law would still apply except on 
those matters which have been expressly provided for under 
the statute and except on matters where the customary law 
was repugnant to natural justice or morality.
The decision in Kamcaca v. Nkhota can hardly be said
to be a satisfactory one. At the same time, however, it
is unlikely whether there could be any satisfactory answer
to the relevant problem. In a note on the case, Franz Von’
Benda-Beckmannargues that English law ought to have been
30applied to the dispute in Kamcaca v. Nkhota. One of the 
points he raises is that the relationship between parties 
married under the Marriage Ordinance and their children 
would be governed by English law during the marriage and 
after divorce. It is thus difficult to see why a different 
law should be applied after the death of one spouse. Al­
though Benda-Beckmannconvincingly demonstrates the diffi­
culties of accepting a contrary view, his observation that 
English law would apply during the marriage and after di­
vorce is still in the nature of an ipse dixit. There is 
no clear authority one way or the other.
Nevertheless, Bolt's application of the maxim expressio 
unius, exclusio alterius in the case would seem to place a 
totally unwarranted restriction on the application of English 
law to people married under the Marriage Ordinance. The ap­
proach would reduce the marriage into a mere series of
statutory conditions operating within the substratum of 
customary law. The Marriage Ordinance was introduced with 
the clear aim of providing a whole new system of marriage 
relationships. The Ordinance was not introduced simply to 
provide a limited number of terms and conditions for people 
who contract marriage under it. Admittedly, Africans who 
contract statutory marriage may do so because they desire 
to be bound by certain specific legal consequences entailed 
by such marriage. Yet, the mere intentions of the parties 
cannot in themselves serve as a basis for determining the 
legal implications of a statute of such general nature as 
the Marriage Ordinance. The approach fostered by Bolt, J., 
in Kamcaca v. Nkhota cannot also easily be reconciled with 
Section 11(b) of the /Native Courts Ordinance^. Indeed, 
the maxim in question could more appropriately be invoked 
to interpret Section 11(b) with the opposite result from 
that reached in Kamcaca v. Nkhota. The Section seems to 
imply that the only aspects of customary marriage which 
survive a subsequent statutory marriage are those about 
claims relating to "bride price" and adultery. It is in­
teresting that these are aspects of marriage for which 
there are no rival principles either under the Marriage Act 
or under the English common law. This may point to yet 
another way of resolving the problems of "double marriage". 
It can be argued that in most matters, the principles of 
English law should prevail and that customary law should be 
applied only in respect of matters about which there are no 
similar or analogous remedies to those available under cus­
tomary law.
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Even this last approach cannot altogether eliminate the 
problem of conflict between the respective principles of 
English law and customary law. For example, a court cannot 
realistically entertain a claim arising from "bride price" 
as envisaged under Section 11(b) (above) without addressing 
itself to other aspects of marriage. A claim for "bride 
price" does not arise ijri vacuo, but is related to other 
claims, especially as regards children. A determination of 
a claim in regard to "bride price" is usually linked to the 
determination of claims about children or even about the 
merits of a divorce. The question of "bride price" cannot 
realistically be relegated into a mere private contractual 
claim.
What seems to be clear here is that the problems relat­
ing to the phenomenon of so-called "double marriage" cannot 
be resolved simply by tinkering with "rules" of "internal 
conflict of laws". These are problems which call for fund­
amental policy decisions about the whole structure of mar­
riage laws. As already noted, the volume of litigation in­
volving such type of marriages is negligible. What is im­
portant, however, is that the few cases that have arisen 
do illustrate a basic flaw in the structure of the laws. 
However, even in the absence of the practical problems as­
sociated with "double marriages", there must be a fundamen­
tal objection to a system of law which furnishes one and 
the same community of people with two different and often 
contradictory standards of social and moral behaviour. If 
the social values fostered under the imported English law 
are in any way better for society in general than those
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which are embodied in customary law, then the enforcement 
of the former should not be confined to one small group of 
people who happen to contract their marriages in a certain 
way. Thus, for example, if there is anything socially 
harmful about polygyny, there can be no logical justifica­
tion to allow it among Africans who contract marriage under 
customary law and to penalise only those Africans who hap­
pen to celebrate their marriages under the Marriage Act.
It might be argued that the law as it is today gives people 
a choice between different types of arrangement - but what 
is the social utility of such a choice? It is submitted 
that one of the main purposes for the involvement of the 
law in people's marital arrangements should be to ensure 
that certain generally-recognised social standards are 
maintained. This is not to deny that there are many mat­
ters of marriage which should properly fall within the 
discretion of the people involved. However, there are also 
matters about which the law should set common standards. 
Examples include : the minimum requirements for marriage 
(for example, with respect to age, consents etc.), the 
minimum requirements for divorce, and the determination of 
the question of custody and maintenance of children upon 
divorce.
7. General Concluding Observations
It is evident that the whole evolution of the laws 
governing African marriages in Malawi must be understood 
primarily as an aspect of the processes of British coloni­
alism in the country. The main features of the law charac­
terise the uneasy meeting of varied traditions and the contra­
dictions in the moral and social concerns, not only between 
Europeans and Africans, and between the various factions of 
European officials, but also between different groups of 
Africans as the latter reacted to new social and economic 
stimuli. The development of African marriage law has not 
been a simple matter of new wine being put into old wineskins, 
with one definite result; rather it has been a question of 
different kinds of new wine being put into different kinds 
of old wineskins, with mixed results. The direction of de­
velopment in the law has been ambivalent; although, overall, 
there can be little doubt that the trend has been towards . 
"Westernisation". The greatest challenge for those who will 
undertake the task of reforming the laws of marriage will be 
that of identifying a clear philosophical base upon which 
the law should stand.
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